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ABSTRACT
This thesis attempts a reconstruction of the history of 
the pastoral tribes of northern Kenya and concentrates largely, 
though not exclusively on the Somali, the Bo ran and the Samburu 
in that order.
The thesis begins with an outline of the pre-colonial 
situation throughout the area, and then deals systematically with 
the coastal Somali down to 1909. later chapters concentrate on 
the interior - an area known after 1909 as the Northern Frontier 
District. Here considerable attention is devoted to the problems 
f acted by nomadic tribes living on both sides of an international 
frontier, having their grazing in one country and their wells in 
another. However, since the tribes themselves are the focal point 
of this study, the diplomatic background to border negotiations 
and wider issues of imperial interest are only considered in so far 
as they have some bearing on the frontier tribes.
The thesis also ‘tries to trace the impact of the Ethiopians, 
the Italians and the British in this area, and considers how far 
this affected the Somali pattern of life. The Somali reaction to 
colonial rule or to its absence, as the case may be, finally leads 
to a consideration of the central geographical area around Wajir 
and Serenli. Here the whole problem of the Somali migration westward 
is considered. The sack of Serenli in 1916 provides a fitting end 
to a period that was often turbulent and always characterised by 
an administration that was overconfident in itself.
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4PREFACE
There are two basic problems inherent in a historical 
study of the nomadic peoples of northern Kenya and southern 
Ethiopia and Somalia. Perhaps the more obvious is the difficulty 
in finding adequate source material, for this is scattered in 
small quantities over a wide area. And, although much of this 
thesis is based on material to be found in the Public Record 
Office of London, X have also made considerable use of the archives 
of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Rome and of the 
National. Archives in Nairobi. At the same time I have consulted 
a number of other sources; American Zanzibar Consular Records 
occasionally proved useful, as did certain documents in the India 
Office and Swedish Missionary correspondence from a Lutheran station 
at ICismayu. Certain papers deposited at Rhodes House were parti­
cularly valuable as were private papers lent to me by friends.
On the other hand, the political situation in the Northern 
Frontier Province of Kenya, when this thesis was being prepared, 
made it impossible for me to collect oral tradition on the spot.
This work is therefore based on material already collected and 
recorded by others, and I recognise that as a result my insight 
into the attitudes and experiences of these pastoral tribes is 
limited to a greater extent than might otherwise have been expected, 
had prolonged personal contact with the people been possible.
5The second difficulty lies in the actual reconstruction- 
of the historical past itself. The near annihilation of once 
important nineteenth century peoples in this area, such as; the 
Laikipiak Masai and the Wardai Gall a, has re suited in an atrophy 
of their traditions. Moreover, the extremely small size of 
political decision-making units amongst all these acephalous 
peoples, as well as their fragmented and small-scale social organi­
sation, poses a problem of its o n  which the source material does 
little to alleviate. These two problems taken together inevitably 
impose severe restrictions on the sort of answers one can give to 
those analytical questions that every historian is likely to ask.
This study was made possible in the first place by a grant 
from the Central Research Pund of London University for which I 
am particularly grateful, and this enabled me to travel to Kenya 
and Italy. I must thank the chief Archivist at Nairobi, Mr. N. Pedha, 
for his assistance in finding material and also the staff of the 
Colonial and Poreign Office Libraries in London who were good enough 
to allow me to make use of Confidential Prints in their possession 
as well as of official publications unobtainable elsewhere. I am 
most grateful for the permission I was given to consult the Africa 
Collection at Rhodes House, and also for access to the Library of 
the Royal Geographical Society at Rome which was extremely valuable.
I have to thank numerous individuals for their kind help, 
their advice or their criticism. I wish to express particular thanks
6to the followings Dr. Andrewejski, Professor Bennett, Dr. Richard 
Gray, Sir John Grey, Sir Yincent Glen day, Professor E. Iiaberland, 
Professor l.M.Lewis, Dr. H.G. Marcus, Sir Gerald Reece, Sir 
Richard Turnbull, and R. Tatton Brown.
Dr. Robert L. Hess provided me with the most useful in­
formation about Italian archives, and my thanks go also to Sn. 
Gazzini, the archivist at the Foreign Ministry’s archives in Rome, 
who initiated me into the oddities of a system whereby files could 
be remo'ved from the archives by private individuals for periods of 
over a year or more; to Professor Sven Rubin son who helped me to 
trace the Swedish Missionary records of Karl Cederqvist, and the 
officials of the Stadarkivet in Stockholm who facilitated the 
microfilming of this correspondence; to the National Archives 
and Record Service of the United States who made available to me 
microfilm of American records in Zanzibar.
My thanks go to Mrs. Byron de Mott who showed me some of 
Chanler’s correspondence, to J.S.S.Rowlands who lent me material 
he had written based on archival and oral research, and to A. T. Mat son 
who loaned me a copy of Talbot Smith1 s paper on the history of the 
Leroghi Plateau which used to be in the Secretariat Library in 
Nairobi but now seems to be missing,; to Dr. Paul Baxter for valuable 
information about the Boran and to Dr. P. Spencer who loaned me a 
copy of his unpublished historical material relating to the Samburu; 
to John Bromley, H.M. Consul at Asmara, for making available to me
a most treasured copy of the Mega Consulate records, and above 
all to Hugh Walker who most generously loaned a number of papers 
in his possession written by earlier administrative officials 
in the Northern Frontier Province.
Almost from the start I was helped by Dr. T.H.R.Cashmore 
whose superior knowledge of this region has been a source of 
continual benefit to me, and I owe him a special debt of gratitude 
for all those chats which have helped to sharpen some of my per­
ceptions. But above all I must thank my supervisor, Professor 
Roland Oliver, whose encouragement and guidance really made this 
work possible. X feel that I have been very lucky to have worked 
under him for three years. Finally, I must thank my wife who has 
not only endured the discomfort of a thesis but actively contributed 
towards its final form by collecting material with me and by trans­
lating all the German and Russian sources used. Without her patience 
and generosity the writing of this thesis would not have been 
possible.
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Chapter X 
THE ECOLOGICAL M D  SOCIAL SETTING
Between the highlands of southern Shoa and the northern 
limits of the Aberdare mountains there lies a belt of lowland 
savannah that opens out towards the coast. Geographically this 
is an extension of the Somali plains, though .to the north-east 
the river Juba has at times provided a rough political bounding- 
line, To the west the savannah gradually rises to a height of 
some three thousand feet aid is then brought to an abrupt end at 
lake Rudolf, only being linked to the area beyond by the Leroghi 
plateau, while the river Tana provides a convenient teminus to 
the south. The present study is confined to this area which was 
known loosely in 1900 as Juba- and Tana-1 and.
The greater part of this territory is covered by scrub bush, 
browse and desert grasses that reach only a foot or so in height.
In the more favourable areas this grass forms a complete cover; 
elsewhere it grows in tufts separated by bare patches of soil, 
stone or volcanic rock. It is also largely an area of internal 
drainage and i& characterised by an almost perpetual state of 
water scarcity. The rains are equinoctial, but they are also of 
relatively short duration, leaving long dry periods between, and 
the annual precipitation nowhere rises much above thirty inches
until the greater heights of surrounding escarpments are 
reached to the north and south. On the lower plateaux, below 
four thousand feet, the major rains of the year fall between 
March and June, A shorter and lighter season of rain occurs 
around September/October within the coastal monsoon belt, but 
elsewhere the drought is severe between July and February.'1'
Only along the littoral does the average rainfall approach 
thirty inches a year, and this area is traditionally associated 
with agriculture and cattle-raising. In other places, but 
especially to the north and west, the annual rainfall is well 
below twenty inches. In some areas, mostly to the south of the 
present Ethiopian border, it is less than five inches a year 
which makes cultivation impossible. Camels are an asset in these 
more arid districts, though there are few places where cattle are 
not also to be found. Agriculture, on the other hand, is only 
possible inland along the banks of the Juba and Tana rivers, at 
the edge of lake Rudolf, or around a few perennial wells. Agri­
cultural and riverine tribes sometimes possess small herds, though 
many live near the vector of animal typanosomiasis in order to 
gain protection from their pastoral neighbours.
There is still considerable controversy over what criteria 
should be used to distinguish herders who cultivate from
Clifford, "Notes on Jubaland", 8.J.. LXXII (1928), 436
agriculturalists who also oun stock; there is further confusion
over what constitutes a typical pastoral society* Inevitably it
is difficult to suggest a satisfactory model, since there are
probably more distinct types of pastoralism in Africa, inhabiting
a greater diversity of environment, than on Asia and the Middle 
1East combined. Yet initially it seemed adequate merely to
2
stress the mutual inter-dependence of men and animals until 
Kroeber, defining pastoralism in terms of a total symbiosis be­
tween herder and stock, also added the absence of cultivation 
as a precondition. 5 When applied to north-western Kenya, however, 
this definition would exclude the Turkana and the Karamojong, who 
both cultivate to a very limited extent but whose nomadic exist­
ence, centred almost entirely around their herds, makes it difficult
4
to fit them into any other category. More recently, the essence 
of pastoralism has been seen to lie in a dependence on livestock 
as the chief means of subsistence, irrespective of transhumance
1A.H.Jacobs, "African Pastoralism", A.Q.. XXXVIII (1965), 144ff.
This article has been of great assistance for this section.
^J.L.Myers, "Nomadism", J.R.A.I.. LXXI (l94l), 20.
^Anthropology (New York, 1948), p.277.
4Por instance J. Barton's remark that the Turkana are "extremely 
nomadic" is very typical, see: "Turkana Grammatical Notes and 
Vocabulary", B.S.O.A.S.. II pt..1 (1936).
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or cultivation.^ This is still probably an oversimplification,
and Dr, Jacobs has now introduced a more perceptive and complex
2taxonomy of pure and semi-pastoralxsm.
However, most writers about African pastoralism agree 
that this type of life represents an ecological adaptation to a 
specific generally semi-desert type of environment. This 
assumption is especially applicable to north-east Africa, where 
the symbiosis between herders and livestock, such as exists to­
day along the northern borders of Kenya, is due basically to 
sheer ecological necessity. Admittedly, it is possible to find 
many examples in Bast Africa of fairly close inter-relationships 
between economy and habitats the once agricultural Jie and Pokot
have become semi-pastoralists after moving Into less favourable
4
and drier country. On;the other hand, the formerly pastoral 
Nandi and Kipsigis have turned increasingly to cultivation after 
migrating to richer and more fertile areas. Nevertheless, the 
distinguishing feature of pastoralism in northern Kenya is the 
ecological pressure that compels the adoption of a nomadic way of
L. Krader, "The Ecology of Nomadic Pastoralism", International 
Social Science Journal, XI (1959)» 499*
2A.H.Jacobs, ibid.
3Imanishi Kinji, "Nomadism an Ecological Interpretation", 
Zinbun-Kagaku-Kenkvusyo. Silver Jubilee Issue (K^oto University, 
1954), 504.
^P. II. Gulliver, The Family Herds (London, 1955), pp. 16-20.
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life, if there is to he any chance of survival, throughout most
of this area there is no alternative to he found in cultivation,
and it ha^Ln fact heen suggested that precisely those conditions
calculated to make agriculture difficult - such as scattered
showers separated hy periods of drought - at the same time make
1
for good grazing in this region. This is very different to
the somewhat ambivalent approach of say, the Nandi and Kipsigis
to agriculture and cat tie-raising, or to the pattern of frequent
oscillations between pastoral and settled life that is also found
2so often in the north-western Sahara.
The pastoral tribes of north-east Africa have differing 
social and political structures. Before describing the organi­
sation of the tribes themselves it may therefore be useful to out­
line the salient features of their common p astoral economy. In­
evitably the life of a herder centres around his cattle, water- 
points, grazing areas and his' search to obtain all that is necessary 
for t he well-being of his stock. As a result, the movement of stock­
holders is not haphazard but tends to be cyclical and confined, in
-i
V.Rada Dyson-Hudson, ,lAn ecological study of a pastoral tribe: 
the Karamajong", The Sudan Journal of Veterinary Science and 
Animal Husbandry. II no. 2 (19 61). 178.
2A.Bernard and H. Lacroix, "Involution du Nomadism^ an Algerie",
Ann ales de Geo gran hie. XT (l906); G. Bataillon, "Introduction", 
in Nomades et Nomadisme an Sahara. Vol. XIX of Recherches sur la 
Zone Aride (UNESCO. 1965). p.98.
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the first place, to areas already well known to the group;
secondly, it would tend to conform to any regular seasonal
movements of the clan or sub-clan. Yet the freedom for members
of the same stock-owning group to move where they please, perhaps
even to undertake the care of another herd, is essential to most
methods of stock holding.
The precise choice of a grazing area for his herd is always
to some extent made by the individual stock-owner himself. It is
a question of balancing poor pasture that is close to a water-
point with the less heavily grazed areas further away, and this
requires considerable judgment. There are also other factors which
have to be taken into account, depending cn the composition of the
2herd itself ? regular salt licks must be provided for the cattle, 
and the sheep will need grass grazing, while the goats prefer 
browse. But whatever the choice, it is partly limited by the normal 
movements of the sub-clan or stock group. Moreover, in times of 
war or migration the importance of larger groups is always ac­
centuated at the expense of the individual and the stock-owner1 s 
freedom toKiact on his own initiative further restricted. All the 
same, migrations are not normally an integral part of pastoral
n
Poulton, An outline of the tribes of the Somaliland Protectorate, 
n.d. itMSS. This was very kindly lent to me by Hugh Walker.
2Saline grazing is also especially important for camels, see:
J.C.Morgan, "The Horn of Africa", Corona. IX (1957), 389. However, 
the accumulation of soluble salts in the soils of arid and semi- 
arid regions is pronounced, and so saline grazing is generally
17
life: they are only a response to political and economic pressure,
and where they occur tribal warfare is almost certain to be the 
ultimate outcome.
An important factor determining the mobility of the stock 
group is the amount of time the various herds can remain without 
water. Dry (unmilked) camels can go up to four weeks without 
drinking,while milch camels require water every five or six days. 
Cattle have to be watered at least once every three days, but pre­
ferably once every day if the drought is not too severe. Sheep 
have to be watered every other day. In the wet season, however, 
sheep, camels and goats do not have to be watered at all, which 
is an important consideration and allows them much more freedom 
of movement than cattle.
In order to give the greatest possible benefit to a mixed 
herd it is seasonally split up into two, three or more parts.,
There is always a subsistence or milch herd that follows the main 
settlement providing it with food. This will be divided into 
camel, cattle and goat sections, and grazing will be found close 
at hand. The surplus or dry herds will be similarly divided but 
driven instead to distant pastures, where they may be expected to
plentiful, see both: L. Bemsteing "Salt affected soils and 
plants11, and G. Aubert, MArid Zone Soils’1 in Proceedings of the 
Paris Symposium on the Problems of the Arid Zone (UNESCO. 1962).
1
Somali camels are noted for the length of time they can go without 
water, see: J. Drysdale, The Somali Dispute (London, 1964), 10.
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benefit from tbe better grazing. The settlement itself, with 
the old and the sick, can never be particularly mobile. Some 
fifteen miles a day is the maximum distance that it might be 
expected to move; by choosing different cattle, at different 
times, to go with the surplus herd the stock-owner can ensure 
that his animals obtain a balance of grazing, water and salt­
licks. In fact long journeys towards permanent water-holes, 
in the dry season, normally involve cattle rather than people and 
camps rather than settlements. It is obvious that, given the 
greater mobility of camels, the division between settlement and 
camp will be far more pronounced when these are part of the herd. 
This separation between stock is least accentuated during the 
rainy season and most pronounced during the period of drought.
As the dry season advances, the tendency is to draw close to 
those water-holes that have not as yet dried up. At the same time, 
the most mobile units will move outwards in search of better grazing 
until the onsent of the rains, when the tribes will disperse more 
evenly over the land.
It is also important that the size of an individual's herd 
should be well adjusted to the size of the homestead. For as the 
numbers of stock increase so do the problems of husbandry; toe 
large a herd with too few hands to manage it will inevitably lead 
to a deterioration in the quality of the stock.
19
There is no explicit ownership of grazing land in north­
east Africa, and "nomadic Ogaden and the Gall a have no system of 
land tenure and little or no system of grazing rights. It is 
merely the survival of the fittest".^* Although most areas are 
associated with a specific tribe or clan, effective occupation is 
everywhere the prerequisite for gaining access to grazing areas, 
and in the last analysis this access will be dependent on the 
ability to enforce it. Dominance of a clan in a certain area will 
also only be recognised by outsiders to the extent that it cannot 
be defied. Intruders can be expected to adopt a client relation­
ship until they have built up their strength in sufficient quantity 
to challenge their original hosts. Sometimes the obvious imbalance 
of forces will lead bneuside to abandon the area; sometimes original 
rights will be defended and fought for. Amongst the agricultural 
tribes ownership of land is of course more pronounced and may even 
extend to pasture* Thus the agricultural Gasar Gudda, on the upper 
Juba, have at times allowed pastoral Somali sub-clans, such as the
Marehan and the Aulihan, to make use of their pasture, though ap-
2
parently always in return for some quid pro quo.
^H.B.Sharpe, Memorandum, KQL EM. II (1934)> 1559* While it is generally 
agreed that there is no ownership of grazing land amongst pastoralists 
in north-east Africa, some people prefer to stress that there are 
'traditional and tribal rights to grazing*; the point is whether they 
will be recognised or not, sees Susan Brodribb-Pugh, "Background In­
formation - Northern Province", MSS., who brings this point out clearly.
I was very kindly lent a copy by Hugh Walker.
2
E.Cucinotta, "La proprieta ed il sistema contrattuale nel 1 destur1 
Somalo", R.O. (June, 192l), 245.
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However, competition between tribes and clans is centred 
far more on the right of access to wells than to grazing areas, 
since it is the proximity of water that determines the value of 
the surrounding land. Basically, there are two different types 
of water-holes: there are those that have been made by one or
two people still living, and there are wells that are natural 
or that have been constructed earlier. In certain areas, es­
pecially in the dry river beds, water can be obtained by digging 
down a few feet. Through the actual digging and maintenance of 
a water-hole, a man establishes a specific right to use it as 
he pleases and he can make any arrangement he sees fit to share 
it with some other stock-owner. Another casual user will have 
to get his permission before watering his own stock there. On 
the other hand, the original digger will not be able to refuse 
permission, once approached, for no one can claim the right of 
exclusive ownership. Once a water-hole is neglected, then it is 
up to anyone who cares to do so to start the digging again.
Amongst the Somali extended family rights are more pronounced. 
Wells that have been dug are sometimes covered and marked with the 
camel-brand belonging to the stock group, may even be surrounded 
by a thorn bush and a definite claim thus be established. At the 
wells of Afmadu, in southern Somalia, they could become the pro­
perty of families and be left to children, heirs or third parties; 
though the sub-clan as a idiole would always be allowed free access,
21
it would be possible to charge visitors for the right of drawing 
water* Such action would have been keenly resented, however, 
and it would have been contrary to the generally accepted tenet 
that water is res nullius and a free gift to all pastoralists*
But where money was paid it would have been divided within the
1 2 diva-naving group as a whole.
Large or permanent wells are otherwise never the object of
individual rights, since these depend on the personal effort that
has gone into the construction of a water-hole. These wells are
used by clans who establish a customary dominance In the region.
Where the wells are extensive and cover a wide area they are
likely to be the meeting point of different tribes or clans. Here
the rights of clans to water their herds first will be defended by
force, and this is the only arbiter that finally decides who has
prior access to a well that is disputed over. However, as Dr.
P.T.W.Baxter has pointed out, although the rules regulating water
rights amongst the Boran are very similar to those of the Somali,
in action the Boran interpret them very differently, since amongst
I i t
1
This is the basic Somali stock-owning group. See page 25 for a 
more detailed explanation of this teim.
^Zoli, Oltre Griuba (Ministero delle Colonie, 1927), p.240. This 
custom may have been restricted to the Mnhammad Zubeir Somali at 
Afmadu. It was not uncommohnih31924ubut I am not certain that it 
still exists today.
3P.T.W.Baxter, "Acceptance and Rejection of Islam among the Boran 
of the Northern Frontier District of Kenya" in Islam in Tropical 
Africa, ed. I.M.Lewis (Oxford, 1966), p.238.
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the latter force is only used against outsiders, whereas the 
Somali fight with each other.
But if the pastoralist, as an individual, has only a 
qualified right both to his pasturage and to his water, the same 
must he said about his herd. To the outsider it may well appear, 
and the stock-owner will perhaps encourage the impression, that 
his herd is entirely his own. Nevertheless, many other people 
will almost certainly have a claim to part of his stock or have 
certain rights in specific animals and even their off-spring. A 
nan1s clan or stock group will not be indifferent, therefore, to 
the deterioration in an individuals herd. Moreover, whatever 
the basis of collective justice may be, a man will generally find 
that his herd is to some extent held as surety for his own good 
behaviour and that of his associates. A man could break with his 
stock group and go and live with his wife's affines, but if he 
were to take all his stock with him, even those he had previously 
left in the care of friends, and if he were to assert his owner­
ship over them, he would turn himself into a social outcast. For 
his affines could not offer any collective security, and this 
could only be re-obtained by entering another stock group, where 
the interest of the group in one's cattle would be offset by their 
collective, backing and support.
It is partly because the security and well-being of an in­
dividual lies so obviously in his close association with others
23
that a man dare not stand on his own* The assertion of oomplete 
and absolute rights over a herd also involves the renunciation 
of any claim for protection from others. Such a course would not 
only ostracise a man from society, but it would also deprive him 
of any form of legal redress for wrongs done to his person or 
property* Because it would lead to almost certain self-destruction 
it would be most unlikely to occur; instead, the stock-owner is 
generally content to possess his herd within a social framework 
that ensures him adequate protection and yet allows others to 
make their demands on him. Paradoxically, the stock-owner can 
be ejected to encourage others to have claims on his animals or 
even to accept stock from him, since widely dispersed stock- 
friends are always the best protection available against freak 
droughts, epidemics and war. This framework of contractual liability, 
like the social control to which the pastoralist also submits, is 
an important aspect of the political and social structure of the 
tribal or clan system to which he belongs.1
The desert scrub where nomadic pastoralism is the prevailing 
economy does little to foster, and on the contrary positively 
hinders, the formation of stable territorial groups. In fact,
1
This passage has been largely based on the works of I.M.Lewis,
A Pastoral Democracy (Oxford, 196l); P. T.W. Baxter, The Social 
Organisation of the Galla of Northern Kenya, Unpublished D.Phil. 
(Lincoln College, Oxford, 1955); P. Spencer, The Samburu (London, 
1965).
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within the broad framework of pastoral husbandry, the degree 
of symbiosis between, stock-owner and herd may be expected to 
increase inversely to the size of the basic political unit.
Moreover, the population density in northern Kenya is only 1.6 
persons to the square mile,'*' so that little could anyway be ex­
pected in the foxm of political institutions, and the basic 
unit of political systems in this area is either the extended 
family or the stock group itself.
The term Segmentary* is commonly, and perhaps rather mis­
leadingly, used to describe th^olitical systems of all the 
pastoral tribes in north-east Africa, when it is intended to mean 
that these possess no centralised political authority. Unfortunately, 
a certain amount of confusion has developed through the equivocal 
use of this term, which is also used more precisely to describe
decentralised types of society where political authority is
2vested in lineage groups. In the latter sense, however, 
example that can be found in north-east Africa is amongst the 
Somali. For while the descent system of. the Galla formally re­
sembles a segmentary one, there are nevertheless important differ­
ences. In the first place, the Galla descent system is static
*1
"Population Density by Province, .District and Race", Bast African 
Economic and Statistical Bulletin.XIII (l95l), quoted by P.T.W.
Baxter (1955), 41*"
^Tohn Middleton & David Tait, Tribes Without Rulers (london, 1958)*
The title and subtitle,, 'Studies in African Segmentary Systems' 
are calculated to cause confusion, since on page three one reads 
that the book is concerned only with ”segmentary lineage systems".
theonly
and incapable of further development or fragmentation* Secondly,
the subdivisions of the clan are not in themselves the basis
1
for political alliance or conflict.
On the other hand, the social and political structure of
the Somali is based on segmentary patrilineages. There are five
main levels of segmentations the cl an-family, the clan, the sub-
2clan, the primary lineage and the diya-paying group or rer. There 
are six main clan-families (Darod, Hawiye, Mr, Digil, Isaq. and 
Rahanwein), who claim to have different eponymous ancestors, 
though only the first two are found in large numbers south of 
the river Juba. In this area the Darod are divided into three 
main clanss The Marehan, the Ogaden and the Herti, while the 
most important Hawiye clans are the Ajuran and the Mgodia."5
All segments within Somali society are based on lineage but 
the clan-family, which is the largest grouping to be found, is 
generally toot, widely dispersed to have any political significance, 
and the basic unit of the political structure is the diva-paying
V.Luling, "The Galla", Unpublished M.A. Thesis (London, 1966), 
30-31#
2
I.M.Lewis (l96l)f p.7# Elsewhere Lewis adopts other classificatory 
terms, but here it is the primary lineage that is the exogamous 
unit. Throughout this thesis 1 have used the term rer in the same 
sense as a diya-paying group, though I am aware that it can also 
be used less specifically in the sense of a lineage without any 
definite length.
3
See Appendices at the end for . genealogical tables of the Somali 
clans add sub-clans.
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1group, This consists of a joint or extended family based
on a three- or four-generation lineage. The unity of this group
is maintained and enforced by means of a contractual alliance,
in which members are pledged to support each other and to accept
collective political and legal responsibility. One of their
most important commitments, in this respect, is the payment of
blood-money and any other legal liability that may fall upon an
2individual member of the group. The full importance of the diva-
paying group lies in the fact that it is also the basic unit of
—
Somali social life. In effect, it holds each member *s wealth
in pawn, or in surety, for his g>od behaviour and for that of
his associates. The brand-marks that are used to identify camels
and cattle are c ommon to the group as a whole, since the entire
group has an interest in the herd while the individual has primary
4interests only in certain animals. Sheep and goats, however, 
are individually owned and carry particular markings for the pur­
pose of identification, yet these are animals that are without
I.M.Lewis, "Historical Aspects of Genealogies", J.A.H.. I (1962), 
38.
2E.Cucinotta, "Delitto, pena e giustizia presso i Somali del 
Benadir", R.C.. XVI anno (Jan.-Feb., 1921), 15-17.
3
M.Colucci, Princini di diritto consuetudinario della Somalia 
Xtaliana Meridionals (Florence. 1924).'50. 55-6.
4
However, the individual can certainly recognise those animals 
in which he has primary interest.
social significance and they cannot be used to pay blood-money
or a bride-price.
In common with other segmentary lineage systems there is
a lack of clear definability in the division of political groups.1
The rer represents the widest range of social and legal contractual
liability but it is also the smallest political unit to be found
within a wide range of larger agnatic groupings. In principle,
the structur^4f the largest unit is similar to that of the smallest
there is little difference between the authority of the sub-clan
chief or that of the rer headman, aad their positions are almost
2the same in the councils they preside over.
The affairs of the rer are regulated by a council (shir) 
which is composed of all adult men. A headman is elected from 
amongst the elders whose job is to regulate the internal affairs 
of the rer and also to control its relations with other similar 
groups. Within the clan or sub-clan there is generally a chiefly 
lineage from which the headman >(garad). who is sometimes called 
sultan, is chosen. Thus amongst the Aulihan the chiefly section 
is the Rer Ali; amongst the Marehan it is the Rer Parah Ugas; 
amongst the Herti it is the Iusuf Mahmud section of the Rer Osman 
Mabmud, while amongst the Muhammad Zubeir, Ogaden, it is the Rer
*1
I.M.Lewis (l96l), p*8; I.M.Lewis, "Clanship and contract in 
Northern Somaliland", Africa. XXIX no. 5 (l959)f 280ff.
^I.M.Lewis, Peonies of the Horn of Africa (London, 1955), p*96.
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1
Ugas section of the Rer Hersi. In their choice of a sub-clan 
headman the Ogaden often practice primogeniture, and most other 
clans have also at times chosen an eldest son. But, equally, 
a sub-clan or clan head may be chosen either from a specific 
family or lineage.
In political matters the sub-clan headman is responsible 
for maintaining peaceful relations amongst the segments that 
come under his jurisdiction. He acts as official arbitrator in 
all disputes for which he has responsibility, and aa his authority 
fines and penalties are imposed by the elders. On the other hand, 
he is only a -primus inter pares and cannot act on his own ini­
tiative; his political role is that of chairman rather than of 
leader.
Both the clan and the sub-clan can become the foci of 
political action, but the clan is the widest level of segmentation 
in which a corporate political grouping can be said to exist.
These wide political alliances do not command the same binding 
attachment as the rer since they do not possess its sanction and 
since, within the clan, diva-paving groups oppose one another. 
Primary loyalty, therefore, is always given to the diva-paving 
group and, in fact, wider political unity can only be achieved
1Zoli (1927), 184; c£. I.M.Lewis (1955), p.99
with difficulty and generally for short periods In the face of
1common danger or where common interests are momentarily involved.
All the Somali are Sunni Muslims of the Shafi rite, and they 
differentiate clearly between the secular and religious in terms 
of men of religion (wadad) and warriors (warenleh). Ideally 
pastoral society is divided into these two categories but in 
practice the division is often blurred# Por though the dis­
tinction between tiadad and warenleh is theoretically maintained,
both nevertheless belong to common diva-naving groups and both
2are encompassed by the same social system. Unlike many other 
Islamic societies, where Sheiks combine secular with spiritual 
authority, in Somaliland Sheiks and wadads are not normally 
involved in political activity nor are they the traditional leaders 
of clan politics. The most important function of the wadads is 
to act as mediators between hostile lineages. In Somaliland they 
exercise a religious jurisdiction only, except amongst the culti­
vating brotherhood (t aria a) communities or irjfthe small theocratic 
settlements that have grown up along the banks of the river Juba.
^Sees Leo Silbemnan, "Somali Nomads", International Social Science 
Joumal# IX no. 4 (1959)» 560. This statement is not so valid 
after 1916 when the later growth of national political parties 
in Somalia forms an important exception.
2I.M.Lewis, "Conformity and contrast in Somali Islam", in Islam 
in Tronical Africa, ed. I.M.Lewis (Oxford, 1966), 263.
^I.M.Lewis, "Modern Political Movements in Somaliland", Africa. 
XXVTII no. 3 (1958), 249; I.M.Lewis (l96l), 213.
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Though Islam does not in theory approve of strong clan
loyalties, in fact the Somali put membership of the clan before
that of the religious fraternity. As I.M.Lewis has pointed out,
amongst acephalous societies such as the Somali, and 
especially those -with a strong delineated clan and 
lineage organisation, there has been a tendency to 
adopt the minimal criteria of Muslim identity - the 
five pillars of the faith - while rejecting or dis­
regarding many of the more detailed prescriptions of 
Islamic law.1
The Somali pastoralist, then, tends to ignore the shariah law
in so far as it conflicts with the principles of his social and
political way of life. Thus compensation (diva) for murder is
always paid by the group, though the Koran stipulates that the
2individual alone should be responsible.
At the same time, religion can be used for political ends.
The Sufi brotherhoods (tariqa) have at times been the vehicle 
for mounting important political movements. Although the lineages 
and diya-paying groups have a larger hold on a man than the 
tariqa itself, nevertheless the Sufi orders provide the Somali 
with a new principle of association, and one that often conflicts 
with his position in the clan. Kor it is quite possible for the 
genealogy of the brotherhood, the chain of saints (silsilad al- 
baraka), to come into conflict with an individual's clan genealogy,
1
I.M.Lewis, ” Introduction", in Islam in Tropical Africa, ed.
I.M.Lewis (Oxford, 1966), 34-5.
2J.N.Anderson, Islamic Law in Africa (H.M.S.O., 1945), pp* 19,
45, 57.
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and the former may well represent religious obligations that 
are opposed to the political demands of the diya-paying group* 
Politically, the potential importance of any group that transcends 
the fissiparous nature of rer loyalties must be obvious, but 
while membership of the tariqa unites people from different clans 
and lineages, it can never generate a strong enough allegiance 
to overcome the conflicting pressures of opposing rer. Thus, 
whenever the silsilad al-baraka comes into conflict with the de­
mands of the diva-naving group, it is always the latter that
i
ultimately determine an individuals action*
While the Somali also esteem living sherifs for the strength
of their bar aka (charisma) and their power to transmit miraculous
gifts (karamat), the l&tter generally have far less political in-
2fluence than the heads of brotherhoods* Frequently the descend­
ants of saints form lineages of holy men believed to inherit the 
bar aka of their ancestor, which belief they exploit to the full. 
These lineages, depending on their size, form into iSlans or sub­
clans and are organised on the basis of di.va~paying groups. In 
Jubaland the Sheildi Al, who probably came originally from Arabia 
and who have a strong reputation for holiness, have lived intea>* 
spersed amongst the Darod and Hawiye as mullahs since 1882. Before
1I.M.Lewis (1961), 98-9, 129, 223.
S. Trimingham, Islam in East Africa (Oxford, 1964), 94.
that they had lived for some time amongst the Tunni, to the 
north of the river Juba, and only left after intervening in an 
internecine struggle between two rer, as a result of which the
i
Tunni expelled them, They were a pastoral group particularly
addicted to caravan trading, and at the beginning of the 20th
%century they acquired a reputation for gun-running.
The actual process of Somali migration has also to some 
extent affected the structure of Somali society, especially that 
of the southernmost Somali in Jubaland. The usual method of Darod 
and Hawiye penetration into a new area was to adopt a client 
relationship (arifa or shegat) with the people already there, 
and then slowly to consolidate their numbers until they had 
achieved parity with or even superiority over the original in­
habitants. The close connection in Somali thought between poli­
tical power and numerical supremacy has always made the size 
of the diya-paying group, linage and sub-clan extremely important. 
But to the south of the river Juba, where the Somali had first to 
co-exist with the Bo ran and Wardai Gall a and then to accommodate 
unpredictable numbers of new arrivals (galti ), it was a matter 
of crucial concern. For, in such fluid conditions, the material
M.B.Bertazzi, Goscia, n.d. ASMAI. Posiz. 17l/l 1-5* See page
^T.S.Thomas. Jubaland and the Northern Frontier District Handbook 
(Nairobi, 1917),p.17; Zoli (1927), 262, 273; I.M.Lewis (l955), 
146; "Notes on Wajir's political background and Somali tribal 
organisation", anon. n.d. MSS. A copy of this was kindly lent 
to me by A.E.Walker.
prosperity of lineage groups normally depended on their success
in becoming the allies or clients of stronger segments, thus
acquiring access to wells and grazing areas. And while no
established segment would be adverse to increasing its numbers
and power, there was a natural bias to assimilate as many new
1arrivals as possible.
Amongst the Herti and, to some extent, amongst the Ogaden 
it became possible not merely to become the client of a strong 
sub-clan but even to become an integral part of it. In this way, 
there developed in the south an element of genealogical relativity 
unknown In the north, so that the lineage system of the southern­
most Darod was able to accommodate clients to the extent that 
they achieved full genealogical identification at the diya-paying 
level. At the same time, the rer in Jtibaland also had an aggregate 
complexion since it was generally composed of the first segments 
to have crossed the river Juba (guri), later arrivals from the 
same diya-naying group (galti). as well as clients from other
lineages (shegat) who only achieved a partial identificatL on with
2the patron group.
The southernmost Darod and Hawiye also adopted the age-set 
system, of the Galla. According to E. Cerulli, this was not the 
result-of any direct contact with the Galla themselves but, instead
^"Notes on Wajir's Political Background and Somali tribal 
Organisation11, n.d. anon, pp. 3-4.
2C. Zoli (1927), 178.
of their close relationship with the Rahanwein. for the Darod 
only appear to have adopted the system after they had moved
1into Rahanwein territory at the beginning of the 19th century.
The Rahanwein, on the other hand, seem to have been in much longer 
contact with the Galla, and it is reasonable to suppose that their 
knowl edge of Galla fighting techniques would have been shared with 
their Darod clients, one of whose obligations would have been to 
fight with their hosts.
Age-sets consisted of groups of Somali youths of a similar 
age, organised on a clan basis. Amongst the Darod there were two 
chiefs of age-sets with equal powers; one chosen from the Herti 
clan, the other frcm the Ogaden. Every eight years the set wrnld 
move to a new grade, and another set would be fonned of the 
youngest male adults. New sets were given derogatory names that 
could only be effaced with an act of valour on the part of the 
set as a whole, and the formation of a set was consequently a 
time when fighting and looting were most likely to occur. The 
leader of the second-lowest grade would nominate the leader of 
the set that was about to be formed, and within sub-clans the set 
would fragment into 1 hundreds1, each of which would have a leader
PL
who would in tuna Ijy' subject to one of the two age-set leaders of
1E. Cerulli, "Tradiaioni storiche e monument! della Kigiurtina", 
Africa I tali an a. IV (1925), 156.
the clan-family."**
The fundamental purpose of the age-set system was to
organise m  effective military machine, bringing together the
fighting men of the clan more efficiently than the segmentary
system of the Somali normally allowed. But it is not clear to
what extent this made a political impact, though it is thought
that the leaders of 'hundreds1 challenged the authority of the
sub-clan chiefs. Also the head of the rer had to be chosen from
tie senior set of the laf gebis (bone-breakers), the age-sets
2
that had been initiated. At the same time there is no evidence 
that the Somali ever allowed the age-set system to take the place 
of, or even to compete with, the contractual function of the diya- 
paying group.
Functionally, age-sets were the same for both the Grail a
and the Somali, and the only difference was that amongst the former
they were subordinated to descent sets. However, both Cerulli and
Zoli were wrong to suggest that the southern Somali had adopted
the gada system of the Galla, end they were equally mistaken in
3
identifying the gada as an age-set system. For though in the
Salkeld, "Notes on Somali tribal organisation in Jubaland",
Bast African Quarterly. II no. 8 (1905), 548; Salkeld, Notes on 
the Province of Jubaland, 1908, PC/nFD/4/^A*
2Ibid.. p.548. See also I.M.Lewis (1955), 106; Zoli (1927), 189ff.
E.Oerulli, "Tradizioni storiche e monumenti della Migiurtina" in 
Somalia; scritti vari editi ed inediti (Roma, 1957), I* p*73;
Zoli (1927), 192.
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distant past the gada may have been initially constructed as age- 
sets, they soon developed into fossilised descent sets with poli­
tical and ritualistic significance only. The Gall a military or­
ganisation was indeed based on age-sets, but these were known as 
harlve and had little or no political significance.
It could be maintained, in fact, that the absence of descent 
sets amongst the Somali is the most important single characteristic 
that distinguishes them from their Boran Galla neighbours. Amongst 
the Boran it is from the horizontal divisions, which are based on 
the luba or gada system, that the political structure of the claa 
is formed, while the vertical divisions of descent lineages provide 
the social framework. Amongst the Somali, on the other hand, 
political and social units tend to be identical and are expressed 
through the vertical divisions of agnatic descent groups. The 
clans and sub-clans, which form the different levels of segaentation 
in the Somali political system, are based on genealogies that have 
been defined organisationally and have become institutionalised,
whereas the dan segments of the Boran, which are defined simply
1by genealogical reference, are purely heuristic.
The origin of the age-grade system is still uncertain. It
2was once thought to have been an Hamitic institution, though more 
V^. Luling (1966), 70.
A
G.P.Murdock, Africa: its peoples and their culture history (New 
Xork, 1959) t 35* Some people also favoured a Nilo-Hamitic origin: 
J.S.Trimingham, Islam in Ethiopia (London, 1965) t P* 191 •
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recently a number of authorities have alleged a Bantu origin, 
let the detailed investigation by Levine and Sangree into the 
age-grade organisation of the northern Bantu suggested that, while 
there might have been some borrowing from Nilo-Hamitic sources, 
the origin of age-grades would have to be sought amongst earlier 
inhabitants of north-east Africa, such as Murdock* s Megalithic
p
Cushites. The wide diffusion of the age-set system was made
possible partly, it seems, because it could be adopted without
any disruption of descent groups already in existence, while at
the same time it conferred a desirable military prestige.
The distinction between ege-sets and descent groups is of
fundamental importance when it comes to examining the structure
of Boran Gralla society. Yet it is a distinction that is generally
overlooked, and as a result it is either asserted that there were
no true age-sets amongst the Boran,^ or that these are only to be
5
found within the gada system. Nevertheless, the southern Boran
1Q.J,J.aenan, "The Galla or Oromo of East Africa", S.W.J.A.. XXI
no. 2 (1956), 180; A.H.J.Prins, Bast African Age Class Systems 
(1953)t 121; E. Cerulli, Btionia Ocoidentale (Rome 1933). II. 
p.l33ff.
2Sees B.A.Levine & W,A*Sangree, "The diffusion of the age-grade 
organisation in East Africa", Africa. XXXII no. 2 (1962), 97-8.
These points had also been made earlier sees Jensen, Neuere 
Notizen tXber das Oada Svtem (Stuttgart, 1941), II, pp. 95-4;
A.H.Jacobs, "Age class systems and political organisation in 
East Africa", Anthropology Tomorrow. IV no. 3 (19 56), 29-37.
3
This point has been made by Dr. P.T.W.Baxter (1955),
^See: A. Legasse, "Class systems based on time", J.E.S.. 1 no. 2 (1963).
^Sees E.Cerulli, Etiopia Ocoidentale (Rome, 1933), II, p.133.
and the Wardai Galla of northern Kenya regard both descent and 
age-sets as quite distinct though parallel institutions. Thus 
descent sets have a religious and political function, while age- 
sets have a military one. The structure of the two is also 
different. For while the descent system is frozen into a pre­
determined pattern that can never be changed, the system of age- 
sets is not regarded as immutable and this underwent considerable 
revision towards the end of the 19th century.
The harive or age-sets of the Boran were probably an off­
shoot of the gada system after the latter had lost its uniformity
1of age. These sets were formed two months after each culmination 
ceremony of a descent set, and they were composed of all males 
born within eight years, from the age of seventeen onwards. After 
a period of eight years the age-mates of a set would move to a 
further grade, and a new set would be formed at the bottom. The 
set itself is constituted when the leader or haivu harive is 
appointed. The haivu harive . as well as the other officers of age- 
sets, are distinct from the officers of descent sets. Courage is 
the only qualification for selection and, whereas only eldest sons 
are considered for other Boran offices, age-set officers may be 
chosen from amongst younger brothers. The choice of the haivu
1This point has been made by V. Billing (1966), 40.
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hariye, his deputy, the haivu dig a , and his four assistant chiefs,
the haivu tirru, is made hy the head of the descent s&ts, the haivu
gudda. whose decision must be approved by the qallu. the highest
1ritual official, of the moiety of the chosen officers* Officers 
of the ^e-set handle disputes between junior age-mates, which are 
generally taken befoz'e the haivu harive. All stock disputes,
2however, go before the gada elders or their judicial officers.
The first duty of every age-set is to raid. But because it 
is too large to be centrally controlled the set is divided into 
districts. These are not territorial units with defined boundaries, 
nor do they consist of fixed human populations or internal poli­
tical organisations. Amongst the Boran the term signifies a loosely 
defined area, capable of supporting a group in a year of average 
rainfall. Basically, there are two sorts of raids* those for 
trophies and those that are designed to achieve some tactical ob­
jective. The latter are more organised, and an abba dirla would 
be appointed to lead the raiders. The junior age-set but one goes 
into battle first, followed by the most junior set, who in turn 
are followed by the junior set but two. Members of the senior set 
remain behind to guard the village and stock. Raids for trophies, 
on the other hand, are organised by fewer members c£ the set and
■4*.T.W.Baxter (1955), 410 
2Ibld.. 421.
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1generally involve small numbers.
The system of descent sets is extremely complicated amongst
the southern G-alla, and it is not necessary to consider in any
detail the formal arithmetical aspects of the system. All Gall a
are divided into descent sets and the number of these differ from
tribe to tribe. The average is five sets which, for five periods
2of eight years, occupy five different grades one after another.
Every eight years one set moves beyond the scale of grades, and 
at the same time the remaining four are initiated into a higher 
grade than the one they previously occupied. As soon as one set 
disappears, another is formed at the lowest grade. There is always 
a period of thirty-two years between the retirement of a father 
and the entry of his son into one and the same hierarchic position, 
and it is this artificial institutionalisation of a generation, 
which is fixed at forty years, that makes for eventual distortion 
and unbalance, Por a manfs set will always be the same as his father's 
and, though it will be composed of men who were initiated at the 
same time, it will also be composed of men of very different ages.
Within each set there may have been one descent group which 
took precedence over the others aad from which a leader or haivu gada
 ^Ibid., 404ff.
2C.H.P.Plowman, "Notes on the Gedamoch ceremonies among the Boran", 
J.A.S.. XVIII (1918)19), 114; A.H.J.Prins (1953), 79.
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1
had to be chosen, though this is by no means clear* At the
time of their culmination ceremony the elders appoint six
haivu a’du'la for the descent sets of their sons, These six
rank next to the haivu aada. and together thqy forma group of
seven which is known as the haivu torba* This group;(Appoints
six haivu garb a to assist them with their judicial work, and
together with the qallu. who is the chief religious functionary,
2t^ iey may also appoint judicial officers known as .ialaba.
It was generally through their descent system that the 
Gall a governed themselves, and there was no more important in­
stitution in their political system. However, it does presuppose 
a degree of centralisation that is not everywhere possible, and 
along the arid desert to the south of Ethiopia the gada system 
has only a remote connection with government. There political 
activity is limited to the loose association of elders from neigh­
bouring settlements who meet at ad hoc assembles to decide on 
matters of local concern. Settlement patterns of between five 
and twenty families make it impossible for the Boran to conduct 
their political affairs on any other basis. On the o ther hand, the 
southern Boran have not abandoned the gada system nor has it lost
1The suggestion that only members from certain families were chosen 
for this office is made by the followings A.H.J.Prins, ibid.. p.79; 
E.Haberland, G-alla Sud-Athiopiens (Stuttgart, 1963), p.228;
G.Denhardt, ’’Bemerkungen zur Originalkarte des unteren Tana Gebietes”, 
Z.G.E.B.. XIX (1884), 141. The point is contested by P.T.W.Baxter 
in ’‘Repetition in certain Boran Ceremonies”, in African Systems of 
Thought (London, 1965), 67; edited by H* Fortes and G. Dieterlan,
^P.T.W.Baxter (1955), 343ff.
42
1any of its potential political significance, but at most times 
the clan is too widely dispersed, aad the movement of extended 
families too variable and unpredictable, for stable descent groups 
to have very much practical bearing on every-day life.
The basic unit of Galla society is the patriarchal extended 
family, which is authoritarian, and primogeniture ensures that the 
eldest son succeeds to the main herd of his father. Younger sons 
are given the minimum required to marry, though they may have the 
opportunity to increase their stock by theft or plunder. However, 
the Gall a have a very strong religious and social sanction against 
all violence between members of the same tribe and, perhaps to 
offset this, an almost institutionalised attitude of aggression 
towards all outsiders.
The Boran are divided into two exogamous moieties (Gona and 
Sabho),^ which are divided into clans (gossa) and further divided 
into sub-clans (worra or mana), some of which are sub-divided into 
branches (fialbel^. Hone of these segments are localised, have 
any leader, senior lineage, or territorial loyalty. Descent sets 
contain members from all clans, which is one reason why their 
function is largely moral and ritualistic. This then is the picture
1
Brown, “The Golbo Boran and their customs”, Isiolo 1944» DC/lSO/5/l.
%Ihe degree of exogamy has struck some observers as unusual, sees
A. d'Abbadie, “Sur les Oromo", Annales de la Societe Soientifjque 
de Bruxelles. 4i&me annee (1880), 183*
D.Pecci, "Hote sul sistema della Gada e della clasSi di eta presso 
le popolazioni Borana”, R.S.E.. I no. 3 (l94l), 305.
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of Boran social and political institutions as they existed 
during the colonial period* There is remarkably little information 
about the institutions of the Boran during the last century but, 
apart from the hariye system which was changed about 1888, there 
is no reason to suspect that other radical changes have taken 
place.
The divisions of the Wardai Galla were modelled on those
of the Boran, and they were divided into two exogamous moieties
(irdida and Barietuma) who lived inter-mixed.^ Their clans and
sub-clans were the same as those of the Boran, though they were
2not always found at the same level of segmentation. It is, 
in fact, extremely difficult to determine if there were any funda­
mental differences between the southern Boran and the Wardai.
The gada system may have had greater political significance amongst 
the latter. There are two descriptions of the Wardai, written 
about 1896, where the haivu gada is mentioned as a political figure 
of considerable importance and where it is suggested *tiat he had 
far more authority than a Somali clan-chief. Along with the haivu 
torba he is described as appointing other officers to supervise 
the running of various districts, and he was also said to appoint
1F.T.W.Baxter (1955), 91; Haberlaad (1963), 127; A.Wemer, "The
Galla of the Bast Africa Protectorate", J.A.S.. XIII (1914) > 140;
B. Gerulli, "Dalla Tribu alio Stato", Somalia (Home, 1959)* III> 
p. 104* But see page 46 of this thesis where the possibility 
of a third division is mentioned.
2 w *Communication from P. T.W. Baxter.
abuoti dirbua or "guardians of the road"Whether this was
an office only to be found amongst the Wardai, or whether the
phrase was a corruption of abba dirla, the leader of hariye
raids, will probably never be known, and while the political
terminology of the Boran and Wardai does not appear to have been
identical, the implications to be drawn from this are by no means
clears. Thus, throughout the 19th century the word moti or
mati was used to describe the deputy of the Wardai haiyu gada
2
and sometimes the haiyu gada himself, while the haiyu gada is
3also on one occasion called the arm rer. The term moti does not
4appear to be used by the southern Boran to describe an official, 
though amongst the Hoku and Uraga Galla the term abba motti is 
still used to describe the haiyu gada before be has taken up 
o f f i c e , 5 j-fc would certainly be indefensible to assume some
^R.M.Grmorod to Rogers, 17 July 1896; "Notes on Galla Laws and 
Customs”, anon., n.d. Pc/cp/68/20; M.R.Mahoney, "Notes on Galla" 
(1929), DC/GRA/3/4* T'or the view that there were no haiyu amongst 
the Wardai sees Brayne-Nicholls, "Boran and Sakuye social organisati 
DC/lSO/4/l* I am assumingthat abuoti is a corruption of abba motti, 
naturally this is very uncertain.
2,Smee and Hardy's Report, I.0.Marine Records Miscellaneous/586; 
Kitchener to Rosebery, 5 June 1886, F0.84/1799; Leon des Avanchers, 
"Ksquisse Geographique du pays Oromo ou Galla", B.S.G.P., 4th 
series, XVII (1859), 161.
^Leon des Avanchers, B.S.G.P. (1859), 161.
^Neither P.T.W.Baxter nor E.Haberland mention the word moti with 
regard to the Boran.
^Haberland (1965), 398*
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connect ion. with the Macha Galla system, according to which Knutsson 
maintains that moti signified a military leader of the harive age- 
sets and that a moti organisation, where the power rests in the 
hands of the age-set leaders, can be contrasted with a gada organi­
sation, where political power rests in descent groups, And it may 
well be that the term moti, whei^applied to the leaders of the Wardai 
Galla, implied nothing more than a mark of respect; it is possible 
that the term itself coming from the verb mou,meaning to rule, 
did not signify any particular office or system of government 
but, rather,pointed to the importance of the personleferred to.^ *
From the middle of the 19th century onwards, when contact 
with the Wardai became more frequent, it was also suggested that 
their village organisation differed from that of the Boran, Earlier
it had been thought that the Wardai had no villages at all, or at
2least none that were permanent, while later their village organi­
sation was regarded as the one static element in the rotating system 
of gada officials. For though it was always accepted tiat the Wardai 
moved their villages, nevertheless it was thought that village heads 
were appointed foir life and were not subject to any limited or fixed
K.E.Knutsson, Authority and Changes a study of the kallu institution 
among the Macha Galla of Ethiopia, no. 29 lEtnologiska Studier 
(Goteborg, 1967), p^68, 188ff.
2T. Boteler, Narrative of a Voyage of Discovery (London, 1835), I,
387.
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period of office holding. It was further suggested that within
each village there were two heads, each of whom controlled a ward,
who were either equally responsible for the settlement as a whole
2or took it in turns to be so. A very similar dual organisation 
also existed among the Boni hunters, who were neighbours of the 
Wardai, so the possibility of borrowing cannot be excluded but, 
on the other hand, these descriptions may only have been the 
result of a misunderstanding of the complicated gada and harive 
organisation.
The division of the Wardai into left and right hand, sections 
was also closely paralleled amongst the Boran, where it repre­
sented the remains of a dual order that had fallen into disuse
4through the integration of new clans into the old system. There 
is some indication that a similar process took place amongst the 
Wardai, where several sections did not belong to either the Irdida 
or Barietuma moieties.^ Yet the fact that the haivu die a. the
R^. Schmidt, "Deutsch-Witu-land", Globus. LIY (1888), 175*
2
0. New, Life, Wanderings and Labours in Eastern Africa (London,
1874) , pp. 162-3; J.H. Phillip son, "Notes on the Galld1, Man, XVI 
(1916), 180.
^A.H.J.Prins, "The Didemic Diarchic Boni". J.R.A.I.. XGIII (1963),
179, 182-3.
4Haberland (1963), 116, 120.
A.Werner (1914)» 140, 275. The Gardyed and Metta clans are mentioned 
as being in the centre, their role being to validate marriages between 
members of the two moieties. See also E. Oerulli, "Le popolazioni 
della Somalia nella tradizione storica locale", Somalia (Rome, 1957),
1, p.61.
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deputy to the haiyu hariye. had to be chosen from the opposite 
1moiety lent itself to the illusion that a dual organisation
2existed amongst the Wardai. Nor was it easy to distinguish
between the plethora of office-holders, and the tendency to
equate all haiyu was a temptation that many observers succumbed
to which naturally led to the belief that the Wardai favoured
multiple office-holders.
There is one other pastoral tribe to be mentioned; the
Samburu, who linguistically and culturally resemble the Masai.
They are divided into two moieties (L'Orok Ngishu, and En Oibor
Ngishu) each of which is divided into four exogamousolans and
then still further divided into sub-clans.^ The sub-clan is the
politically significant unit, and though its members may be fairly
widely dispersed they perform age-set ceremonies together, to
5the exclusion of all outsiders. In the semi-desert areas where 
they live, small settlements of about four to ten families are 
the norm, and where the ground is more difficult the tendency is
P.T.W.Baxter (1955), 410.
Tl.D.W. Jeffreys, “Dual Organisation in Africa", African Studies,
V (1946); A.H.J.Prins (1953), 80.
3The Samburu are also called Burkeneji which is a corruption of the 
Masai Lo 1 Oibor Kenejie, people of the white goats. They call them­
selves Lokop or Loikop, sees KLC EM (1934), II, p.1448.
.B,Carson, ".Among the Samburu", East Africa Annual (1946-7), 41.
^P.Spencer, The Samburu (London, 1965). This section relies heavily 
on this work.
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towards even smaller and more widely dispersed groups. Neverthe­
less, the age-set system of the Samburu provides an extremely 
effective political framework, in marked contrast to the largely 
ritualistic significance, of the gada system of the southern Boran 
who live in a similar environment. The difference lie^in the identi­
fication of the Samburu set with the sub-clan, a group small enough 
to maintain its formal character, whereas the Boran descent sets 
are composed of members of all clans in the same moiety.
The system of government amongst the Samburu has been aptly
1termed a * gerontocracy*, for political power rests in the hands of 
the elders alone, and the mo ran, the unmarried warriors of the tribe, 
are kept in deliberate subservience. They are sent far from the settle- 
ments as often as possible, and the age-set system is used to keep 
them in check. They are not allowed to marry, nor to have any say 
in the councils of the elders when matters of importance are dis­
cussed. The real and effective power of the elders lies in the 
threatened use of their curse and also in the monopoly they exer­
cise over wives. The result is rivalry and tensions between differ­
ent age-grades within the sub-clan. But there are several clans 
where the theoretical requirements of the age-set system are partly 
ignored and where moran are allowed to marry.
The Samburu have a special relationship with the Rendille, 
their north-eastern neighbours, with whom they have been in contact
Spencer (1965). Subtitle of book.
49
for a considerable period of time* The Rendille are not inferior 
to the Samburu, though they may not be as strong militarily 
speaking, and the essence of their friendship probablyjlay in the 
mutual advantage it entailed. For the Rendille have a camel- 
based economy, which results in certain social problems. Herds 
increase slowly, if at all, and a nearly static number of stock 
cannot be made to support a growing population. The obvious 
solution was emigration to the cattle economy of the Samburu, 
where herd-boys could be readily absorbed and where the high 
degree of polygamy could also lead to a chronic shat age of women.
At the same time the Samburu provided their allies with protection. 
Through long and close contact with the Samburu, the Rendille have 
adopted some of their customs. But though they have an£ge-set 
system this does not regulate tribal life to any great extent, 
and it has been suggested that the far more exacting life of 
herding camels ensures an adequate degree of social conformity 
without any additional institutional aids. The different economies 
also ensure that there is little competition between the two tribes 
over grazing.
The Gall a (Bo ran and Wardai), the Somali (harod and Hawiye), 
and both the Samburu and the Rendille all have contact with, and 
sometimes control over, servile or low caste people. Relations
V.Spencer (1965)» passim.
between the dominant tribe and its often despised neighbours vary
considerably and in some instances are extremely complicated.
The Samburu have a special relationship with the Dorobo, a small
group of predominantly Masai speakers who live by hunting and
gathering. For reasons of strategy or economy the Dorobo associated
themselves with certain areas and then formed uneasy alliances with
their pastoral neighbours. After a serious defeat or epidemic,
pastoralists at times settled with them and became members of their
tribes while they built up their herds. The degree of integration
between certain Samburu sections and Dorobo clans seems to have
gone even further: around Mt. Ngiro Samburu claim exclusive
ownership to land and practice bee-keeping, which they have learnt
from their Dorobo neighbours. Although in the last century these
ties were probably less pronounced than they are today, they were
n everthelessin existence and the Dorobo had a similar relationship
1with the Iiaikipiak Masai.
The G-alla and the Somali both have contact with despised
peoples, whose status is defined both by their descent and by their
2occupation. The Warta, who are hunters and p&tters, are similar 
to the Tumal blacksmiths, the Yibir and Midgan hunters and leather
1
A thorough analysis of the relationship between the Dorobo and 
their neighbours can be found in P. Spencer, "The Dorobo of Northern 
Kenya”, Chapter vi of fA Survey of the Samburu and Rendille Tribes 
of Northern Kenya* (l96l) X must thank Dr. Spenter for showing
me this chapter.
2This word is used by several peoples to describe despised tribes 
in general.
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makers who are scattered throughout Somalia and southern Ethiopia.
The relationship between the q&lla and the Warta is that of patron
and client; they cannot live with the Galla or marry them, hut
those who are subject to the southern Boran have their own tribal
1organisation and constitute one of their junior clans. Furthermore 
the Warta are supposed to have their own legal, social and poli­
tical institutions, though little or nothing is knowi of these.
The Boran treat the Sakuye, Gabra and Garre as junior tribes, and 
though these are acknowledged as being inferior, and graze their 
herds separately, they nevertheless live under the same law. The 
Boran extend their peace to cover these junior tribes, who are 
always their closest allies in times of war. Boran and Gabra 
intermarry with apparent equality, but poorer Gabra give their
daughters away to Tumtu, a despised exogamous group; this action
2even stockless Boran would not stoop to. The position of the 
Sakuye is not so favourable. Intermarriage with the Boran is not 
normally permitted, anddxould a Boran condescend to visit the 
tribe he would expect to be, lavishly entertained, at any rate in 
the pre-colonial period. The same sort of relationship also ex­
isted between the Wasanye and Wapokomo;^ the clans of these inferior
1E.Haberland (1963), 132; ¥. Luling (1966), 25.
^P.T.W.Baxter (1955), 55, 72.
'A..Werner, "A few notes on the Wasanye", Man. XXII (1913), 14;
V.Luling (1966), 23.
tribes were linked to those of the Wardai Galla, but in general
the subject population was excluded from assemblies of the gada
and hence from tribal government. The Wardai also seem to have
exercised control over the Boni hunters and fishers, while to the
north several small agricultural and riverine tribes who lived
along the banks of the river Juba came under Somali sway. Some
of these tribes were linked to the Somali by ties of marriage, the
degree and the type of integration depending in a large measure
1on the extent to which Islam had been assimilated by them.
While a great deal of effort has sometimes been expended 
to show that various low caste peoples - such as the Boni - have 
certain unique characteristics and may thus be considered autochthons, 
it is now more readily admitted that despised peoples^an be the 
product of wars and thus nothing more than an aggregate of dis-, 
placed persons.^ Yet, whatever their origin, all these groups 
tend to be tribally very intermixed.^*
The low population density throughout northern Kenya has 
in fact been responsible for a considerable tribal intermixture
•i
Powell-Gotton, Somali Notes, British Museum, Add.MSS (Ethnographic 
Department).
^Parenti, "Gli Waboni", Rivista di biologia Qoloniale.IX (1948), 65;
V.L.Grotanelli, '’Note sui Bon cacciatori di bassa casta dell oltre 
Giuba",, Annali Lateranensi. XXI (1957), 195*
^E.Cerulli, "La Tribu Somala", Somalia (Rome. 1964), III, p.90;
A.Werner, "The Native Tribes of British East Africa", J.A.S..
XIX (1919-20), 285.
A^. Werner, ibid., 285.
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amongst all the pastoralists there. It is doubtful if there are
any tribes in this area that have not assimilated significant
numbers of alien peoples. She Boran do not appear to be any
exception in this respect, and, though the presence of junior tribes,
such as the Sakuye or Gabra, may give the impression t hat full
integration is never attainable, the number of Boran qalu and
the position of certain clans such as the Karayu point quite clearly
1to the opposite conclusion. Equally, one reason for the less
rigorous application of the age-set system amongst certain Samburu
clans lies in the fact that these contained absorbed peoples of
2non-Samburu origin.
At the same time, this tribal inteimixture draws attention 
to the complexity of the history of this area. It makes impossible 
any easy or facile reconstruction of the past. And this complexity 
is further reinforced by the small scale of the political unit.
The tendency towards temporary tribal alliances, and towards tribal 
interpenetration and client relationships, has made for extremely 
fluid conditions. Pastoral life is rarely static, and this applies 
as much to the political as to the economic sphere. Inevitably, 
these realities of pastoral life were not grasped at first, and
•i
Haber!and (1963) f 1 7 8 0 .  The suggestion of general intermixture 
has been made by D.W.Wickham, "The Tomal or Smith Glass in Gurreh 
District" (1927), 4. Nairobi MSS N ADM/Secretariat Library.
^P.Spencer (1966).
the fragmentary observations of chance travellers in the 19th 
century generally contained serious misunderstandings. It was 
only as contact with the interior {increased that the pastoral 
way of life in this area slowly began to be appreciated.
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Chanter II 
THE . WIMB'JBBHTH OEM'URY BACKGROUND
. The underlying tendency throughout mo sfc of the 19th century 
was to make a theoretical knowledge of the African interior con­
form to European concepts and, no matter what the second-hand 
information gleaned, itwas inevitably recast in a terminology 
that evoked the picture of centralised semi-urban polities all 
enjoying definable boundaries. There were references to towns 
and cities, to kings and kingdoms, yet, at the root of the problem, 
there was not just a question of semantics, there was also a 
fundamental lack of perspective due to the absence of first­
hand experience. It is, perhaps, hard to realise that the de­
centralised character of nomadic life in this area was never fuly 
appreciated until the very end of the century, when it had been 
empirically observed at clo se quarters, while the instability ini 
herent in every pastoral frontier was equally overlooked. Even as 
late as 1895 the political structure of the Ogaden could be described 
as,
a limited monarchy, composed of a sultan with has 
council of sheiks or chieftains of clans, and bears 
a resemblance to that of the Sovereign and nobles 
of early British history. The wealthy lords hold 
the offices of Prime Minister, Chief Judge, Commander 
in Chief and so forth by reason of the strength of
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their following and their own social position.
The tenure of their offices, land and property 
generally is to a great extent feudal.
The simplification of complex relationships, that also
went hand in hand with an ignorance of the interior, led to
misleading antitheses. The sharp distinction that was made
between Somali and Galla, or the emphasis that was placed on
their supposed mutual enmity, was based on the false assumption
that each represented an unadulturated ethnic group. As a
result, the extent of very considerable Galla-Somali contact
was never appreciated; where it was observed,moreover, it was
also generally misunderstood, for the basis of close tribal
contacts lay in the widespread adoption of she gat or client
relationships and of temporary alliances of convenience that
blurred any rigid division of peoples and led to an over-lapping
of pastoral boundaries. Yet, to a European mentality, the adoption
of clients would be readily mistaken as evidence of African empire
building, or at any rate of the means whereby a stronger tribe
widened the area under its control, whereas in practice this was
a relationship generally chosen by the weaker tribe and not
2imposed by the stronger.
^Graufurd to Hardinge, 17 Dec. 1895, in H. to S., 25 Dec. 1895,
EO.107/59*
^Menelick utilised this outlook to further his own political 
ambitions with great effectiveness, see Chapter V
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Much of the myth that surrounded "the li ttle known kingdom
of Boran,f and "Afelata - king as he terms himself of the Gall as,..
a kind of legendary African Prester John", and which has survived
today in an exaggerated idea of hoth Boran and Wardai power in
the 19th century, can be traced initially to misunderstandings
on the part of those who had to rely on the descriptions of others
for their knowledge.
Throughout the 19th century it was also readily assumed,
by European explorers and travellers, that the political boundaries
of pastoral tribes to the soutl|of the river Juba were both clearly
demarcated and moderately stable. The illusion of stability was
partly due to the unmistakable dominance of the Wardai and Boran
Gall a to the south of the river prior to 1867, which contrasted
sharply with the equally complete Somali control of the area to
the north. Contemporary descriptions generally remarked upon the
function of the river Juba as a dividing-line, a frontier that
was supposed clearly to separate and keep apart two hostile and
2
entirely different ethnic groups. This tendency to equate rivers
tlardinge to Salisbury, 17 Sept. 1895, FO. 107/37; Sir A. Hardinge,
A Diplomatist in the East (London, 1928},, p.217.
2
D'Avezac, "Essai sur la Geographic du pays S^oumalH, B.S.G.P,,
2nd series, XVII (1842), 90 > 97; W. Christopher, "Extract from a 
Journal kept during a partial enquiry into the present, resources 
and state of N,E.Africa", T.B.G.S.. VI (1844), 393; Leon des 
Avanchers, B.S.G.P. (1859)> 159; Guillain, Documents sur 11histoire, 
la geographie et le commerce de ltAfrique Orientale (Paris. 1865), 
II, p.180; D'Abbadie, "Lettre a Mr. le President de la Soc.",
Xwith boundaries was characteristic of the century, though 
the initial oversimplifications were less noticeable in the 
second half, when a better knowledge of the interior and a 
greater familiarity with both place-names and topography led to 
the complex construction of riverine frontiers. It was popularly 
conjectured that the ll'ver Daua divided the Wardai from the 
Boran Grail a, while the river Sagan was supposed to mark the 
westward limit of Boran power and to divide them from the Arbore; 
it was also thought that the river Sabaki formed the southern 
limit of the Wardai, and after 1874 the river Tana was assumed
p
to be the new southern limit of the Somali.
Superficially then the position was simple. For it is in­
disputable that at the beginning of the 19th century the Wardai 
were in. a dominant position to the south of the river Juba, just 
as the Somali were in control to the north. Dr. Krapf, the missionary
B.S.G.P., 5th ser., XII (1866). 165; GL A.Haggenmacher, "Heise im 
Somaliland1*, P.M.. XLVTI (1874), 18; M. Oamperio, **11 Commercio 
della costa dei Somali11, B.S.G.I.. 2nd ser., I (1876), 667; Stanton 
to Derby, 14 Nov. 1875, FO. 141/94; K. Johnston, Africa (London, 
1878), 274.
Of. the remark: "the only desirable boundaries in Africa were those 
which followed the course of waters, as those boundaries only were 
acknowledged by the tribes11, Catalan! to IBEACo., 7 Aug. 1890,
FO.84/2089.
2
E.Bremer, MForschungen in Ost Afrika11, P.M. (1868), 364; Bottego,
II Giubo Esplorato (Home,1899), 574; James Christie, Choi era 
Epidemics in East Africa (London. 1876), 189-90; G. Denhardt, 
Z.G.B.Byfl884T. 159.
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and one cf the first people- to contact the Wardai Gall a in the
19th century, suggests that this was so.'*' Unfortunately, the
traditions cf the Wardai and of the Boran are too vague to he of
any value for this'period, and it is primarily from the observations
2
of Somali traders who described the anterior to Smee and Hardy 
in 1811, from the accounts of later explorers and from the tradi­
tions of neighbouring tribes that a more precise picture , can 
be reconstructed.
The infoimation that was given to Smee and Hardy, one of
whose specific tasks had been to enquire about the Gall a and to
3"find out the limits they occupy along the coast", pointed to 
the control by the Wardai^ of the right-hand side of the river 
Juba from the coast to the liver Daua; this was confirmed later 
in the century, moreover, by the traditions of the Gasar Gudda.
To this should be added c&e of the few pieces of information about 
the interior gathered during Captain Owen’s expedition of 1824 
to Bast Africa,^ that the Wardai controlled the whole area between
^Krapf to Coates, 10 Jan. 1844* BO. 54/6.
2Cpt. Smee and Lieut. Hardy were employed by the East India Co.
They explored the East Coast of Africa in 3811.
^Smee and Hardy’s ’Journals’, I.0.Marine Records Misc., 586.
^Smee and Hardy always referred to the Wardai as Gurache Galla.
This wa-s a name often given to the Wardai in the 17th and 18th centuries, 
though it occurred rarely in the 19th century.
5V.Eerrandi, "Seconda Spedizione Bottego: Lugh emporio commerciale 
sul Giuba", B.S.G.X. (1903), 211.
6Owen’s job was to explore and map the coast of Eastern Africa
6 1
the Juba and Tana rivers*1 However*;, the exact limit of their
power inland was never definable in the 19th century except in
so far as the river Daua was concerned, and only from the traditions
of the Garre is it now clear that at the beginning of the century
the Wardai were in possession of both Wggir and El Wale, as well
2as the area to the norbh-east. What is not so clear is whether 
the Wardai also controlled wells to the west of Wajir - such as 
Buna and $1 Badl, not far from lake Rudolf* Although the traditions 
of the Garre do not rule out the possibility, neither do they offer 
an^ositive corroboration, while later developments in this area 
do not suggest that the Wardai were so far west in 1800.
At the same time, the closer one looks at the available 
material, the more it appears that even these tentative boundaries 
are misleading. In the first place they were certainly neither 
static nor precise, and it is extremely doubtful if either the 
river Juba or the ri’ver Daua ever marked the precise north and 
north-western limits of Wardai influence. The traditions of the 
Wagosha, for instance, mention a pact made with the Wardai at Demu
but his tendency to exceed his brief sometimes gave him greater 
insight into the local political situation.
*^ W*T'.W.Owen, Narrative of Voyages to explore the shores of Africa 
etc. (London, 1832); I, p. 172; Wolf, ’‘Narrative of voyages to 
explore the shores of Africa etc"., J.R.G.8.. Ill (1833)> 216;
T. Boteler, Narrative of a voyage of discovery to Africa and 
Arabia performed ia H.M.S. Leven & Barracouta from 1821-1826 
(London, 1835), II, p.220.
2J.W.K.Pease, HAn Ethnological Treatise on the Gurreh tribe", 
PG/nED/4/8/i,.
]^?or the suggestion that the Wardai controlled the area as far NW
to the north of the Juba, an area the Wardai ware supposed to
control. These traditicns are linked to migrations carried out
under the leadership of Wanuka and have been dated to 1795-1805*
Later, Leon des Avanchers, a Franciscan missionary who spent
some time on the coast, was also told of a small village on the
2
north side of the liver Juba which was supposed to be Galla.
Nor was the river Daua likely to have acted as a hard and fast 
bounding line, since Smee was told that the area to the north 
was characterised by its mixture of Galla and ^omali tribes, which 
suggests an area where tribes met and overlapped rather than one 
where a frontier kept peoples apart. The same could be said 
also of the river Juba, and from both the traditions and the age- 
sets of the Darod it seems certain that from the beginning of the 
19th century they were living amongst the Wardai, in small numbers, 
as herd-boys and shegats. ^
as Buna, Sataweza and El Had, sees R, Turnbull, "The Werdeh",
Kenya Police Review (July, 1957), 269; R.G.Otter, nThe impact aa 
East Africa of the Gall a and Somali", Rhodes House Library,
MSS African, s.520.
1V.L.Grottanelli, "11 Bantu del Giuba nelle tradizione dei Wazegua", 
Geogranhica Helvetica. VIII (1955)> 254 and Pescatori dell Oceano 
Indi ano (Rome, 19 55)» 210. Smee and Hardy also mention that the 
southern limit of the Somali lay just to the north of the mouthof 
the river Juba, 1.0.Marine Records Misc. 586,
Leon des Avanchers, B.8.G.P. (1859)* 159*
■^Smee and Hardy, 'Private Journals’, British Museum, Add. MSS. 8958.
^C.W.Hobley, Kenya from Chartered Cornu any to Grom Colony (London,
There are also reasons to suppose that the area controlled
by the Wardai ms in fact considerably smaller than an outline
of their frontiers suggests. Much of the liver Juba 'was fly-infested,
and for that' reason it was avoided by pastoral tribes who in any.
1case would not have attempted to control its banks. Significantly, 
the Wardai also never completely dominated the coastal area, which 
isaie reason why so little is known about them. They were considered 
to be "typical inland men", and were effectively shielded from 
outside contact by both ihe Wasania and the Bajun, who exercised 
provisional control along the littoral. Thus, throughout the 
19th century, the term * Bajun coast* was frequently used to describe
2L
the mainland between the Juba and Tana rivers.'
1929), 178; IC. McDougall, "Notes on the decline and extermination 
j of the Gall as", 1914# DC/MAL/2/3; Salkeld, Bast African Quarterly 
(1905), mentions that the Broli age-set lived amongst the Galla.
1H. Tozzi, "Cenni sulla regions della Goscia", L*Agricultura Qoloniale, 
XI (1940), 467. It is Interesting to note that after extensive floods 
in 1916, which led to the disappearance of fly along much of the Juba, 
pressure from Somali pastoralists on the riverine Wagosha increased 
noticeably, Salkeld to Director of Agriculture, 6 Dec. 1920, 
PC/jUB/l/16/l.
2
A.H.J.Prins, Sail mg from Lamu: a study an Maritime culture in 
I si ami c East Af ric a (Assen^TYg 65 )Y 25.
3Leon des Avanchers, B.S.S.P. (1859), 165; . New (1874), 173-4;
T, Boteler (1835) , I, p.400 ; 0.P.Rigby, "Remarks on the Rorth-Kast 
Coast of Africa and the tribes by which it is inhabited", T.B.G.S..
YI (1844), 72. Smee and Hardy also only mention Buggunes on the 
coast, ^.M.Add.MSS.8958. . ~ '
^Bajun was sometimes spelt Bayounich. Le Roy, D*Aden a Zanzibar 
(Tours, 1894) , p.3^ 4; D.S. de La Rochette, "A Chart of the Indian 
Ocean", 4 June 1803, 1.0.List of Charts A.C.31; Ward to J.Abbot,
12 May 1851, Dispatches ;from USA Consuls in Zanzibar 1851-1857, 
Microfilm T.100 roll T.5.
Further inlandin the driest regions where aamel-
based tribes were better adapted to the aridity, it is likely that
tribes which were Somali in origin, such as the Rendille and the
Ajuran, had long been in the area and were alio-wed by the Wardai
]_
to act as nominal clients and graze over large areas. On this 
point traditions are extremely -vague, though cne cannot ignore a 
id. de spread conviction that Somali tribes inhabited an area generally 
associated with the Wardai Galla from at 1 east the beginning of
the 19th century, also that these tribes had long been in the
' 2 
area and that they were allies or she gats of the Galla.
To the north-west of the Wardai, in the foot-hills of 
Ethiopia, the position of the Boran Galla appears to have been 
strikingly similar. Their control over a wide area, from Dirre to 
the Liban, does not seem to have prevented the Garrefrom migrating 
south from Filtu to Wagille around 3800, while the later Boran ex­
pansion eastwards appears to have gone hand in hand with a prior
*3
expansion of the Garre in the same direction. ,1 Much of the apparent
1I have examined the pre-19th century history of this area, and the 
relationship between the Rendille and Somali, in a SOAS Seminar Paper 
entitled ’The relationship between Bantu, Galla and Somali migrations 
in the Juba/Tana area1, 22 Feb., 1966.
2E.G.Ravenstein, "Somal and Galla-land; embodying information collected 
by the Rev. Thomas Wakefield", P.R.G.S., n.s. VI no. 5 (I884), 271; 
M.B.Bertazzi, "Goscia", ASMAI. Posiz. 17l/l-5; R.S.Salkeld, East 
African Quarterly (1905); P.R.French and Cpt. Barrett, "Historyof 
Jubaland", 1913, PC/NTO/4/6/l.
^J.W.K.Pease (1927), PC/NFB/4/8/l; "Memorandum” encloseddn Clarke 
to Grey, 20 May 1907 and Hohler to Grey, 14 June 1907, F0.37l/l9 2.
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strength of the Boran must, in fact, have consisted of Garre
shegats and other allied tribes. Control of the lowlands
was one that the Boran seem to have shared with these allies, and
it could therefore have been lost with their defection.
In the lake Rudolf area, it has been suggested that the
Hkor section of the Gelubba consisted of Boran who had moved to
1the west of the lake around 3800. The Arbore are also said to 
have been In origin a small Boran grcup that moved beyond the river
Sagan, losing contact with the Galla further east, and becoming
2 *shegats to the Amar Kokke. Certainly, according to Leon des
Avancher*s information, there was a marked similarity between
the names of Arbore and Boran clans, while the occasional reference
in the 19th century to 1 Arbore-Galla* may not be without its sig- 
3nificance. But we know altogether too little to be able to satis­
factorily unravel the historical development ofany Boran-Arbore 
relationship, or even to determine its limits. For, if it was once 
thought that the Boran and Arbore were very closely related linguisti 
cally,4 it is now realised that linguistic evidence ties the Arbore
■J
Chiomio, "I Magi nell Etiopia dell sud ovest", R.S.E., Ill (l94l),
300; Shackle ton, "The Merille or Gelubba", 1939, Lok/32.
M^. Ricci, "Notisie etnografiche sugli Arbors11, R.S.E. ♦ IX (1950), 6.
5Leon des Avanchers, B.S.S.P. (1859), 112; Bottego (1895), 338.
A.Sacoheti, "Ricerche Antropologiche sugli Arbore", Rivista di
Bioloffia Coloniale, IX (194Q), 54. A. Saccheti mentions Oerulli
aa suggesting a close lexical and morphological connectinn between
Galla and Arbore, but gives no reference.
to the Gelubba rather than to the Boran.^ Moreover, Boran ex­
pansion towards Tertale and the area further west took place 
very recently, according to Professor Haberland. Tertale is 
also sometimes con safe red to be the furthest west that the Boran 
expanded. All that seems certain is that Boran influence 
extended in that direction, and that laterii the century the 
Arbore, who then had no political ties with the Boran, were domin­
ating smaller tribes around the northern end of lake Rudolf, such 
as the Gelubba and the Anar Kokke.
The Laikipiak Masai controlled the area to the east and 
south of lake Rudolf, and their loosely associated clans stretched 
between lake Barings in the west to the Merti plateau in the east.^ 
Contact, however, with Somali tribes such as the Rendille had 
probably led to a certain amount of overlapping. Moreover, one
1
A.N.Tucker and M.A.Bryan, Non Bantu Languages of north-eastern 
Africa (London, 1956). However, Arbore does seem to be related 
to Boran too, see: M.M.Moreno, Introduxione alia lingua Qmeto 
(Milan, 1938).
2E. Haberland (1958).
3Leon des Avanchers, B.S.S.P. (l859), 162.
4 *The best account cf the Laikipiak is that given by Ole Menye, 
born in 1878, who was a teacher at the Missionary schools of 
Moshi, Taveta and Mombasa. He served under Mr. Collier as Govern­
ment Interpreter for Masai on the Laikipiak plateau in 1900--1903, 
sees T.H.R.. nos. 41-2 (1965), 27. .
"Ethnological notes on the tribes of Marsabit District", PC/ffl'D/4/l/2.
cannot entirely ignore the possibility that the south-east of
lake Rudolf the position m s  considerably more confused and
1
complex. For it has been suggested that a group of Didinga 
moved down the east side of the lake ii the 38th oentury, sub­
sequently settling in the Mt. Marsabit area, where theyr proximity 
to the laikipiak led over a period of time to structural simi- 
larities between their languages. It is further alleged that 
the Didinga were driven by famine to migrate a second time 
and that a small section, led by the Nyikorama clan, travelled 
up tie east side of lake Rudolf, while the bulk of the Didinga 
skirted its southern end and then moved north-westwards.^ From 
their age-sets Driberg dated this last movement to the very end of 
the 18th century. But it is difficult to reconcile this with the 
calculatiaisaf Gaptain King who worked independently ai the age-sets 
of the Toposa and Donyiro, whom the Didinga later displaced from 
their traditional grazing grounds.^ Unfortunately, Driberg is 
the only person to have written at any length about the Didinga.
Nor does there appear to be any independent verification of these
^Linguistically the Didinga are related to the Murle and Longarin 
groups. Today they straddle the Uganda/Sudan border.
2
J. PI. Drib erg, 11 The Didinga Language", Mitteilungendes Seminars fttr 
Orientalische Sprachen, XXIV (1932), 139; £*• Gerulli. Peoples of 
South West Ethiopia and its Borderland (London, 1956), 71.
*3 * MJ.H.Driberg, A preliminary account of the Didinga", S.N.R., V 
(1922), 210, and "The Didinga Mountains", O.J., LXIX (l927l, 400. 
However, cf. J.P.Crazzolara, The Lwoo: Part. Ill Plans (Verona, 1954) 
346-548.
^L.F.Ualdor ed., A Tribal Survey of Mongalla Province (London, 1957), 
57.
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unusual traditions, and without some further corroboration they
1
must obviously be treated with some daution.
Despite the later hostility between the Garre Somali 
and the BOran and Wardai Galla, also despite the hostility between 
both these Galla groups and the Laikipiak Masai, the major long­
term threats to their respective 1 spheres of influence', where 
their grazing rights were acknowledged, came from outside this
area - both from the north and from the south.
The main threat from the north lay ultimately in the move­
ment southwards of Darod ^omali tribes towards the river Juba. 
Professor X. M. Lewis has noted that, ,fby the end of the 18th century,
southern Somaliland as far south as the river Juba had assumed
2more or less its present ethnic complexion". By this date, then, 
the Ogaden Darod had presumably already attempted to move through
the country held by the Rahanwein and Hawiye agricultural tribes
and, having failed to overcome them by force, had joined with 
the Elai section of the Rahanwein and settled amongst them as she gats 
at Bur Hacaba and at Matagoi near Dinsor. But, although the Darod 
posed the main longer-term threat to Galla domination south of the
1
From J.P.Crazzolara, ibid.. it appears that a Fr. A. Pellegrini has 
done a considerable amount of research into the Didinga. 1 have 
not seen the results of this but judging from Grazzolara's own 
references 1 would be surprised if it in any way supported Driberg's 
hypothesis.
^1.1.Lewis, The Modem History of Somaliland (London. 1965), 29.
^Zoli (1927), 143; Sir Richard Turnbull, "The Darod Invasion", X.M.Lewis, 
"Somali conquest of the Horn cf Africa", J.A.H. , I (i960), 225.
Juba, it was the lising power of Bardera that first undezmined 
their position there.
The small town of Bardera had been founded in 1819 by
1 2 Sheik Ibrahim Hasan Jebro of the Jiambelul tribe of Dafet,
and a few years later a defensive wall was built around the
3 * 4collection of huts by Sheik Ali Gure, a XAsan. Bardera quickly 
established its reputation as a stronghold of the Qadariya and
6became the most important religious centre in southern Somaliland. 
But as its power grew, so it embarked on a serious of religious
Gruillain (l857), III* pp. 35-40; J.S.Trimingham (1965), 241;
”Breve Monografia di Bardera”, anon. ASMAI. Posiz. 171/1-5;
W.B.Minnis, ”A Precis of Somali History during the Christian era”,
Wajir 1950, kindly lent to me by W.G. Walker; but cf. G.Stephanini,
In Somali: note e impression! di viaggio (Florence, 1922), 396.
2
The Jiambelul are Rahanwein who form part of the ^han Dafet tribal 
cluster. This is a territorial cluster cf the Herdo, Ifmogi,
Barbaro, Jiambelul, Hober (pre-Hawiye), sees I.M.Lewis (l955)> 44.
^M.Colucci (1924), 81; but in 0. Kerston, Yon der Deckens Reisen 
in Ost Afrika (Leipzig, I869), HI, 317 > it is suggested that Ali 
Gure founded Bardera, perhaps b ecause 1b built the wall.
Lisan are a section of the Rahanwein.
^The Qadariya are a Sufi brotherhood. In East Africa they had no 
real ties with Iraq where they originated. They first penetrated 
inland along the Benadir in 1819> sees Oerulli, ”Wote sol movimento 
lusulmano nella Somalia”, R.S.O., X (l923)> 17; B,Martin, “Muslim 
resistance to colonial rules Shaykh Uways and the Qadiriya^tariqa in 
East Africa”, J.A.H., X no. 3 (1969).
D^. Powell-Gotton, Somali Wotes, B.M.Add. MSS., Ethnographic Department; 
Gr. Ferrand, Les Gomalis (Paris, 1903), 173-4; N# Pucci oni, Club a e 
oltre Giuba (FI orence, “1937), pp. 63, ul; G. Giamarra, ”Justice indigene 
et indigenat dans la Somalie Italienne”, Bulletin de Colonisation 
Compares, no. 9 ( 1912), 390.
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wars. Bardera* s short-lived period of aggression had two important
results. In the first place, it helped to strengthen and unite
in their opposition the coastal tribes to the north of the river
Juba. Secondly, though it made a less dramatic impact to the south
of the river, it is nevertheless contributed directly to the
exodus of the Wardai from the Juba/Daua confluence.
In the north the first Somali town to oppose Bardera was
Lugh, an important trading centre, since Sheik Ibrahim had forbidden
1all trade in ivory. Lugh, however, was quickly defeated. Further
raids against Lugh and against the Rahanwein then led, in 1837, to
an alliance between the Gasar Gudda of Lugh, the Garre, the Galla
and the Rahanwein, all of whom attacked Bardera, though without
success. The immediate result of this failure was the burning
2
of Lugh and its conquest aad oc cup at inn by Bardera.
Once Bardera had gained control of Lugh, the logical extension
of her influence lay in the direction of Brava, which was the terminal
•x
of the caravan routes now dominated by Sheik Ali Gure. The years 
immediately following the sack of Lugh were, therefore, a time of 
in creasing p res sure cn the tribes of south-eastern Somaliland,^
1V. Ferrandi (1903), 277.
^M. Golucci (1924), 81; "Breve Monografia di Bardera", anon. ASMAI. 
Posiz. 171/1-3.
^Guillain (1865), III, p.176.
"^O.Khirston (1869), HI, p.317.
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and they culminated in the sacking of both Baidoa and Brava in
1841. During the next few years, British and American vessels =
visiting the Benadir found that at Brava they were obliged to
pay illegal duty to a 'Sheik Ibrahim, sheriffa of Bardera', and
from this it was plain whose authority was beginning to count on 
2
the coast. It was not until 1843, ih fact, that Bardera was destroyed, 
when a joint Rahanwein and Gasar Gudda expedition completely over-
3
whelmed the Qadariya stronghold. For twenty years the town re- 
mained deserted, razed to the ground, and the major threat it 
had posed to Rahanwein hegemony north of the Juba disappeared as 
suddenly as it had emerged.
Although initially Bardera appears to have remained on good 
terms with the Galla to the south of the xiver Juba and to have 
traded with them, in 1836 two razzias were undertaken against the 
Wardai. This hostility gradually increased, moreover, under Sheik 
Abiker who succeeded Ali Ourre. In 1S39 the Wardai ^re attacked . 
at TTarai, just south-west of Mandera, while the foILowing year they 
were defeated at El Wale,(Gerba) Gol and Seraro in succession.^
^The date 1840 is favoured by: Guillain (1865), III, p. 38; J.S.
Trimingham, Islam in Ethiopia (London, 1952), 241; l.L.Robecchi 
Bricchetti, Somalia e Benadir (Milan, I899), 78. On the other 
hand the date 1838 is favoured by R. Turnbull (Oct. 1957), 311;
Minnis (1950).
"Report on the Proceedings of the French with respect to their aggression 
on the part of the territory of the Iman of Muscat", anon,, 5 Jan. 1842, 
F0.54/4; Hamerton to Bombay Secretary, 2 Jan. 1842, FO.54/15; Christopher's; 
'Journals', 1.0. MSS.13.
7
JU. Ferrandi (1903), 280; Lovatelli to Ministero, 27 March 1893,
Documenti Diplomatic! (Rome, 1895), XIII.
4"Breve Monografia di Bardera", ASMAI.. Posiz, 17l/l-5«
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These defeats seriously weakened them at a time when they were 
being persistently harassed by a more tenacious enemy further 
west.
During the 1840s the Garre and the Boran were raiding
as far east as Gerba Gelo and once or twice as far south as El
Wak. As a result of these attacks the Wardai were forced to mtreat
1from the river Daua by the middle of the decade. The offensive
was carried on sgainst them by the Garre, who allied themselves
to the Garre Murre, the Gasar Gudda, the Gobawein and the Shermoga,
all of them tribes of the Lugh area who were known collectively as
the Her Galana, and together they pushed the Wardai as fax south 
2as Bardera. By the end of the decade the northern limits of the
Wardai were generally represented as being somewhere to the south
■3
of Bardera and to the west not further north than Dif.
Both the Garre and the Boran filled the gap that had been 
left by the Wardai. However, the growing strength of the Garre, their 
ability to rely cn support frcm the Rer Galana and also from Somali 
tribes around Bardera, introduced an element of instability into 
any possible Boran/Gaire con dominion of the area. Taken together
1Information given by Ali Cham ale a suggests the Wardai were on the 
banks of the Daua in 1840, sees D ’Avezac, B.S.G.P. (1842?, 97. This 
is supported by information given by Muhammad Arrali lime Sayd Ali in 
1841 to D ’Abbadies Geographic & l^thiopie (Paris, 1890), 333* They 
may still have been there in 3843, see: Christopher, T.B.G.S. (1844), 
393; but by 1848 there were Garre in Lebine which is opposite Lugh, 
see: Guillain (1857), III, p.177.
^Pease, 1927, VG/m/4/a/l.
^Leon des Avanchers, B.S.G.P. (1859), 161, 359; Brenner (1868), 364;';
J.Christie (1876), 191; D ’Afcbadie (0890), 250; Zoli (1927>, 140.
these Somali clans could stake their own claim independently of 
the Boran, and in 1846-8 they drove the Boran from the Lugh area, 
ousted them from Oddo country and defeated them at Bua Hererr, 
driving them westwards towards Sankurar. The Garre undoubtedly 
wished to gain occlusive control over an area that would allow 
them to maintain clo se contact with other Somali clans further 
ncrth and east; their struggle against the Boran would appear to 
have had this limited objective since all the fighting took place 
in areas immediately adjacent to Somali country. Further south­
west, in the Wajir area and to the west of Bardera, the Boran and 
their Ajuran shegats still retained control and the Garre did not
i
attempt to oust them from these areas.
Nothing is known of the part played by the Ogaden Darod in
the Rahanwein /Bardera wars, or what their role was in the defeat
of the Wardai in the 1840s. But the hitherto accepted interpretation
is that the Ogaden and Marehan Somali tried to cross the Juba between
Bardera and Dugh in 1842 but were defeated, that in 1844 they tried
again and this time were allowed to come as she gat s. and that three
2years later they treacherously slaughtered the Galla and, taking
Vannutelli & C. Gitemi (1899), 139; Gurreh District Political 
Book, PC/NPD/4/1/2. However, Haberland (1963), 20, gives 1870 
as the date of t his defeat. The traditional view of the Boran-Garre 
alliance is that it was short-lived and an expedient measure to 
defeat the Wardai, see: P.T.W.Baxter (1955), 61.
R. Gani, II Giubaland (Naples, 192l), 20; Barton^ "Origins of the Galla 
and Somali1', J.E.A.N.H.S. (1924), 165; Salkeld, "AJourney across 
Jubaland", G.J.. XLVI (1915). 20; P. Elliott, "jubaland Sad its in­
habitants", G.J.. XL! (1913), 538; I.M.Lewis (1955), 48; T. S. Thomas 
(1917), 8; T.H.R.Cashmore, "A Note on the chronology of the Wa Nyika 
of the Kenya Coast", g.H.R.. LVII (l96l), 165-6.
them by surprise, annihilated them.'*’
However, there is no evidence of such a crushing defeat 
at this period and this orthodox reconstruction is probably based 
on the misleading synthesis cf two separate and fragmentary tradition 
In the first place, the Garre do remember receiving help from the 
Ogaden in about 1843, and the age-set Samouyia which was initiated 
about that time amongst the Darod is said to have scored a notable 
victory over the Boraa. Quite possibly some Ogaden remained 
behind after the razzia and settled to the south of the river Juba; 
only there is no evidence of a large-scale migration, and it is 
difficult to maintain that “following in the wake of the Gal la, the 
Darod moved into the land south of the Juba between 1842-1848f.
If a one-way movement only is envisaged. The Ogaden migration to 
the south of the river Juba, which is a central theme of another 
set of traditions, took place ten years later as a result of their 
defeat at the hands of the Rahanwein, and not because of any victory 
over the Galla; the crushing defeat of the Wardai came later still 
and took three years to accomplish.
The Ogaden raid around 1848 was connected with the initiation 
of an age-set, and the spoils that were won had to be shared with
^See for instance C.W.Hobley (1929). H0bley says that 30,000 head 
of cattle were captured, 80,000 women and children were taken 
prisoners and 2,000 elders and chiefs were killed. Other authors 
vary the figures but the story is substantially the same.
2Salkeld (1909), PG/ffl'D/4/6/l; J.W.K.Pease, An Ethnological Treatise 
on the Gurreh tribe, PC/HFD/4/8/i.
%.M.Lewis (1955), 48.- X cannot -find any mention cf a Darod/flalla
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their Elai hosts. It was their dissatisfaction with the proportion
of spoils that bad to be surrendered to the Elia, and also the
1
small say they were allowed in cabila affairs, that gradually
led the Ogaden to demand certain concessions. Later, when these
were refused, the Darod moved from Bur Hacaba to Mattagcri, where
they concentrated themselves, aad where they were defeated by the 
2
Elai in 1857.
It was this defeat of the Darod that made it necessary for 
them to retreat towards the Juba. The Aulihan, Marehan and some Dir 
crossed at Bardera; the Scechal, Herti and other Ogaden crossed 
at Gheilab and Dacatch,a little to the south, after fighting a 
rearguard actich against the Elai at Raccale. It is sometimes 
maintained that, immediately following their defeat at Matagoi, 
a group of Darod also pushed south towards the lunni, at the 
mouth of the river Juba, and that they crossed the river at Giumbo, 
seeking refuge emongst the Wardai.^ This is unlikely; for one 
thing it overlooks the evidence of Yonder Decken, a German explorer
1 alliance, however, in G-uillain (1857), III, 179-80. Cerulli also 
understands Guillain to say that the Gall a were to the south of the 
Juba, the Somali to the north, sees II Libro degli Zengi, in Somalia 
(Rome, 1857), I, 286, But see l.M.Lewis (i960), 226 for a different 
interpretation.
^ke cabila is a Somali lineage group.
Zoli (1927), 142-3; Monografie, Residenza di Oiuba, Dec. 1907, ASMAI. 
Posiz. 87/1-7. Ihe date 1840 is suggested by ¥.B.Minnis (1950) and 
’Notes on Wajir's Political background1 anon.MSS.
^Zoli (1927), 143; CJ.Ettore, ’’L'oltre Giuba sotto la dominazione 
inglese”, R.G. (1925), 330; Salkeld, 1909 and P.R.Prench and 
Gpt. Barrett, 1913, PC/NPD/4/6/l.
4f.Carletti, Attraverso il Benadirr (Viterbo. 1910), 326j
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who visited Giumbo in 1864, while it appears ihat the Darod did
1
in fact cross the Juba at Giumbo, only several years later.
It is interesting to note that when Yon der Decken sailed up 
the river Juba in 1865, he did noearn of any Darod living amongst 
the Wardai. The Ogaden TOre still to be found amongst the Bor an, 
though their position had become increasingly difficult. The re­
building of Bardera in 1863 by $heik Muhammad Eden led to frequent
Somali raids against the Galla, until in 1865 the Boran refused to
2allow the Ogaden access to the wells at El Wak and Wajir. The
3Boran were at first defeated in the war that folio*ied. However, 
in November 1865 the Boran were said to be planning an attack ax 
Yon cfer Decken, while later they regrouped and ejected the Darod 
from the area, so that the latter were obliged to retreat southwards
M.B.Bertazzi, Goscia, ASMAI. Posiz, 17l/l-5; Turnbull (Oct. 1957), 311.
0^* Kerston (1868), III, p.295; Monografie, Dec. 1907, ASMAI. Posiz. 
87/l~7; Consul "to Sec. of State, 1 Nov. 1865, American Consular 
Records: Zanzibar, 1862-69, T.100 series, Roll 5.
L^. Yannutelli 6b C. Citerni (1899), 193; Breve Monografie di 
Bardera, anon., ASMAI. Posiz. 171/1-5*
3Although the year 1865 is mentioned as that of the love-feast 
and slaughter of the Gal la by J.S.ICirkman, Men and Monuments on 
the East African Coast (London, 1964), 43; I.M .Lewis (1965), 30;
B.Cerulli, "II libro degli Zengi", Somalia (Rome, 1957), I, 287, 
it is not' likely to be a reference to this defeat. I suspeciithat 
the Darod attack on the Wardai at Afmadu in 1867 is what is referred 
to in traditions as the love-feast of the Galla and D&rod.
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and seek permission to live amongst the Wardai. It appears
that the Darod/fardai alliance -was entered into cynically by
the former as a mhtter of necessity, and from the start the Darod
seemed intent on strengthening their position so that they could
eventually overthrow their hosts.
The Darod sought assistance from several of their clans
and sub-clans that lived along the Benadir, and these gradually
made their way towards the Juba. After living amongst the Wardai
for only a year, the Darod attacked them at Afmadu in 1867 and de- 
2feated them. The fighting lasted from 1867 to 1869 and the Wardai 
were successfully defeated at Tabda, Guloli and 1*1 lain. The 
Somali offensive had achieved dramatic results indeed: within
three years ‘the Wardai had been pushed back to the Tana, and many 
were forced to cross the river and seek refuge along its southern 
bank. Those groups that remained to the north of the Tana sought 
refuge along the coast at Anpl.a or behind the swamp of 2Siwa la 
ICombe, where they were welcomed by the Sultan Ahmed bin Sultan
•i
J.Simmons, nA suppressed passage in Livingstone’ s last Journal 
relating to the death of the Baron Von der Decken", J.R.A.S.,
(1936), 342.
Q
It has been suggested that the Somali attacked the Wardai because 
the l&fcfcer had been weakened by an outbredc of smallpox, see: K.Turnbull 
(Oct. 1957), 311; l.H.Lewis (i960), 226. Certainly the outbreaks 
of epidemic cholera amongst the Boran in 1865 and 1867 never 
reached the mouth of the Juba or the coast,$ see: Christie (1876), 192.
^oli (1927), 144; V.Rossetto, Memoria sul Basso Ciuba (Rome, n.d.), 36.
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(generally knowi as Simba) of Witu.1 At ¥ltu Godana Jara's Wardai
were dram into the Sultan's dispute with the Arabs of Lamu, and
2they helped him maintain his jndependence after 1866.
Throughout this period the Wardai Gall a were also being
attacked by Masai and Kamba moran. and in 1860 Dado Bone at, haiyu
3
gada of the Tana river Galla, had been murdered by Masai. Hemmed 
in on all sides, they were frequently raided and by the end of 
theaentury had been all but annihilated in these wars of attrition.
In 1872, the Swahili chief of Kau on the river Ozi combined with 
the Somali and destroyed the power of the Galla long the coast 
to the south of the river Tana.^- Their declining strength was 
reflected in the gradual abandonment of tribute normally paid 
to them, especially in the coastal toms. Yet until 1886 the Wardai 
south of the Tana still received one tusk from every elephant killed 
in the area, and it was only in that year that combined Somali and
5Kamba attacks so reduced the Galla^as to deny them even this tribute.
A
A. Werner, J.A.S. (1914-)* 122; ’'Memorandum re. the sultanate of Witu", 
enclosed in Malet to Granville, 4 June 1885, EO.84/1714.
^Bismarck to Munster, June 1885, EO.CP.5156. A. Werner met Godana
Jara in 1912, see A. Warner, ibid.
©
^Lindblom, The Akamba in British Bast Africa (Ubnsala, 1916), 19;
James Kirkman, l,The History of the coast cf East Africa", in 
FirMmde to Bast .African History, ed. M. Posnansky (London, 1966), 105; 
C. New /1874)7 162-3; T.H.R.Cashmore, T.N.R. (l96l). 166. Dr. Cashnore, 
however, thhks Dado was killed in 1857-8'.
'^Sir Charles Eliot, uThe native races of British East Africa",
East African Quarterly. lino, 7 (1905), 471.
%cDougall (1914), Do/MAL/2/3; Holmwood toSalisbury, 2 March 1877, 
E0.84/1849. ’J
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To the north, the riyer Tana neveijfprovided an effective 
harrier to Somali raids, though the sheer extent of their recent 
conquests made it unnecessary for the Darod to settle permanently 
further to the south. In years^ )f drought and during the dry season 
the Somali frequently crossed the Tana in. search of water and 
better grazing. From 1874 there are a number of references to 
the ford at Massa bring used to facilitate a temporary Somali 
occupation of the right-hand side of the river, and the Galla 
were unable to offer any serious resistance to these iicursions.
In fact, when the river Tana was visited in 1888 by Churchill, a 
British Vice-Consul at Zanzibar, it appeared to him that the Galla 
were ’’rapidly becoming extinct”. He suggested two reasons for this. 
The first, that they were a ’’puny and effete race”, was wide of 
the mark and confused the effect with the cause. The second reason,
however, was that ’’they generally have herds of cattle aid sheep...
2this draws the cupidity cf the marauding Masai and Somali tribes”.
The observation was pertinent, and it is somehow ironic that so 
many of the peoples who had lived in dependence cn the Wardai had 
refrained from owning cattle, because it would have exposed them
*^ Demhardt (1884), 193; de Pree, "Notes on a Journey on the Tana 
River, July-Sept. 1899", G.J., XVII (l90l), 513; J. Bell Smith to
I.B.F.A.Co,, 17 Oct. 1889, FQ.84/2007. Bp to now it has been taken 
for granted that ”It wais not until 1909 that the Somalis reached the 
Tana river", Prysdale (1964), 38. See also, I.M.Lewis, ’The Problem 
of the H.F.D. of Kenya", Race. V (1963), 55; D. A. Low, "British East 
Africa: The establishment of British rule 1895-1912 \tf History of 
Fast Africa, ed. V. Harlow & F.M.Chilver (1965), 11,^31.
2
Churchill, "Memorandum on the Tana river”, 25 July 1888, encl. in
C. to E.-S., 21 Aug. 1888, ff0.84/l905.
to precisely this sort of danger:*1* whereas the Wardai themselves 
never appreciated the depredations they were encouraging in a 
similar position - through possessing coveted goods that could not 
he adequately protected. On the coast at Anola end Port Dumford 
the Wardai were periodically raided, while at Witu they suffered
N 2badly at the hands of the Somali in 1884 and 1888. Though the
Wardai did not become extinct, they were never againja power to be
reckoned with.
Most of the Darod who crossed the river Juba moved on
further inland to the west or. the south-west, but there were some
who remained on the coast. In 1868, a few Mijertein Hert i arrived
from Berbera by sea and settled at Kismayu in order to trade, "much
■2
to the disgust of other Somali", according to Christie. They were 
later strengthened by further contingents arriving over-land and, 
in alliance with the Ogaden f ran Afmadu, they were able to drive 
off the Tunni to the north as well as the Galla remnants to the 
south. ^  The Galla presented no further problem as they t©re clearly 
unable to offer further resistance, but the position of the~Tunni
1
e.g. the Pokomo who did not own cattle for this reason, see:
V/.A.Chanler, Through Jungle and Desert (London, 1896), 48*
“TlcDougall (1914), DC/KAL/2/3; C.W.Hobley (1929), 176-8; E.-S. to 
S. 21 Aug. 1888, FO.84/19O8; Holmwood to S., 2 March 1887 FO.CP.5497
^James Christie (1876), 202.
4Zoli (1927), 146; C.'Ettore, R.O. (1925), 330; Sir Bartle Frere, 
"Memorandum on the position and authority of the Sultan of Zanzibar" 
17 April 1873, FO.96/176.
was different. They were not only quite strong, but they also
had powerful allies to whom they could turn in times of need, 
and the following year, helped by the VJazegua Wagosha and %ai 
Rahanwein, they attacked both the Herti and the Ogaden. The
Tunni were once again defeated. However, this time the fight
had been close, and they now turned to Ahmed Yusuf, the powerful
Sheik of Geledi, for the assistance they needed to overcome the Darod
In 1870 Yusuf headed an alliance that defeated the Herti and drove
them back to Kismayu. Their defeat might have been serious if the
Mi^ertein had not previously sought the help of the Governor of Lamu
2who, coming to their aid, had enabled them to hold the town.
This time .ntervention on the part of Lamu, an timately 
of Zanzibar, into Somali politics at the mouth of the river Juba 
was to have important consequences. For the interest first shown 
by an Arab ruler in this area was later shared by other Suropean 
powers, and the foothold that Zanzibar had acquired in Kismayu was 
to be the first step towards the eventual dismemberment of the Somali 
peoples.
The prompt assistance given to the Herti had been motivated by 
commercial considerations. The Governor of Lamu, who had apparently 
acted in his own interests and to encourage private trade, favoured
G. Ferrari (1910), 1226; Zoli (1927), 145-146.
O
T.S.Thomas (1917), 21; Ghurchill to'Sec. of Sta<fce for India,
8 Nov. 1870, I.0.Secret Department/49.
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1
the settlement of Kismayu, and Majid the Sultan cf Zanzibar,
who saw the means of turning the whole affair to his own advantage,
 ^2readily agreed. The potentialities of the area were easy to per­
ceive, and Kirk, the British Consul at Zanzibar, was not making an 
adventurous prediction when he wrote, "although at present trade 
at Kismayu is an significant there oan be little doubt in time it
3will rise to importance as the natural harbour of the river Juba"
The death cf Majid in 1870, however, delayed further action, and 
it was not until two years later that Sef Nur was appointed V/ali 
and sent to Kismayu with ten men.^ But this force was inadequate and
in 1874 Hamed bin Hamed, one of the most vigorous and able Arab
5administrators, took over the town supported by 80 troops.
Hamed's first task was to complete the stone fort which would
house the garrison, and be then suggested that a small mud fortifi­
cation should be built at the mouth of the river Juba so that he 
could collect revenue. At the same time his presence guaranteed the 
safety of Kismayu for the Herti, and through the adroit selection
1ICirk to 12 July 1870, SO.84/1325.
2Later Kirk claimed to have been instrumental in Majid's decision 
and his correspondence at the time suggests that this might have 
been so: J. Kirk, "Visit to the Coast of Somaliland", P.R.G-.S.,
;XVII no. 5 (1873), 342.
^Kirk to Granville, 31 lay 1873, 3?0.84/1374.
^Between 1870 and 1872 there was an unofficial Arat Governor at Kismayu.
Churchill to Sec., 8 Nov. 3870, I.0.Secret Dep artment/49; ^oli (l927), 153*
5Holmwood,"Tour of the North coast of Zanzibar", November 1874,
K). 84/1423.
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of an ally they had wen the first round in their struggle with 
the Tunni for control of the south bank of the river Juba.
The Tunni, however, were unlucky in their attempt to out­
manoeuvre their enemies. In K375 the Egyptian Government had 
sent McKillojS Pasha, a retired Scots admiral, on an expedition 
designed to bring the whole of Somaliland under Egyptian control.^ 
McKillop sailed down the East African Coast and, through intrigue, 
managed to gain control of Brava which had surrendered without 
fighting. At Brava there were two Tunni chiefs who offered to 
accompany the Egyptian force to Kismayu and there to act as 
intermediaries between the invaders and the local inhabitants.
Kismayu was only taken after a fight and after 350 troops with
2camp equipage, artillery and horses had been landed and deployed.
The Tunni then attempted to involve the Egyptian troops in their 
own quarrels with the Herti and also with the Wagosha tribes under 
Purahan Mucica, In this way, they hoped to re-establish control 
over the river Juba at little cost to themselves. Pirst, the Tunni 
p ersuaded McKillop to ask the Wagosha to come and pay homage to 
the Egyptians, and then, after Mucica had arrived at Kismayu at the 
head of a delegation, the Tunni insinuated that he was un trustworthy;
^Stantcn to Derby, 14 Hov. 1875, FG*14l/94; I have lookieBiatisomes 
■ of the broader implications of this expedition in an article entitled; 
”Kirk and the Egyptian invasion of East Africa in 1875; a re­
assessment”, J.A.H. forthcoming.
Sc. to Derby, 11 Nov. 1875, no. 158, FO.84/1417.
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in the ensuing m&Lee he was killed by the Egyptians, perhaps 
inadvertently. This initial success, however, brought no 
real benefit to the Tunni. 3Tor the Wagosha, who ee strength had 
in no way diminished, chose as their new chief Uassib Punda who was 
a redoubtable fighter and an ex-Tunni slave. Under his leadership 
hostility between the two groups became even more intense. At 
the same time, the Egyptians tried to extricate themselves from 
their premature involvement in a sterile conflict. Since the Herti 
alone were to be found in the vviieinity of Kismayu, where the 
Egyptians were stationed, McKillop decided to support them instead 
of the Tunni who were found to the no rfch of the river. The former 
were therefore able to gain control of Giumbo and the northern side 
of the Juba. ^
But within a month the Egyptians had left, and the Sultan of 
Zanzibar, Said Barghash, once again re-established his position 
along the coast. Sporadic fighting between the Tunni and the Darod 
continued, until in 1878 the Herti were pushed back to the south 
of the river. Since the Tunni were naturally hostile towards the 
Arabs it became increasingly important to prevent them from gaining 
control over the mouth of the river, for this would also have given 
them control over the riverine trade. The re-building and occupation
Mucica was iBad of. all the Wagosha, except for the Wazegua who lived 
in their own villages and supported the Tunhj, see: P^well-Cotton
(1932); G. Ferrari (1910), 1232; V.L.Grotanelli (1953), 258.
Sl.B.Bertazzi, >'Goseia", ASMAI. Posiz. 171/1-5; Zoli (1927), 150, 154.
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of (*iumbo by Zanzibar troops seemed inevitable, though it was
1
another three years before the necessary steps were taken.
Part of the delay can probably be explained by the tensions that
developed between the Herti and the Arabs in 1880, when the
Wali accepted a flag from a Freneh ship that had called at
Kismayu. The Herti destroyed the flag and killed an Arab asl-cari.
Threatened by the garrison, they refused to cooperate and, after
a Herti had been killed, general fighting broke out, with only
the Osman Mahmoud and the Muhammad Ismail sections of the Herti
2trying to keep on good terms with the GrO'vernor. Thus, when in 
1881 the Sultan decided that Griumbo should be re-occupied and asked 
for assistance from the Herti, the latter refused and it was the 
Muhammad Zubeir Ogad^h who offered their support.
This action on the part of the Muhammad Zubeir led to a bitter
as early as 1873 Kirk had noticed two distinct settlements of Somali 
around Kismayu, the Herti and the Ogaden, the 2© had been no more 
than the usual rivalry between them and on many occasions they had 
helped each other in their struggles against the Tunni. Now, however, 
their rivalry was based on a blood feud since Muhammad Ismail, head 
of the Herti, had committed suicide after being arrested by the 
Arabs and their Ogaden allies. Ali Nahar, one of the most respected
1K._ to S., 12 Nov. 1878, FO.84/1515; G. Revoil, Voyage au Gap des 
Aromates (Paris, 1880), 62.
schism between them
[hi oh
many years. Although
2Zoli (1927), 154.
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Ilerti, escapedjdetention and the Herti revolted, attacking the Mali's
house at Kismayu. The Arabs succeeded in stationing fifty troops
at Gobwen, on the river Juba, but they were exp osed to frequent
1attacks tom the Herti.
The fighting continued till 1884» when the Wall tried to make
2peace on the terms of the Herti. Hut the relationship between the 
small garrison and the Somali inhabitants in and around Kismayu 
had deteriorated at the time that they were about to be scrutinised 
from the outside. However, the yet increasing interest on the 
part of European countries in the African littoral had not escaped 
the Sultan's notice, and in 1885 the garrison at Kismayu was 
doubled; while Ali bin Abdullah was sent to P°rt Durnford to act 
as the Sultan's akida and to establish a small station, supported 
by ten to twelve askari and flying the Sultan's flag. These 
moves were undertaken none too soon, for Port Durnford had already 
been visited several times by Germans interested in that part of 
the coast. Indeed, Kirk had already written of these initiatives 
"there certainly e Germans/... will find no rival, as there is 
not a village or settlement of any sort on its banks and no sign 
of possession";^ and it was soon being predicted in a German
1IC. to G., 31 May 1873, FO.84/1374; G.Revoil, "Voyage ohez les
Benadirs, les gomalis et les Bayouns",,Tour du Monde, LVI (1888), 594.
2Zoli (1927), 154.
Commander Forsyth^tS Cpt. Brackenbury, 7 Dec. 1889, FQ.84/2077.
TC. to G., 27 Feb. 1885, FO.84/1724.
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newspaper that Port Dumford would become the first important
settlement of the German East Africa Company on the Benadir /sicj^
coast, and that it would be known as Hohenzollern harbour. *"
Then, at about the time that the Kismayu garrison was being
doubled, Ce©chi, an Italian explorer who had been sent an an
official mission to East Africa, arrived at Zanzibar and asked
for a concession of the mouth of the river Juba, on condition
that the revenue from eustoms|duties was divided equally between
Zanzibar and the Italian Government. This request was rejected
brusquely, though later Italy was to claim that it had in fact 
2been accepted.
But growing European interest in the East African mainland
also led in 1886 to the appointment of a Joint delimitation 
3Commission, which visited the coast in an attempt to ascertain 
the limits of the Sultan's dominions. On the 24th March they visited 
ICismayu and heard evidence frm the Somali chiefs about their re­
lationship with the Sultan, as they understood it. The questions 
and answers offer a fascinating glimpse of Somali cunning and some 
indication of how completely they controlled the situation:
National Zeitung, 24 November 1886.
K^. to S., 15 Sept. 1885, PO.84/1730. See also for a full account, 
Robert L. Hess, "Italy, Zanzibar and Somalia 1885-1S93'1, in Boston 
University Papers cn African History, ed. J. Butler (Boston, 196 ).
3 * -The Commission was made up of Britain, Prance and Germany.
Q. does ICismayu belong to the Sultan Said Barghash?
A. You can see his flag. Q. Are you subjects of ihe
Sultan? A. We would prefer to give you an answer
tonight. Q. tell us simply if you o bey the orders
of the Multan,yes or no? A. In the town cf Kismayu
we obey him; outside it is another matter; we will 
see .b&a  ^ later. Q. The country between Kismayu
and the river Juba, does it belong to the Sultan or 
to the Somalis? A. Why do you ask us that question^
Q. We want to know if this country belongs to the 
Sultan and if you obey him. Answer us that. A. If it 
is a question of a good thing we obey him, if it is a 
bad thing we don't obey him. Q. Gan the Sultan's 
soldiers go from here to Lamu without being attacked?
A, If there is no war theycan pass. Q. Are you satis­
fied with the way In which the Pul tan is established at 
Kismayu? A, The Sultan is in the town; we are outside; 
there is peace between us.T
To Kitchener, whowas the British representative on the
Commission, "the Somali chiefs at Kismayu appeared on examination
2to be doubtfully loyal subjects of the Sultan cf Zanzibari' The 
mistake Kitchener made, however, was to imagine that the Somali 
had ever been "subjects" of the Sultan, and the last sentence 
of their testimony summed up their relationship with the garrison 
perfectly. It indicated that the Sultan's writo was confined to 
■the walls of the town and, whenever attenpts were made to prove 
that the Somali lived within the Sultan's dominions, the evidence 
always turned, in one form or another, on the minuscule presence 
of an Arab force at Kismayu. It was here that the Somali paid
4
Enclosed in K. to Rosebery, 30 April 1886, EO.84/1798. The original 
is in Erench, the translation is mine.
TC. to S., 9 April 1886 no. 11, FO.84/1798.
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customs duty. It -was from this port, and generally in the 
Sultan’s ships, that they travelled to Zanzibar bringing presents. 
Visitors to the coast generally obtained passes fromthe Sultan, 
and yet the Somali had also made it very clear that anyone who lad 
an interest in their land outside Kismayu town had to deal direct 
with them and not through the Sultan’s agents; "The Sultan is 
in the town; we are outside”. The individual traveller who relied 
on the good offices of Zanzibar officials alone got nowhere.'1'
In fact nothing seems to have changed since 1873> when Sir Bartle 
Frere observed that ’’where the Galla aad Somali tribes come down 
to the coast ^Ehe Sultan//^., authority is still less recognised 
beyond his Arab garrisons”, then mentioning specifically that the 
Somali at Kismayu ”do not recognise the Sultan authority”.
In effect, the position of the Sultan’s forces at Kismayu 
was extremely delicate and required the most careful handling.
They were unable to impose their authority without the cooperation 
of the Somali themselves - and what sort of authority was that? - 
and being subjected to conflicting pressures were continually 
forced to compromise. The apparent cause of the deteriorating 
relationship between the Herti and the Zanzibar garrison in the
G^. Revoil, Tour du Monde (188), 390 wrote, ”1’autorite de Said 
Bargach ne depasse pas les murs de la ville”. He alsp noted 
how ineffectual the Sultan’s letter was and how it did not enable 
him to go beyond the walls, of Kismayu.
^Frere, "Memorandum on the position and authority of the Sultan 
of Zainzibar”, 17 April 1873, F0.96/l76.
* , Jt
t
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1880s lay in the latter* s attempt to maintain a closer control 
over the local trade up the Juba rivei|)y building a fort at 
its mouth. As the main traders, the Herti had the most to lose, 
but there was in fact another quite different reason. At a time 
of increasing contact between the coa&t and visiting European 
ships, the Somali were concerned about their own relationship with 
European agents and the^were determined to secure their own bar­
gaining positions. The possibility that Zanzibar might utilise 
the friendly assistance of a European power to increase its 
own authprity was feared and visits from foreign ships were 
generally greeted with suspicion.
Somali reaction to foreign visitors at Kismayu or at the mouth 
of the xiver Juba had never been encouraging, even at the best of 
times. From the very end of the 23th century, when several British 
sailors were murdered at the mouth of the river, the Somali had 
gained a decidedly bad reputation,^ and the India Pilot warned
all ships that "the inhabitants cf these towns ^ he Benadir portsj
2like those of Juba may be considered hostile to Europeans".
But more significantly, when a group of Frenchmen attempted, 
without success, to establish themselves <n the river Juba in -1870, 
one of their men was killed by a Somali, said to have teen exasperated
^Captain's Logs, Daealus, 24-25 Bee. 1898, Adm.5l/l427; A. Bissell,
"A Voyage from England to the Red Sea", in Dalrymple*s Nautical Memoirs 
(London, 1806), I no. 7, p. 16; E. Reclus, Nguvelle Geferaphie 
Universelle (Paris, 1888), XIII, p.184.
2J. Horsburgh, Directions for sailing to and from the East Indies 
China etc. (London, 1809) * I» p. 187.
at the "arbitrary treatment he had received at the hands of
the Arab governor of ICismayu. and attributed it to the presence
of white men".1 Again ten years later, when the Waii in order
to make a good impression on Europeans accepted a flag from a
French ship that called at Kismayu, we have seen the troubles
that ensued. Yet these bad been largly due to the fact that the
2Herti were afraid they might come under French control.
Finally, in 1886 Dr. Juhlke was murdered after insulting a
Somali,"* and two years 1 atea^ bhey made theiijposition quite clear;
"Somalis on the coast here", the British Consul at Zanzibar
telegraphed back to Lord Salisbury, the Foreign Secretary, "also
sent to inform Sultan that they have the power and will expel any
Europeans who try to ssttle to Kismayu".^ As a result of this
telegram, Lord Salisbury tried to dissuade the Italian Government
who were hoping to colonise this part of the coast, from taking
any immediate action, and warning that any attempt to gain
control of Kismayu would meet with serious resistance from the 
5Somali.
^Ghurchill to Sec. of India, 8 Nov. 1310, 1.0. Secret Department/49-
2See page 85 
3
H. to 7 pec. 1886 and H. to I., 21 Dec. 1386, FO.84/1776.
It was said that Dr. Juhlke was trying to forestall Italian 
initiatives on the river Juba.
^Evan-Smith to S., 27 July 1888, no. 55> FO.84/1908. The Somali 
mentioned this at a time when the Sultan was under considerable and 
obvious pressure to cede Kismayu to the Italians, see; R.L.Hess in 
Boston University Papers on African History, ed. J. Butler (Boston,lg6gy- - —
5s. to Kennedy, 13 Sept. 1888, FO.84/1896,
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The Somali attitude to European intervention,however, was
not entirely hostile. It seems in fact that they were prepared
to accept a European presence at Kismayu, and even to welcome
it, but only ontheirown terms. Their apparent xenophobia was
largely directed towards Zanzibar, and their main fear was that
some arrangement would be made without their being consulted.
That wss the cne thing the Somali would not tolerate; any bargain
was to be struck with them, and they giadetthat abundantly clear.
Eor cne thing, the Somali had already benefitted very con-
considerably from itinerant Europeans, so far at little cost to
themselves. When Denhardt visited Kismayu in 1885, Sheik Ali Nahar
of the Mijertein signed a treaty ceding all his land in return
1
for "large gratuities". A few years later the same land was
once again ceded to Dr. Juhlke after suitable payment, and when the
2
Italians afterwards visited Kismayu the performance was repeated.
By 1889 the Imperial British East Africa Company (i.B.E.A.Co.) 
also trying to get treaties signed, but the prices had risen through 
competitor; Murgham Tusuf, head of the Muhammad Zubeir, told the 
Company* s agent that while willing to cede his land prompt action 
was necessary. Thus the Somali also were actively engaged in the
^Simons to E.-S., 2 Dec. enclosedii E.-S. to S., 4 Dec. 1889, EO.84/2059.
2About £55 changed hands and Dr. Juhlke was asked not to tell the other 
chiefs. Holmwood to Anderson, 23 Nov. 1886, EO.84/1776; Bumney to 
S., 27 Aug. 1885, EO.84/1707; II Ministero Esteri Germanico al 
Ministero, "Memoria", June 1886, ASMAI. Posiz. 55/l™l; uBecent changes 
in the Map of East Africa. Based on the Kolonial Politische ICorrespondenz, 
a weekly newspaper published by the Soc. for German colonisation, a weekly
search for revenue and offered to cede their territory to any
1"bidder who named the right price.
To each and every European power concerned these treaties
had a political significance, but i t seems more than probable
that this significance was not perceived by the Somali themselves.
Commenting with a frankness that was malicious3y motivated, the
British Vice-Consul at Lamu noted that the German treaties were
purely commercial, and this surely must have been the way they
o
appeared to the local contracting parties. The concept of ceding
land was foreign to Somali pastoralists, whereas the payment of
money for friendship was readily understood: the Somali later
thought they were being paid to keep the peace and that this was
a symbol of their own autonomy and the subservient status of the
to
European visitors. Of course,/the Europeans the acceptance of
money aid of a regular^p,ayment was considered evidence enough as
to who were the masters. Tet Somalis like Sheik Ali Nahar, who had
long received a monthly stipend of eight dollars from the Sultan 
3of Zanzibar, would hardly have considered themselves in the employment
newspaper published by the Soc. for German colonisation, J. Wagner1 s 
'Deutsch-Ost Afrika'and other publications of the German East 
Africa Company ", P.R.G.S.. n.s. IX no. 8 (1887), 492.
1E.-S. to S.,7 Dec.1889, K).84/l984.
%andys to Portal, 6 Aug. 1889, Eo.CP.5977.
to E.-S., 2 Dec. in E.-S. to Salisbury, 4 Bee. 1889, EO.84/2059.
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of the Sultan or even particularly beholden for the cash - 
after 'all, they knew they were being paid 'protection money*
to avoid trouble; "Said i bara sella ma i bara fitna" was a
current epigram, the Sultan wanted peace not war.'1* When tie 
seme Somali were paid regularly by the X.B.E.A.Co., they per­
ceived no difference.
On the eve of the partition of Bast Africa, the coastal 
Somali had evidently not yet grasped the significance of the 
events that were rapidly overtaking them, Their relationship 
with the British Company, andiater with the British Government, 
was complicated by their past experien ce cf Zanzibar authority 
along the coast. Their problem lay In the adjustments they would 
have to make in the face of a new centre of power. Inland, the 
most important single development had been the decline of the Boran 
and the virtual collapse of the Wardai Galla, Here the problem 
consisted in the xelative vacuum of power and in the ensuing competition 
to fill the empj# spaces. Tribes on the perimeter were brought into 
closer touch with each other and converged on the savannah plains 
of northern Kenya. The greatest and most persistent pressure came 
from the Somali in the north; later the Ethiopians advanced from 
the west, but from quite early on there had also been important
population movements into the area from south of lake Rudolf itself.
G^, Revoil, Tour du Monde, L (I885), 195.
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The first:; recorded attempt of the Laikipiak Masai to extend
their power as far as the Lorian Swamp appears to have been frustrated
by the Wctrdai or their allies at the beginning of the 19th century.'1'
Nevertheless, this was a period when the strength cf the Laikipiak
was rapidly increasing through their assimilation of other defeated
Masai clans. The collapse of the Uasin Cishu after a series of II 
2Maasai victories, at the end of the 18th century, led to the entire 
population moving to the Leroghi plateau. A similar movement took 
place some twenty years later, when the II Maasai defeated the Wak- 
wavi in a series of battles near Mt, Meru.^ The Wakwavi migrated 
in sufficient numbers to break through ICikuyu held territory and
H.E.Lambert, "Systems of land tenure in the Kikuyu land unit", 
Qommunicat ioni from the School of African Studies. XXII (University 
of Capetown, 1950)V 13*
2
I have adopted the term 11 Maasai, following Ur. Jacobs, to 
describe the so-called ’Masai proper’ as distinct from the Wakwavi.
See also, A. Low in History of East Africa, ed. R. Oliver and C. Mathew 
(Oxford, 1963), I, 304ff.
^F.J. Jack son, Early Lays an East Africa (London. 1930), 199- 200;
A. Jacobs (1965), 55.
^P.H.Gulliver, Interim Report on Land and Population in the Arusha 
Chiefdom, MS at the Institute of Anthropology, pp. 23-4; T. Wakefield, 
^Routes of native caravans from the coast to the interior of eastern 
Africa", J.R.G-.S., XL (1870), 304-305.
9 6
1finally established themselves amongst the Laikipiak.
The 3Bsuiting population increase cn the Leroghi plateau was
apparently welcomed by t£ie Masai clans already there, but it had
one serious drawback. The increase had taken place before a
succession of very severe droughts which seem to have accelerated
a gradual movement southwards of Laikipiak clans. By the end of
2the 1830s, when the drought was at its worst, considerable pressure
ms being exerted from the north" on the southernmost of the clans,
r 3the Samburu, who were then centred abound Lake Baringto.
Originally, the whole valley from Baringo teethe Leroghi
plateau had been occupied by the S mburu .and they had shared grazing
cl
with other Laikipiak dans as far north-east as the El Barta plains.^ 
Under pressure from these clans, however, they had also moved south, 
but they were now exposed to attack^ fecom the powerful 11 Purki Masai
^G.A.Pischer, Das Masailand (Hamburg, 1885),10; Joseph Thomson,
Through las ail and (London, 1887), 242-3; ICrapf, Vocabulary of the 
Engutuk or the language of the ¥akwafi nation in the interior of 
Equatorial Africa (Tubingham, 1834;. 4: R.P.Burfcon. ZanzibarT City, 
island and coast (London, 1872), XI, 72-3.
^J.L.ICrapf (i960), 142. ICrapf mentions the date 1836.
3Dundas "Notes on the tribes inhabiting the Baringo district of 
the East Africa Protectorate", J.R.A.I., XL (l910), 51; Talbot- 
Smith, "Leroghi Plateau and notes ca the tribes of Baringo District”, 
1908. I am very grateful to A.T.Matson who lent me a copy.
C^. jf.Hobley, "Notes on the Geography and people of the Baringo district 
of the East Africa Protectorate", G. J., XXVIII (1906), 475; HIE,Bader, 
Memorandum, 10 March 1932, ICLQ.EM."Tl934), II, 1706.
1clan to the south-west and faced famine conditions in Baringo 
2
itself. About 1840 the Samburu migrated, leaving behind only
3four villages of the II Doigio clan, and moved north along the
4Suguta river bed, turning past Lomelo towards the El Barta plains.
Here the Lorogushu Samburu came into contact with the Rendille,
who occupied the plains to the south of lake Rudolf as far west
5as the ICerio river. Perhaps they were not altogether strangers,
for it is remarkable that within .two years they had fogged a close
alliance that led to the capture of Mt, Ngiro and Mt. ICulal from
6the Gabra Boran, and Mt, Marsabit frcm the Laikipiak Masai.
The Samburu and Rendille continued their movement towards the
north and north-east. The Boran, for instance, remember being
constantly attacked by Kore, who are generally identified as
7Rendille, when they moved into Wajir in the 1840s or 1850s. By
J.B.Garson, East African Annual (1946/7). 41; J.M. Weatherby,
"Nineteenth century wars in Western Kenya", A-zania, II (1967), 137.
2 *■
C.W.Hobley, G.J. (l906), 475; Baraza with the Samburu at ICisimi 8 Jan. 
1§33 in KLC.EM. (1934), II, 1605.
3The II Doigio were later known as Njemps, sees Dundas, J.R.A.I. , 
(1910), 52; Talbot-Smith (l908); B. Bernadi, "The age system of 
the Masai", Annali Lateranensi XVIII (1955), 260; J.R.Macdonald, 
"Journeys to the north of Uganda", G.J., XIV (1899), 147; "Report 
on the Njemps", n.d. anon, in DC/MBT/^/i; P.H.G.Powell-Gotton, In 
Unknown African Countries (London, I9O4), 162.
^"Report on the Tribes in Baringo District", anon.,1907, NADM,
Nairobi; Bois to P.C.Naivasha, 10 Aug. 1908, and "intelligence Report 
on the Samburu tribe", n.d., anon. DC/MBT/5/1. The Samburu later 
claimed to have taken a route south-east of Maralal.
^Dundas, J.R.A.I. (1910), 51.
^P.Spencer (1965), xviii.
?"Notes on Wajir’s Political Background", MSS.
the 1850s, according to the Samburu age-sets, they had already
reached the northern end of lake Rudolf and were dominating the
1Reshiat tribes in the area. Inevitably, however, they gradually
lost contact with the lake Baringo xegion and, in their expansion,
abandoned the plains to the south aid west of lake Rudolf. These
2 3were now slowly filled by southward moving Turkana and Suk .
By the 1880s the Turkana were raiding the Samburu to the east of 
lake Rudolf and had established themselves on the Loriu plateau.^*
Together with the hostile Laikipiak they now blocked any possible 
S&mburu movement south towards their former grazing areas.
P. Spene.er, A History of the Samburu & Rendille, 1961. Unpublished
This was kindlj/jLent to me by the author.
2The Turkana are an offshoot of the Jie, sees P.H.Gulliver, The 
Family Herds (London, 1955), 5. There is a possibility that the 
Turkana did not exert any pressure on the Samburu to migrate, and 
that the former moved into empty grazing areas, see: R.W.Baker 
Beall, ’'Frontier Tribes", 1932, NADM, Nairobi; Gulliver (1953), 54 
But Cf. _ Weatherby, Azania, II (1967)\ 137.
^For the Suk/Samburu (Njemps) conflict in ihe 1860s see; M.W.H.Beech, 
The Suk (Oxford, 191l), xiii; J. Brasnett, "The Karasuk problem", 
U.JA. XXII (1958), 115; C.W.Hobley, G.J. (1906), 475. A valuable 
analysis of tribal movements in an adjacent area can be found in 
J.W. Weatherby, "Inter-tribal warfare on Mount Flgon in the 19th 
& 20th centuries", U.J.. XXVI (1962).
^The second Turkana raid on the Samburu has been dated 1888, see:
J. Barton, "Notes on the Turkana tribe of British Fast Africa",
J.A.S., XX (l920)l), 110. Also, Von Hohnel, The Discovery of Lakes 
Rudolf and Stephanie (trans. N.Bell), (London, 1894), II, p.230 
suggests raids took place after 1860. See also R.W.Baker-Beall, 
Memorandum, in KXC.FM. (1934), II, p.1763.
^James Christie (1876), 225.
On the whole, the Samburu and Rendille concentrated on fighting
the Boran to the north-east, by now their traditional enemies,
and they coped with the Turkana to the south as best they could. ^
The Rendille nevertheless seem to have grazed over arvast region.
Not merely did they move from the northern end of lake Rudolf to
the Uaso Nyiro and east towards Wajir, but if the explorer Ghanler
can be relied on, and there is no reason to doubt his word, the Rendille
were also to be found to the soxith of the Lorian Swamp, as late as
2
the 1870s, in an area called Kirimar. However, just after this
period there were two outstanding events that combined to make
some retraction of the area under their control absolutely imperative.
As a result cf rinderpest epidemics in the 1880s, which were 
followed by outbreaks of small-pox in the next decade, the fighting 
strength cf the Samburu and Rendille was brought too low for them 
to be ablejbo hold their own against Boran attacks in the north.^
The Turk an a too were increasingly menacing. Thi s was a critical 
time for the Samburu; their loss of stock had been so extensive 
that some became temporary Dorobo and lived by hunting and gathering. 
Others were enslaved by the Turk ana. Those who had stock concentrated
A detailed account of the fighting between the Arial Rendille in 
the south and ICiriami allies of the Lailtipiak can be found in 
R, Spencer (1961), Unpublished, pages 3ff*
2
I have been ithable to identify Kirimar. Ghanler to Directors
I.B.B.A.Oo., 22 Sept. 1893, JO.2/59.
3Donaldson-Smith, Through unknown African countries (London, 1897), 
295-6; V. Bottego (1899), 392; L. Von Hohnel (I894), IX, 2-3.
them in favourable areas like Mt. Marsabit, where they attempted
1to build up slowly their economio and political strength.
Although the Samburu and Bendille expansion northwards had
been achieved largely at the expense of the Boran and their allies,
it is by no means clear how far south the Boran had in fact moved
at the beginning of the 19th century. The suggestion that they had
a foothold in Laikipia and In northern Kikuyu at the time of the
21830 droughts remains to be substantiated. However, it is likely
that the Gabra were near Mr. ICulal at this period, and the Algan
section probably suffered most from Bendille and Samburu attacks
since the explorer Joseph Thomson mentions Galla camels being
3 mkilled in these raids. The Boran, on the other hand, would have 
been further north, and their traditions mention Samburu attacks 
into Dirre but not the area further to the south-west.^
As a result of natural disasters these attacks were contained, 
but what was the position of the Boran further east, and what effect 
did the Somali/Wardai wars of 1867-1869 have on them? It used to
P.Spencer (l96l), 3-4; H.S.H.Gavendish, “Through Somaliland and 
around and south of Lake Budolf", G.J., XI (1898); Von Hohnel (1894), 
II, 230; Ghanler to IBEAGo., 22„Sept. 1893, i10.2/59. It is interestin 
that the one author who claimed the Samburu had many cattle also ad­
mitted that they were kept well out of sight and that he had not seen 
them. A.H.Neumann, Elephant hunting in Bast Equatorial Africa (London, 
1898), 253.
2
The suggest!m was made by K.K.Dundas, “Notes on the origin and 
history of the Kikuyu and Dorobo", Man, VIII (1908), 137. See also: 
A.H.J?acobs (1961'), 67; C. Chenevix Trench, The Desert’s Dusty Pace 
(London, I964), 148; Stigand (1913), 284; J.M.Weatherby, Azania,
II (1967), 137.
^J. Thomson (1887), 225* Algan Gabra had camels but not the Boran.
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be thought that the Boran benefited from the oollgpise of the
Wardai and that they "streamed southwards into the grazing grounds
1which had been vacated by the Wardai". It was understood that
a
with the Ajuran they took possession of the wells at Wajir and El
Wak until the beginning of the 20th century, when the Somali attacked
2them and drove them out.
But the Boran were already in ...control of Wajir and El Wak
3before the crushing defeat of the Wardai, and it is probable that 
this defeat had no immediate effect cn the Boran further inland.^
On the other hand, Somali attacks against the Boran Galla took 
place earlier than has generally been appreciated. Thus several 
sections of the Marehan crossed the Juba inl872 and immediately 
moved north-west against the Boran. Three years later Ogaden attacked 
the Boran at Wajir and on the Lorian Swamp, These early probes, 
especially towards the Lorian Swamp, would explain Rendille tradi­
tions that they were pushed out of this area in the 1870s.
But whether it was these attacks against the Boran or the 
spreadof an epizootic disease that weakened them is a matter for 
speculation;, By 1883, however, they had been so weakened that
^C.H.Stigand (London, 1913), 207.
■ R^.G.Otter, "The impact on East Africa of the Galla and the Somali", 
Rhodes House Library, MSS.Afr. S.520.
Turnbull (Oct. 1957), 310j I.M.Lewis (1963), 54.
^See pages 72ff.
'^However, for a contemporary view that the Boran were extending their
all clans reorganised the ‘harjry^  age-sets in an attempt to
forge a tighter-knit organisation, better able to resist their 
1enemies.
Despite these Somali attacks against the Boran, the Darod, 
after defeating the War&ai Galla, did not attempt similarly 
to crush the former. In fact, had they continued their movement 
towards the Lorian Swamp, they would have outflanked the Boran, 
and this was precisely what Abdi Ibrahim, head of the Abd Wak 
Ogaden, attempted to do himself. In 1886, he led a mixed army 
of Abd Wak, Aulihan, Muhammad 2ubeir, Herti' and Marehan from 
Afmadu to the middle reaches of the Uaso Nyiro to ctest the possi­
bilities of plunder beyond Boran country. This expedition was not 
a success; on the way it was ambushed by Dorobo, Samburu and 
Rendille, but Abdi Ibrahim was sufficiently impressed by the
pasture to return four years later, when he was again defeated by 
2the Rendille, Finally in 1892 he set out with a large force and 
made for Garba Tula; from here he tried to go past Burbalp;y§, 
the scene of a previous defeat, and on this occasion hzr.r -rat
southern frontier,sees James Christie (1876), 200. Also in 
18r67 they did attack Bardera, see: V. Rossetto (1890), 20.
50. Zoli, (1927), 146,' 153.
1P.T.¥.Baxter (19 5 5), 408.
2Simons to IBEACo., 26 May 1890, FO.84/2062; E.Turnbull (Oct. 1957), 
glOff; A.Arkell Hardwick, An Ivory Trader in Worth Kenya (London, 
1 9 03 ), 213; W.A..W. Clarke, Notes on the Battle between Somalis and 
Meru circa 1892 (1 9 3 3 ), Dc/GRA/3/ 4.
1 0 3
many of the Somali deserted him when they learnt cf the route
he intended taking. Those that remained were practically
annihilated by a group of Meru and Rendille, aid Abdi Ibrahim
1himself was killed.
At the same time, the defeat of the Laikipiak by the II Purko
had led to their dispersal at the end of the 1880s, and the
Momonyot section of the Laikipiak retreated to the Lorian, where
they also aame into contact with the Somali but were worsted in 
2a clash. However, these encounters led to no permanent population 
movement; the Somali never settled on the Uaso Hyiro, and the 
Laikipiak did not long remain near the Lorian Swamp. They were 
a symptom of the vacuum of power in the area and they brought the 
Somali into contact with the Samburu, Laikipiak, Rendille and 
Meru within the space cf a few years. There were other ways, 
though, besides war, in which these different peoples were brought 
into contact with each other, and the most important was probably 
trade. So far, all the population movements that have been considered 
resulted in fighting and in competition for pasture; most of them 
had been motivated in the first ±lstance by the desire to find better
1W.A.W.Clarke (1933), DC/GRA/3/4; H.E.Lambert (195O), 13;
Ghanler to IBEACo., 22 Sept. 1893, F0*2/59; A.Donaldson Smith 
(1897), 351.
A.Fischer (1885), 97; K.G.Lindsay, Memorandum, 23 Oct. 1932, 
in KLC. EM., (1934)» II, 1572; "History of Meru", n. d. , anon., in 
Meru District Record Book, FC/CP/l/9/l; Of. W,A.Ghanler (1896), 117, 
who thinks Wakamba & Meru also attacked Momonyot.
grazing <and more abundant supplies of water. These movements 
created their own sort of contacts but they destroyed others. 
Trade, however, favoured intercommunication on a far wider scale 
than war, and it was trade moreover that brought the interior 
and the coast into contact with each other.
Basically, there were two different types of trade affecting 
two distinct areas. In the first place, there ms the coastal 
trade that generally required little organisation; secondly, 
there was the inland caravan trade that frequently involved con­
siderable expense, much planning, aad took months rather than 
days. The coastal trade between the Juba and Tana rivers, with 
the exception of Lamu, ms extremely local. Ocean-going vessels 
that called at Lamu avoided the coast-line to the north, until
they reached the Benadir ports, and trade was therefore carried
1on by canoes and small boats that kept close to the shore.
There was regular contact with Brava, and the Bajuni coast
was visited annually by an Arab factor who bought grain and other
v 2
produce, especially from ICiamboni. However, most trade was 
carried on from Giumbo, at the mouth of the river Juba, which 
maintained regular contact with Pate. When G-iumbo was visited in
*^0. ICerston (I869), II, 277ff; A.B.Bissell in Nautical Memoirs by 
Dalrymple (London, 1806), 1 no. 7, p.40.
2G.W.Devereux, A Cruise in the Gorgon (London, I869), 392.
1799, cattle, slaves and. ivory were offered for barter and these
were to remain throughout most of the century the principle
articles for export.
Most of the ivory probably found its way to the Benadir ports
1whence it was exported to Zanzibar or Arabia. Cattle, on the
other hand, may have been bought and sold in Griumbo itself, though
they were also traded along the coast to passing ships. The usual
procedure was to drive the cattle onto the sea shore, well in
view of a vessel, and thus tojlnvite trade. Bartering for food and
2water was likewise commonplace. After the Wardai had been de­
feated the Mijertein Somali travelled regularly from ICismayu to 
the mouth of the ri'ver Tana, and even to Lamu, a distance of over 
two hundred miles, in order to sell their cattle. They also carried
on an active trade with the coastal Bajun aid would travel south
3to Kodai or ICiamboni. Eventually, hides became the chief export 
item of Kismayu, but this was not until after 1875*^
It was the sale of slaves, however, that brought most profit.
This was the only ir^ de along the coast that involved large sums
*1
For a general picture of the East African ivory trade see;
R.W.Beachey, "The East African ivory trade in the 19th century11,
J.A.H.. VIII no. 2 (1967).
^Blankett to Banier, lg April 1799, Adm.l/69; Log. H.M.S, Barracouta, 
Master Bucuth, 17 Dec. 1823, Adm. 52/3941.
G-.Revoil, Tour du Monde, LVI (1888), 402, 410; Gr.L.Sulivan, Dhow Chasing 
in Zanzibar Waters (London, 1873), 22; W.W.A.Eitzgerald, Travels in 
British East Africa, Zanzibar and Pemba (London. 1898), 437.
I^iolmwood, "Agricultural and commercial Report on the northern dominions 
of the Sultan of Zanzibar11, 1875, EQ.84/1415.
of money and, at times, careful organisation* In the 17th
1
century Giumbo had been a slave exporting town of some significance, 
and it is probable that some export of slaves was still being 
carried on at the beginning of the 1 9th century. However, there 
is not much evidence to support this last point. An Indian trader, 
who had been on four trips to Brava, claimed in 1801 that there 
was a considerable trade in slaves on the river Juba, though this 
may have been an exaggeration since certain other details in his 
repcrt were rather inflated* A few years later, the Sultan of 
Pate also volunteered the information that many slaves were exported 
from the Juba, but he was not exactly well informed about that part 
of the coast. The Sultan was unable, for instance, to name a single 
tribe livingcn the banks of the river, and at the same time he 
suggested that the Juba had its source in Europe (sic). This in­
formation about the slave trade did not fit in well with other de­
tails which Smee and Hardy picked up at Zanzibar from traders who 
had actually visited the Juba mouth itself. Por these traders
'Z
emphasised that little was exported from this region. Moreover, 
when Captain Owen visited the coast in B24, he claimed that far 
from being an export of slaves from this area, slaves were in fact
V. Lobo, Itinerario, Braga Mgs. 813.
2
Opt. Seton to Bombay Sec., 21 Sept. 1801, I.0.Marine Records 
Miscellaneous/586.
Smee S-arcfe? *VI (1841-4), 35ff.
1imported from the south. This fits in with later information 
which mentions tie shipping of slaves from Ibo to the Jubain 
the late fifties, and whatever the position in the first half of 
the 19th century, the trend was oertainly towards importing 
slaves. ^
It was probably not until the beginning of the 1850s that
exceptionally large numbers of slaves began to be shipped to the
Benadir, and when in the following decade the coast was closely
patrolled, the trade gradually switched to the land route instead.^
In this way slaves would be brought overland in caravans from
Tanzania to I/amu or the Benadir, where they were either absorbed
or re-exported to Arabia.
The Somali/Wardai wars of 1867-9 naturally made the northern
5end of this route unpractical for a few years, and its importance 
can to some extent be measured ty the .very considerable increase 
in the number of slave-carrying ships intercepted by British cruisers 
at this time.^ However, the land route reopened in 1871 and became
^Owen to Aam., 8 March 1824, Adm.1/2269.
p
Rigby to Sec. of State for India, 1 Sept. 1859, PC*84/1090.
^Rigby to Anderson, no. 23, 1861, 1.0.Secret Department/38.
Tlayfair to FO., 30 May 1865, FO.84/1245.
5Another result of these wars was to make the Somali south of the 
river Juba large slave-owners themselves. Some of the implicatiois 
of this are considered on page 204.
^G.L.Sullivan (1873), 200-1;
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the mainstay jof the trade, especially after 1873, when the
sea traffic was completely prohibited by Said Barghash. It
is impossible to estimate, even approximately, the number of
slaves taken north from Lamu along the coast to ICismayu or Brava.
This was supposed to be the least profitable part of the route
since the rate of mortality amongst slaves was estimated, perhaps
with exaggeration, to have been at least 75°/o by the time caravans
2had reached Bajun country, immediately north of the river Tana.
On the other hand, as Holmwood, an assistant of Kirk, also
observed, "^.orth of Lamu7 the slave trade is entirely in the
hands cf the Somalis who are able to work it with little further
3outlay than that of procuring slaves".
One of the more important side-effects of the McKillop expedition 
of 1875, however, was to give Kirk and the British Government 
sufficient leverage to pressure Said Barghash into completely out­
lawing the slave trade both by land and by sea.^ The Sultan’s edict
1Kirlt to FO., 20 June 1871, FO.84/1344; "Memorandum on the Somali 
Slave Trade", encl. in Kirk to G., 31 May 1873, FO.84/1374;
Opt. Ward to Rear-Admiral Gumming, 31 Dec. 1874, FO.CP.2624. See 
also R. Coupland, The Exploitation of East Africa 1856-1890 (London. 
1939), chapter x.
2Holmwood to Prideaux, 17 Wov. 1874, F0.84/1400.
'Z
ibid.
4See my forthcoming article in the J.A.I-I.. on Kirk and the McKillop 
expedition.
to this effect appears to have been largely effective, due to 
its energetic implementation at the Benadir ports; and despite 
the fact that one Arab Governor was murdered for too vigorously 
suppressing the slave trade, Kirk estimated that at the end of
i
1876 the trade in slaves was virtually at an end north of Lamu.
Thereafter, it revived occasionally buftinever on a large scale.
In 1884, when a lack of rain led to a failure of crops and famine 
amongst the WaNyika, children were exchanged for food. It was 
said that large numbers of Somali were bringing herds of cattle
p
to Lamu to exchange for children, but the trend did not last.
The Somali, however, continued to acquire slaves from razzias, 
though this was an inefficient method of collection and did not 
yield large numbers. The canoe trade by night, which was also small- 
scale, could not be aitirely suppressed either.
The most interesting feature of the Juba/Tana coastal trade 
is that it was not linked to any inland caravan routes. The river 
Juba itself was not used as a trade route, and the Bajun traders 
distributed their wares only on the coast,^ If goods found their 
way inland it was through unorganised and chance exchange. This
K. to D., 11 Deo. 1876, FO.84/1454; K. to D., 5 Jan. 1877,
FO. 84/1484.
Haggard to Kirk, 8 Sept. 1884, FO.84/1678.
^Simons to E.-S., 24 June 1890, FO.84/2062; K. to G., 16 March 
1884, FO.84/1677.
See: V.L.Grottanelli (1955), 85, 144.
gradually altered with the growth cf Kismayu in the 1870s, 
and the desire of the Boran to bypass the Benadir ports. But 
in 1870 itself Kismayu was still only a village of sixty families 
living ja reed huts; five years later, however, a stone fort 
had been built, over one hundred Zanzibar troops were stationed 
there, and an estimated 1,000 Somali were living in this bur­
geoning town.'*' Nevertheless, it is true to say that trade on 
the coast between the Juba and Tana had no hinterland of any 
significance, and it was the initiative of the Boran in the 
interior that led to contacts with the coast, and not the other 
way round.
The long-distance caravan trade linked Bugh, which was situated
more than four hundred miles up the river Juba, with the Benadir
ports. At the end of the 18th century Lugh had a reputation for
its trade in ivory and slaves, though cattle, goats and sheep
were also exchanged there. Imports consisted largely of Surat
cloth and dungaree, as well as copper wire, lead and iron, which
were turned into spearheads and other articles of war by craftsmen
2
in the town itself. The importance of Lugh lay in its positicn 
as the terminal of an important caravan route, and a commercial 
centre with an enormous economic catchment area that extended along
•i
Churjpill to Sec. of State for India, 8 Nov. 1870, 1.0.Secret 
Department/49; IC. to D., 11 Nov. 1875, no. 158, B’0.84/l417.
^Seton, 1801, 1.0.Marine Records Misc. 586; Smee & Hardy, T.B.G-.S., 
(1844), 59.
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the whole of southern Ethiopia and northern Kenya, almost 
as far west as lake Kudolf itself.
Trade between Lugh and the coast was highly organised, since 
the Benadir ports were open to shipping for less than four months 
in the year. Also it was only during two months that ships could 
sail from the coast to Zanzibar, where most of the ivory and 
hides were exported.^ Caravans had to return from the interior 
in time to be able to sell their goods for export, and they had 
to leave for the interior when the goods they were importing had 
arrived.
Most caravans went inland at the beginning of the north-east 
monsoon in December, and returned two and a half to three months 
later. During the first half of the 19th century, caravans 
probably did not go further inland than Lugh, while presumably
2the Boran brought their goods to the town where they were bartered. 
Nevertheless, there is an account of a Somali crossing the river 
Juba before 1840 to trade with the Oromo (Wardai Galla), but no 
indication of how far west he went or whether this was an isolated
3
incident. It may also be significant that Gall a was the language 
1Guillain (1859), XI, p.534.
^.Christopher, T.B.G.S. (1844), 393; D'Abbadie (1890), 16;
C.P.Rigby, T.B.G.S. (l844).
^D'Abbadie (1890).
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of commerce and was also spoken at Lugh."1* But with, the defeat 
of the Wardai around 1848, and the presence of Garre Somali to 
the west of the river Juba, caravans from the coast ventured 
much furtherjinland and the Somali began to extend their journeys 
into Boran country itself. Gradually they attempted to monopolise 
this trade and it became tightly controlled by the Garre and the 
Rer Galana around Lugh. Traders from other Somali clans were dis­
couraged and, if they persevered taxed, while non-Somali traders,
and especially the Boran, were actively prevented f rom sending
2
their caravans to Lugh at all.
The 1850s, then, was a period when Somalpenetration of the
area to the west of the Juba was gradually advancing. The explorer
Ghanler was clearly mistaken in his view that the first Somali/
Rendille trade contacts dated to 1888.3 Well over twenty-five
years before that the Somali had begun to trade with the Rendille
nearly lake Rudolf. But that was not all. They had also established
contact with the Konso and Burghi, to the north-west of the Boran,
4and with the Samburu to the south. It is also quite possible
L . i.Yanhut^lliy &, Oil £ i terni (1899), 83.
2GuiUian (1859), XI, 534ff; V. Fez-randi (1903), 3x6.
Ghanler to IBEACo., 22 Sept. 1893, EO.2/59.
4Leon des Avanchers (1859), 393ff; Wakefield (1870), 323ff*
G.L.Sulivan (1873), 44; L. Vannutelli & Go. Gitemi (1899), 199.
113
that they had reached Mt. Marsabit by the 1860s and, if not, they
nevertheless knew of it from the Boran. ^
However, one result of this growing Somali domination of all
long-distance trade with Lugh was to make the Boran search for
some alternative route. Since aroundl830 to 1840 the Boran had
apparently sent at least one caravan to Bardera, yet the destruction
of that town in 1845 halted any further development of trade
2in that directicn. With the rebuilding of Bardera in 1862, 
however, and increasing rivalry between Bardera and Lugh, the Boran
3
began to send their exports to the former. Moreover, the route to
Bardera passed through El Wak which was a convenient stopping-
place on the way to ICismayu; and after 1875 the B°ran began to
experiment with sending the odd caravan down to the mouth of the
4Juba when political conditions permitted.
But while it is possible to trace the gradual evolution of 
long-distance trade routes in northern Kenya, it is much more 
difficult to be at all precise about the actual quantity of trade
A
Somali traders mentioned 'Saku' to Avanchers, aid this is the 
Boran name for Mt. Marsabit, seo footnote--!.
2
"Breve Monografia di Bardera", anon., n.d. ASMAI. Posiz. 17l/l-5.
“'V.Ferrandi (1903), 310; J. Christie (1876), 184; P.O. Pundas, 
"Expedition up the Juba river", G. J.» III n.s. (l893)> 219.
^E.G.Ravenstein, P.E.G.S. (1884), 268; K. to P. , 6 April 1876,
FO.84/1453.
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that was carried on, or even to he certain of which goods were 
the most important items of trade. Throughout the 19 th century 
there are vague and rather unspecific references to ivory and 
slaves being exchanged at lugh. G-uillain, a French sailor who 
visited the East African coast in 184-8, claimed that most ivory 
exported from the Benadir ports came from Lugh and also mentioned 
that 1,000 frasilahs were shipped that year from Mogadishu. But 
even his detailed figures are of little value since the bulk of 
the trade between Lugh and the Benadir was carried on at Brava, 
and G-uillain had no figures relating to exports from that town.1
Thus, almost nothing is known about the slave trade that is
said to have flourished at Lugh, of how it was organised or whence
the slaves were procured. The Gall a apparently did trade in slaves
and bought sDme from the Konso. But amongst the southern Boran
slaves were rare, and slavery did notplay an important part in
the traditional Galla social system. .Possibly more B0ran became
slaves than owned them, though where the bulk of the slaves that
2were bartered at Lugh came from remains a mystery.
At the same time, the Somali were not the only people who were 
penetrating into the savannah lowlands of northern Kenya. This area
^Guillain (1959), XI, 534. 1,000 frasilahs = 37,000 lb. approx.
*T. Luling (1965), 15-
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■was also "being approached from the south by Swahili traders. Thus,
by the 1860s, Swahili caravans had reached Mt. Marsabit, though
most stopped at Reya, a short distance to the south, and also the 
1Lorian Swamp. It was important that the Samburu and the Rendille,
who had come into contact with the Somali in the 1850s, should
in the course of the following decade have become "accustomed to
2Swahili traders". This contact between the Samburu and the Swahili 
was also probably facilitated by the occasional movement southwards
3
of the former towards Isiolo district. But the Swahili also out­
flanked the Samburu, and later traders such as Jumbo ICimameta 
penetrated to lake Rudolf where they bartered with the Turkana.^
The Ramba also participated in this trade with the Samburu, though 
it is said that they did not normally go further north than the 
Uaso Nyiro.^ '
Inevitably these two trade routes, from Mombasa and Brava 
to the savannah plains of northern Kenya, helped to bring this 
area to the attention of the ooast, and it cannot be entirely co­
incidental that when Europeans first pushed into this region, their
C^. Hew (1875)> 460; J. Christie (1876), 198; Wakefield, "Notes on 
the Geography of Eastern Africa", J.R.G.S., XL (1870), passim.
A^. H.Newman (1898), 252.
^J.Christie (1876), 198.
^Wakefield, J.R.G.S. (l870); J.W.Gregory, The foundation of British 
East Africa (London, 1901), 46, 48.
G^. Lindblom (1916), 156.
paths corresponded fairly closely to those of earlier long-distance 
caravans. Thus, at the end of the 19th century, ivory poachers 
and hunters, aiventurers of fortune, explorers and eccentric 
travellers all made their m y  towards northern Kenya. No matter 
low rapidly they passed through the area, they stall introduced^, 
new element into the lives of the people they met. Their very 
presence opened up a whole gamut of possible new relationships 
around which the history of this area was to turn. But if by 1890 
lake Rudolf hadkbeen explored by Europeans, while the area between 
the upper Juba and the lake was on the point of being opened up, 
the coastal legion between the Juba and Tana rivers was still 
virtually unknown. No traveller had as yet moved more than a few 
miles inland there, and then only from Kismayu, Port Dumford 
or the mainland opposite Lamu. Beyond that lay an enormous stretch 
of unknown country. It is slightly ironic, therefore, that the 
first steps towards an administrative penetration of the northern 
interior were taken from this coastal area and without much success. 
It is perhaps not altogether surprising that when administrative 
posts were thrown out into the interior the river Juba proved to 
be an unsatisfactory line of communication, and the older route 
from Mombasa- (Nairobi)-Meru-Uaso Nyiro-Marsabit-Moyale turned 
out to be a more effective way of reaching the northern frontier 
district. Thus, as was to be expected, the earlier exploration
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of the far interior was not followed by any prior administration 
of that area. It was the coast, much of it unexplored, aid the 
coastal Somali who were first subjected to European administration, 
and in this respect the climacteric came in 1890 when the Imperial 
British East Africa Company accepted responsibility for the Juba/ 
Tana Protectorate.
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Chapter III 
COASTAL DAROP M B  THE I.B.E.A. CO.
The introduction first of Chartered Company rule and later 
of a Protectorate government appears, from an outside point of 
view, to mark a watershed in the history of north-eastern Kenya. 
Perhaps, in so far as these first steps presaged others that would 
lead ultimately to the imposition of administrative control through­
out the area, it is justifiable to overlook "the gradualism en­
forced upon European Governments in this first period of their 
rule" and to maintain instead that British power burst upon East 
Africa and established itself towards the end of the 19th century.^ 
Nevertheless, as far as the pastoral tribes of northern Kenya were 
concerned, there does not seem to have been any immediate experience 
of a turning-point, while the direct impact of protectorate rule 
was sometimes considerably delayed, aad even when it came only made 
itself felt slowly and by degrees.
Can it be maintained, therefore, that the initial period of 
the Colonial era had a special significance with regard to the
M.Perham, "Introduction", History of East Africa, ed. V, Harlow 
and E.M.Chilver (Oxford, 1965), II, P*xxiT ~
2
This is the position adopted by George Bennett and Carl Rosberg,
The Kenyatta Election; Kenya 1960-1961 (London, 1961), 3. Also: 
S.Brodribb-Pugh, "History of the Northern Frontier District of 
Kenya", MSS.
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pastoral Darod of Jubaland? Paradoxically it can, despite the 
fact that the admin is trat jon of northern Kenya was not seriously 
undertaken until the ssconc^lecade of the 20th century. At the 
same time, however, the precise nature of this significance does 
not seem to conform to several assumptions about Colonial involve­
ment in Africa that have been, or are still, widely accepted.
On the one hand, it used to be suggested that though the 
actual extension of administration throughout Kenya was a gradual 
process, the appearance of Europeans in East Africa made an over­
whelming impact from the very start. According to this opinion, 
the superiority of the British was so incontestable, and the 
attraction of their civilization so great, that the region to the 
south of the river Juba offered "an easy field for the extension 
of European influence when it ^was/ • ♦. commercially and financially
worth while'*, and that once the Somali had seen a few hundred
1
white men there could "hardly be any doubt as to the result".
Thus, although the penetration of Jubaland was slow, this was 
thought to be due to economic factors aid was not considered to 
be a reflection of the limited power at the disposal of the Colonial 
government. The nature and extent of Colonial involvement in East 
Africa were to be explained by 'European ambitions1 alone; it was
1Sir Charles Eliot (1905), 122.
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taken for granted that the impact was one-sided and that African
1
tribes had no influence over policy. According to this opinion
the significance of the first part of the colonial era for the
pastoral tribes of northern Kenya lay in the extent of their
contact with European explorers, officials and missionaries, and
in the re suits that were presumed to follow from this.
On the other hand, there has been an increasing tendency
to emphasise how very limited were the resources available to
early colonial administrations. It is now abundantly clear that
European civilisation was not so overwhelmingly present in Africa
that resistance to it could be brushed aside or ignored. Not
only is the local situation seen to have had greater historical
importance than was previously thought to be the case, but it is
also sometimes considered to lave been the key factor determining
the shape of government plans. Thus it is stressed that there was
"a lack of policy on the part of Whitehall on the one hand and
2
local initiative on the other hand’1.
Yet it is difficult to maintain convincingly that the local 
agent of colonial rule could have set in motion a positive policy, 
if the resources at hand were at the same time really limited. In
•j
Sir H.H.Johnston, The Opening m> of Africa (London, n.d.), 250;
A.R,Tucker, Eighteen years in Uganda and East Africa (London, 1911), 
566; A.J.Hughes, East Africa: The Search for Unity (penguin 
African Library, 1965), 27ff.
p
B.A.Ogot, "The development of African Politics ii the Plural Societies 
of East Africa", Africa in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, 
ed. J.G.Anene & G.Brown (Ibaden, 1966)^ 490*
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Jubaland these resources increased significantly only when a 
punitive expedition had to be undertaken, and the conclusion 
that seems unavoidable is that "only a serious military crisis 
brought forth reinforcements and forced up grants-in-aid to a
1
level which permitted some rough policing of the whole territory".
The necessity for considerable capital expenditure, before ad­
ministration could be extended in Jubaland, was recognised by the 
British Oonsul at Zanzibar as early as 1893;^ thelrelationship
between capital expenditure and military campaigns was noted by
3the Swedish missionary at Kismayu, Karl Gederqvist, in 1900*
An important aspect of this equation, local crisis plus 
punitive expedition equals extension of colonial involvement, 
lies in the knowledge that such expeditions were not sought after, 
and the temptation has been to argue that colonial involvement was 
similarly a reluctant procedure. As a result it is maintained that 
"the European powers sought initially no more than a light, in­
expensive consular control to keep out rivals; ^ h a ^  only the 
necessity of putting down internal resistance led them on to be­
come the conquerors of Africa in- their own despite". According
R^. Oliver & J.D.Fage, A Short History of Africa (London, 1962), 198. 
^Rodd to Rosebery, 28 August 1893> F0*107/5*
C^. to M., 11 Aug. 1900, E.F.A. IS/314 (Bvangeliska Fosterlands- 
stiftelsen Arkiv, Inkomma Skrivelser).
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to these arguments the initial adjustment of political relation­
ships "between African and European should he seen as a "pragmatic 
process in which the 'local crisis' was the key determinant, and 
in which the type of historical interaction can he "broadly pre- 
dieted hy the local type of African society"• Thus the import­
ance of colonialism was not supposed to lie in any European action 
hut rather in the African reaction, and the historical initiative 
was placed almost exclusively in the hands of African peoples. 
According to this hypothesis, the importance of the first decade 
of the Colonial era in Jubaland lay in the close succession of 
punitive expeditions. The Colonial impact was thus measured in 
terms of th^.esistance movements it evoked.
Yet there was nothing uniform ahout the incidents of East 
2African resistance. In the face of a local crisis the admini­
stration of Jubaland was as likely to contract as it was to expand. 
Furthermore the relationship between the I.B.E.A. Co. and the 
Ogaden and Herti Darod was strikingly complex. The rivalry of 
clans, and even of diva-paying sections, led to varying groups of 
friendly segments. The Somali reaction to the Company's presence 
was far from uniform, and it is not possible to generalise ahout
1
E.Stokes, "Malawi Political systems and the Introduction of Colonial 
rule 1891-1896", The Zambesian Past, ed. E. Stokes and R. Brown 
(Manchester, 1966),353, As a generalised and extreme expression 
of this view E. Stokes cites J. Gallagher, "The Partition of Africa", 
Mew Cambridge Modem History (1962), XI, p.617 ff*
^d.Perham in History of East Africa, ed. V. Harlow & E.M.Chilver 
(Oxford, 19657," II, p. xx.
the motives that led some sections to cooperate and others to 
resist.
To the Ogaden and to the Hefcti, the fundamental significance 
of the first two decades of colonial rule lay in the reversal it 
entailed of the relatinnship between Afmadu and ICismayu. Ever 
since the Galla had come down to the coast in the 16th century, 
and perhaps even earlier still, Kismayu had been dominated from 
Afmadu and the Deshek Wama. Both the Galla and the Somali had 
imposed their own terms upon the Arab villages near the mouth of 
the river Juba, and from the interior they had controlled the 
coastal centres of trade. It was this process that had been 
irretrievably reversed. The Berti eventually accepted that they 
had lost control over Kismayu, but only after they had experienced 
several years of Company rule, and it was considerably longer 
before the Ogaden at Afmadu adopted a similar attitude.
Kismayu. was a growing centre of power, one that increasingly 
overshadowed the interior and which, as a result, emphasised the 
dichotomy of Ogaden pastoralism. For until 1909 the threat to the 
Ogaden Somali was limited to the attempted extension of government 
control over Afmadu, and those segments that were closely connected 
with the coastal plains had to compromise in their relationship 
with the administration. But there were also other segments that 
could more easily retreat further into the interior towards Wajir 
and El Wak. These could adopt a hostile attitude towards the government
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without suffering the consequences. Access to the interior 
"beyond Afmadu, however, was limited largely to the camel-owning 
segments of the Ogaden, while those that owned cattle alone
X
were more ecologically tied to the coast with its better grazing.
This distinction between cattle and camel-owning segments explains 
to some extent the variable relationship between the Ogaden and 
the government during the first two decades of their administration.
But the first years of the Company1 s rule were dominated by 
treaty making, and the Company1 s aims were not immediately grasped 
by the Somali. It was probably for this reason that the Somali 
did not seem to experience any significant turning-point at the 
start.
In July 1890, Britain and Germany had ratified an agreement
2defining their respective spheres of influence in Bast Africa. 
Shortly afterwards Britain had also come to an understanding with 
Italy, whereby she agreed to renounce any claim to the coast or
3
hinterland immediately north of the river Juba. These were the 
diplomatic preliminaries that paved the way for the establishment 
of British rule. As an indirect result of these negotiations, the
T.§.Thomas (l917)> 5* 7; P.Eliott, "Jubaland and its inhabitants11, 
G.J.. XLI (1913)t 556; C.Ettore, "Le Popolazione dell oltre Giuba", 
Rivista Coloniale (19.25)» 335*
Q
E.Hertslet, The Map of Africa by Treaty (London, 1896), I, 316.
^See: R.L.Hess in Boston University African Papers (Boston, 1967).
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I.B.E.A. Co., to which the administration of the British sphere
of influence had Been entrusted, undertook the government of
Jubaland in two distinct steps.
In the first place, the Anglo-German agreement of July
1890 had Involved the abolition of the German Witu Protectorate,
which extended from the river Tana to Kismayu, and in November
1890 Britain declared a Protectorate over this area. The Company
assumed control of this Juba-Tana Protectorate"1* from January 1891,
but, as a result of negotiations with the Italians, it was not
until the following July that they undertook the administration
2
of Kismayu and its ten-mile radius. As long as the Company re­
tained control over both these sebtions of Jubaland, the potential 
weakness inherent in this artificial division went unobserved, 
let when the I.B.E.A. Co. was later faced with the necessity of 
abandoning the Juba-Tana Protectorate, &ismayu was virtually 
isolated from the interior, and the British Government’s approach 
to developments around Afmadu and the Juba was governed by events 
far to the south, in Witu and along the river Tana, the area to 
which Afmadu had been unrealistic ally linked.
-i
This Protectorate, declared by Britain on 19 Nov. 1890, was 
referred to in dispatches as either the ’Juba-Tana Protectorate* 
or as the ’Northern Protectorate1. It is better known, however, 
as the Witu Protectorate and thus confused with the Witu Sultanate 
which was integrated into the Protectorate in December 1890.
2The Delimitation Commission of 1885-6 had agreed that the Sultan 
of Zanzibar's possessions included Kismayu and a ten-mile radius.
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The dominant motive behind the foundation of the I.B.E.A.Co.,
which received its charter on 5 September 1888, had undoubtedly
been commercial, though there had also been a strong desire to
1further Imperial interests and to combat the slave trade. However,
in the last analysis, the success or failure of the Company must be
judged in purely financial terms, since the undertaking to administer
large areas of British East Africa was subordinated to economic
rather than political ends.
The first concern of the I.B.E.A. Co. in the Juba-Tana
area, after it had received its charter, was to isolate the German
Witu Company, already operative there, and to stake a prior claim,
2if possible, to the interior beyond the German Protectorate. Thus
the Company attempted to forestall the German explorer, Dr. Peters,
on the river Tana, and to prevent Yon Toeppen, manager of the German
Witu Company, from making treaties with the Somali to the north- 
3west. The I.B.E.A. Co.*s strategy consisted in claiming pre­
emptive treaties of friendship with the local tribes, despite the 
fact that these were generally signed after the German Protectorate 
had been officially declared in the area, and were therefore 
illegal.^ In, fact Lord Salisbury, the Foreign Secretary, found
^M.J. de Kiewiet, The I.B.E.A. Co. (London, Ph.D., 1955) > 104.
^Portal to Salisbury, 27 Oct. 1889, F0.84/19S4*
^Sandys to Portal, 21 July 1889 in P. to S., 29 July 1889,
F0.84/1979; Simons to IBEACo., 24 Oct. 1889, F0.CP.6025.
^However a number of treaties did pre-date the declaration of a
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it necessary to warn the Company's agents to be "circumspect in
their negotiations and treaties with local chiefs and not pre-
1
cipitate matters as regards Witu", Thus, from the very start, 
the treaty of friendship was to play a crucial role in the Company's 
aims. It both conferred a theoretical legalit^n any inter­
vention in the area and was also a preliminary step towards 
the peaceful penetration of the interior.
As a result of this attempt to outflank the German Pro­
tectorate, the Company, almost inevitably, attached far greater 
importance to securing the friendship of those Somali clans that
2lived in the interior, instead of those that lived on the coast.
It appeared to the Company, therefore, that the Ogaden were the 
first people that they needed to deal with and that the Herti, 
who were largely confined to the environs of Kismayu, could be 
approached later. This assumption was further reinforced by the 
knowledge that Murgham Yusuf, head of the Ogaden, was a "trader 
on a large scale" who had dealings with a French commercial firm, 
and that any arrangements made with him were bound to have a favour- 
able economic, as well as political, repercussion. Nevertheless,
German Protectorate, see; S. to Hatzfeldt, 12 Nov. 1889, FO.CP. 6025. 
Also: P. to S., 29 July 1889, FO.84/1979; FO. to P., 29 Oct. 1889 
tele. FO.84/1983.
%0. to Maekinnon, 2 Sept. 1889, FO.CP.5977.
2S. to IBEACo., 24 Oct. 1889, FO.CP.6025.
^Simons to Evan-Smlth, 26 May 1890, FO.84/2062.
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it was also considered important that the Germans should be
denied the opportunity of making further treaties with the Herti,
for Denhardt’s treaty with Sheikh Ismail in 1885 was considered
an advantage that needed to be neutralised.
In order to make it easier to open negotiations with
the Somali, Mackenzie, the Company1s chief representative in
Blast Africa, tried to secure the services of Dualla, a Somali
who had acquired a certain notoriety through accompanying Stanley
on his previous journeys and who had also been with Count Teleki to
1lake Rudolf in 1888. However, Dualla who was then in Aden was
unobtainable, and so on 30 September 1889, Simons, the Company^
agent at Lamu, sent Ali Mohamed, a Herti Somali from Kismayu,
to make preliminary arrangements with Murgham Yusuf, head of the
Ogaden, and Shurwar Ismail, Sultan of the Herti, in anticipation
2
of his own visit a few months later. It was hoped that Ali Mohamed 
would persuade these two leaders to assemble all the other Somali 
clan headmen for a baraza with Simons which was to take place
3at Lama Dat and at which some 30 chiefs were expected to be present. 
Although the plan was a shrewd one it was ineptly followed up.
^Mackenzie to Sec. IBEACo., 2 Dec., 1889 and IBEACO. to FO,, 2 Jan. 1890, 
FO.84/2072.
2S. -to IBEACo., 24 Oct. 1889, JO.OP. 6025.
3Simons to IBEACO., 26 Sept. 1889, FO.CP.6051.
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For when Simons arrived at Kismayu in January 1890, he attempted 
to negotiate immediately with the Ogaden and refused first to 
make a treaty with the Herti, Although this reflected the greater 
importance attached hy the Company to an agreement with the Ogaden, 
it was nevertheless a serious miscalculation. It underestimated 
the ability of the Herti to prevent any contact with the interior 
without their consent. It also presupposed that the liwali of 
Kismayu, Hamed bin Hamed, would be able to act as an effective 
counterweight to Herti opposition.
In fact one reason why Simons had overlooked the importance
of gaining support from the Herti Somali was that he lad counted on
the backing of the liwali. judging him to be a strong man capable
1of independent action. Yet the liwali had almost no power of 
his own, and faced with the determination of the Herti that Simons 
should not proceed inland, be could only temporize. First, he 
refused Simons permission to go inland on the grounds that his 
letter of introduction was inadequate. Then, later, he called a 
baraza of the Herti, to whom the purpose of Simon's visit was 
explained, though it bad already become well known. Ali Nahar, 
one cf the most influential elders of the Herti, was particularly 
(explicit in stating that the I.B.E.A.Co. would have to come to
^E.-S. to S., 13 March 3B90, FO.84/2060: Mackenzie to E.-S. , 
24 April 1890, FO.84/2061.
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terms with them before they could make contact with the Ogaden,
and this view was also expressed by other elders. After that,
every obstacle was placed an Simons's way, and he had to leave
Kismayu having achieved nothing, though having gained the know-
1ledge that the Somali had "the upper hand".
In April Simons visited Kismayu again. This time he was
accompanied by McKenzie, who then sailed further north to inspect
2the Benadir ports. Simons now had a personal letter of Intro­
duction addressed to the liwali from the Sultan of Zanzibar, and 
he also approached the local Mijertein Herti of Kismayu first, 
before attempting to deal with the Ogaden. nevertheless the 
bargaining was Vfeough, and Simons was subjected to a ruthless 
process of intimidation designed to make him raise his offer.
Eventually the Mijertein agreed to accept payment of 3,000 dollars
3and a monthly stipend of 750 rupees. However, the figure was 
not considered final till McKenzie had visited the port again, and 
confirmed the figure, since the Somali hoped he might increase it.
McKenzie's arrival led to assurances that the Gompany was 
not prepared to pay any more, and the Mijertein were therefore
1S. to B.rS.f 26 May 1890, 10.84/2062; S. to B.-S., 23 Jan. 1890, 
P0.84/2059; B.-S. to S., 27 Jan. 1890 tele. B0.84/2069.
2M. to B.-S., 24 April 1890, B0.84/2061.
3^There were 15 Hs. and 7 dollars to the £.
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given the amount already agreed to* The "bargaining should have 
"been over but, in fact, it had hardly begun. For while the Mijer­
tein accepted the payment made to them, they refused at the same 
time to sign the treaty of friendship and demanded more money.
Their intransigence was not without its logic, for Ali Nahar, who 
owned property at Lamu and travelled frequently along the coast, 
was told by the liwali of Malindi, Said bin Hamed, that the Company 
was prepared to pay considerably more if sufficient pressure was 
exerted* Said bin Hamed had been travelling with McKenzie and
his hint that larger payments might be made destroyed any hope
1of an early settlement. ,
Simons had to begin bargaining again, only this time his 
life was openly threatened. The Somali expressed their dislike for 
Christians, wadad were hired to pray for his death, and maximum 
pressure was brought to bear upon him. Already outmanoeuvred, and 
unable to face the combined demands of the Herti, Simons attempted 
to detach several segments by bargaining directly with each one.
He managed in this way to come to an agreement with the Varsangeli 
and DolbahaniriL Herti segments, promising the former 225 Rs. and 
the latter 81 Rs. a month. For a time the Mijertein remained ob­
stinately uncooperative but finally the Omar Mahmoud and the Ismail
B.-S. to S., 21 June 1890, FO.84/2062.
Mahmoud segments of the Mijertein settled for a monthly payment
of 185 Rs. each, The remaining Mijertein, finding themselves
out of step, had to ask Ali Nahar to intercede on their behalf
and they also agreed to the Company’s terms, Simons, however,
had no doubt that the Mijertein would again cause trouble in
order to increase their pay, When that happened he suggested
that a firm policy should be adopted, that all payments should
be stopped, and their leaders imprisoned. In the meantime he-
was particularly anxious to limit communications with the northern
Somali coast, and to prevent any further migration of Herti Somali
from the north to Kismayu lest the growing numbers of Mijertein
ultimately proved too strong for the Company, But these two hints
of possible trouble in the future were wrapped in a cocoon of
self-congratulatory paragraphs that did much to dispel any fear
2of future complications.
Before Simons had left Kismayu he lad signed treaties not
only with the Herti, but also with the Ogaden, and as a result
he claimed to lave annexed "the Somali country extending from the 
river Tana in direct line to the river Juba". Tet the appearance
1
Simons to McKenzie, "Report on a visit to ICismayu and Mission 
respecting Ogaden Somalis", 26 May 1890, IK).84/2062.
2S. to M., "Report", 26 May 1S90, FO.84/2062.
3S. to E.-S., 31 May 1890, FO.84/2062.
of success was largely an illusion. The majority of the Mijertein 
Herti were dissatisfied with their payments and consequently 
ill-dispo sed towards the Company. It also seems likely that in 
the process of bargaining Simons had lost sight of the necessity 
of proportioning payments according to Herti customary law. In 
these circumstances it was particularly dangerous for the I.B.E.A.Co. 
to ignore the resentment that their payments were causing. More­
over, although the Company had now signed treaties with the Ogaden, 
Murgham Yusuf had not himself come down to the coast; he was 
undoubtedly playing a waiting game, as were most other important 
Somali elders, and gaining kudos by bringing dollars to the Somali 
without selling them to the infidel.
Within a month, however, the urgency of treaty-making had 
disappeared, and the Anglo-German agreement of June 1890 ensured 
that the whole of the Juba-Tana area would come within the British 
sphere of influence. So the Company now delayed taking any further 
action. Another reason for procrastination lay in the I.B.E.A. Co.’s 
unsatisfactory relationship with the Italian Government.
In August 1889 the Company had unwisely agredd to the joint
1occupation and equal control of Kismayu with Italy; this agree­
ment had been intended to break a deadlock in delicate Italian- 
Zanzibar negotiations, and while it was successful in this respect,
^Sir P. Anderson, Minute, 30 July,1894, FO.45/720.
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it later proved to have heen an extremely embarrassing concession.
Although at one point it appeared to the British Consul at
Zanzibar that the Company was thinking of sub-letting Kismayu to
the Italians, the Directors were in fact soon trying to secure the
2port for themselves alone.
At first the Company suggested to Catalan!, the Italian 
Ambassador in London, that since the river Juba had been recognised 
as the frontier between the British and Italian spheres of in­
fluence, and since neither party - or so it was alleged - had 
realised that Kismayu was ten miles to the south of the river, 
it should now belong to the Company alone. A few months later, 
McKenzie was suggesting to the British Government an additional 
argument why the Company should have complete control over Kis­
mayu. He emphasised how the Somali there were, "disgusted and dis­
appointed at finding themselves turned over to the administration 
of the Italians" and claimed that this would gravely compromise 
British efforts in the area.^ Moreover, the Company's Directors 
maintained that since treaties had been signed with the local Somali,
i ,
/"Agreement between IBEACO. and Italian Government", 3 Aug. 1889,
FO.84/1962. It has also been suggested that this agreement was 
madeto frustrate German ambitions, sees De Kiewiet (1955), 141.
E.-S. to S., 13 March 1890, FO.84/2060.
^IBEACo. to Catalan!, 24 May 1890, FO.84/2083.
4E.-S. to S., 29 April 1890, F0.84/2061; IBEACO. to F0., 11 June 1890, 
F0.84/2083.
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they alone had the right to exercise control over tribes in 
their territory.^ McKeniaie then warned the Italians on the im­
practicability of joint administration, and threatened to with­
hold the Company1 s representative if joint occupation were 
2insisted upon. For a time the Company also played with the idea 
of trying to administer Kismayu without the agreement of the 
Italians, and the Foreign Office was approached for permission 
to appoint the liwali of Lamu as the Company's agent at Kismayu. 
This request, however, was refused with the reminder that it was 
ultra vires to act in a spirit contrary to the earlier agreement 
with the Italian Government.
The Mglo-Italian mesentente was resolved towards the 
middle of 1891, and the British Company was then confronted with 
the task of undertaking the administration of Kismayu. The timing 
was not auspicious. At the beginning of 1891, the old Herti-Ogaden 
rivalry had once again flared up; the liwali had been sent 100 
troops to strengthen his position, but trade up the river Juba was 
obstructed and the interior was very unsettled.^*
IBEACO. to Signor Dossi, 24 July3890, T0.C.P.6051.
Memo. handed, to Catalan! by McKenzie, 29 July 1890, TO.CP.6051.
5T0. to IBEACO., 4 Dec. 1890, E0.84/2096; IBEACO. to TO., 20 I'Tov. 
1890, TO.84/2095.
4S. to S., 27 March 1891, TO.84/2147.
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Yet the Company's policy hinged on the prospect of active 
trade. It depended an the ability to place steamers on the river 
Juba, so that caravans could be diverted from Brava to Kismayu.
It was also to be trade along the Juba that would open up the
1
country around Bardera and even the lorthem portion of Borana.
Not only that, it was to be trade with the Boran and the Wagosha 
that would lead to the taming of the Somali, aid McKenzie argued 
that,
the Somali barrier between these two powers (the Wago’sha 
and the Boran Galla) is ... capable of being broken down 
by means of well organised and frequent caravans and once 
these two powers come into contact, there will be a power­
ful lever at hand to hold the lawless Somali in check, 
and bring him rapidly under civilizing influence. The 
opening of the river Juba to navigation is, I consider, 
second cnly in importance to the construction of a railway 
to the Victoria Nyanza,2
In short, trade was to have special political as well as economic
function sJ.
However, before the Company's caravans could achieve any
of these admirable results, they had first to be able to enter
Somali territory, and it was acidly pointed out by General Mathews,
who commanded the Sultan's troops that,
although treaties have been made with the Somalis, the 
Company are now unable to enter their territory and 
should they attempt it, at the present time, with their 
weak administration they would be attacked. 3
1S. to E.-S., 26 May 1890, FO.84/2062.
2M. to E.-S., 24 April 1890, F0.84/2061.
L.W.Mathews, "Notes on the Political Map forwarded by the 
IBEACO.", 16 June 1891, FO.84/2153.
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There could be no doubt at all that the treaties of friendship
so far signed, had granted the Company no rights whatsoever.
On the other hand, the Somali and the Company both wished to
trade. Nor did the Somali mind trading with Europeans, provided
1they stayed in Kismayu. Yet it was this proviso that wrecked
the chance of a purely peaceful penetration of the Jubaland coast.
The previous Arab administration had been accepted tecause
2it did not interfere with the Somali, and the Company likewise
kept the peace for as long as it followed a 'policy of non- 
3interference1j This was a policy full of contradictions. On 
the one hand non-interference ruled out the possibility of active 
Company trading in the interior which was so central to the 
I.B.E.A.CO.'s designs. On the other hand, it also prevented the 
establishment of close contact with the Wagosha and made it certain 
thht the Somali would not be outflanked. This theoretical policy of 
administration by trade, and of trade without interference, was 
a non-starter. It may have provided an abstract justification 
for the absence of administrative machinery, but it was to be a 
manifestly inadequate basis on which to maintain the Company1 s 
presence at Kismayu.
^Ainsworth to Be Winton, 29 Nov. 1890, FO.84/2O66.
2E.-S. to S., 13 March 1890, F0.84/2060.
3E.-S. to S. , 4 March 1890, FO.84/1977.
The I.B.E.A.Co, lacked the necessary staff to administer
the Jubaland coastline, and the economic prospects did not
justify, according to the Company, the sort of expenditure that
alone might have led to an effective influence and direction
over events in the anterior.'*' The most that they were prepared
to do was to station an agent at Kismayu who oould accomplish
2
little beyond the collection of customs duties.
At first sight, then, there was a striking similarity 
between the British Company, and the earlier Arab, administration 
at Kismayu. In both cases there was a notable absence of poli­
tical control, and what little evidence of administration there 
was centred on the collection of custom dues. Tet the underlying 
weakness of Arab administration was not just that it was spread 
too thinly over too wide an area. It had also been far too 
static, and the garrison at Kismayu had remained unchanged for 
years; the soldiers had intermarried with local Somali women and 
their sympathies and allegiance had become identified with the 
local Somali interests. As a result, the liwali had little in­
dependent power of his own, while his soldiers were more likely
1E.-S. to S., 23 Feb. 1891, FO.84/2152.
Sl.J. Be ICiewiet Hemphill, "The British Sphere 1884-94", History 
of East Africa, ed. R. Oliver & 0. Mathew (Oxford, 196^), I, 394.
3E.-S. to S., 4 March 1889, FO.84/1977.
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to represent the Somali viewpoint in any dispute.
Ironically, after the I.B.E.A.Co. first arrived at Kismayu, 
its first objective -was also to represent as far as possible the 
Somali viewpoint, in the hope of gaining their sympathy. It was 
not realised at the time that this would entail a corresponding 
diminution of the Company's authority. But while the liwali had 
tended to side with the Herti, the Company concentrated on winning 
the friendship of the Ogaden. In these circumstances it is hardly 
surprising that the Ogaden should have sought every advantage from 
their new relationship with the Company, and that they should have 
exploited their position to the fall.
Simons, who had already concluded treaties of friendship 
with the local Somali, was appointed the Company's first super­
intendent at Kismayu. He was almost immediately faced with three 
demands from Murgham Yusuf and the Ogaden, designed to tdst the 
Company's willingness to be helpful. First, the removal of the 
liwali was requested, then a claim for bloodmoney from the Sultan 
of Zanzibar was pressed aid, finally, larger monthly payments 
were asked for.
Ihe removal of the liwali only took a few months. It was 
widely acknowledged that Hamed bin Hamed got on extremely badly 
with the Ogaden, and Berkeley, the Company1 s chief administrator 
advised his removal from the post. Hamed had already undermined 
his position by informing Berkeley that in his view the best way
140
to deal with the Ogaden was to fight them, at the same time
requesting a large consignment of Maxim guns.1 Suliman bin
Hamed was appointed in his place and he was thought to be very
2 'popular with the Muhammad Zubeir.
However, the question of a claim for bloodmoney was more 
involved. In November 1891, Murgham lusuf wrote to Simons claiming 
that the Sultan of Zanzibar owed the Ogaden 2,400 dollars as blood­
money for three Somali who had been killed, and that no settlement 
had yet been reached. This same claim had been raised the previous 
year when Euan-Smith, the British Consul-General at Zanzibar, had 
brought the matter up with the Sultan, who promised to look into 
the allegation, but had subsequently let it drop. Berkeley now 
toot th. »p * « « «  that,
although the sum is small the matter is important to 
the Company... The Somalis lave now placed themselves 
Under our protection are keenly expectant as to the 
results of such action on their part, and will un­
doubtedly be very much influenced by the result of 
this first case in which they have asked for our 
intervention.4
1IBEAC0. to FO., 23 Dec. 1891, F0.C.P.6338.
^Berkeley to Piggott, 15 Nov. 1891, FO.84/2229.
^E.-S. to Sir P. de Winton, 21 June 1890, P0.OP.6340.
B^. to P., 15 Nov. 1891, FO. 84/2229.
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Yet the case for the Somali claim was not very convincing.
The incident was already old’ and, in any event, the culprits 
had already been punished* Also, before blood-money was paid, 
it was customary to produce the dead body, and in this case no 
bodies had ever been seen. Nor tad any charges been brought until 
the British Company had arrived on the scene, and it looked 
suspiciously as though the Ogaden were using the Company1 s good-
X
will to press a worthless claim.
Nevertheless, the Company tried to get the British Consul
at Zanzibar to put pressure on the Sultan so that the case could
be reopened, while the Somali also agreed to settle for only 1,200 
2
dollars* Eventually, in February 3892, a Somali delegation went 
to Zanzibar accompanied by Mr* Lemmi,the Company's new superintend­
ent at Kismayu, The delegation was a strong one and it was well 
picked. It consisted of Ahmed bin Murgham, son of Murgham Yusuf, 
Sheik Hassan Yiri, Murgham Yusuf *s private secretary, Sheik Abdi 
Hersi, head of the rer Hersi segment of the Muhammad Zubeir,^ 
as well as Sheik Jebrahil Tara, a relative of the murdered Somalis. 
However, this visit accomplished nothing positive, since the Sultan
V. to S., 4 March 1892, FO.84/223O.
2S. to B., 18 Jan. 3892, 3?0.84/2230.
This was the section to which Murgham Yusuf belonged.
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refused to admit any liability, and when the matter was taken up
in hondon, the Principal Secretary at the Foreign Office also
declined to help remaking pertinently that "this case seems pretty
clear. The Company's ©-gents wish to get credit from the Somalis
1by getting this claim settled".
Tet the Company's prestige was too far involved for the
matter to be dropped. Unable to get the claim settled, Berkeley
hinted that the Somali might take the law into their own hands and
murder the allegedly guilty Arab soldiers. Since they were unable
to obtain justice, the Company, he maintained, would refuse to
2accept responsibility. The threat however was half-hearted, since 
the Arabs concerned we is employed by the I.B.E.A. Co. itself, and 
nothing came of it. Eventually Berkeley agreed that the Company 
would pay the blood-money itself. The question of justice had long 
ceased to be either important or relevant, aid he was not concerned
to avoid any possible loss of face. The Sultan of Zanzibar co­
operated to the extent that he wrote a le tber saying that he would 
pay the Somali claim; later Berkeley produced this letter as evi­
dence of a notable victory for the I.B.E.A.Co., and then paid the
3claim out of Company funds.
^Sir P. Anderson, Minute, 25 March 1892, FO.84/2250. Also,
FO. to IBEACO., 22 June 1892, FO.84/2252.
2P. to S., 5 May 1892, FO.84/2231.
3P. to S. ,11 Aug. 1892, FO.84/2232.
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The other demand made by Murgham Yusuf had been for a 
marked increase in the monthly payments made to the Ogaden, and 
the Company resisted this demand no better than the others.
For nine months Simons and then Lemmi ensured that there -were 
only marginal increases in the regular payments, but in April 1892 
there was a crisis that resulted in the renegotiation of the 
earlier treaties and the adoption of far more generous rates of 
payment.
This crisis developed out of the attempt of Captain Dundas 
to sail up the river Juba in the Company's stem-wheeler 'Kenia'.
The ship's progress was threatened by the hostile behaviour of 
both the Herti and the Ogaden, and when Murgham Yusuf “granted 
permission" for the 'Kenia1 to proceed, he also made it clear that 
the diip had no right to be on the river without Somali authorisation 
which had not previously bec-n.obtained.'**
In June 1892 Berkeley visited Kismayu to settle what he 
imagined to be a lelatively simple misunderstanding. But on arriving 
he found the situation much more complicated than , he had anticipated. 
In the first place, it had become embarrassingly clear that Simons 
had overlooked the Herti, and that they had never given their con­
sent to let the Company use the river Juba. Nor were they being 
paid enough; the Isa Mahmoud segment of the Mijertein had only
1F.G.Dundas, "Expedition up the Jubt( river through Somaliland,
East Africa", G.J.. X n.s. (1893)/ 211; IBEACO. to FO., 12 June 
1892, FO.84/2232.
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received payment after putting pressure on Lemmi, while other 
segments complained of not having been paid at all. Berkeley 
held a two day baraza with the Herti and eventually came to 
what he termed 1 /a.7 thoroughly friendly understanding*1, 
which meant no more than an increase in the monthly payments 
from 1,200 Rs. to 2,300 Rs.
Having satisfied the Herti, Berkeley now turned his attention 
to the Ogaden. Murgham Yusuf had heencn the point of fighting 
with Hassan Burghfiw, head of the Abdulla se&tion of the Ogaden, 
and they both agreed to come to Kismayu, though they had to be 
kept well apart from each other. First, Murgham Yusuf visited 
Berkeley privately and asked how much he would be paid for 
allowing the Company1 s steamer to go up the river Juba. He also 
insisted that previous treaties had settled aman. peace or 
friendship, but not ruksa or permission to go into the interior. 
According to Berkeley, however, the previous treaties had given 
the Company the right to trade inland, yet when Yusuf produced 
his copy of the treaty there m s  no mention in it of any right 
to travel inland. Berkeley's copy was found to be different, 
but both copies had been signed by Simons, the Company's repre­
sentative. The rectification of this discrepancy now cost an 
additional 7,000 dollars, which had to be distributed to Murghan 
Yusuf's followers, while Yusuf was paid 1,000 dollars and his 
council 1,400 dollars. Monthly payments were also increased,
and in addition Yusuf was allowed to employ twenty men for a
small salary to guard the Company's ship.***
Hassan Burghin was then paid 700 dollars, and three of his
men were placed on the Company's payroll. Such largess not
unnaturally stimulated fresh demands from the Herti who had to
be given an additional 500 dollars. Within a few weeks Berkeley
had spent £2,000. This was the price the Company had to pay to
secure, once again, the good-will and the cooperation of the
Somali. As Berkeley himself explained, "there was no alternative
2
except to abandon our position altogether", yet what had these
agreements secured?
The I.B.E.A.Go. now had the right to send caravans inland
to trade with the Wagosha and the Boran, but they had already
destroyed the possibility of buiLding up a close relationship
with the Wagosha through their defence of Somali slave-hoi ding.
The problem of slavery was of course one of the most emotive that
the Company had to handle. In theory, the Company worked for
3the abolition of slavery* The instructions that had been given 
to their local administrators laid down that slavery was either
1B. to IBEACo., 27 July 1892, FO.CP.634i.
2B. to IBEACo., 27 July 1892 tele., E0.84/2255.
P.L.MoDermot, The Imperial British East Africa Company (London, 
1893), 222.
1to b© abolished outright or at least discouraged. Yet the
officials who came into contact with the Somali found another
line more practicable.
The Somali had been p articularly sensitive to any hint
that slavery might be disallowed, and the Herti believed that
the abolition of slavery was the 'raison d'etre' of the Company's
2presence at ICismayu. Simons had therefore agreed that the
Company would pay compensation for any slaves that were freed.
But an indication of how the Company's agents acted on the spot
can be seen from Lemmi1 s behaviour when returning from Zanzibar
with the Somali delgation. They had encountered by chance several
escaped Call a slaves at that time ii the care of Bishop Tucker.
The Somali had demanded their slaves back and Lemmi had supported
them vigorously being particularly anxious to maintain their 
A
good-will. However, it was Berkeley's visit in 1892 that showed 
the lengths to which the Company was prepared to go in order to 
satisfy the local Somali.
Both the Herti and the Ogaden claimed to be dissatisfied 
with the way in which their slaves escaped to the Wagosha. During
-j
"Instructions to the Principal Representatives in .Africa of the 
IBEACo", 1890, FO.84/2062.
0
Gobwen Station Record Book, DC/Kism. /3/1.
3C. to P., 20 March 1894, PC/CP/6@/l9.
A.R.Tucker, Eighteen Years In Uganda (London. 1908), I, 166-8.
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Berkeley’s stay at Kismayu eight of Ali Hahar*s slaves escaped, 
and he asked -what action the Company would take. Having already 
paid considerable sums of money to secure the friendship of the 
Herti, Berkeley did not feel inclined to jeopardize his relation­
ship with them. As a result of this, Has sib Pun do, the most in­
fluential Wagosha chief, was forced to free 60 Somali slaves 
and agreed to turn back any further slaves who attempted to escape 
and seek protection in his territory. This unusual defence of 
slavery was then justified on the dubious grounds that slaves 
were enticed away from their masters or kidnapped, but for as 
long as it lasted the Company’s relations with the Wagosha were 
far from friendly.'1* Moreover, the I.B.EJ.A.Co. had originally 
planned to strengthen the Wagosha and to make an alliance with 
them that would act as some counterweight to the Somali. How 
the Company was weakening the one group of people who could have
p
offset their growing dependence on the local Somali.
As it was, Berkeley1 s capitulation in June 1892 to the demands 
of the coastal Somali had failed to secure any commensurate benefit 
for the Company, In fact, when Todd succeeded Lemmi as the Company’s 
superintendent, towards the end of 1892, the situation at Kismayu
1B. to IBEACO., 13 Aug. 1892, FO.84/2250.
Kiewiet (1955), 236-7; IBEACb. toFO., 19 Jan. 1894, PO.2/73.
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was fast deteriorating. The most pressing and the most urgent 
problem consisted of the relationship between the Company and 
the Herti in Kismayu itself. Shirwar Ismail, the Sultan of the 
Herti, had been dissatisfied with the payments made to him.
There was also a genuine sense of grievance amongst the Herti
1at the Company's preference for a close alliance with the Ogaden.
At the same time, Todd caused deep resentment by imprudently
stating that all land in Kismayu belonged to the Company, unless
a claim had been registered in Zanzibar* Most Somali owning property
and land suddenly found themselves deprived of any legal title
to their effects. Somali property in Kismayu was, for the most
part, leased to Indians, and they therefore pressed for Todd’s
removal and allied themselves strongly with the Herti. Todd does
not seem to have appreciated the seriousness of the complaints,
and, sin ce there m s  ©me doubt as to the legality of his arbitrary
ruling, the whole problem of property rights was discreetly covered 
2up. Ins'&ad, the unrest was explained away by other motives.
It was suggested that the Ogaden were directly threatening 
the Company's position. Todd mentioned bands of fifty or more 
coming fully armed into Kismayu and using threatening behaviour.
Todd to Scullard, 31 Jan. 3B93, FO.107/10.
•'Bodd to H., 10 Feb. 1893, no. 47, FO.107/2; R!odd to IBEACo.,
5 Jan. 1893, PO/CP/77/55; E. Ooronaro. R.C.. XX no. 2 (1925), 
89; C. Ettore, R.C., XX no. 1 (1925), 39; C. Zoli (1927), 155; 
T.S.Thomas (1917), 22-23.
3Todd to Piggott, 9 Feb. 1893, FO.2/57.
As a result, Rennell Rodd, the British Consul General at
Zanzibar, thought that the'"Ogaden Somalis in the hinterland
1of ICismayu were assuming a very threatening attitude", and,
as events moved towards a local crisis, it was thet Ogaden
2who were blamed for the worsening situation,
The motive that was suggested, to explain this development
of Ogaden hostility, was the dissatisfaction felt at the way
in which Murgham Yusuf had distributed money paid to him by 
3
the Company. This reason is not entirely convincing. It does 
not account for the close alliance between the disaffected Ogaden 
elements and Shirwar Ismail, in the first place, and the subsequent 
failure of the Ogaden to support the Herti when the crisis 
materialised.
Amongst the Ogaden, opposition to Todd was organised by 
three sub-cl an elders, Abdi Hirsi, Arise and Oulu Ali Her si, all 
of whom had been appointed by Murgham Yusuf to act as intermediaries 
between the I.B.E.A.Co, and Afmadu, One reason for their appoint­
ment was that they all held property at Kismayu, lived in or near
•j
Sir Rennell Rodd, Social and Diplomatic Memoirs (London, 1922),
I, p.298.
2The crisis of February 1893 was blamed cn the Ogaden by Rodd, 
supra., and recently by Be ICiewiet (l955)> 238.
%. to Rosebery, 10 Feb. 1893> FO. 107/2. Dissatisfaction over 
the distribution of blood-money was held to be the cause of the 
crisis by J. Drysdale (1964), 36 and H. Moyse-Bartlett, The King1s 
African Rifles (Aldershot. 1956), III.
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the town and were, therefore, easily contactahle by the'Company* s 
superintendent. But their association with Kismayu involved them, 
as much as the Herti, in the dispute with Todd over the Company* s 
right to sequester property not already registered at Zanzibar. ^
It is possible, however, that Gulu Ali Hersi had another grievance 
as well. He had been appointed by Berkeley to guard the Company* s 
steam-ship 'Kenia* and had sailed up the liver with Captain Dun das* 
But his monthly salary, and that of twenty men paid to assist him, 
was less than that paid to Murgham Yusuf's other assistants, and 
it was known that he wanted more pay* The organisation of armed 
bands appears to have been largely the work of Gulu Ali Hersi, and 
Ogaden dissatisfaction was limited mainly to those few who had
interests in the town. The majority of the Ogaden, however,
considered Kismayu to be essentially a Herti town, and they had
2little wish to get involved in a dispute that did not concern them.
By the end of January 1893, the situation at Kismayu had so
deteriorated that Todd was virtually a prisoner in his own re­
sidence. He had also weakened his own^osition by removing the 
liwali from Kismayu and reducing the garrison to fifteen askaris and
1T. to Piggott, 9 Feb. 1893, FO.2/57; T. to Soullard, 31 Jan. 1893,
FO.107/10.
2
Haffa in particular was an exclusively Herti quarter of Kismayu 
adjoining the stone fort. G. Perrand, hes ffomalis (Paris, 1903), 
174; Berkeley, "Report on Kismayu", 8 Nov. 1891, in IBEACo. to 
FO., 23 Deo. 1891, FO.OP.6338; J. to H., 23 Nov. 1897, F0.107/82.
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a small band of irregular viroboto.3* His authority was openly
questioned, and Shirwar Ismail, aided by the Ogaden who had
interests in Kismayu, was beginning to organise a general Herti
revolt, Todd* s analysis of the situation that "all trouble with
these people is principally on account of the question which has
arisen as to whether the Company or the Somalis are in charge 
2
of Kismayu11, really only left him with one course of action; 
and he asked for immediate naval support to be sent so that he 
could re-establish his position.
Captain Scullard arrived on January 29th in the 'Widgeon* 
and the following day he im/estigated the various grievances and 
interviewed many of the elders of Kismayu. The trouble seemed to 
be limited to four individuals - Shir war Ismail and the three 
Ogaden. Hadji Ahmed, who was ^ urghan Yusuf's chief representative 
at Kismayu, was thought to be friendly but not capable of restrain­
ing Arise, Gulu and Abdi Hirsi. Murgham Yusuf had also written 
to Todd to say that he could punish the three Ogaden malcontents 
and, though they might have had some local support, there was never 
any evidence of general Ogaden hostility. Oaptain Scullard came 
to the further conclusion that Shir war Ismail did not have the
i
Viroboto were Arab irregulars generally from 2anzibar. It was 
claimed later that Todd never informed his superiors that he 
was reducing the garrison. IBEACo. to FO., 18 April 1892, ^0.2/57; 
Craufurd to P., 27 Jan. 1894* ^ 0 . R* to Rosebery, 10 Feb,1892» 
FO.107/2.
2T. to Scullard, 31 Jan. 1893, F0.107/10.
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backing of all Herti sections.1 On the other hand, it was felt
that if prompt action was not taken against him, potentially
2friendly Herti might switch their allegiance. Todd's plan to 
arrest the four trouble-makers alone was frustrated by their un­
willingness to meet hdm individually, and so it was agreed to 
call a general baraza on February 1st. The Herti Somali who 
attended were all armed and extremely nervous. They knew that 
there was a warship in the harbour, they may have known that 
there were marines concealed in the building, and they certainly 
suspected treachery. The critical moment in the meeting came after 
Todd had extracted an apology from Shirwar Ismail, and when he 
attempted to separate the friendly Herti from those he wished 
to arrest. His movements were misunderstood, and Arise, who 
stabbed Todd, was shot at close quarters and killed with Abdi 
Hia?si.General fighting then broke out, and the Herti, now all
implicated in the miglee, together backed Shirwar Ismail in his 
3revolt.
The immediate effect of Todd1s baraza was the flight of the
whole Somali population of Kismayu, who took with them their possessions
and livestock. The Company's employees also evacuated the town and
 ^   1,11 ' " ™    1 "     .
Unfortunately it is no longer possible to identify the Herti sections
that were considered, friendly, and though it may have included the
Warsengeli and Dolbahanta, it must also have included some Mijertein.
^Murgham Yusuf to T. n.d. and S. to Cpt. Campbell, 7 Feb. 1893, BQ.107/10.
3The best known account of Todd's baraza is to be found in T.S.Thomas 
(1917), 23-24 and it is followed by J. Drysdale (1964), 36 et.al. However,
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boarded the 'Widgeon' in the harbour. However, the liwali of
Malindi was left in charge of the town, and he proceeded to bum
down the Somali huts and to destroy the tom ship of Haffa nearby.
Work was begun at once on a stockade around Kismayu, and messengers
were sent to the Company's steamship 'ICenia* on the river Juba to
1make sure that all was safe.
When Rennell Rodd arrived at Kismayu on February 7th, the 
town was being turned into a defensive fortress capable of with­
standing the most violent Somali attack. Otherwise, the Company's 
presence in Jubaland was confined to the 'Kenia*, but its boilers 
did not work and its rudder needed repair. Had it been possible 
to move the 'Kenia', this would have been done; instead, she re­
mained moored in midstream, a target for Somali marksmen and a 
liability to the Company.
Rodd* s view of the crisis vfas surprisingly optimistic, 
but then he had a low regard for the Herti and the Ogaden, con­
sidering them to be cowards and poor fighters. His general im­
pression was "that the Somali trill be thoroughly cowed by the 
energetic handling which they have received, that the majority 
will now quietly submit, while some may possibly change their 
marauding grounds"; and he also thought that "in a waterless
to C., 7 Feb. 1893, FO.107/10; Alexander to P., Feb. 1893,
F0.2/57.
country where no food is obtainable" they would soon be reduced
i
by starvation. He therefore favoured the present defensive
policy, but was scathingly critical of the Company1 s past handling
of the Somali problem.
In the first place, Rodd deploredlthe Company1 s "policy of
conciliation" and advocated a system of "imposing and not pur-
22chasing order and submission". He thought that the Somali now 
needed firm handling, and he ordered the payment of subsidies to 
the Herti and the Ogaden to cease from February 1893 - an order 
the Company subsequently endorsed. Rodd also felt very strongly 
about the way the Company had placed a young, inexperienced man 
like lodd at Kismayu, and then .left him isolated and without proper 
support for fourteen months. But, more positively, he maintained 
that what the Company ought to have done was "to play off the 
Watoro (Wagosha) against the Somalis who are really afraid of them 
and would probably retire from the country altogether, or at any 
rate to a convenient distance if the former were properly encouraged 
and then "if the Company would arm from ten to twenty men in each 
village with good muzzle loaders, supplying powder and caps, for
1R. to Rosebery, 10 Feb. 1893, FO.107/2.
21BBACo. to FO. 38 April 1893, FO.2/57.
^M.-Smith to FO., 10 Feb. 1893, FO.107/7.
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which they would pay, in limited quantities, the Somali folk
would soon have less ’big-heads1 as they call the disease they
X
are now suffering from”.
Yet Rodd seems to have missed the point that purchasing
order was in the short run considerably cheaper than imposing it,
For even when such a policy failed it was not the Company that
bore the expense of sending a warship to re-establish order,
and expense was the all important factor. In May 1893 the I.B.E.A.Co.
decided to abandon Witu, since the Government would not contribute
adequately to the cost of imposing order and submission in that 
2
area. The question as to whether the Company would remain at 
Kismayu was also raised, and the decision to stay was based purely 
on financial expectations.
At the same time, the Company’s withdrawal from Witu made 
Rodd’s suggestions entirely impractical, since Witu was identified 
with the British Protectorate of November 1890. This meant that 
the Company abandoned the whole of Jubaland, and, after July 31st 
1893? its administration was confined to Kismayu and a ten-mile radius,^ 
Of course it could be argued that the Company had in fact abandoned 
nothing, since it had never administered the area concerned, and
R^. to Sir 2?ercy Anderson, 14 Feb. 3893? FO.107/2.
2IBEACo. to FO., 18 and 24. May, 1893, F0.2/57.
rz
I have analysed the Company's financial situation at the end of 
this Chapter, Although there was a yearly deficit the Company 
did hope for improvements aad did not realise how much money was 
being los&.
4IBEACo. to FO., 4 and 10 July 3893, FO.2/58.
that therefore its position was unchanged.^  But this was not 
strictly true, for the Company1s freedom of action was now 
severely limited. The payment of subsidies to the Wagosha became 
technically illegal, since they were outside the ten-mile limit, 
so the possibility of caraying out Rennell Rodd's advice, and 
establishing close contact with them, vanished. Furthermore, 
both Yonte, the headquarters of the Herti, and Afmadu, where the 
Ogaden nere centred, were also outside the ten-mile limit, and 
the Company even had to juggle with figures and falsify distances 
just to establish a feasible position on the river Juba. All 
that was possible, after the abandonment of Witu, was a holding 
operation at Kismayu designed to maintain the Company's defensive 
position in the town; and between July 1893 and July 1895, when 
the Company finally came to an end, the policy was one of re­
trenchment and economy as far as was possible.
Todd's baraza of February 1st 1893 had demonstrated the 
danger of negotiating with the Somali from a weak position. The 
immediate task, therefore, of forging a workable relationship be­
tween the I.B.E.A.Co. and the Herti now went hand in hand with 
the attempt to strengthen the Company's position at Kismayu and at
^This was Rodd1 s, view, R. to Rosebery, 14 July 1893, FO.107/4.
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Gobwen, on the river Juba; and the most important single factor
that delayed the establishment of friendly relations was the
weakness and duplicity of the Company*s garrison.
By the beginning of April, a stockade had been built around
Kismayu and the garrison there had been strengthened by 300 men.
Todd, however, had asked for trained men to be sent and, instead,
he had to make do with Hyderabad viroboto, who turned out to be
undisciplined raw recruits.3' Almost a third of this force was
immediately sent to Gobwen to protect the 'Kenia1, but the town
2did not offer the same defensive possibilities as Kismayu. When 
it was visited in April by Bird Thompson, the Company's new 
superintendent, andW.G,Hamilton, who was in charge of the viroboto 
and other troops, they decided that a military camp shoiild be 
built on Turlci hill nearby, which would both protect the town 
and also control a further section of the river Juba. Though 
permission to begin building was requested, the work was undertaken 
almost at cnce. In the circumstances this was understandable;
Gobwen needed immediate protection, while it would have been several 
months before authorisation to build the camp could have been ob­
tained. But as it happened permission was never given, because
3R. to Rosebery, 10 F©b. 1893, P0#107/2; Farrant to Piggott,
2 Sept. 1893, FC/CP/68/l9.
“TRodd to Rosebery, 10 Feb. 1893, F0.107/2; T. to P., 1 May 1893, 
FO.2/58.
3The hill was so named after McKillop's expedition of 1875 had 
established a temporary fort there. B.-T. to P., 13 April 1893, 
FO.2/58,
Bird Thompson f ell seriously ill and had to he taken to Mombasa. 
The administration of Kismayu was, therefore, left in the hands 
of an inexperienced and young assistant, R.G.Farrant, and, in 
so far as the Company's chief administrator at Mombasa was con­
cerned, the question of a camp on Turki hill was shelved for the 
present. Warrant's instructions had been to "simply carry on
the work at present, letting things remain 'in statu quo' and not
2
talcing any active measures". Unaware that the construction of
a camp on Turki hill had not been sanctioned, he completed the
work that had already been undertaken.
This strengthening of Kismayu and Gobwen was meant to assist
the opening of talks between the Company and the Herti. Apart from
its purely defensive character, it was designed to show the Somali
that the Company meant business and that they could not be evicted
by force. In the same spirit Todd remained on at Kismayu, although
he had been badly wounded, so that the Somali c ould not claim to
3have been instrumental in his departure.
After the baraza of February 1st, the Herti had retired to 
Yonte which had become their traditional gathering place in times 
of war. Throughout the month light skirmishing took place around
P. to IBEACo., 23 Aug . 1893, FO.2/59.
2P. to F., 19 July 1893, FO.2/59.
to Rosebery, 10 Feb. 1893, FO.2/59.
Kismayu., but the Herti only attacked the town once, when they
1were driven back by shells fired from a warship in the harbour.
When Captain Campbell visited Kismayu on March 22nd, the
situation was much the same, except that Todd had received some
indication that the Herti desired peace. To test this rumour,
a messenger was sent to Yonte, and the reply was to the effect
that the chiefs wanted peace and were willing to hear the Company's
terms, but that they were afraid to come to Kismayu while there
2
was a man-of-war in the harbour. It was impossible to start
negotiations straight away, since neither Ali Nahar nor Shirwar
Ismail would agree to come to Kismayu, but Todd felt that a decisive
step had been taken towards the establishment of peaceful relations.
The Company1 s display of force had apparently had the desired effect,
and the p resence of a warship was now regarded as unnecessary
and a hindrance to the further development of friendly relations
3with the Somali.
As a first step towards normalising their position, the
4Company allowed Somali women to barter their godds in Kismayu.
^F.W.Lamb, "Histor^f Cobwen and adjacent country and events 
leading to its occupation", 1911, DC/Kism/3/l; S. to C., 7 Feb.
1893, FO.107/2.
^Campbell to R., 2 April 1893, FO.107/3.
■^C. to Rear-Admiral Bedford, 4 April 1893, F0.107/3*
^Bird Thompson to Piggott, 13 April 1893, FO.2/58.
1Then, in the middle of April, Bird Thompson and the chief
administrator at Mombasa drafted a copy of proposed peace terms*
There was to be an indemnity of 10,000 dollars and 200 guns were
to be surrendered* Somali entering ICismayu were to leave their
arms with the guard at the gate, and they were to be bound by
the laws and regulations of the Company. Also Somali slaves who
had escaped to Kismayu since the outbreak of hostilities were
to be freed without compensation for the owners* The abolition
of slavery, however, was not proposed since the Somali would
not have agreed to this condition, and because it was unlikely
2that the Company would have been in a position to enforce it.
On 4th May Ali Nahar and five other Herti chiefs came 
down to Kismayu, where the peace terms were read out to them 
outside the town, as they feared treachery. They made no reply 
except to say that they wanted peace, and then left. It had been 
agreed that they would return on May 6th, This time they did all 
the talking, presented their grievances, but reiterated their wish 
to be friends with the Company. On May 8th there was a third 
meeting. Bird Thompson made a few concessions; it was now agreed 
that the escaped slaves should be valued at 3>000 dollars, and that
^Bird Thompson took over from Todd on May 1st 1893.
p
"Proposed Peacfe terms", 24 April 1893> FO.2/58.
this sum could he deducted from the indemnity. Herti cattle 
and property destroyed in the fighting was also to he valued 
and the amount accepted in lieu of actual payment; so too were 
the 4,775 Rs. which Todd had confiscated from Indian traders 
and which represented the amount the Herti had placed in their 
hands.**'
These meetings were a success and, before leaving, three
Herti agreed to sleep in Kismayu and live there permanently, as
a surety for the good behaviour of the clan. The Herti were
now free to trade in Kismayu, and, until the Company had ratified
the peaces proposals, a general amnesty was declared. As a further
sign that the crisis was at an end, Sayid bin Hamed, the liwali
2
of Halindi, now left Kismayu.
While Bird Thompson had been negotiating with the Herti, 
he had discovered that the Ogaden also wished to get in touch 
with him. They had taken no part in the disturbances and had given 
no help to the Herti. Yet they had lost a certain amount of property 
in Kismayu and they were now asking for compensation. This claim 
was refused, and it was pointed out by Bird Thompson that the 
Ogaden had suffered loss only on account of the Herti. Writing to 
the chief administrator at Mombasa he saids
^B.-T. to P., 24 April 1893 and B.-T. to P., 11 May 1893,
F0..2/58.
S .  to IBEACo., 5 June 1893, JO.2/58.
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I do not think that th© Company would object to 
them ^Ehe OgadenJ talcing what they wanted by force 
and giving the Herti a good beating as well. That 
this would show that they were friends of the Company 
and were ready to punish their enemies. 1
However, there is no evidence at this b&age of the Company 
attempting to manoeuvre the Ogaden against the Herti. What was 
surprising, in fact, was the way in which the Company had abandoned 
its former policy of establishing a close alliance with the Ogaden. 
The crisis in February 1893 had led the Company to concentrate on 
their relationship with the Herti;- it had also led to a contraction 
in the range of the Company1s interests which made the Ogaden 
seem rather remote. The 1.33.E.A.Co.1 s new attitude towards the 
latter was decidedly negative, and it was largely limited to the 
hope that they would not support the Herti in any act of aggression.
Although it is doubtful whether an attempt to gain the active 
support of the Ogaden would have been successful, it was, neverthe­
less a possibility that the Company could not really have afforded 
to overlook. For on?: June 27th, Bird Thompson was taken to Mombasa 
seriously ill, and Farrant, who had had little experience, m s  
left in charge. Within a few days there were rumours that the 
Hyderabad viroboto had decided to desert and throw in their lot 
with the Herti. A section had been fined for refusing to garrison 
Turki Hill, but from their subsequent behaviour Farrant did not
1B.-T. to P., 11 May 1893, PO.2/58.
163
judge the situation to be particularly dangerous.
Yet, throughout July, Ali Nahar used the possibility of
a viroboto desertion to put pressure on the Company so as to
obtain a revision of the peace terms. The Herti now also claimed
that Bird Thompson had made a verbal agreement on Hay 6th that all
Herti slaves seeking refuge in ICismayu would be returned to their
masters, so long as the Somali remained peaceful. They pressed
for the implementation of this agreement - of which there m s  no
1
record - and began to adopt a less friendly attitude.
On August 8th, the viroboto at Cobwen and. Turki Hill told
Farrant that they no longer wished to serve the Company, and
asked to be paid. However, fifty-four deserted with their arms -
2a Snider rifle - and thirty rounds of ammunition each. Two days 
later it was learnt that they had joined the Herti, and together 
at 4.30 a.m. on August 11th they attacked Turki Hill. Hamilton 
was shot through the heart, the camp was overrun. Two cannon and 
a considerable amount of powder was seized. A week later Kismayu 
was also attacked, but the Herti and mutinous viroboto were repulsed.
1F. to P., 28 July 1893, PC/CP/68/l9; F. to P., 11 Aug. 1893,
FO.107/5.
j?rom Lamu Rogers telegraphed the number incorrectly as 74. This 
number and even higher ones occur in all later correspondence, 
Farrant1s own estimate seems to have been correct, sees Moyse- 
. Bartlett (1956), 112; F. to R., 10 Aug. 1893, PC/CP/68/l9.
3F. to P., 11 Aug. 1893, FO.107/5.
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The garrison at Kismayu was now the second largest in
the Company's concession area* It was time for strong measure^
but, as Farrant observed, "it is not obvious what could be done
1
except to strike and then retreat". Clearly vigorous action was
beyond the capability of the Company's forces, and it was not
until Lieutenant Lewes arrived in the 'Blanche' that a blow could
be struck at the Somali. On August 23rd Lewes recaptured Turki
Hill, and the Company's stem-wheeler 'Kenia', which had just
been repaired, was then taken up the river Juba. The Somali villages
of Hajualla, Hajowen and Magarada were destroyed and burnt;
afterwards the boat returned to Gobwen where it broke down. The
'Kenia* was moored in mid-stream and then abandoned. Two friendly
Arab akidas undertook to guard the boat, while all forces were
2withdrawn from Turki Hill and Gobwen.
The blow had been struck and the retreat had followed, but 
had the blow been aimed at the right people? As Rennell Rodd 
correctly observed, it was Ogaden villages that had been attacked 
and punished, and the Ogaden had not so far joined with the Herti 
in any act of hostility. . Nor had the Company's objective been 
achieved, since the Herti made no attempt to come to terms. The 
Ogaden, on the other hand, now saw the wisdom of being accepted
1F. to R., 10 Aug. 1893, FO.2/59.
2
Lewes to Senior Naval Officer Zanzibar, 25 Aug. 1893, FO.2/59;
Rodd to Rosebery, 1 Sept. 18939 no. 77» FO.107/7.
5Sir Renhell Rodd (1922), X, p.335.
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as friends of the Company. Hitherto they had adopted a neutral 
stand, waiting to see what the outcome of Herti aggression would 
he, and as a result of that aggression they had suffered con­
siderable loss of property and livestock.
The possibility of establishing better relations with the 
Company occurred with the arrival of McDougal, on September 13th, 
as the new superintendent of Kismayu town and district. Realising 
that further punitive measures would not be undertaken, since 
the Company was without the resources, and that any self-imposed 
isolation of Kismayu town from its hanterland only resulted in a 
loss of income, Mcbougall decided to encourage the Somali to come 
into the town and trade. A message was sent to Murgham Yusuf 
that no harm would come to Ogaden who traded at Kismayu, and this 
guarantee was almost immediately put to the test. Within a week 
increasing numbers of Ogaden women were coming to the town and 
on September 25th two important Ogaden headmen visited Kismayu. 
They had been trading in ivory ^nd seemed anxious to be on good 
terms with the Company. This was undoubtedly a sign of growing 
confidence in the new administrator, but it did not mean, as Me- 
Dougall supposed, that the Ogaden were '‘beginning to understand 
that we are their friends and not their foes, and that we shall 
give them justice as well as protection, and that finally they
1McD. to P., 13 Sept. 1893, PC/CP/68/l9.
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1
shall have to give in".
This unrealistic hope, that moral suasion would achieve 
the same effect as force, was the typical by-product of an ad­
ministration incapable of imposing its will, yet pretending to 
be effective. It was an illusion that justified inaction and 
encouraged optimism, but it achieved nothing concrete. What had 
probably become reasonably clear to the Ogaden, and perhaps also 
to some Herti, was that the British administration could not be 
dislodged from ICismayu. The Ogaden had accepted this position. 
What was only dimly understood was that the British would attempt 
to extend their administration v;into the interior, and that was 
a development that the Ogaden would implacably resist. Already 
the Herti had fought the I.B.B.A.Co. over what they considered 
to -be an unjust extension of the Company^ rights in Kismayu, 
and this was surely indicative of what was to be expected when 
any further extention was attempted.
With the advantage of hindsight, it is clear that the Ogaden 
had agreed to trade at Kismayu out of self-interest alone, and not 
because they were beginning to appreciate the Company1s allegedly 
avuncular role, firstly, the Ogaden benfited financially from the 
trade and they secured an outlet for their ivory. Secondly, they
1Mc. 'Do P., 26 Sept. 1893 (tw> letters), PC/CP/68/ig.
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minimised the risk of being identified with the Herti and having 
their property destroyed and pillaged. Also, and perhaps most 
important, these benefits did not involve any concomitant inter­
ference in their own autonomy.
By the end of October 1393, several Ogaden elders and their 
wives had come to live within the stockade at Kismayu, as a surety
i
for the good behaviour of other members of the clan. Within 
two months McDougj&Ls had re-established satisfactory relations 
with the Ogaden, and, when Craufurd took over the district on 
November 28th, he attempted to maintain this position. Craufurd 
was successful in this, and the Ogaden remained on good terms with 
the I.B.E.A.Co. until July 1895. ^he widespread knowledge that 
the Company was soon to be superseded by British Government ad­
ministration helped to reduce tension, and it greatly facilitated 
the maintenance of a cordial atmosphere. The only difficulty occurred 
in February 1894, when the Herti murdered an Ogaden in ICismayu and 
tried to cause trouble. The Ogaden fled from the town and a few
days later the Herti unsuccessfully attacked ICismayu,no doubt hoping
2
to implicate the Ogaden in this act of hostility. But, by the 
end of the month, Murgham Yusuf had managed to normalise the
3
situation.
1lcD. to P., 14 Nov. 1893, PC/CP/68/l9.
( « ■
C. to P., 19 Feb. 1894 and C. to P., 7 Feb. 1894, PC/CP/68/l9;
0. to P., 21 Feb. 1894, FO.2/73.
Murgham Tusuf to C., 28 Feb. 1894 in P. to IBEAOo., 11 April 1894, 
EO.2/74.
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The Company, however, ms still faced vrith bwotserious
problems that were not to be solved until eight months before
they left Kismayu. On the cne hand, there was their relationship
with the Herti e^ fa, on the other hand, closely associated with
this, there was the problem of making their presence at ICismayu
appear to be unassailable. The mutiny of the Hyderabad viroboto
had created doubt amongst some Herti sections about the Company1s
ability to maintain its position at Kismayu, and this doubt per-
sisted. The Hwali of Kismayu, who was once more Homed bin Hamed,
encouraged the Herti to believe that ^together they could get
rid of the administration. Also the viroboto were replaced
by one hundred of the akida of Mbaruk's men, who proved to be
equally unreliable. They virtually mutinied on 30 March 1894* and
had to be confined to barracks before being sent away.’*
The Company's less orthodox attempts to strengthen its
position were even less successful. In February 1893, Said bin
Hamed had suggested that runaway slaves should be armed, but,
although Bird Thompson and McDougal;1;. approved of the idea, no
2more than twenty were ever,: given systematic training. A more 
serious suggestion was that the Wagosha should have been armed,
C^. to P., 9 April 1894, FO.2/74; C, to P., 24 April, 1894,
PO/OP/68/19.
T?. to IBEAOo., 12 June 1893; B.-T. to P., 11 May 1893; B.-T. 
to P., 13 April 1893, FO.2/58.
3They did have some guns, though this was perhaps not known to the 
Company's administrators. Lloyd Mathews had supplied them with 500 
Enfields in-the reign of Barghash. H. to S., 1 Oct. 1897, FO.107/80.
and in fact Nassib Pundo had asked for guns and ammunition so
that he could assist the Company in their efforts to subdue the 
1Herti. Ronnell Rodd strongLy advocated the arming of between
ten and twenty Wagosha in each of their villages, and then using
2 _
them to support the administration. But it was feared by Farrant
and Piggott, the chief administrator at Mombasa, that guns given
to the Wagosha might fall into the hands of the Somali, and also
that once armed it might later prove difficult to disarm them if
necessary. So, although the Company’s avowed policy was to
supply the Wagosha with a limited number of guns, about 75, this 
4was never done.
After 31 July 1893 the Company’s activities were restricted
to a ten-mile radius around Kismayu, and legally they were unable
5to do anything outside this area. So while the Wagosha repeatedly 
asked for arms, the Company was unable to carry out its policy, 
and, instead, had to lesort to interesting the Zanzibar Government 
in the matter. It was suggested that, in return for supplying a
**T. to P., 1 May 1893, FQ.2/58; Nassib Pundo to 0., 12 March 1894, 
FO.2/74.
2R. to Sir P. Anderson, 14 Feb. 1893, FO.107/2.
%. to P. , 26 July 1893, PC/CP/68/l9; P. to S., 20 Feb. 1893, 
in IBEACO. to F0.,22 Sept. 1893, FO.2/59.
4IBEACo . to FO., 19 Jan. 1894, F0.2/73; C. to P., 28 Nov. 1893, 
PC/CP/68/19.
This sentence only refers to the Company’s position in Jubaland.
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few guns, agricultural implements and seeds, to the Wagosha,they
could expect an annual income of £100,000 a year. From a Company
that was going bankrupt the suggestion must have been taken with
1
a pinch of salt, and it was not acted upon.
The I.B.E.A.Co. * s weakness was clearly a source of hope for
the Herti Somali that they might regain their original position
in ICismayu, and until September 1894 they maintained their hostile
attitude. Yet despite the mutinies of the viroboto and Hbaruk's
soldiers, no attack on ICismayu was ever successful, and it must
eventually have been realised that with the support of the navy
the position could be held. It is not certain what eventually
led the Herti to begin negotiations with the Compan y. One suggestion
was that the cattle plague from 1891 to 1894 had resulted in an
2
appalling loss of livestock which was leading to famine. Another 
factor prompting them towards a settlement was that at the beginning 
of 1894, the Herti, who had been defeated by the Wagosha, wanted 
to make peace with them and the latter refused, until the Somali 
had first come to terms with the Company.
\
However a few Wagosha who lived within Kismayu District were armed 
and trained by the Co. in 1895* 0, to IC., 12 April 1894, F0.107/l9*
2C. to P., 21 Pet. ]S94, FO.2/73.
to P., 20 Feb. 1894, PC/cp/68/19; H. to S., 1 Oct. 1897, F0.107/80.
See also the interesting reference in L. Robecchi Bricchetti (1899),209.
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Several Herti sections were undoubtedly thinking of making
peace as early as January 1894? but then changed their minds. In
February 1894? Ali Nahar learnt th&t there was going to be a change
of administration and that the British Government would take over
from the I.B.E.A.Go. At the same time, hems advised by friends
in Zanzibar not to make peace until the change had taken place.
It was this advice, coupled with the liwali1 s suggestion that
the Company could be made to leave, that delayed a detente for 
1
several months.
However, on September 10th 1894? peace was concluded. The
Herti surrendered the two cannon and the rifles captured on Turki
Hill. They also provided sureties for their future good behaviour,
and during the following eight months both the Herti and the Ogaden
remained on good terms with the Company, nevertheless, it is
interesting, in view of the subsequent developments, that Craufurd
thought he had established better relations with the latter rather
2
than the former.
In effect the wheel had turned full circle. The Company had 
originally tried to construct a friendly alliance with the Ogaden 
and, as a result, had somewhat underestimated the importance of
-j
It is rather ironic that Craufurd should first have heard about 
the proposed change of administration from the Herti themselves.
C. to P., 8 Feb. 1894; C. to McLenna, 22 March 1894; 0* to P.,
26 April 1894, PC/CP/68/l9.
2C. to P., 25 Jan. 1895, PC/CP/68/l9; 0. to P., 18 May 1895,
JO.107/36.
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first coming to terms with the Herti. Then the baraza in February 
1895> a^d the mutiny a few months later, had necessarily focused 
the Company* s attention on its relationship with the Herti. In 
the new situation its previous overtures to the Ogaden became 
largely irrelevant. Moreover, after Julyl893* the initial importance 
attached to Ogaden control over the interior ceased to have any 
practical bearing on the Comapny* s position, which was then re­
stricted to a ten-mile radius. The main concern of the local ad­
ministration centred on the attempt to make peace with the Herti, 
and the choice lay between closing Kismayu to all Somali until 
peace had been agreed to, or opening the town to traders before 
a settlement. The latter policy was adopted towards the end of 
1893 and it m s  the Ogaden, not the Herti who came and traded.
As a result, an apparently friendly alliance had after all been 
constructed between the Company and the Ogaden; the original 
aim had been achieved. But by this time there was no longer any 
question of gaining access to the interior. All that was hoped 
for was an increase in revenue.
The problem of correlating expenditure with revenue o vershadowed 
the last two years of the Company* s administration at Kismayu, but, 
in reality, the problem had been there right from the beginning.
What tended to be overlooked was that the accounts would only have 
been truly balanced once revenue had covered, not just the expenses
173
on the spot, but also the annual rent paid to the Sultan of
1 2 Zanzibar. This rent was estimated at 23*404 Rs, by Craufurd.
In the only year when revenue reached this figure, there would
have been under 5*000 Rs, left for administrative purposes, had
the accounts been balanced. As it was, 108,202 Rs. were spent
on administration during that year producing a deficit of over
100,000 Rs.5
In fact between 1891 and 1895 there was no year when the 
Company was not faced with a sizable deficit, During this period 
there was a visible deficit of at least 375*826 Rs. (£25,055).
For in addition there were certain expenses connected with the 
defence of Kismayu that were paid at Mombasa and not included 
in the Kismayu accounts. There was also the depreciation on the 
stem-wheeler 'Kenia1, which was left to rot on the river Juba.
Perhaps even more unsatisfactory, the total revenue during these
four years only amounted to £4*541; a pathetic figure when con­
trasted to the £300,000 a year that the Company1 s first superi­
ntendent at Kismayu confidently predicted.^*
*1 QThe Company paid the ^ultan a fixed rent for its entire concession. 
The total figure was probably only broken down once to show what 
proportion applied to Kismayu. No attempt was ever made to integrate 
this smaller figure into the Quarterly or Annual Accounts of the 
District,
2C. to P., 18 May 1895, F0.107/36.
5H. to S., 17 Sept. 3895, F0.107/37. See also Table X on page 180•
4C. tp P., 27 Jan. 1894,. Fo. 2/73. See Table I.
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This miscalculation over revenue reflected the lack of
realism and knowledge with which the potentialities of trade
had been assessed. The Company charged a 5°/o ad valorem tax
on all imports and exports,"** and the first trade figures for
July-December 1891 might have been encouraging if they had
been regarded as capable of improvement. Had they only been
maintained, income over the four years would have amounted to
£10,000. But exports during the second half of 1891 were
inflated by the cattle plague, and hides made up almost 75°/o
of the total value. As the plague disappeared this source of
income was bound to contract, and in J892 hides only accounted
for 25°/o of the value of exports, a percentage that diminished
2yet again the following year.
More important than hides, however, was the trade in ivory.
Yet here again the value of ivory exported between 1891 and 1894 
was decreasing. Taken together, these two commodities accounted 
for over 90°/o of the value of exports in 1891 and 84°/o the 
following year. Moreover, nearly all ivory exported at Kismayu 
was seized from the Boran, and this was a source of supply that 
was boxmd to be uncertain.
k .
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1
There was also an additional source of income known as Income Revenue. 
In 1895 this totalled 4,273 Rs. and it was largely made up by charging 
interest on loans to traders in ICismayu. There was, moreover, a charge 
of one dollar for living near the walls of the town. P. to 0., 28 April 
1896, PC/0P/68/l9.
2
Hot only was the value of hides leing exported a smaller proportion 
of the total value of trade, but this total value was also con» 
tracting. See Table 2. C. to P., 18 May 1895, FO.IO7/36.
3A little of the ivory exported at Kismayu came from Boni in contrast
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Until the end of 1893 exports were falling, and there 
were several months when there weie no exports at all. The dis­
turbed state of affairs along the coast must have been largely 
responsible, and it is significant that the only item to improve 
in 1893 'was orchella weed, which was gathered and sold by women, 
who alone would trade in times of trouble.^ But, after September 
1893, when the Ogaden began to trade actively in Kismayu, the 
overall situation improved. The export of relatively unimportant 
products, such as tortoise shells, ostrich feathers, rubber and 
dried fish (items not normally associated with the Ogaden:), increased.
Yet the most important development was the sharp rise in the export 
2
of livestock, which to some extent made up for the fall in the 
value of hides sent to Zanzibar, These improvements, however, came 
nowhere near to producing an income that could have covered the 
cost of administration.
The increase in trade from 1894 onwards also seems to have 
gone hand in hand with the gradual emergence of the Somali as the 
dominant traders on this part of the coast. Por the establishment 
of peaceful relations between the Herti and the Wagosha in November 
1894 opened the door to Somali penetration of the Wagosha market.
to Lamu where the Boni were the chief suppliers, sees E. Sedge,
"A recent exploration under Opt. Dundas", F.R.G-.S.. XXV (1892), 520,
1See Table 2.
2
This increased from 13,000 Rs. in 1893 to 35,000 Rs. in 1895.
In 1891-2, livestock were actually imported on account of the 
cattle plague.
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Previously almost all trade with the Wagosha had been in the
hands of Arabs, but their share of this market was now reduced
to only 5 4 % .  The Herti began to move increasingly into the
export market, in contrast to their previous position as middle-
men, taking cereals to Tula Island-and even to Zanzibar. It
is certainly ironic that the improvement in trade, and the
additional revenue this brought with it, should have been the work
of the Somali; ironic, because, as De Kiewiet has pointed out,
"the whole purpose of the Company * s administration at ICismayu
2was to bresk the Somali monopoly over the Juba trade". Perhaps 
this avowed policy was one reason for the poor trade figures.
But, while the Company's administrators may have hoped to promote 
Arab and Indian interests in ICismayu, they were conspicuously 
unsuccessful.
The improvement in trade during 1894 and3895 had been the 
particular achievement of Craufurd, the Company's superintendent 
at ICismayu from 28 November 1893 to 31 July 1895. When Craufurd 
arrived he had found no maps of the district, no charbs of the 
coast, no copies of any treaties. No arrangements lad been made 
for the safekeeping of a large amount of cash cn hand. Correspondence
•j
C. to P., 21 Nov. 1694, PC/CP/68/l9.
^M.J.De Kiewiet (1955), 236.
^Ainsworth to De Win ton, 29 Nov. 1890, NO.84/2066; Berkeley,
"Report on Kismayu", 8 Nov. 1891, in IBEACo. to P0., 23 Dec. 1891, 
Jib.OP. 6338.
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was neither filed nor indexed, and there was a large sum of money
that had not been reported to the Company's chief administrator
at Mombasa. No monthly, quarterly or even annual report had yet been
written and no trade returns had been submitted. Correspondence
1was irregular and some was missing.
Craufurd was the first superintendent at Kismayu to submit
quarterly and annual reports, and to write once a week irrespective
of whether any boat called or not. But, even more important, he
was the first Company administrator to remain in charge of Kismayu
for any length of time. In the twenty-seven months before his
appointment there had been seven different officers in charge of
the districts an average of one every four months. Not unnaturally,
Craufurd felt that the frequent change of administrators had led
to a disbelief in the stability of the administration. His own
fifteen months in office helped to counterbalance this, and it
2
also gave him time to become familiar with the Somali.
Before relinquishing his post, Craufurd made one important 
recommendation, and it was completely ignored. He thought that the 
setting up of separate administrative units at Lamu, ¥itu and at 
Kismayu was the wrong approach to governing the area. Instead, he
1C. top., 27 Jan. 3894, PC/CP/68/l9? "IBEACo. Instructions to
Station Agents", 1891, PC/CP/109/90, Monthly Reports had been 
requested since 1891.
2C. to P., 25 Jan. 1895, PC/CP/68/l9.
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advocated that "the whole country from Witu proper and the Juba 
river should ... be placed under one administration" and, by way 
of justification, he added, "it is a Somali country quite different 
from the negro districts to the south and requiring a very dis­
similar government".*^ This was probably the most inport ant ob­
servation that had so far been made about the Somali in Jubaland, 
and its implications for the future were portentous. Here was 
the first sign of an attitude of mind that was eventually going to 
determine the development of this area. Jor once it was assumed 
that dissimilar government was required in the region, or that 
the Somali were quite different to other people, then, from the 
start, it could have been confidently predicted that no attempt 
was liteely to be made to integrate the Somali into the East Africa 
Protectorate; aad Somali separatism was already encouraged from 
above.
But, at the same time, Craufurd also quoted with approval 
a statement by Rennell Rodd, which suggested that the Somali south 
of the Juba should perhaps be regarded as temporary immigrants only. 
Rodd had written that "the Somali ... have no business south of the 
river Juba", while adding, "it is certain that the more of them 
that return to their old habitations north of the Juba the better
Vdem supra.
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1for the development of. territories in the British sphere”.
This view was extreme, and its importance lies only in the 
recognition that land recently acquired Toy the Somali did not 
necessarily belong to them. When the moving Somali frontier came 
within the sphere of administration, and not just the sphere of 
influence, some limit had to be determined, and it was then that 
the whole question of Somali expansion had to be critically examined.
However, these were problems of policy that only became 
pressing later, when the administration had been extended inland.
Tnthe meantime, the I.B.E.A.Go. was dissolved in 1895, and Sir 
A.H.Hardinge, the Consul General at Zanzibar and the first Commissioner 
of the East Africa Protectorate, undertook in the name of the British 
Government, the administratdon of the new Protectorate. Hardinge's 
approach to the Ogaden and the Herti had been determined, however, 
by his contact with the Tana, and by his previous handling of the 
Abdulla Somali.
Rodd to Rosebery, 10 Feb. 1893, F0.107/2.
TABLE 1
Revenue Expenditure
1891-1892 28,299 Rs. 108,262 Rs.
1892-1893 10,757 Rs. 163,706 Rs.
1893-1894 10,508 Rs. 46,594 Rs.
1894-1895 18,562 Rs. 31,674 Rs.
TABLE 2C
Value of Exports
D1891" 1892 1893 1894 189.5
Rs. Rs. Rs. Rs. Rs.
Ivory 23,799 40,934 34,449 37,422 41,822
Rhinoceros Horns 262 695 282 799 1,164
Tortoise Shell 90 284 622 5,196 3,396
Orchella Heed 588 836 4,325 3,730 196
Mai 2B 1,293 859 445 16,691 8,111
Gamels — 1,100 1,740 1,580
Cattle 116 2,215 6,020 7,210 13,882
Donkeys 256 732 300 1,400 5,615
Goats and Sheep 235 6,076 5,602 13,415 14,119
Hides 93,924 18,123 1,605 1,965 1,808
Ghee — •— 345 354 1, 669
Grease — — 310 76 294
Rubber — — - 65 — —
Dried Fish — — — 1,660 1,692
Ostrich Feathers — — — 1,980 1,305
to S., 17 Sept. 1895, P0.107/37.
BThe year runs from July 1st to July 1st.
CThese figures are taken from 0. to P., 27 Jan, 1894, FO.2/73 
and 0. to He, 30 April 1896, F0.107/52.
^The figures for 1891 only cover half a year from July to December,
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Chapter IV
THE COASTAL DAROD AND THE) PROTECTORATE GOVERMB HT
When the I.B.E.A.Co. had abandoned ¥itu in 1893, the responsi­
bility for protecting the Swedish, German and British mission 
stations on the river Tana from the Abdulla Somali had been the 
subject of an acrimonious exchange of letters between the Company 
and the Foreign Office.'** Opinion differed as to where respective 
obligations lay, and Hardinge was drawn into this dispute. But 
it was perhaps unfortunate that the firkt Somali he had io deal 
with were the Abdulla, one of the most truculent of the Ogaden 
sub-clans, and one the Company itself had been particularly un­
successful in influencing, for it was to be on the basis of this 
experience that Hardinge formulated a policy for dealing with the 
Somali as a whole.
The Abdulla had maintained little contact with the I.B.E.A.Co. 
While their villages included Hajowen, on the river Juba, their 
main grazing lands lay much further south, and the relative in­
accessibility^)! the Tana hinterland enabled Hassan Berghin, head 
of the Abdulla, to remain isolated. Moreover, he claimed to be
independent of Murgham lusuf and was not therefore normally approach-
2able through Afmadu, Also he very rarely visited Kismayu, where
^IBEACO. to F.O., 23 Jan. 1895; F.O. to IBEACo., 7 Feb. 1895, FO.2/96,
B^. to IBEACo., 26 March 1892, FO.CP. 6340; Portal to S., 25 March 
1892, FO.84/2230.
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he felt he might he overshadowed by the more powerful head of
the Muhammad Zubeir, and Hassan Berghin never willingly played
1second fiddle to anyone.'
nevertheless, in 1890 he had signed a treaty of friendship
with Simons, and had received the usual subsidy. At the same time
he had obtained permission to establish a stronghold at Korokoro,
a Pokomo village on the river Tana, with the hope that eventually
it would rival Afmadu in importance. As a result the Abdulla had
undertaken a campaign against the Pokomo with the Company’s tacit
approval and with a liberal supply of their flags, while Simons
had also written to the Company’s superintendent at Lamu requesting
that all Somali with flags be looked upon as friendly and not
2
interfered with.
Prom the point of view of Lamu, however, the presence of Abdulla 
Ogaden on the river Tana was far from welcome. In 1889, for 
instance, it was being reported that Von Toeppen, a representative 
of the German Witu Company, was trying to secure the friendship of 
the Abdulla, while in that same year Korokoro had to be abandoned 
by the Pokomo as a iesult of a severe famine and Somali raids.^
tf. to H;,,,,y29.pe8. 1897, FO.107/88.
2S. to B.-S., 26 May 1890, FO.84/2062.
5S. to IBEACo., 24 Oct. 1889, FO.CP.6025.
4J. Bell Smith to IBEACo., 17 Oct. 1889, FO.CP.6025.
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But after 1890 the Abdulla began, to raid further down the river,
often as far as Ndera, and their approach towards the coast
was regarded as a contributory factor exacerbating the unsettled
1state of affairs in W'itu. Their constant raids against the Pokomo
and the Galla at times also endangered the mission stations on 
2
the river* Yet, initially, the main concern at Lamu was that 
trouble in the Juba region might spread to the Tana. After the 
mutiny on Turki Hill in August 1893? it was feared that1 armed 
viroboto would move south and join the Abdulla. Though the possi­
bility may have been remote, it was morder to prevent this that 
a Government station was opened at Port Dumford.
The coastal road between Kismayu and Lamu^ was known to pass 
very close to Port Durnford; its control was therefore thought
E
to be of considerable strategic importance. Yet the Abdulla were
able to maintain contact with the Herti and Afmadu Ogaden without
going anywhere near the coast. So the station never succeeded in
isolating the Abdulla from other Somali sections, as tjas intended,
and its only value lay in the opportunity it provided for increased
contact with Hassan Berghin.
But for several years the station e^erted^houinfluenceover the
Somali at all. In 1893 there were no Europeans who could be spared
- —  —  —  - -
The history of Witu and of the Arab coast of Tanaland after 1895 has 
been made the subject of a study by Dr. T.H.R.Cashmore, "Studies in 
District Administration in the Bast Africa Protectorate", Unpublished 
Ph.D. Thesis (Jesus College, Cambridge, 1965), Chapter iv, 'The 
Problem of the coastal communities'.
20hanler to IBEACo., 28 Nov. 1892, ID.2/57.
5Rodd to Rosebery, 23 Sept. 1893, FO.107/7.
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as administrators, and so Mzee Seif, head of the Bajun, was
appointed political officer and sent to Port Dumford with an
escort. He used his position, however, to enforce his authority
over Bajun villages that previously had been independent in the 
1area. In July 1895, he was remo-ved and imprisoned in Zanzibar
for acting in concert with the Abdulla, and a new Bajun chief, Tiro,
2
was appointed in his place. In fact it was not until 12 September
1895, that Reddie, the first District Officer, arrived at Port
Dumford. Yet he was supported by only 50 Soudanese troops and
5this was too small a force to make any significant impact.
Reddie initially seems to have built his hopes on the prospect 
of encouraging trade with the Abdulla. It was claimed, apparently 
incorrectly, that the Abdulla were most anxious to come to Port 
Dumford and there dispose of their ivory.^ Yet, when they did 
come for ivory in June and August 1896, it was to seize it from the 
coastal Galla and Bajun. The raids were particularly vicious, and 
it was said that H&ssan Berghin was joined by Ahmed Murghsm, the
\)r between Kismayu and Mlcowe, the mainland village opposite Lamu.
^Hardinge to Salisbury, 16 Sept. 1895, no. 171, FO. 107/37.
R^. to General Mathews, 20 Aug. 1893, FO.107/5; H. to K., 10 Oct., 
1894, F0.107/23; W.W.A.Fitzgerald, Travels in British Bast Africa 
(London, 1898), 466.
2H. to S., 12 July 1895, FO.107/36.
3H. to S., 16 Sept. 1895, no. 171; E. to H., 28 Aug. 1895, F0.107/37. 
4H. to S., 9 May 1896, F0.107/52.
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son of Murgham Yusuf* Moreover, within a few months Reddie had to
leave Port Durnford heoause of ill-health, The station was left in
the hands of Captain Ibrahim Effendi who adopted a purely passive
2attitude towards the Somali.
Thus the gradual development of an administrative post at Port
Durnford did not provide an adequate means for making contact with
the Abdulla Ogaden. Moreover, there was still no way of putting
any pressure on them, and the ability to do so was becoming in­
creasingly important. There was evidence that the Abdulla were in 
touch with the people of ¥itu, who were selling them slaves and 
assisting them on their forays against the Pokomo, and, as early 
as 1894, continuing Abdulla raids against villages on the lower 
Tana had persuaded Hardinge that they would need to be taught a 
sharp lesson.4 Finally, attacks on the mission station at Golbanti 
in 1894 and 1895 led Hardinge to visit the Tana in February 1895, 
and to determine how to handle the problem on the spot.
R^. to Craufurd, 19 Aug. 1896, PC/CP/68/20,
2H. to S., 1 Feb. 1896, no. 28, FO.107/5.
to M., 5 July 1894, FO.107/21; H. to K., 13 Nov. 1894 and
"Judgement in Fumo Omari's trial", 30 Nov. I894, FO. 107/24. It 
is perhaps ironic that the Pokomo encouraged a Roman Catholic mission 
to settle amongst them in 1889, on the assumption that it would pro­
vide them with protection against the Somali. However, in 1890 the
mission came to an end, not as a result of Somali raids but because 
of floods from the Tana. Sees A.T.Matson, "The Holy Ghost Mission 
at Kosi on the liver Tana", The Bull, of the Soc. for African Church 
History, II no. 2 (1965), 175.
4H. to Kimberley, 10 Oct. 1894, F0.107/23.
5W.¥.A.Fitzgerald (1898), 323; H. to K., 2 Nov. 1894, F0.107/23;
H. to K., 5 Feb. 1895, no. 8A, F0.107/41-
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After talcing the necessary steps to protect the mission
stations, Hardinge came to the conclusion that the place from
which to tackle the roots of the Abdulla menace was not so much
Lamu or Port Dumford as Kismayu, and he wrote;
When the withdrawal of the Company from Kismayu enables 
us to teach Murgham Yusuf and his Ogaden the sharp lesson 
which they so greatly need, Somali raids may be stopped 
at their source and defensive measures on the Tana dispensed 
with. •*
Thus Hardinge favoured a forward policy jn Jubaland and was prepared 
to defend this on the grounds that it would be cheaper than under­
taking any defensive measures that would have to go hand in hand 
with the adoption of a purely passive attitude. Yet his freedom 
to put this policy into practice was circumscribed by the in­
struction that "caution must be exercised ... in dealing with the 
Somali", and by the unwillingness, of later Secretaries of State
2to allow the use of reserve forces in Jubaland for minor crises.
A forward policy was therefore initiated that could not be backed 
up when it was later challenged by the Somali, and only in the 
event of a major crisis developing was the backing produced. Hard- 
inge's initialypolicy was only half approved and consequently it 
was only half applied; the anomolies this produced were an im­
portant factor influencing the Government's relations with the Ogaden.
1H. to L ,  6 Feb. 1895, FO.107/34.
2K. to H., 5 May 1894, FO.107/16.
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*
Hardinge's altercation with the Company also made him very
much aware of the problems associated, with an administrative
frontier running along a river. For until July 1895 the British
Company had teen responsible for a ten mile strip along the coast
/
as far north as the river Tana, and that had been paryof the 
problem.'** Hardinge was convinced therefore that the future ad-
2
ministration of Tanaland should control both banks of the river.
He felt that "the Tana itself would in practice be a very bad
boundary", and there can be little doubt thfet he felt the same
way about the Juba river. Although Great Britain only controlled
one bank of the Juba, Hardinge suggested;
a joint Anglo-Italian system of police for both banks, 
both parties enjoying equal rights to cross to the other's, 
territory for the apprehension or punishment of offenders.
However, this was a suggestion that the Italian Government turned
down. They also rejected other suggested arrangements for closer
P n
collaboration, and the zeal cooperation that was supposed to exist 
between the two administrations remained something of a myth. But 
Hardinge had been right in thinking that cooperation with the Italians
1H. to K., 25 Feb. 0895, no. 15, FO.107/41.
^ibid.
to K., 25 Feb. 1895, FO.107/34.
4H. to S., 17 Sept. 1895, no. 172, FO.107/37.
5E. to S., 17 Sept. 1895, FO.45/736; C. to Filonardi & Co.,
27 April 1895, F0.2/97.
188
was important, and that the Juba was 1 an artery of communication"
X
rather than a dividing-line. The Ogaden, Herti and Wagosha,
all had sections on both sides of the river. They frequently
crossed the Juba. Thus there was the real possibility that Italian
Somaliland would become a sanctuary for disaffected Somali elements
in revolt against British rule, and it was a possibility the Somali
were fully alive to.
Lastly, Hardinge maintained that the administration of
Jubaland ought to be subordinated to the British Consul General
at Zanzibar but nevertheless undertaken by the Sultan’s staff.
He thought it was very important for the Sultan to administer the
coast, as it wmld then be possible "to use his name and forces in
2the numerous little wars with Somali and other coast chiefs".
The idea was fascinating],: yet this was another of Hardin ge's sug­
gestions that came to nothing, though it did have important con­
sequences. It led to the appointment of Jenner as Kismayu's first 
Sub-Commissioner and the subsequent removal of Craufurd from the 
Province. While Jenner favoured a forward policy like Craufurd,
1H. to IC., 16 May 1895, no. 92, FO.107/36.
H. to IC., 15 June 1895, no. 39A, FO.107/41. Hardinge's plan had
been to use Arab administrators throughout the Protectorate, see; 
T.H.R.Cashmore (1965), 70, 162; G.H.Mungeam, British Rule in Kenya
1895-1912 (Oxford, 1966), 26.
3
Hardinge recommended Jenner for the post as this was whom Sir 
Lloyd Mathews, First Minister to the Sultan, would have wished to 
appoint. H. to IC., 25 Feb. 1895, FO.107/34.
he lacked the latter1 s restraint and sense of caution; quick
to give others advice, he did not always follow his own. suggestions.
Jenner tended to he overconfident, perhaps also overtrusting, and
he never mastered the intricacies of Ogaden politics. It was
this moreover that ultimately led to his death and to the failure
1of his policies. But when Jenner arrived db Kismayu on 10 July 
1895, he first tackled the problem of the Herti, and nn this he
p
was more successful.
When the Herti made peace with the I.B.E.A.Co. in 1894, they 
had still hoped to arrange better terras with the Consul General 
at Zanzibar, as soon as he became responsible for the administration. 
The submission of Shirwar Ismail and Ali Wahar had been partly 
tactical, and it was probably only as a result of three visits, 
in rapid succession, by Government officials that finallyInduced 
their complete surrender.
In June 1895, Shirwar Ismail insulted Todd^ and refused to let 
him enter Yonte. Craufurd therefore set out with 85 troops and two 
maxim guns determined to enforce his admittance. The Herti were
1Jenner was murdered in Wov. 1900. The circumstances of his death 
are discussed on pages
2J. to H., 11 July 1895, FO.107/37.
5C. to H., 25 March 1896, F0.107/51.
The same Todd as was involved in the fracas of February 1893.
He returned to Kismayu briefly in 1895-r
5H. to S., 17 Sept. 1895, FO.107/37.
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given to understand that they would have to pay tribute and this
they agreed to. But, on approaching Yonte, Graufurd was told that
he would not be allowed to pass through the town and was asked
to turn back. Nevertheless he continued on and warned that any
trouble would be dealt with severely. Herti warriors were dram
up outside the tom, but the strength of the caravan was obvious,
and they passively accepted the situation, as the column passed
1through the tom without a shot being fired. Ali Nahar then came
and paid tribute; he was told that the conduct of his warriors
was unsatisfactory and it was impressed on him that power lay in
the Government’s hands. A successful visit of this sort undoubtedly
2
had an impact on the Herti elders.
Craufurd visited Yonte again in July. This time he was ac­
companied by Jenner. They were welcomed by Ali Nahar and allowed 
to pass through the tom. The Herti chief also promised obedience 
to the new administration and undertook to visit Kismayu after he 
had been assured that neither he nor Shirwar Ismail would be arrested. 
Jenner and Craufui’d then visited ^osha, but on their way back they 
passed through Yonte once again and this time Shirwar Ismail met 
them, though he was still too afraid to visit their camp or to go
1C. to S., 13 July 1896, FO. 107/60.
2J. to H., 13 July 1895, FO.107/37.
1back with, them to the coast.
In September Hardinge visited Kismayu and stayed there for 
several weeks. Shirwar Ismail and Ali Nahar both wrote to him 
asking to be paid, but Hardinge was determined to be tough. "The
Somalis", he wrote, "have beentoo much in the habit of assuming
that any abstention on their part from raids or rebellion is a
2favour to be paid for." On September 24th, Hardinge visited
Yonte on his way to Gosha district, and the Herti finally realised
that it was time to make their complete submission.
In October Shirwar Ismail and Ali Nahar placed themselves, their
4families and their possessions under Government protection.
They agreed to collaborate fully with the Government and as Hard­
inge noted "it w^as/... the combination of diplomatic and military 
forces that has produced the present satisfactory state of affairs". 
The simple sub-clan structure of the Herti had also been a factor 
facilitating the settlement. For the Dolbahanta Herti were largely 
confined to Italian Somaliland, and there were not many Warsangeli 
around ICismayu. Thus the Jubaland Herti were almost all Mijertein; 
Ali Nahar was head of the Ali Suleiman, the most numerous section
1J. to H., 28 July 1895; H. to S., 17 Sept. 1895, no. 172, FO.107/37
2H. to S., 17 Sept. 1895, no. 172, FO.107/37.
3H. to S., 1 Oct. 1897, no. 242, FO.107/80.
Protection Order no. 45 , 29 Oct. 1895, FO.107/39•
50. to H., 9 Nov. 1895, F0.107/39.
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of the Mijertein, and Shirwar Ismail was head of the Osman Mahmoud, 
the chiefly Herti lineage which was nevertheless rather small. 
Together they formed a powerful partnership. The only other Mijer- 
tein sections which were particularly numerous were the Ismail 
Suleiman and the Omar Mahmoud, and the latter proved to he especially 
uncooperative.*^
The acceptance of Government protection was not just an idle
gesture on the part of the Herti. It placed Ali Nahar and Shirwar
Ismail firmly on the Government side and ranged them against the
Ogaden. Their continuing loyalty was, in fact, later ■ explained in
terms of the latent rivalry within the Darod clan-family, hut
2there were also other reasons. As Sheik Ali Nahar was at pains 
to explain to Murgham Yusuf, Tonte and other Herti villages were 
within easy striking distance of Kismayu, and their cooperation
3with the Government was basically a recognition of this reality.
At the same time Oraufurd made full use of this new Herti
willingness to cooperate. He almost immediately appointed Shirwar
Ismail and Ali Nahar Political Officers, and used them as part of
4a propaganda campaign to make the Ogaden more conciliatory. They
^T.S.Thomas (1917), 10; P. Elliott, "Jubaland and its inhabitants",
G.J.. XLI (1913), 560.
2H. to s., 5 April 1898, FO.107/100; Eliot to L., 8 March 1901,
FO. 2/446.
5C. to H., 25 March 1896, FO.107/51.
4C. Ettore, R.O. (1925), 94.
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accompanied tvro expeditions to Afmadu, the first in November 
18959 the second in January 1896, Craufurd hoped nto impress upon 
Sultan Murgham Yusuf of the Ogaden Somalis the fact that 
Potentates of equal importance held obedience and. service to 
Her Majesty’s Representative to be honourable”.-^- Murgham Yusuf, 
however, was no ^impressed, and branded Shirwar Ismail as a traitor 
and a slave of the ferengi (Europeans), Nevertheless, it was pro­
bably the refusal of Ali Nahar to support the Ogaden in any act 
of hostility, or even to remain neutral if war broke out, that
forced the Ogaden reluctantly to accept the intrusion of Government
2forces into the Afmadu area.
However, the tendency of Jenner, and later Sub-Commissioners 
at Kismayu, to rely exclusively on Ali Nahar for the implementation 
of their policies ^undoubtedly caused some resentment. The local ad­
ministration increasingly ignored the Herti council, though it is 
difficult to assess to what extent Ali N&har followed their example. 
Shirwar Ismail died in $00, but, during the last years of his life,
Ali Nahar was assumed to be primarily responsible for controlling 
3the Herti, Also, since Mohamed Shirwar was too young to become 
Sultan on his father's death, Ali Nahar was appointed Regent.^-
1C. to H., 17 Dec. 3895, FO.107/39.
2C. to H., 25 March 1896, FO. 107/51.
5H. to S., 17 March 1897, no. 54, P0.107/76; Zoli (1927), 158.
^Major Harrison, "Memorandum on Jubaland", 8 July 1902, PC/jUB/2/l/6.
The first signs of discontent came in 1896, when Ali Nahar
was stabbed in the back by Hamed Muhammad Ali, a nondescript
Herti trouble-maker. Jenner had already asked him to arrest Hamed,
but the Isa Mahmoud Mijertein had photect&d the latter in the hope
of embarrassing and discrediting Ali Nahar, As a result of this
assault Ali Nahar was allowed to employ four more men to "assist
1
and protect him in the execution of his duty". Yet the number
was evidently-not enough, for a few years later Ali Nahar had to
request further help from Jenner. Several Herti were refusing to
obey his orders and were intriguing against him. Both the Warsangel
and the Omar Mahmoud Mijertein were- inclined to be uncooperative
and the two ring-leaders had to be deported to Mombasa before the
2
situation could be brought under control. By and large it seems 
that the more a Somali leader cooperated with the administration, 
the less authority he would have over his own followers and hence 
the less use he would be to the Protectorate Government. In the 
search for collaborators this was a dilemma that was not noticed 
often, though there are many telling references to the extreme 
weakness of those Somali chiefs the administration felt it could 
rely on most. However, Ali Nahar himself certainly experienced
1J. to 0., 5 Aug. 1896, PC/CP/74/45.
Q
0. to S., 4 Oct. 1899, FO.2/191; Farrant to Craufurd, 21 July 1899 
P. C/CP/ll0/9.
something of the problem and Jenner wrote that “he admitted
it himself that his power amongst the Herti had considerably
waned since he entered Government service".1
Ali Nahar1 s position was strengthened by his appointment as
Regent, but a crisis finally developed in 1906, when an Osman
Mahmoud Mijertein named Ashgar proclaimed himself 'Mullah' and
began to collect followers near Tonte. Salkeld, who was then the
Sub-Commissioner at Kismayu, acted at once before a movement could
2develop and Ashgar was killed in a skirmish. There can be no
doubt that Salkeld thought he had prevented a movement similar
3to that of "Muhammad Abdille Nassau' s'' spreading to Jubaland, and 
this was an obsessive preoccupation at that time.^ ' At the Colonial 
Office, news of Salkeld* s quick handling of what was assumed to 
have been a potential uprising was met with considerable approval, 
and one official minuteds "this method of dealing with Mullahs must 
save a great deal of blood-shed"; while Winston Churchill, then 
Under Secretary of State, added tartly "doubtless some Cromwell
I™
guiltless of his country’s blood". But how far did Ashgar1 s 
1J. to H., 26 July 1898, FO.107/95.
2H.Moyse-Bartlett (1956), 218; G. Zoli (1927), 160; T.S.Thomas 
(1917), 39; H.-S. to S., 4 Jan. 1906 and S. to H.-S., 2 Jan 1906,
co.533/11.
Otherwise known as the ‘Mad Mullah1 by the British, he began a re­
bellion in British Soma3.iland that lasted from 189S till 1920*
^Sheik Muhammad1 s impact south of the river Juba was multiform and 
spread over the period 1898 to 1916. In this thesis I have dealt 
with the impact piecemeal in the relevant chapters, but I have also 
dealt with it as a single topic as an article, "The Impact of Mohammad 
_Abdille Hassan on the Kast Africa Protectorate", J.A.H., X no. 4 (1969) 
Minutes on dispatch 18 Jan* 1906, quoted from T.H.R.Cashmore (l965),327
reputedly 'seditious preaching' represent a serious politico- 
religious movement? Salkeld's precipitate action, above all the 
early death of Ashgar and the lack of any proper subsequent in­
vestigation into the incident, has made an evaluation of these 
proceedings extremely difficult.
Nevertheless, it is obviously significant that Ashgar had only 
been in Jubaland a short time, and that the previous year he had 
visited Sheik Muhammad in northern Somalia. Undoubtedly there 
was contact between the Jubaland Herti and those in the British 
Protectorate. How much contact is not known but a number of Herti 
associated with Ashgar appear to have been traders rather than 
pastoralists, aad so may be presumed to have kept in touch with 
the north. One in particular, Ahmed Abdi had been to Lamu, Mombasa 
and Nairobi. He had written articles for the East African Standardt
and there can be little doubt that he would have been well acquainted
with Sheikh Muhammad's rebellion. The administrative authorities
in Jubaland were convinced that the trouble had been caused by
1"northern chiefs".
Sheik Muhammad's .iihad had initially at least been closely 
associated with the Salihiyya brotherhood (tariqa) and it is inter­
esting that the first representative (khalifa) of that tariqa in 
Jubaland, Sheik Ali Nairobi, should have arrived in 1906. The exact
' Sadler to S., 23 May 1907, 00.533/29; Salkeld to S., 6 Feb. 1907, 
PC/JUB/2/2/2.
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date of his arrival is not known, though it was probably after
Ashgar had been killed for he was never associated with his
movement. However, most of Sheik Ali*s supporters were drawn
from those Herti sub-clans and lineages that had given their
support to Ashgar, though, perhaps remarkably, he x-ras never
associated with sedition and his tariqa never seems to have had
a political impact.
Ashgar1s death had other repercussions however. The Omar
Mahmoud Mijertein and the Warsangeli held that Ali Nahar was
responsible for Ashgar's death and out of revenge five men from
2these two sections murdered him in Mayl906. The Dan Wadag and
Yusuf Ali sub-sections of the Osman Mahmoud Mijertein were also
implicated, since they had assisted the murderers, but other
3sections remained loyal to the Government. For a short time there
was a real possibility of internecine civil war amongst the Herti,
4though in the end this was avoided." The administrators at Kismayu, 
however, wished to undwrtake active measures to punish the murderers, 
while the Governor, Hayes Sadler, fearing complications thoughtthe
5imposition of a fine and an embargo on Herti trade the best policy.
1C. Zoli (1927), 265; K. to S., 50 May 1906, PC/jtJB/2/3/l;
T.S.Thomas, "Precis for x^ eek ending 18 Feb. 1916", 00,533/167.
K^. to Italian Resident at Giumbo, 30 May 1906, PC/jUB/2/3/l.
to H.-S., 6 July 1906, 00.533/16.
4H.-S. to Elgin, 19 June 1906, CO. 533/15.
5H.~S. to E., 5 Aug. 1906, 00.533/16.
let this was a policy that achieved its objective slowly.
It contributed therefore to the climate of uncertainty that sur­
rounded Government relations with the Herti, and in the end it 
necessitated a re-examination of that relationship, ^erious con­
sideration was given to the possibility of abolishing the Herti 
Sultanate. Though this step was not taken it was decided to give 
Government pay to more heads of Herti sections, and to utilise 
these officials for the implementation of Government policy. The 
earlier attempt to control the Herti through their Sultan, or his 
wakil (attorney), was thus reversed.
Some attempt was also made to revise the near monopoly of 
Government jobs enjoyed by the Herti. It was recognised that the 
Warsangeli had the Omar Mabmoud Mijertein were creating trouble 
and refusing to pay their fine, because in this way they hoped to
2obtain large salaries and Government posts to keep them peaceful.
But their discontent only served to draw attention to the dangerous
preponderance of Herti in Government jobs.
The initial intention of the administration at ICismayu had been
to offer-a share of the advantages of Government to both the Ogaden 
3and the Herti. Graufurd had advanced the view thats
1S. to H.-S., 6 Feb. 1907, PC/jUB/2/2/2.
"Jubaland Intelligence Circular", Salkeld, 7 April 1907, 00.533/28. 
5J. to Ahmed Murgham, 28 Feb. 1898, F0.107/91.
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pending the institution of direct control bj Government 
Officials, the employment of the natives of the territory 
/yra.£?... a politic aad economical proceeding. ^
And this had been accepted by Lord Salisbury, then the Secretary
of State, without comment. In 3896, the Ogaden had been allowed
to select two men for employment in the customs department, with
2
the promise of further jobs if they behaved themselves well. But 
the necessity of undertaking punitive expeditions against the 
Ogaden-in 1§9^ and in 1901 made it impossible to employ them at 
the same time.
On the other hand, from January 1896, Herti were employed as
•2
scouts and mail-runners. A number were also trained as Government 
askaris aad some served in Uganda for four years." They supported 
the Government in 1898 and so secured the implacable hatred of 
the Ogaden. * The following year three Herti were killed in a serious 
dispute over grazing rights with the Ogaden, and Herti askaris 
were involved in the fighting.® They also participated eagerly 
in the punitive expedition of 1901, which was brought about by the
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murder of Jenner and many of his Herti escort; 1 and in December 1901
1C. to S., 9 Oct. 1896, F0.107/60.
2J. to H., 24 June 1896, PC/CP/74/45.
5C. to H., 25 March 1896, F0.107/51.
4
J* to Ahmed Murghan, 28 Feb. 1898, F0.107/91.
^Perducci to Dulio, 24 Feb. 1898, ASMAI. Posiz. 68/l-H; H, to S.,
9 April 1898, F0.107/92; J. to H., 28 April 1898, F0.107/93.
D^r. Radford to F.O., 27 Nov. 1900, F0.2/384.
^H.Moyse-Bartlett (1956), 115-6; 1.S.Thomas (1917), 31; T. to L., 23 Nov.
over 100 Herti were fighting with the Government against the 
1Ogaden,
Moreover, after 1898 all the Kismayu police were recruited
from the Herti, and one of Aii Nahar* a brothers was a Sergeant 
2
Major. They were also used with considerable success to seiae
Aulihan and other Ogaden cattle In 1897 and 1898. Police parties
were frequently sent to reconnoitre and bring back intelligence
of Ogaden movements during periods of hostility. Jenner thought
the use of Herti policy in 1898 had "obviated on more than one
occasion the employment of military force", and he therefore pro™
4posed an increase in pay for all Herti chiefs as a reward.
In the last year of his life, Jenner also thought of using his
Somali police to open up the interior to administrative control.
In 3899 he had advocated setting up a military station at Bardera,
but a year later he wrote? "I think, however, I was wrong, and that
5our principle ought to be to dot these cheap police posts about".
Consequently Jenner had tried to recruit Ogaden police as well.
A few were accepted in February 1899, and a year later there were
and 13 Deo. 1900, 3?0.2/294; T, to B., 16 April 1901, F0. 2/458.
-j
Cpt. Fisher, "Memorandum respecting the state of affairs in Jubaland", 
30 Dec. 1900, F0.2/445.
2S. to S., 10 Oct. 1907, PC/JUB/2/2/2.
5J. to H., 3 March 1898, F0.107/91; F. to H., 1 April 1898, F0.107/92.
After 1902 their combative quality was explicitly recognised and 
they were referred to as Military police. J. to H., 26 Oct, 1898,
F0.107/98; H. to J., 8 Oct. 1902, F0.2/574.
5J. to T., 1 Nov. 1899, F0.2/293.
1
over forty. In 19^0 Abdurrahman Mursaal, bead of the Aulihan
Ogaden, was sent to establish a customs post at Serenli with
eighteen police. There was also a plan to open a post at Wajir,
but Jenner1 s death led once more to a monopoly in the Jubaland
police force of the Herti, and their use dn a semi-military
capacity against the Ogaden, Yet even when peace was restored,
the Ogaden felt that the Herti police were biased against them,
and they also resented having to deal with the Herti as intermediaries
between them and the Government. They wanted direct contact
2with the administration.
The most important Herti intermediary was Adam Musa, the Govern­
ment Interpreter. His wide experience had singled him out for 
special attention by both Graufurd and Jenner. Adam Musa had lived 
for many years in Aden, and his earlier services to the Government 
had earned him Her Majesty’s Egypt medal with the caslp for 'El
Teb', and the Khedive's star for the campaign in the Eastern Sudan 
3in 1884. He was clearly a man who oould be trusted with responsibility.
The Ogaden naturalfer coveted the post of Government Interpreter, 
and felt that the choice of a Herti was particularly inappropriate
1J, to H., 6 Feb. 1899, FO.2/189; Dr. Radford to FO., 27 Nov. 1900,
FO.2/384.
p
“Questions raised by Ogaden", 12 & 13 Dec. 1904, CO. 533/8.
5C. to H., 17 Deo. 1895, FO.107/39.
when it came to handling their own relations with the admini­
stration. Moreover, although Adam Musa at first did no more
than accompany Craufurd and Jenner on their visits to Afmadu,
1he was soon given important additional duties.
In 1897 it was suggested that he should be sent to Serenli
with sixty Somali irregulars to build a fort and temporary post 
2there. The following year he played a crucial role in arranging 
a settlement between the Ogaden and the Government. His in­
structions were to obtain an acknowledgement from the Ogaden that 
they owed obedience to the Government. Once this had been achieved 
he was given the responsibility of collecting a fine that had been 
agreed to.^
The following year, Adam Musa travelled with a caravan to 
Moyale, via Bardera and Si Wak, returning through Hendille and the 
country around the Lori an Swamp. He obtained valuable information 
about the anterior and brought back enough ivory to cover the cost 
of the expedition. More important, however, he explained to the 
Bo ran and Ajuran "about the Somalis and ICismayu Government",^’ and
1C. to H.t 25 March 1896, FO,107/51.
2H. to S., 1 Oct. 1897, FO.107/80.
3J. to H., 23 Hot. 1897, FO.107/36; H. to S., 4 Feb. 1898 and
H. to S., 19 March 1898, F0.107/91.
^"Statement" by Adam Musa, 14 Feb. 1900, FO.2/285.
the political implications of this were later significant.
The Ogaden strongly resented this extension of Adam Musa1 s 
responsibilities. Equally, they resented their virtual exclusion 
from Government jobs. let their opportunity to challenge the 
Herti did not come until 1906. Up to that date, the Herti were
2thought of as loyal and dependable servants of the administration.
The Ogaden, by contrast, were assumed to be untrustworthy. But 
the murder of Ali Hahar changed all that. The Ogaden and the Herti 
were now tarred with the same brush, there was little to choose 
between them. Just as the Herti had previously offered to help 
the Kismayu administration when there had been trouble with Afmadu, 
so now the Ogaden offered to chastise those Herti who were in revolt. 
However, this new image of the Ogaden as Government supporters had 
been preceded by ten years of tempestuous resistance to Government 
advances, and it was by no means clear that a period of calm lay 
ahead.
Between 1895 and 1905? the essential difference of a forward 
Government policy from the point of view of the Ogaden and of the
^Cederqvist to Missionsdirecktor, 16 March 19^0, AS/BPA/is/514.
2However cf. Opt. Ward’s view, which was endorsed by Bliot, that 
the Herti were of ’’doubtful loyalty” and only ’’nominally friendly”. 
W. to E., 2 Bee. xgoi; B. to L., 9 Bee. 1901, FO. 2/451.
3K. to H.-S., 21 June 1906, 00.533/lS.
Herti was that, for the latter, this entailed their immediate 
encirclement, whereas, for the former, it presented a frontal 
attack with the consequent possibility of retreat. The Herti had 
no room for manoeuvre, and so they submitted. On the other hand, 
the Ogaden found that their own mobility was socially divisive 
and fissiparous, sinoe it was not shared equally by all sections. 
Those that could break away and retreat did so, while those that 
remained behind had to come to terms with the new administration,
1
and this increased the level of social tension amongst the Ogaden.
At the same time, a forward Government policy threatened the
existence of a relatively new tut important addition to the economic
and social structure of the Ogaden, Victories over the Wardai and
Boran Galla had led them to become the owners of large numbers
of slaves. As a result they had departed from a purely pastoral
2way of life and, around Afmadu, cereals were extensively grown. 
Within a year of Jenner* s arrival, however, it was certainly clear 
to the Ogaden "that when the British officers ^ eldj. .their country, 
their slaves and wealth /would/* * necessarily pass away".^
It was often noticed that sections furthest from the coast were 
the moslpellicose. H. to S., 27 Wov. 1898, FO. 107/98.
A description of Ogaden agriculture at Afmadu can be found in 
C. to H., 25 March 1896, W . 107/51.
*5.idem.
It was unfortunate that this realisation came so quickly.
Perhaps it had already been theretefore the I.B.El.A.Co. had 
withdrawn from Kismayu. But Jenner1 s instructions had specifi­
cally mentioned a stricter enforcement of the abolition of slavery, 
though, until he was backed by more armed forces, he was told not
to make a public or ostentatious announcement on the subject and
1just to apply the law quietly. Craufurd anticipated little
difficulty with regard to the Herti, who did not own many slaves,
but the reaction of the Ogaden was likely to be altogether different
When Jenner wrote to Murgham Yusuf informing him that there had
been a change of administration, the Sultan replied peremptorily
and requested the Government to stop interfering in his country
3and to restore his pay. Hassan Berghin had acted in much the 
same way for, though he sent messengers to Kismayu with assurances 
of friendship, he had declined tofeake any personal contact, which 
was tantamount to an insult.
However, Jenner and Craufurd ignored these signs of Ogaden 
hostility and waited until they were ready to act. They assumed 
that the tactics already used against the Herti would be equally
1H. -to J., 5 July 1895, Pd/jUB/2/l/l.
2J. to H., 13 July 1895, FO.107/37.
%. to S., 17 Sept. 1895, FO.107/37.
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successful against the Ogaden, and they imagined, therefore, that 
a few rapid marches to Afmadu would achieve the desired results.
After securing the submission of the Herti, towards the end 
of 1895, Graufurd thought it was time to "take steps to demonstrate 
the reality of Her Majesty's Protectorate over the Ogaden country".^ 
He set out for Afmadu on 27 November with a strong escort. On the 
way he stopped at Melkana, a village belonging to the Abdulla 
Ogaden, but the Sultan and chiefs were absent. A quarrel developed 
over the rights of the caravan to use the wells, and only the 
adroit handling of a tricky situation prevented fighting between 
the inhabitants and the escort. This was the first of several 
occasions when Graufurd avoided bloodshed with great skill and good 
luck.
Both Murgham Yusuf and Hassan Berghin sent a message that they 
would fight if Afmadu was approached, stating "that this was their 
country, and that graufurd/®« had no right to be in it without 
their permission, which would not be gl-ven". The attitude of the 
Ogaden had at first been one of defiance, but, as Graufurd drew 
closer, the Ogaden council veered towards capitulation. At one moment 
the council agreed that tribute would be paid by each sub-clan
1C. to H., 17 Deo. 1895, FO.107/39-
with a double donation from the Sultan. But panic ensued in the
1
end and Murgham Yusuf and his advisors fled.
Furthermore, the Ogaden council was divided and Sheik Jebril 
Farah, head of the rer Hersi, and A n  Hurgham, Yusuf's brother, 
were both conciliatory, sin ce their own lands would have suffered 
in the event of fighting, Murgham Yusuf appears to have shared 
their view, but the Abd Wak and the Abdulla were both keen to 
fight. In the end there was a skirmish, not between the Ogaden and 
the caravan, but amongst the Ogaden themselves? a nd after that 
Murgham Yusuf refused to see Craufurd. After Craufurd bad returned 
to Kismayu', however, he received two letters from the Ogaden pro­
mising obedience, which were signed by the heads of all the main
2sub-clans except the Aulihan.
To put this letter to the test, Graufurd set out for Afmadu 
once more on 25 January 1896, with an escort of 112 men. Again 
he passed Melkana, where this time he managed to secure the payment 
of tribute. On January 29th he arrived at Afmadu. The Ogaden elders 
were respectful and submissive. They offered to pay tribute at 
once, A well had been set aside for the expedition and water had 
been dram and troughs filled for the camels to drink from. Fowl.;
C^. to S., 13 July 1896, FO.107/60; C.H,Craufurd, "Journeys in 
Gosha and beyond the Deshek Wama", G.J., IK no. 1 (1897),
2An explanation for the absence of the Aulihan may lie in the death 
of Ahmed Agan, head of the sub-cl an, in 1896, and the discussions 
that would have taken place before Her si Degaja was chosen in his 
place. They were also absent from the formal act of submission on 
30 January 1896.
2 0 8
and. milk: were also provided. The Ogaden succeeded in making an 
extremely good impression, and cn 30 January they formally sub­
mitted to the Government. Murgham Yusuf was too ill to sign.
1himself and he gent two wakils to sign for him. Then, after 
listening to a recitation of complaints, Graufurd returned to the
2coast satisfied that he had secured the submission of the Ogaden.
Craufurd* s success, however, was not as complete as he imagined. 
His view that "the holder of the wells /of Afmadu/has the Ogaden 
nati cn in the hollow of his hands" was based on an ignorance of 
the interior beyond Afmadu and was certainly exaggerated. On 
the other hand, he underestimated the element of sheer luck which 
had contributed to the effectiveness of his expeditions. Murgham 
Yusuf had also been a dying man, but he had done his best to 
bribe Ali lahar to fight on his side. He had finally agreed to 
submit after the Herti refused to connive at any Ogaden ho stility. 
Yet other Ogaden sections, whose wealth lay beyond the reach of the 
administration, were inevitably going to act independently for as 
long as they could, and the signatures of their elders was unlikely 
to be a factor makingthe slightest difference.
What had so far been achieved was a demonstration of Government 
authority, but this had not been followed up by the imposition of
1 "Ogaden Submission", 30 Jan. 1896, FO. 107/51.
2C. to H., 25 March 1896, TO.107/51.
3C. to S., 13 July 1896, TO.107/60.
1Government control. When Murgham Yusuf died in May 1896, Farrant 
■wrote to Afmadu to find out who had "been chosen to succeed him, 
and there was still no attempt to determine or influence the 
decision. Nor was this merely a reflection of limited Government 
authority, it also emphasised the absence of reliable intelligence 
about Ogaden politics, and this was a recurrent problem.
All that Farrant learnt was that Yusuf's heir was to be his son 
Ahmed Murgham, who was too young to assume control, and that Ogaden 
affairs would be dealt with by a Council of Regency. Graufurd 
assumed that this would lead to improved relations with the Ogaden, 
while Jenner explained Ahmed’s friendship towards the Government in 
terms of Ali Nahar’s assumed influence over him, yet neither wase 
right. ^
The most alarming aspect of Ahmed Murgham's position was the 
lack of support given to him by other Ogaden sections, and it was 
almost certainly this that prompted him to establish friendly re­
lations with the Kismayu administration. Hersi Degaja, head of the 
Aulihan, told Jenner that he would not recognise Ahmed’s authority
-j
R.G.Farrant had first served with the I.B.E.A.Co. In 1896 he was 
posted to Kismayu as a Collector (the equivalent of the D.G. or 
Ditrict Commissioner).
^Perducci to Dulio, 26 March 1898, ASMAI. Posiss. 68/l-H,
to H., 16 May 1896, FO, 107/52.
to S., 25 May 1896, FO.107/52; J. to C.,ll Sept. 1896, PC/CP/74/45.
and, while expressing his complete obedience to the Government,
hoped that in future the administration would discuss Aulihan
1affairs with him directly. Hassan Odel, head of the Abd Ttfak,
and Hassan Berghin, head of the Abdulla, also refused to recognise
Ahmed Murgham1 s position, and declined to maintain any further
2contact with the Government. Since several Abdulla sections 
were, anyway, committed to raidin^n the river Tana, the clan's 
relations with Kismayu had inevitably been somewhat strained, while 
the Abd Wak grazing grounds were still inaccessible from Kismayu.’ 
Ahmed Murgham's support, therefore, came almost entirely 
from the Muhammad 2ubeir, his own clan, and from the Mukhabul, 
whose head, Ali Murgham, was Ahmed's paternal uncle. ^  Additional 
government support was clearly necessary. Ahmed Murgham offered 
to go to Kismayu to swear his allegiance to the government, but before 
going he asked Jenner if he could bring three to four hundred 
followers with him. Jenner, thinking of the expense, had at first 
been inclined to refuse the request but then changed his mind!
1J. to H., 24 June 1896, PC/CP/74/45.
2J. to C., 5 Sept.1896, PC/CP/74/45.
5R. to 0., 26 Aug. 1896, P0/CP/68/ 20; J. to C., 31 Dec. 1896,
P0.107/61; H. de Free, "Notes on aJ0urney on the Tana river,
July-Sept. 1899", G.J.. XVII (l90l), 513.
^Ahmed may also have received support from the Suleiman and the
Her Muhammad, sub-sections that are not mentioned in the official 
correspondence. J. to H., 24 June 1896, PC/CP/74/45.
It was pointed out to me", he wrote, "that his position 
as Sultan was rather precarious, and would be shaken if a 
disposition was shown by the Government not to recognise 
his new dignity.-^
It was therefore recognised both by the Ogaden and the Kismayu
administration that the purpose of the visit was to strengthen
Ahmed's position. Yet Jenner nevertheless refused to give Ahmed
the same privileges as Shirwar Ismail, though these were requested.
2The Ogaden were still on probation.
Jenner never explained in his correspondence why Ahmed 
Murgham's position should have been so precarious. It is easy 
to assume that on Murgham Yusuf's death there was a centrifugal 
tendency amongst the Ogaden clans. Jenner himself encouraged 
this impression,it usefully substantiated his pretension to be 
supporting the legitimate claimant to the Ogaden Sultanate. But 
was Ahmed's claim really legitimate? According to Sir Charles 
Eliot, Murgham Yusuf had designated Omar Murgham, Ahmed's younger 
brother, to succeed him and had given him his ring on his deathbed. 
It had been Jenner1 s subsequent recognition of Ahmed Murgham as 
the ^ultan that had encouraged the Muhammad Zubeir and the Mukhabul 
to back Ahmed, but this line ms not followed by the other Ogaden
1J. to 0., 5 Sept. 3396, FO.IO7/6O.
2
Agreement signed by Ahmed Murgham, chief of the Ogaden tribe,
1 Sept. 1896, PC/CP/74/45.
^From 1900 to 1904 Sir Charles Eliot was Commissioner and Consul 
General, East Africa Protectorate and Agfe^, Consul-General, 
Zanzibar.
1
sub-clans who refused to be represented on the Council of Regency. 
Furthermore, it was suggested that Murgham Yusuf had chosen Omar 
Murgham to succeed him because of his greater ability, aid one of 
Ahmed’s problems consisted of his unprepossessing characters Mhe
2was young, and rash, lacking the personal influence of his father”.
Yet, whatever the root cause of Ahmed’s weakness, Jenner was
supporting as Sultan of the Ogaden a man who exercised little personal
authority, and this in itself was a dangerous policy, especially
since his council was scarcely more effective. Craufurd recommended
that Ahmed ^aould be given 40 Rs. a month plus a small sum for his
followers, on the understanding that he would be of some assistance
to the government, but his craven attitude towards the Kismayu.
administration made him an even less effective tool in Jenner’s 
3hands. For, the more his cooperation was guaranteed, the less 
likely it was that other Ogaden would follow his example.
In December Ahmed Murgham paid his tribute a few days late and 
brought with him an insufficient number of cattle. Although he 
happened to be the only Ogaden leader willing to pay any tribute 
at all, Jenner began to adopt an unrealistic ally rigid attitude 
towards the Muhammad Zubeir in particular. For a few months the policy
to Lt, 8 March 1901, FO.2/445; Intelligence Division to F.O.,
21 July 1898 encl. 1, F0.107A^4.
2
T.H.R.Cashmore (1965), 319.
5C. to S., 9 Oct. 1898, FO.107/60.
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seemed to pay off and Jenner wrote;
On the whole I am satisfied with ^ Xhmed Murgham1 s/\.. 
attitude, and I consider that in his heart he really 
wishes for peace with us, recognises our strength, and 
is prepared to submit to the orders of Government, but 
he is not a strong man.3-
What tended to be overlooked was that the real problem lay in 
persuading other Ogaden sub-clans that the administration was 
strong, and this was an impossible task for a weak Sultan. The 
job would ultimately be Jenner1 s, and he did not sufficiently 
realise that hi sown rigidity towards the Muhammad Zubeir, and 
Ahmed Murgham in particular, was likely to advance the date when 
he would have to accept this task or admit the government* s weakness.
The confrontation came in February 1897, when Jenner dis­
covered that the Ogaden were preparing a 'razsia against the Boran, 
and it was one of his own choosing. Since the Boran were theoretically
friends of the British Government, Jenner foolishly prohibited the
raid aid then dispatched part of the Kismayu garrison to a village
2near the Bveshak Wama as a warning. However, the best policy
would have been to ignore the proposed attack altogether since
it could not be prevented, and Jenner had already been advised
3not to gpt involved in outside disputes. The troops only deterred
1J. to 0., 31 Deo. 1896, PC/CP/74/45.
2H. to S., 17 March 1897, FO.107/76.
to J., 5 July 1895, PC/jUB/2/l/l.
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a few nearby villages from joining in; the Ogaden ignored Jenner1 s 
prohibition.
What had happened was that Jenner had entirely misjudged the
nature of the Ogaden raid, which was not intended as an ordinary
1hunt for loot and ivory. The Bombi age-set now wanted to whet
their spears and eradicate their shameful name by a dead of valour.
The prestige of the whole age-set was at stake and their leader
2was Ahmed Murgham. Inevitably he was implicated in the raid,
3
though Her si Degaja was said to have led the Ogaden northwards.
A raid of this sort had deep social implications that Jenner was 
largely unaware of, he did not even know of Ahmed's important 
positinn amongst the Bombi, and so he publicly and unnecessarily 
forbade an act the Ogaden would feel socially compelled to carry 
out.
The raid happened to be a failure and the Ogaden obtained no 
loot from the Boran. 4 But Jenner at once strongly recommended that 
Afmadu should be occupied for three to four months, that some of 
the walls should be destroyed and that Ogaden cattle diould be
A .
However for another view sees H.Moyse-Bartlett (1956). 113. 
^R.S.Salkeld (1905), 548.
3J. to H., 27 March 1897, FO.107/76. 
ir. to H., 13 June 1897, FO.107/78.
confiscated.^ Hardinge energetically supported these proposals
and also sent a telegram to Lord Salisbury, the Foreign Secretary,
to say that Major Hatch, Officer Commanding Troops in the Pro-
2tectorate, recommended a punitive expedition.
Salisbury, however, naturally hesitated before sanctioning the
use of force and acted with due deliberation. He took two and a
half weeks to answer Hardinge*s telegram, and then only asked for
more details. After further delays totalling a month, Salisbury
decided that the Uganda zebellion necessitated the indefinite
postponement of active measures in Jubaland, and the matter was 
3shelved.
Tet this decision, understandable though it was, undermined 
the whole basis on which a forward policy was being constructed in 
the Juba area. Jenner had only followed Craufurd* s valedictum;
"my policy", he had written shortly before leaving Kismayu, "has 
been to show the Somalis that I could gain my ends by force; but, 
nevertheless, to achieve them by peaceful means whenever possible". 
Now, on the other hand, the sfcing had been removed from any govern­
ment threat, for the use of force was not to be sanctioned. It was 
±J. to H., 27 Kerch 1897, FO. 107/77-
%. to S., 4 April 1897 tele. no. 27, FO.107/84; H. to S., 4 April 
1897, no. 72, FO.107/77. For further details about this telegram
and its reception at the F.O. as well as Ogaden developments see;
G.H.Mungeam (1966), 3O-31.
3S. to H., 21 April 1897, FO.107/83; H. to J., 10 June 1897,
FO.107/78.
4C. to H., 25 March 1896, FO.107/51.
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perfectly clear to Jenner that, if this policy was not soon
reversed, it would mean the end of any attempt to control the
Ogaden. Perhaps for a short while some bluff might succeed,
but, as early as August 1897, Jenner was writing to Hardin gei
Our prestige will suffer, as it will be evident that 
we are acting bostilely to the Ogaden, and yet dare not 
go up to Afmadu and attack them.l
As a result of Salisbury's decision, Hardinge had already 
instructed Jenner to take advantage of any disposition on the 
part of Ahmed Murgham to arrive at a peaceful settlement. After 
the payment of a fine the incident was to be regarded as closed, 
but what action could betaken if the Ogaden remained defiant and 
refused to pay? Hardinge was now *ble to recommend nothing more 
drastic than an interdiction of Ogaden trade in Kismayu, and Jenner 
thought that this would hurt the adminisiration more than the Somali. 
There would be a drastic reduction of inoome in Jubaland, while the 
Ogaden could still send their produce to Italian ports. For it 
was not possible to prevent the Ogaden from trading with the Benadir, 
and Jenner argued that an ineffective blockade -was worse than no 
blockade at all. He now favoured the adoption of a friendly attitude
1J. to H., XI Aug. 0897, FO.107/79.
2H. to J., 10 June 1897, FO.107/78.
3H. to S., 24 June 1897, FO.107/78.
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towards the Ogaden, since they could not be punished.'
In June 1897, Jenner began negotiations with Ahmed Murgham
and offered to remit the fine if the Sultan was prepared to show
some sign that he regretted his action, but this was going too 
2far. Hardinge did not want the impression to be given that the 
Government was retreating from an embarrassing position and Jenner 
was informed that delay was the best tactic.
As a result a period of increased 1 ewlessness followed. Omar 
Murgham killed two Herti police, and the BahaKla Ogaden refused 
to pay adequate diya. A few months later, the Aulihan murdered 
a Wa-rdai Galla who was trading with the Gosha.^ Hardinge tried 
twice, therefore, to reopen the question of a punitive expedition. 
"Putting aside all questions of justice", he wrote to Lord Salisbury, 
"it is impossible, with any regard for our prestige, and for the 
security of persons under our protection, to let such an incident 
pass without notice." The Ogaden moreover appeared to expect 
some form of retaliation and Hardinge hoped that "perhaps next 
year Your Lordship may permit us to take more active measures".
1J. to H., 11 Aug. 1897, FO.107/79.
2J. to H., 13 June 1897, FO.107/78.
3H. to J., 23 June 1897, FO.107/78.
4J. to H., 3 March 1898, FO.107/91.
5H. to S., 2 Oct. 1897, F0.107/81.
He specially stressed that an expedition need not he expensive,
and now advocated a quick march to Afmadu, where all the wells
would either be destroyed or rendered unusable. However, this
was not sanctioned, and false hopes were later engendered by
Hardinge1 s impression that Ahmed Murgham was anxious to avoid
1
a quarrel with the Government,
Yet there does seem to have been some evidence that the 
Bahahla Ogaden were willing to come to terms with the Kismayu 
administration. The Muhammad Zubeir, Aulihan and Suleiman sections 
all paid small sums towards their finej the Maghabul also contributed 
four hundred dollars worth of property. There were several reasons 
why Ahmed Murgham was anxious to re-establish friendly relations 
with the Government. In the first place, the threat of an expedition 
against Afmadu had led to the temporary abandonment of agriciilture 
around the wells, and a consequent scarcity of grain. Greater 
stability was required before sowing could begin again, and the 
delay was proving irksome. It was also realised that the Government 
threat was primarily directed against those sections that were 
most associated with Afmadu, and their desire to minimise the. 
danger was consequently an important factor in inducing a conciliatory 
attitude.
1H. to S., 19 March 1898, FO.107/91.
But, after February 1898, the Aulihan were bent on mischief.
Herti police had seised twenty-six of their cattle as a zeprisal
for the death of a British protected Gall a, and this put an end
to their further cooperaticn.^ Before Jenner could seriously
improve relations with Afmadu, Ahmed Murgham had been swept along
and involved ii tie growing scale of Aulihan lawlessness. On March 31st,
the Aulihan killed two Arabs and a Galla on the Kismayu-Turki Hill
road. The following day they raided cattle near Kismayu and attacked
a party of Herti police. Then slowly the number of Ogaden sections
involved in raids began to grow. On 23 March, six Waboni were
murdered, and this time Omar Murgham and nine Abdulla were implicated.
By the end of the month an Ogaden messenger was claiming that Ahmed
Murgham had instigated all these murders, and that his present
policy was to send out small marauding parties in different directions
2
to embarrass the administration as much as possible. Similar
information regarding Ogaden intentions was also obtained by the
Italian Resident at Giumbo, though, more realistically, Ahmed
3Murgham was not credited with any initiative in the matter.
There is no precise information, however, about which Ogaden
sub-clans were involved in a general agreement to harass the Kismayu
1H. to H., 3 March 1898, FO.107/91.
^  to H., 1 April 1898, FO.107/92.
Ferducci to B. , 26 March 1898, ASMAX. Posiz. 68/l-ll.
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administration. The Abdulla do not appear to have been invol-ved
in the Xater hostiXities against the Government, and, with a
few exceptions, seem to have remained neutral in the dispute."*"
It is probabXe that there were other sections who followed their 
2exampie. But from the point of view of Kismayu, where information 
about the Ogaden was in any case scarce]*: no fine distinctions could 
be drawn, and Hardinge wrote that! ’’all the sub-sections of the 
Ogaden tribe /were/., said to be implicated".^ In these circum­
stances a punitive expedition appeared unavoidable, and Hardin gp 
pressed once more for the requisite permission:
The submission of Afmadu will never, I fear, be a 
reality until we can prove to the' Ogaden that we are 
able to enter their country and ; adopt in our dealings 
with them an offensive and not merely a defensive 
attitude, 4
But neither this oblique approach, nor a more formal request, 
achieved any immediate results.
Thus Hardinge* s options were becoming drastically limited. In 
the face of repeated and indeed almost daily acts of hostility he 
was prohibited from ordering the use of force. When Craufurd was 
sent to ICismayu on 1 April, he was told to bring the Ogaden Somali
^Reddie to Rogers, 27 Feb. 1898 and Rogers to H., 28 April 1898,
FO.107/93.
2
It is interesting to note that when the Ogaden subsequently made 
peace the Abdulla, the Rer Mnhammad and the MB&habul did not tender 
their submission, the implication being that they had not taken part 
in the hostilities.
5H. to S., 2 April 1898, T0.107/l00.
4]?. to H., 1 April 1898, K>.107/92.
to reason by every possible means in bis power, "short of an 
actual hostile movement against Afmadu", a proviso that made 
the task impossibleThe most that could be done was to pro­
hibit any trade with the Ogaden in Kismayu, to confiscate all
their property in the town, and to disarm those that could still
2be found in the district.
On April 5th, Hardinge telegraphed that the Protectorate
Council had unanimously recommended the occupation of Afmadu,
it was the last shot in his locker. This telegram was forwarded
to the Intelligence Division of the War Office for their comments,
and, though the occupation of Afmadu was agreed to in principle,
Sir John Ardagh, the Director of Military Intelligence, thought
3that the time was inopportune because of events in Uganda.
Salisbury had little choice but to send Hardinge a telegram on
15 April informing him that it was not yet convenient to undertake 
4an expedition.
A fundamental weakness of the Bast Africa Protectorate wTas 
the lack of sufficiently large reserve forces and this severely 
limited the occasions when military action could be threatened.
1H. to 0., 1 April 1898, FO.107/92.
2P. to H., 1 April 1898, 20.107/92.
H. to S., 5 April 1898, F0.107/l00; Intelligence Division to F.O.,
9 April 1898, 20.107/104; s. to H., 13 April 1898, FO.107/99.
4S. to H., 13 April, FO.107/99. See also Sir A. Hardinge (1928), 222,
where he explains Salisbury’s action in terms of developments in 
the Southern Sudan.
Delay in handling a small crisis in Jubaland, however, had 
resulted in a much larger one. It was ironic and tragic that on 
the very same day that Salisbury infoimed Hardinge that a punitive 
expedition was inopportune, the Government post at Yonte was over­
run and destroyed.'*' If there was any lesson to be learnt, it 
was surely that theie was no substitute for the quick and efficient 
handling of potential crises, even using force if necessary, 
and that delay only tended to exacerbate difficult situations, 
since it was invariabljr considered a sign of weakness. But if 
Hardinge sometimes felt like imitating Reddie, the District Officer 
at Port Dumford, who asked for "a freer hand,, to act as circum­
stances indicate", there can be no doubt that the Ogaden crisis had 
been compounded by two very senior Protectorate officials trying 
to initiate a forward policy against the wishes of the Secretary 
of State.^
3The first aims of the 1898 punitive expedition were to clear 
the Ogaden from the Gosha aad Kismayu districts, and then to establish 
a line of posts between Kismayu and the Deshek Wama. But the ultimate 
objective was to advance on Afmadu where a permanent military post
1J. to H., 15 April 1898, FO.107/92. 
to R., 1 April 1898, FO.107/93.
*5
I have deliberately avoided as far as possible any account of the 
military operations, ^hese have already been described by H. Moyse- 
Bartlett (1956), 113-114.
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1was to be set up. Once this had been done, it was assumed 
that the Ogaden would be faced with the choice of either
2evacuating the country or coming to terms with the Government.
Jenner thought that the Ogaden would leave the district altogether 
and "settle down an the outskirts of Boran”, where he predicted 
the "eventual breakup of tie tribe”.
However, these assumptions were never put to the test because, 
at the beginning of July, Major Quentin, Officexjin Command of the
4
expedition, decided that it would be madness to s et out for Afmadu.
At the same time, there was a growing realisation that the wells 
were not as important as had first been thought. Jenner now wrote
Bthats”th§i lake and not the Afmadu wells are the key to the situation”. 
This change of view had perhaps been partly encouraged by the reali­
sation that the capture of Afmadu was beyohd the capability of the 
expedition, but it was also becoming evident that during the dry 
season there was not enough water at the wells for all the Ogaden 
cattle, while the Deshek Wama provided an additional and indispensible 
source of supply.
By the beginning of August, therefore, Hardings had abandoned 
the idea of settingip a military post at Afmadu, and he had settled 
instead for an administrative station on the Deshek Wama. But Jenner 
objected that the area was unhealthy and no suitable site could be
XH. to J., 20 April 1898, 3?0.107/92; H. to S., 31 July 1898, F0.107/95.
2H. to S., 9 April 1898, F0.107/92.
3J. to H., 29 April 1898 and H. to S., 10 May 1898, F0.107/93;
”Notes on the Expedition against the Ogaden Somalis**, Intelligence
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1
found.' So when Hardinge visited Jubaland in September 1098
to conclude peace talks with the Ogaden, he also toured Kismayu
and Gosha districts, finally deciding that the new post should be
built at Yontf, on the river Juba, less than twenty mD.es from the 
2sea.
As a result, the 1898 Ogaden expedition did not lead to any
significant administrative expansion. Militarily the Ogaden were
defeated, but the further step of bringing them under political
control, which had originally been a principal objective, was
now abandoned. What then had the punitive expedition achieved apart
from restoring the status quo ante.
In the first place, the prestige of the Ogaden had undoubtedly
suffered. But perhaps the most significant change lay in the access
now granted to Jenner and other members of the Kismayu administration
3to the interior beyond Afmadu. It was supremely ironic that im­
mediately after their defeat the Ogaden should have welcomed, and 
in fact demanded, some sign of British occupation; though thi s
was due more to fears of Ethiopian aggression, than to the success
Division, War Office, 21 July 1898, K).107/l04.
^Major Quentin to J., 4 July 1898, FO.107/95.
5J. to Ii., 6 July 1898, F0.107/95; J. to H., 7 Hov. 1898, F0.107/98.
h .  to H., 26 Aug. 1898, F0.107/96.
2H. to S., 18 Sept. 1898, F0.107/96.
J^. to H., 6 Feb. 1899, FO.2/189; Statement by A. Musa, 14 Feb. 1900,
F0.2/285; M hamed Agil 1 Report', 1899, FC/CP/78/65.
of the punitive expedition. There seems to be a mistaken impression
that the defeat of the Italians at Adowa in 1896 emboldened the
Jubaland Darod into thinking that the Europeans having been c!efeated
once, could be defeated again.1 In fact the Ethiopian victory and
the Amharic expansion southwards caused very considerable alarm.
In 1898 and 1899 there was near panic amongst the Ogaden that the
Amhara would advance as far as Afmadu, and Ahmed Murgham urgently
requested a British Protectorate flag as proof of British occupation
2and sovereignty. One result of this panic, then, was to open up 
Ogaden country to penetration from the coast. Dr. Radford, the 
Medical Superinetndant in the Province, remarked that in 1899 and 
1900 frequent expeditions were made through Ogaden country, ’'with 
and without military escorts, the Somalis daily becoming more friendly". 
As a result of these expeditions the area around El W ale and Wajir 
was explored for the first time, and valuable information about 
the territorial limits of the Ogaden was gained.
Relations between Kismayu and the Ogaden Sultan improved drama­
tically once hostilities had ended. By 1900, the possibility of 
any further Ogaden hostility seemed so remote that on several oc­
casions Parrant tobk his wife to Afmadu.^ Cederqvist, the Swedish
A
See: G.H.Mungeam (1966), 30 who cites the opinion of Hardinge
in H., to S., 4 April 1898, F0.107/77.
2H. to S., 30 Sept. 1898, F0.107/96; Pestalozza to M., 20 Aug.
1899, ASMAI, Posiz. 68/1-12.
5Dr. Radford to F.0. 27 Nov. 1900, F0.2/384.
4H. to S., 5 March 1900, F0.2/285.
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missionary, also felt that it was quite safe to travel anywhere
1
amongst the Ogaden* Conversely, Ahmed Murgham now often visited 
Kismayu and in 1900 he travelled to Mombasa and Zanzibar in order
2
to say farewell to Hardinge , who was xetiring from the Protectorate, 
At the same time, this progress probably gave rise to a mis­
leading and dangerous dptimism. There were two inherent weaknesses 
in Jenner* s essentially euphoric approach to the Ogaden that tended 
to get overlooked whenever there was an amelioration in his re­
lations with the Somali, Firstly his intelligence system m s  far 
too rudimentary, and only functioned spasmodically, During the/
1898 conflict, Major Quentin had constantly complained that it
3
had been impossible to obtain authentic information about the enemy.
Jennets Herti spies were far too conspicuous for the job, and
his best success was achieved with Shirwar Ismail’s Galla herdsmen,
but what he needed at the time were Ogaden informe is and of these 
4
he had none.
After hostilities had ended, there was still a need to obtain 
detailed information especially about the Ogaden, but little scope 
for accomplishing this, The gradual re-employment of Ogaden in
1C. to H., 24 July 1900, AS/BPA/lS/313.
2H. to S., 22 March 1899, F0.2/190.
Major Quentin to Major Hatch, 5 Nov. 1898, FO.107/98.
4J. to H., 26 July 1898, FO.107/95.
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Government services was only just beginning inl899, and it was 
still too early to use these recruits for gathering informa.tion* 
Military intelligence in Jubaland was also practically non­
existent.1 80 Jenner had to rely on the gossip of travellers, 
the talk of headmen and elders, and the views of his own Political 
Officers and Herti police. Where this system broke down was in 
obtaining details of potentially hostile Somali sections. The 
elders of these sections were generally the most difficult to 
contact, while other segments friendly to the Government frequently 
kept quiet about disturbing developments out of loyalty to their 
kinsmen.
Thus there was an inbuilt tendency for Jenner to receive 
only the more encouraging news. As long as the Ogaden were peaceably 
inclined there was perhaps little danger in this, but with the ad­
vantages of hindsight it is easjr to see how vulnerable Jenner was 
to any unexpected deterioration in their political cooperation.
Lack of adequate information also made it impossible to give 
differential treatment to various segments. Jenner never attempted, 
for instance, to make use of the divisive factors in Ogaden society - 
to weaken and control the clan. Instead, he adopted a uniform policy 
towards the Ogaden as a whole, which encouraged their unity in the
■i
T. Souter, "Extract from Report of the Commandant of Troops,
Province of Jubaland, British East Africa", May 1900, FQ.2/29O.
face of any crisis. Rather revealingly, it was later stated
that the Abd Wak fought the Government in 1901 because they
felt the administration could not distinguish one sub-clan from
another and so would treat them all as guilty.
Jenner appears to have underestimated the feeling of hostility
that existed among some of the most important Ogaden sections.
Frequent communication with Ahmed Murgham (head of the Muhammad
Zubeir), Abdi Liban (head of the Suleiman) and Egal Hassan (head
of the Mukhabul), was offset by a lack of contact with potentially
dangerous sub-clan chiefs such as Hassan Odel (head of the Abd Wak)
2
and Hersi Degaja (head of the Aulihan). Moreover in 1899 the 
Abd Wak and the Aulihan were the two sub-clans that needed watching 
the most closely. Although Jenner realised that the Aulihan were 
the "most troublesome section", he nevertheless failed to ^ e that 
after their surrender in August 1898 their attitude had undergone 
little change, and the basic dangers remained unaltered.
The Aulihan had been responsible for the start of hostilities 
and they had also been the first to surrender. This last fact had 
made a good impression on Jenner, Hersi Degaja also returned 
fifteen out of the twenty-seven Henry Martini Mark 4 rifles that he
•t
W.J.Monson, "Intelligence Report", n.d. F0.2/446,
2E. to L., 8 March 1901, 3?0.2/445; T. to L., 23 Nov. 1900, F0.2/294.
3J. to H., 26 Aug. 1898, F0.107/96.
had captured, while less than half the Sniders an the hands of
1other Ogaden sub-clans were returned to the Government* At 
the same time, the Aulihan refused to hand over Gure Hersi who 
had been responsible for the murder of a Galla, and this was a
2
good example of how little they were really prepared to concede. 
Moreover, since many sections were found cn both sides of the river 
Juba, the Aulihan also successfully managed to involve Jenner in 
disputes with the Italian administration, which ranged him firmly 
on their side without giving him any control over their affairs.
The most important instance concerned Abdurrahman Mursaal, a 
powerful Aulihan elder, who had crossed over from the Italian side 
of the river. He received full support from Jenner when be claimed 
compensation from Ferducci, . the Italian Resident at Giumbo, and 
when Perducci claimed that Abdurrahman was an Italian citizen,
Jenner declared him to be a British Protected person and proceeded
3to employ him in the Kismayu administration as a Political Officer, 
However, it was A. Mursaal who had actually led the attack on Tonte 
at the beginning of hostilities in 1898, and the employnent of 
a man whose friendship was so uncertain turned out to be a bad
1H. to S., 9 Sept. 1898, JO.107/96; Q. to H., 5 Nov. 1898, JO.107/98.
2J. to H., 31 Aug. 1898, JO.107/96.
3p. to J., 29 June 1900 and H. to S., 23 Julyl900, JO. 2/289,
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mistake. He was subsequently involved ±1 later Ogaden revolts, 
while Jenner was 1 ed to imagine that he had secured his cooperation.'1'
Equally dangerous during the post-1898 period was Hassan Odel, 
head of the Abd Wale. After visiting Kismayu once to tender his sub­
mission, he had then isolated himself from further contact with 
the coast. Jenner seen ed to regard his one visit as something of 
an achievement for the administration, but the fact that it was 
not repeated was more a sign of its weakness. The Abd Wak had 
played a key part in the 1898 rebellion, and their subsequent 
isolation strongly suggested that they were unrepentent and hostile.
Apart from all the problems caused by inadequate intelligence, 
Jenner's second weakness, in his handling of the Ogaden, sprang 
largely from his temperament. Perhaps the kindest observation 
that could be made of Jenner was that he was altogether too^opti- 
mistic, too trusting of the Ogaden "whom he unfortunately credited 
with high qualities foreign to their real character", and that
3
this misjudgement ultimately cost him his life. But there was 
also another side to his character. Both Perducci and Cederqvist 
who came into close contact with Jenner agreed that he was a man 
of violent temper.4 This was a userioixs liability and it inevitably
1P. to 2., 17 July 1898, ASMAI. Posiz. 68/l-U.
2J. to H., 51 Aug. 1898, EO.107/96.
^Papers relating to the Murder of Mr. Jenner, 0.7823 (l90l), item 
23? quoted in T.H.R.Cashmore (1965), 322.
4C. to I M  8 March 1899? AS/EEA/lS/305; Carlo della Valle, "Giumbos 
osservatorio sul Giuba e sulla Goscia ed Enrico Perducci suo primo 
Presidents", ASMAI. Monografie, Qartella 2/7-10.
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casts doubt on the soundness of his judgement. Acts carried 
out in anger by Jenner were capable of arousing the most bitter 
and longstanding resentment amongst the Somali, and it was two 
such acts that seem to have been ultimately responsible for 
his death.^
In July 1900, several W&gosha were hilled by Muhammad Zubeir 
after a quarrel about ivory. The incident was not of great im­
portance in itself, apd Jenner asked Hassan Yera, qadi to the 
Ogaden, to arrest the murderers. When Hassan failed to act, Jenner 
charged him with complicity and fined him 1,000 Rs. When he failed 
to pay, Jenner had him arrested and angrily imprisoned him in 
Kismayu. This was a great insult and it was not forgotten.
One of the first people to plot with Hassan Yera was an .
Aulihan, Hassan Warfa, whose son had been whipped by Jenner, and 
together they sought the assistance of Hassan Qdel, which was readily 
given.^ Towards the end of September, Jenner set out on a tour 
of the interior. In his last letter, dated 1 November, he wrote 
of the "absolutely peaceful" conditions "now that we have pacified 
the Ogaden". But Hassan Odel was waiting with 300 Ogaden for an
1
Jenner is also said to have been a sodomite, which could explain 
other antagonisms. But until these traditions are thoroughly in­
vestigated they should obviously be treated with reserve. Information 
from T.H.R.Cashmore.
2Cederqvist to M., 15 July 1899, AS/EFA/is/307.
3E. to L., 8 March 1901, F0.2/445; C. Zoli (1927), 158.
4T. to S., 25 Mov. 1900, F0 . 2/293; E. Coronaro, R.0. (1925). 96;
T. S.Thomas (1917), 29-30.
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opportunity to ambush Jenner. The one person -who oould have
warned Jenner was Ahmed Murgham, but he had just been fined
1,000 Hs. himself for not making Hassan Tera pay, and when Jenner
1
met him he revealed nothing.
Several other people of importance were implicated, though
their motives ^remained uncertain. Omar Murgham acted as a spy and
visited Jenner1s camping sites twice to find out their strength.
Aden Hagel, a Muhammad 2ubeir elder, was also implicated and so
2was A. Mursaal, indirectly. On 16 November, Jenner was killed 
and his camp was overrun. A new punitive expedition had to be 
undertaken.
The basic aim of the second Ogaden expedition was no different 
from that of the first. On both occasions the capture and retention 
of Afmadu was initially assumed to be imperative, and on both it 
was an objective that was sDon abandoned. But, whereas the 1898 
expedition led to the opening up of the hinterland beyond Afmadu, 
at least to exploring parties, the 1901 campaign, by contrast, re­
sulted in a complete withdrawl from the interior; and this antithesis
1J, to T., 1 Nov. 1900, F0.2/292.
^Perducci to Dulio, 20 Nov. 1900, ASMAI. Posia. 68/1-17; T. to L.,
4 Bee. 1900, F0.2/294.
3
The. military details of the campaign can be found hi H. Moyse- 
Bartlett (1954), 115ff.
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reflected the adoption in the spring of 1901 of a new policy 
towards Jubaland that radically altered the development of 
the Province.
The murder of Jenner took place during an awkward hiatus in
the administraticn of the Bast Africa Protectorate, On 7 October
Hardinge left Mombasa to take up a diplomatic post in Persia,
and Sir Charles Eliot, who succeeded him, did not arrive until
1the end of December. The responsibility for organising a
punitive expedition fell, therefore, on Ternan, the Acting
2
Commissioner, wh> arrived at Kismayu on 25 Ho’vember.
By 8 February 1901, he had occupied Afmadu in force and cap­
tured Ahmed Murgham. Ternan then pushed a further fifty-seven 
miles into the interior with a flying column in an attempt to 
inflict a decisive defeat on the Ogaden. But within two weeks 
Ternan had abandoned Afmadu and returned to the coast through a
misunderstanding over his instructions. The punitive expedition,
3therefore, came to an unexpectedly rapid end. The precipitate 
withdrawal of all Government forces to the coast made it necessary 
to consider anew the relationship between Kismayu and the interior,
^Gr.H.Muggeam (1966), 67ff.
^Ternan was also the Officer Commanding Troops in the Protectorate.
E^. to T., 19 March 1901, F0*2/446; E. to L., 16 March 1901,
F0.2/456. d
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Jenner’s death had, in fact, made some change almost in­
evitable. For, towards the end of his life, he had abandoned 
the idea of establishing permanent administrative posts and 
planned instead to erect temporary stations which could be visited 
from time to time by peripatetic officials. The great merit of 
this scheme was that it entailed practically no capital expenditure, 
and this was especially important in a Province that did not have 
sufficient income to offset the cost of its own administration.
It was also well suited to the nomadic habits of the Jubaland 
pastoralists. But it necessarily presupposed the friendly co­
operation of the Somali, since these stations were not designed 
to withstand sieges or repeated attacks from a hostile neighbourhood.
When, therefore, at the beginning of 1901, both Sir Clement
1Hill and Ternan advocated setting up an administrative post at
Afmadu, they were not thinking in terms of a provisional station.
In the new circumstances, the continuation of a forward policy
depended on the building of substantial and expensive military camps.
Ternan estimated that the construction of military quarters at
Afmadu would cost £5,000, that payment of the garrison would come
to £10,000 a year, and that transport would involve a further £1,800 
2per annum. These were extremely large aims - only £400 was allocated
^Sir C.Hill was head of the Africa Department at the Foreign Office.
Hill to L.j 1 Jan. 1901, F0 CP.LXIY; Correspondence Relating to the 
death of Mr. Jenner, and the Ogaden Punitive Expedition, CO. 591^1901), 20.
2S. to L., 14 Jan. 1901, F0.2/456.
in 1910 for setting up Jenner1s type of 'temporary stations' at
both Afmadu and Serenli1 - and Lansdowne, the new Secret aryjof
State, telegraphed Eliot in April, suggesting that he should
visit Kismayu to consult with ternan cn future policy in Jubaland.
However, even before leaving Mombasa, Eliot had assumed
that Lansdowne did not intend to sanction the permanent occupation 
*3of Afmadu. And after a short visit to Kismayu, he categorically 
dismissed the idea of a forward policy ±1 the strongest possible 
terms;
I very much doubt whether this province is worth the 
money which is spent upon it... and I am strongly of 
the opinion that, unless His Majesty's Government are 
prepared to spend much more money on thi s Protectorate, 
it would be better to leave the deserts alone for the 
present, and to devote our attention to those parts 
which are both accessible and profitable. I am, 
therefore, quite willing to abandon all posts in the 
interior, including Mfudu, and to hold only Yonte and 
Kismayu... This withdrawal, of course, means that we 
must let the Somalis quarrel amongst themselves.4
A few months later, as if to emphasise the point, he again wrote;
I am penetrated with the conviction that it is useless 
to spend lives and money on subduing the barbarous in­
habitants of barren deserts, and that most punitive 
expeditions are a mistake.5
1Butler, Minute, 11 May 1910, CO. 533/72,
2L. to E., 13 April 1901, F0.2/455.
3E. to L., 18 April 1901, F0.2/456.
4E. to L., 29 April 1901, P0.2/456.
5E. to L, 1 Oot. 1901, F0. 2/450.
Eliot's arguments against a forward policy were uncritically
accepted at the Foreign Office, but his original idea had not
just been a retreat to the coast and the abandonment of the interior.
Eliot had also envisaged the formation of a camel corps. Combining
speed with surprise, he expected it to have a considerable influence
1
on developments in the Afmadu area.
However, the Treasury refused to sancticn any expenditure on
a camel corps, quoting Eliot’s dispatch to the effect that money
spent on Jubaland was largely wasted, and that anyway it was better
to leave the deserts alone. As long as that policy was accepted they
2
could see no justificaticn for a camel corps. So, as a result, 
there was a complete abandonment of the interior, which the Foreign 
Office later and somewhat laconically termed a policy of 'abstention'.
Yet there were other reasons too why a policy of retrenchment 
should have been favoured. Sheik Muhammad's rebellion further north 
was beginning to have a strong psychological impact on the Jubaland 
administration, as well as on the Protectorate Government.^ There 
were real fears that the rebellion would spread southwards, and
E^. to L., 18 April 1901, F0.2/456; E. to L., 20 May 1901,
F0.2/447.
^Treasury to F,0,, 9 Aug. 1901, F0.2/520,
3F0. to Co., 10 March 1905, GO.555/8.
^See my article in the J.A.H. , X no. 4 (1969) for a more detailed 
analysis of this.
237
these fears were heightened - especially in 1902 - by inaccurate 
rumours coming from the Italian Protectorate. These mentioned that 
Muhammad. Abdille Hassan ms marching south at the head of large 
numbers of troops, and that the Italians were abandoning the in™ 
terior of their Protectorate."*" Moreover, after the battle of 
Sri go in October 1902, where Sheik Muhammad scored a notable 
victory over the British, Lansdowne admitted that the Sheik could 
not now be prevented from moving south, and Eliot was instructed 
to take all necessary military steps tocfefend the few administrative 
posts in Jubaland. Although Sheik Muhammad's threat to the East 
Africa Protectorate was more imaginary than real, his rebellion 
nevertheless continued to cast its shadow over Jubaland, and while 
in later years rumours that he was about to move south lost some 
of their potency through sheer repetition, they still discouraged 
a forward policy.
After 1905 this policy of ’non-intervention* underwent slow 
and subtle changes. Byl909 it had become a policy of ’observation’, 
and there was some argument as to whether this should be 'active1 
or 'passive'.^ Yet until 1910? there was no significant administrative
V. to L., 18 Oct, 1902, F0.2/576; Perducci to Harrison, 7 Oct.
1902 and Dulio to Perducci, 28 Sept. 1902, F0.0P.LXXI.
2L. to E., 10 Nov. 1902, FO.2/576.
•3
A more detailed analysis of the gradual development of a forward 
policy in Jubaland can be found in T.H.E.Cashmore’s thesis, 
page 324ff«
h.H.Mungeam (lSSfc6), 234.
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advance into the interior; the occupation of Afmadu was often
mooted, aid it became a "symbol of the forward policy" but,
1
nevertheless^it was repeatedly delayed*
Until the oral traditions of the Herti and Ogaden have been 
utilised, this period of Jubaland history must remain extremely 
obscure. In the first place, only a small proportion of the 
official correspondence was ever forwarded to England* Then all 
the copies that were kept in Nairobi were destroyed in the Secretariat 
fire of 1938, while the District and Provincial archives also suf­
fered considerable damage from natural hazards. But, even more 
important, this was a period when official policy itself encouraged 
a minimum of contact between the coast and the interior. Consequently 
little m s  known about developments amongst the Somali themselves.
However, one trend that clearly emerged over this period was 
the growing disunity of the Ogaden. There were several reasons for 
this. Eor a start, the crisis that developed as a result of Jenner1 s 
murder instead of leading to a united Ogaden stand, only served 
to underline the internal divisions of the clan. Through the mis­
handling of this situation, no account was taken of these divisions 
when the second Ogaden expedition was undertaken. In fact, Ternan 
mistakenly assumed that Jenner1s death involved a general revolt, 
masterminded by Ahmed Murgham, of all Ogaden sub-clans. The subsequent
h.H.R.Cashmore (1965), 325.
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mounting of a punitive expedition against the Ogaden in general
was the logical outcome of this attitude, hut it credited the
1clan with a degree of unity that it did not possess.
It would have been much better to have treated the murder as
2
a crime, rather than as an act of political revolt. For, as Sir
Charles Eliot acutely observed:
The murder of Jenner was due to personal motives: 
its only political importance was that it showed the 
audacity of the Somalis and their small respect for 
our government. But it was not part of a revolt or
a rebellion,^
The Abdulla remained quiet, and neither the Mukhabul nor
the Her Muhammad joined in the fighting.^ Ahmed Mupgham and most
of the Muhammad Zubeir also tried to remain uninvolved, but Ternan
5saw to it that they were all implicated in the murder. Government 
troops were therefore opposed only by the Abd Wak and the Aulihan, 
with the Muhammad Zubeir reluctantly joining in. The Mukhabul 
and the Rer Muhammad retreated to the Tana. The campaign itself 
lasted alshort time and was inconclusive from a military point 
of view. However, the capture of Ahmed Murgham and ten other 
Somali chiefs in February 1901 might have proved decisive had they
1T. to L., 26 Hov. 1900, F0.2/294.
^Sir Charles Eliot (1905), 120.
’'Report on the Native tribes of East Africa1', in E. to L.,
9 April 1902, F0* 2/570. This view was also shared by others 
Major Harrison, "Memorandum on Jubaland", 8 July 1902, PG/JUB/2/i/6; 
Cedercivist to T., 51 Dec. 1900, AS/EFA/lS/317.
to L., 22 Deo. 1900, F0.2/294; B. to L., 8 March 1901, F0.2/445. 
Cpt. Fisher, "Memorandum re. the state of affairs in Jubaland",
not been badly treated and imprisoned in Kismayu, which made
1
the Ogaden disinclined to yield.
Ironically, it was the fortuitous escape of Ahmed Murgham
from prison at about the same time that Government troops were
withdrawn to the coast, which provided the right conditions for
a negotiated settlement, A fine of five thousand cattle was
accepted by the Ogaden, but its payment remained uncertain for
2
Ternan, contrary to instructions, allowed a contingent of Indian 
troops to leave the province before the fine had been paid and
Lansdowne would not allow a recommencement of hostilities to be
3.used as a threat enforcing its collection. ' While Eliot probably 
agreed with the Secretary of State, he nevertheless saw the 
absolute necessity of maintaining what he euphemistically called 
’administrative pressure’, if there was to be any real prospect 
of ensuring the collection of the fine.^ In practice, there 
turned out to be a similarity between the application of this 
sort of pressure and the forbidden use of military force, at least 
in 1901, The phrase was applied to the economic oblockade of 
Jubaland and an embargo on all Ogaden trade until the fine was paid.
30 Deo. 1900, F0.2/445.
E. to 1., 8 March 1901, F0.2/445.
2E. to 1., 18 June 1901, F0.2/449.
to E., 9 Aug. 1901, F0.2/443; V. to T. , 3 Wot. 1901, PC/jUB/2/1/4.
4E. to L., 18 April 1901, F0.2/456.
5E. to L., 4 Feb. 1902, F0.2/569.
Yet these were policies that depended for their success on a
joint Anglo-Italian campaign along the river Juba, and it was
the systematic destruction of Ogaden canoes, plus the regular
patrolling of the river, that secured prompt payment by the
1Aulihan of their' share of the fine. Squally, it was a rapid
expedition to Afmadu that secured the final payment of the
2
Muhammad Zubeir portion.
Owing to the absence of any central authority amongst the
Ogaden, there was considerable difficulty in apportioning the
fine between the various sections. The possibility of turning
these divisions to good account was mooted by Captain Ward,
the Officer Commanding Troops in Jubaland, but he then rejected
the idea on the grounds that it involved too many complications!
It would I think be possible, 1b wrote, to arrange terms 
with each section of the tribe separately; each would 
then become a lever to increase the pressure on the 
others, but frcm a military point of view the situation 
is already v^ry complicated owing to the presence of 
nominally f riendly Herti Somalis in and around Kismayu 
and Gobwen. The difficulty would be ascentuated if 
there were friendly Ogaden as well.4
■j
Anglo-Italian relations are analysed in greater detail later 
in this chapter.
M^cD. to S., 14 March 1902 and Harrison to Hatch, 13 March 1902, 
F0.2/570j Opt. ‘Coke to E., 7 May 1902, F0.2/571.
3McD. to E., 13 Dec. 1901, EO. 2/569.
to OCT, EAP., 2 Dec. 1901, E0.2/451.
This desire to deal with the Ogaden as a whole necessitated
the pretence that their Sultan, Ahmed Murgham, was the only-
representative of the "whole clan, M clou gall, the new Sub-Comwissioner
at Kismayu, made it known that the fine was to be divided amongst
the Ogaden sections by ^ hmed Murgham, and that all payments were
1
to be made through him alone. Letters from the Abd Wak and
Aulihan, refusing to acknowledge Ahmed Murgham as Sultan and asking
for direct negotiations with the Government, were left unanswered
by McDougall. Instead, they rore forwarded to Afmadu, where Ahmed
2
Murgham was left to establish his position.
However, there was little point in drawing attention to the 
Sultan's technical superiority, when his authority was widely 
recognised to be purely nominal. The evidence suggests that the 
Sultan had absolutely no influence over the payment of the fine 
by sections other than the Muhammad Zubeir. The Aulihan paid their 
portion because of the pressure that had been pit on them by the 
Kismayu administration. Ahmed Murgham paid because he desired 
peace and further Government support.
By February 1902, therefore, only two Ogaden sections had 
fully paid their fine. The Abd Wak had only surrendered a derisory 
total of 36 cattle, and McDougall decided to alter his policy.
1
The number of cattle to be paid 5,000 was divided as follows; 
Muhammad Zubeir, 1,300; Abdulla, 1,000; Abd Wak, 1,050; Aulihan, 
700; Sheik Ali, 400; Mtnkhabul, 400; Habr Suleiman, 150.
^McD. to L., 2 July 1901 plus enclosures, K0.2/449*
2 4 3
He wrote to Sir Oharles Eliots
My principal object is to bring pressure to bear upon 
the two tribes that have paid the fine viz. the Mohamed 
Zubeir and the Aulihan, to cooperate with the Government 
against the Abd Wak, Shir Ali and Maghabul, who have 
trekked into Tanal and, to pay 500 cat tie. 1
At the same time, McDougall reduced the fine on the Abd Wak and
their allies by over half, though he was careful not to draw
attention to this adroit manipulation of previously agreed 
2figures. There was little possibility of putting any pressure
on these sections, but in October 1902 it was claimed that the
3fine had been entirely paid. No figures were given and one is 
not likely to be far wrong if it assumed that only token payments 
were made, enabling an embarrassing situation to be brought to 
an end.
Ahmed Murgham* s ready compliance with Government demands, 
and his attempt to secure the cooperation of the Telemugga (the 
Abd Wak, Abdulla and Her Muhammad), weakened his already precarious 
position amongst the Muhammad Zubeir and led to the hostility 
of the Telemugga themselves. Eor while the Balhala (the Muhammad 
Zubeir, Suleiman and Aulihan) paid their share of the fine, there
1McD. to E., 15 Feb. 1902, 00.2/569.
2
The total fine remained unaltered and so this reduction went 
unnoticed. Mob. to E., 14 March 1902, E0. 2/570.
to L., 28 Oct. 1902, E0.2/576.
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is every indication that the Telemugga, on the contrary, only
paid a small proportion of theirs, aid the limitations, of Ahmed1 s
authority were clearly revealed. Hassan Odel did not acknowledge
Ahmed1 s position as Sultan, and lelations between the Abd Wak and
the Muhammad Zubeir worsened, though fighting did not break out 
1
between them.
Relations between the Mohammad Zubeir and the Abd Wak were
equally bad. As a result of the first Ogaden expedition, the Abdulla
had temporarily left their customary grazing areas around the
Deshek Waraa, and retreated southwards towards the river Tana.
Once peace had been restored, howevwr, the Muhammad Zubeir made
use of their absence to trespass, and in 1399 serious fighting
broke out between these two sub-clans of the Ogaden over water
2
and grazing rights. Ternan managed to arrange a temporary settle­
ment, but the basic problem remained unsolved.3
Hardinge had hoped that the Abdulla would return to the Heshek 
Wama, but was unable to put any pressure on them to do so.^ ’ They 
remained near the Tana, therefore, threatening the Pokomo and 
Gal la to the south of the river. Small bands of Abdulla and Wardai - 
some of the latter were now Muslims - broke away from Hassan Berghin 
and began to live exclusively by raiding on their own, and extracting
- j
Abd Wale to Hakim at Kismayu, n.d. in B* to L., 14 July 1901,MO. 2/449.
TRadford to F.0.,27 Nov. 1900, F0.2/384; F. to H., 5 April 1899,
PC/CP/78/65; 0. to 5 July 1899, PC/CP/68/l8.
3R. to H., 12 Aug. 1900, F0.2/290; E. to C., 2 June 1899, PC/CP/69/22.
4H. to S., 17 Jan.1899, F0.2/188.
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1^r3.bute from the coastal Bon and Bajun. It was clearly a
profitable occupation and there was less danger of Government
interference in the south. Yet, because the Abdulla were making
increased use of grazing on the Tana, their contact with the heshek
Wama was becoming more intermittent, and challenges to Iheir
traditional position in this area were bound to increase as long
as their contact waned. At the same time, the Muhammad Zubeir
were also beginning to graze further south which exacerbated 
2
the situation.
Nevertheless, it has been suggested that the Abdulla helped
the Muhammad Zubeir during the 1901 campaign. Sir Charles Eliot
claimed that they had agreed to look after Muhammad Zubeir cattle
3and drive them to comparative safety. Captain Osborn, who led 
two expeditions in 1902, also thought that they had been fighting 
together.^" Yet McDougall and Reddie, the District Officer at Port 
Dumford, were just as convinced that the Abdulla were not on good
5
enough terms with the Muhammad Zubeir to collaborate with them;
1McD. to H., 10 Jan. 1899, P0.2/188; E. to 1., 20 June 1901, 
F0.2/449.
Sheik Hassan Berghin to Rogers, in R. to H., 12 Aug, 1900, 
PO.2/29O; Ahmed Murgham to Bwana Masuno bin ICombo, Nov. 1902, 
FC/jUB/2/1/6.
3E. to L., 8 March 1901, P0.2/445. 
4Cpt. Oshorn to OCT. EAP., 7 June 1901, P0.2/449.
%cD. to E., 2 July 1901, P0.2/449; R. to E., 31 Dec. 1900,
P0.2/445; R. to E., 8 March 1901, P0.2/446.
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and Reddie had justified a friendly policy towards Hassan Berghin
since 1898 with the exhortation ’’let’s keep them apart”. If
there was some cooperation between the Abdulla and the Muhammad
Zubeir at the beginning of 1901, however, there was certainly
none at the end of the year. In October, the Abdulla killed four
Waboni slaves belonging to the Muhammad Zubeir, and the latter
2
then avenged this by murdering five Abdulla slaves. A feud 
started that dragged on for many years, and after 1901 there was
no possibility of even a limited partnership between these two
30 gaden sub-clan s.
Ahmed Murgham’s own standing amongst the Muhammad Zubeir 
was also a matter for internal dispute. A Government polic^6f 
non-intervention did little to strengthen the Sultan’s position, 
and he eventually found himself without sufficient administrative 
support. 3?rom 1902, Abdi Salaam, head of the powerful Rer Hersi 
section, began to unite Muhammad Zubeir elements opposed to Ahmed 
Murgham, By the beginning of 1905> the Mtihammad Zubeir were so 
evenly divided into rival sactions that they asked .-the Kismayu 
administration to settle the issue, threatening otherwise to 
choose a chief themselves. Ahmed Murgham suggested splitting the
1R. to S., 1 & 13 April 1898, F0.107/93.
^cD. to S., 10 Oct., 1901, F0.2/451.
3H. to S., 19 Feb. 1903, PC/JUB/2/1/5.
Muhammad Zubeir into, two, but the Governor, Sir Donald Stewart,
who visited Kismayu at the time, decided on a compromise, Ahmed
Murgham ms confirmed in his position as Sultan, but Abdi Salaam
ms appointed his deputy. Since both men loathed each other, this
solution only went a short way towards re-introducing unity into
the section, and the divisions continued to weaken Ahmed’s authority.
In 1906, however, Ahmed Murgham was involved in a serious
personal feud with the Aulihan, and the Government’s policy of
observation was put to the test. The full implications of Sir
Charles Eliot’s nonchalant remark that ”we must let the Somali
quarrel amongst themselves” were about to become embarrassingly 
2clear. In October it was reported that the Muhammad Zubeir and 
the Aulihan were disobeying Government orders and fighting amongst 
themselves, so Kismayu was closed to the Ogaden. But towards 
the end of the year the rer Dumal and the Aulihan assassinated 
Omar Murgham near Bardera. The circumstances surrounding Omar’s 
death remain obscure5 however, his brother, Ahmed Murgham, im­
mediately proceeded to Kismayu where he ’borrowed' 80 Government 
rifles and with the help of these carried out a successful raid
S^. to L., 7 Jan. 1905, CO* 533/8; E.-F.Elliott, ’’Somali tribes”, 
Jubaland Political Records, PO/HFd/4/6/1.
2E. to L., 29 April 1901, F0.2/456.
to McCullen, 4 Oct. 1906, PC/jUB/2/3/l.
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against the Aulihan, reportedly killing 150 and capturing very 
large numbers of cattle and camels, The Muhammad Zubeir soon 
gained the upper hand in subsequent skirmishing, but there were 
fears that the struggle would widen and that the Aulihan would 
seek the support of their kinsmen, the Her Afgab, who grazed 
between the Webi Shebelle and the river Juba, and who were in 
any case moving west away from the areas disturbed by Muhammad 
Abdille. Hassan's wars.^
The administration ms faced with the problem of havang 
conscientiously adopted a policy of non-intervention and now 
suddenly finding that intervention was necessary, Salkeld, the 
Provincial Commissioner, maintained that the fighting between the 
Muhammad Zubeir and the Aulihan had nothing to do with the 
Government. Indeed, both parties had stressed that they wished to 
remain on friendly terms with the Kismayu administration, which 
seemed good enough while the official policy was based on the 
assumption that there was nothing to be gained from interfering in 
Jubaland more than ms necessary to protect Kismayu from raids.^
^T.S,Thomas (1917), 39; Zaphiro to S., 10 Dec. 1906, CO.533/28,
2T.s.Thomas (1917), 39; S. to J., 7 Jan. 1907, PC/jUB/2/2/2 or
00.533/27.
Salkeld, "Report on development of the Juba river", n.d. CO.533/29• 
^Jackson to Sec. of State, lg Jan. 1907, CO.533/27.
249
But Salkeld held that the attitude of Government chiefs did 
matter and could not be so easily overlooked. He wished to with­
draw Government recognition of Ahmed Murgham and to terminate 
his subsidy? because he had taken Government rifles without per­
mission? showed no disposition to return them? and had used them 
in a way that could not be approved of. In his defence Ahmed 
claimed that he had not begun hostilities with the Aulihan? 
and what could be more natural when one was threatened than 
trying to secure arms with which to defend oneself.
The excuse was inadequate yet .there was little pressure that
could be exerted on the Sultan of the Muhammad Zubeir. Force had
been ruled out? and as Salkeld remarked;
the moral influence which can be brought to bear from
Kismayu to attain that end /peacejis little or none? 
for I do not think that the Mohamed Zubeir who are at 
present the winners think they require to refer the 
matter here. 3-
Yet Jackson? the Acting Governor, also ruled out any attempt
to dismiss Ahmed Murgham from Government service. While admitting
that .Ahmed1 s position as a Government functionary was searcel5r
consistent with his actions? he nevertheless wished to leave him
2
a loop-hole in case he decided to seturn1 to his allegiance. After 
Salkeld had pointed out- that Aimed was not likely to be of further
1S. to J., 7 Jan. 1907, PC/jUB/2/2/2 or 00.533/27.
2J. to S., 19 Jan. 1907, PC/CP/2/2/2 or 00.533/27.
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1use to the administration, Jackson reluctantly agreed to his 
dismissal if it was felt to he absolutely necessary, but warned:
"if he seems likely to become openly hostile to us 1 am opposed 
to measures of any kind being taken against him". In the tradition 
of the best opera bouffe, letribution was to be withheld if Ahmed 
was truly antagonistic, and administered, only if he showed himself 
to be harmlessly repentent; it was a lamentable indication of 
how limited a policy of observation really was.
In view of these jnstmctinns no immediate action m s  taken 
against Ahmed Murgham. At the beginning of February he sent his 
wife to Gobwen as she was sick, and she then went to Kismayu. Other 
Ogaden chiefs were there and from the informal discussions that 
took place, it was felt that peace between the Aulihan and the 
Muhammad Zubeir could somehow be arranged. Negotiations were
begun and dragged on until in April hostilities were finally ter-
4 *5minated. But the peace was not considered to be permanent. y
The blood-feud left a legacy of latent hostility between the two
1S. to J., 7 Feb. 1907, CO. 533/27.
J^. to S., telegram n.d. forwarded in McD. to S., 2 Feb.1907,
PC/JUB/2/2/2.
3S. to J., 7 Feb. 1907, CO.533/27.
S^. to Chief See., 7 April 1907, CO. 533/28; Kirlcpatrick, "Intelligence
Report", April 1907, CO.533/29-
•’"Notes on the Province of Jubaland", anon., Feb. 1908, PC/NFD/4/6/l.
which
0 gaden sub-clans/could easily flare-up, and there were occasional
1incidents between them later.
Immediately after the peace had been arranged, however, 
optimism returned, and it was felt in administrative circles that
2
there had been a marked improvement of the situati cn in Jubaland.
The policy of interfering as little as possible in the affairs
of the Ogaden was continued, but Ahmed Murgham refused to visit
3Kismayu fearing arrest if he did so. Being unwilling to re­
establish contact with the Government, Salkeld dismissed him as 
a Government chief in July, and fined the Muhammad Zubeir 1,000 Rs,
The fine presented the usual problems. About half was collected
fairly rapidly within two weeks, and a 33°/o tax was levied on all
4Ogaden transactions in Kismayu, But the remainder of the fine 
was paid exceptionally slowly.
The Aulihan/ttuhammad Zubeir conflict and the dismissal of Ahmed 
Murgham had unexpected repercussions. In the first place, the 
dismissal of their Sultan did not deter the Muhammad Zubeir from
further hostility. A new age-set, the Bopto, was initiated towards
the aid of 1906, and the following year the Rendille were singled
^J.O.W.Hope, "Intelligence Report", May 1910, CO.533/75? Sultan 
Osman Geyli Murghan, Dahri Omar and Ismail Abdi, Mohammed Zubeir 
to Power, 26 Feb. 1916, DC/GOS/6/3.
2Sadler to Seo. of State, 7 May 1907 , 00.533/29.
Kirkpatrick, "Report cn affairs in Jubaland", 5 April 1907,PC/jUB/2/2/2. 
4S. to Chief Sec., 7 March & 6 Aug. 1907, PC/JUB/2/2/2.
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out as the target for a raid and Ahmed Murgham led the Muhammad
1Zubeir to the Lorian Swamp. Towards the end of 1907? the 
Aulihan were formally warned to take normal precautions against 
a raid.^
These conflicts also drew attention for the first time
along the coast, to the growing importance attached to guns by
the Ogaden. The Muhammad Zubeir had obtained their first large
consignment from the Govemnmt and this was a source that could
not be tapped again, but soon there weie rumours that they were
sending their camels to the Boran in southern Ethiopia to be
3bartered for rifles. This was an important trend that was only
just beginning in 1907? but soon it was to pose formidable problems
4for the administration.
The dismissal of Ahmed Murgham seems to have strengthened
his positinn amongst the Muhammad Zubeir, and it was bolstered further
5by later rebuffs from the administration. Abdi Salaam, on the 
other hand, who tried to remain loyal to the government, gradually
1S. to J., 6 Feb. 1907, PC/jUB/2/2/2.
2S. to Chief Sec., 7 Hot. 1907, PC/jUB/2/2/2.
?3. to Chief See., 7 April 1907, CO.533/28.
Hope, "Intelligence Eeport from the Abyssinian Frontier", May 1910, 
CO.533/74.
5Filleul to PC. Jubaland, 10 Feb. 1914, BG/kISM/i 3/5.
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lost power.3' Nevertheles, Afmadu was too close to the coast 
to he comfortable, aid Ahmed Murgham seems to have felt that 
he 'would never again be secure in Kismayu. The cessation of 
hostilities in 1907? therefore, marked the beginning of a north­
westward migration towards Wajir. It is rather amusing that 
when a forward policy was initiated in 1909? an advance to Afmadu 
some 80 miles from the coast could be justified on the grounds 
that it was the political and strategic centre of Jubaland. The 
prolonged policy of 'observation1 had evidently resulted injk
high degree of myopia, for by 1909 Ahmed Murgham and the Muhammad
2
Zubeir had already established themselves in strength at ¥ajir.
By that date, then, Afmadu had ceased to be a centre of political 
importance to the Ogaden; their westward movement had carried 
them beyond and it ms in Wajir and on the Lorian that an eventual 
confrontation with the Government would take place.
Later it was said that this Muhammad Zubeir migration had been 
motivated by the search for water alone, that the wells at Afmadu 
had become insufficient and that the Deshek Wama was too exposed 
to interference from the coast. The desire to avoid Government
killeul to PC.Jubaland, 8 April 1914, DC/KISM/13/5.
2Gov. to Seo. of State, 27 May 19O9, CO-533/59.
^Pilleul to PC. Jubaland, 10 Feb. 1914, DC/KISM/13/5.
254
interference may also have heen a factor, hut by 1910 the Ogaden 
sanctuaries inland from Afmadu or in the region of the Lori an 
Swamp were no longer entirely beyond the reach of Government forces,
For another frontier was in the process of being established, and 
the Ogaden now experienced European pressure from the far interior 
itself, as well as from the coast.
This gradual elimination of sanctuaries to which the Somali 
could retreat and evade contact with a potentially hostile ad­
ministration, was an important factor in the extension of Government 
control. In so far as this process involved the methodical widening 
of the area under administration, the problems appeared to be straight­
forward enough. But where sanctuaries were contiguous to international 
boundaries, the problems increased immeasurably, Although the river 
Juba was supposed to be an effective frontier, it also provided easy 
access to two administrations, each harbouring the othefs malcontents.^ 
The fluctuating collaboration between the British and Italian ad­
ministrations had an extremely important influence, therefore, on 
thfr Ogaden themselves. The successful extension of Government con­
trol over the Aulihan, for instance, depended, in the first place, 
on denying them access to Italian Somaliland; and Anglo-Xtalian 
cooperation was absolutely necessary for the establishment of a 
secure boundary.
1For instance Jenner's murderers took refuge in Bardera where the 
Italian Resident refused to surrender them. The same story was 
repeated with Ali Nahar*s murderers. Sees Kirkpatrick, "Intelligence 
Report", April 1907, 00-533/29; 1. to S. ,19 Nov. 1907, 00.533/41.
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By 1909, the Ogaden had become aware of two gradually evolving 
frontiers, both of which ultimately threatened their freedom of 
movement - one along the liver Juba, the other along the foothills 
of Ethiopia. However, this transformation of the river Juba, from 
an artery of communication to an impassible border, had been talcing 
place slowly from 1895 onwards and it bad been a factor in the 
Ogaden rebellions, and in the relationship between the Somali and 
the Eismayu administration.
Many problems arose from the fact that, behind a facade of
cordiality, there lay little real Anglo-1talian cooperation. Jenner
himself once described the atmosphere of distrust that existed;
"it is a mi stake to suppose", he wrote, "that the Italian authorities
1regard our interests in this country as identical with their own".
This was a view that Hardinge shared, and it was one the Italian
2
administrators also held strongly. The Italians were painfully
aware of frequent attempts to divert trade away from the Benadir
ports to Kismayu, and British motives were generally considered
3
to be unfriendly. This keen sense of economic rivalry made it
4
_ particularly difficult to secure collaboration on political issues.
1J. to H., 14 June 1898, FO. 107/94.
H^. to S., 20 June 1898, F0.107/94; E'errandi to Presi&ente E. G. S.,
8 Oct. 1896, ASMAI, Posiz. 7o/l-8.
3
0.Rossetti, "la via del basso Oiuba", h*Italia Coloniale, I no. 10 
(1910), 6; P. to Min., 6 May 1898, ASMAIPosiz. 68/I-II.
^"Rapporti con le autorita della Qolonie Inglese", Monografie (1911), 
ASMAI. Posiz. 87/2-20.
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However, the sort of political cooperation that the British
desired was also seen to-be undesirable in its own right. There
was no approval for the suggestion that the Sub-Commissioner at
Kismayu should be allowed to cross to the Italian side of the Juba,
1in order to apprehend criminals or recapture political refugees.
Jenner’s suggestion that the frontier should be regarded as purely
nominal, until it was administered, aroused deep suspicions about
British intentions. To the Italians the frontier was inviolate.
When the British Ambassador at Home in 1901 informed the Italian
Minister of Foreign Affairs of "certain reasons which might induce
Her Majesty’s Government, in certain circumstances, to regard the
cro ssing of the frontier of the Italian sphere of influence as a
2
military necessity", this caused considerable apprehension.
Equally, the suggestion that chiefs, like Wassib Pundo, head
of the Wagosha, whose villages were situated on both sides of the
river, should be responsible to both administrations, received little
practical support. While Hardinge hoped to wimpress upon the
Somalis on both sides of the border the community of interests and 
4of policy", Perducci, the Italian Resident at Giumbo, felt it
1H. to E., 16 May 1895, EO.IO7/36; E. to S., 13 Sept. 1895, W. 45/736.
2 land
This referred to the border with British Somaly. Currie to L.,
10 Jan. 1901, ’ K>. 2/503.
3C. to H., 17 March 1896, E0.107/51; Cederqvist to M., 11 Aug. 1900,
AS/EEA/is/314.
4H. to S., 24 June 1897, 1*0.107/78.
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intolerable that Italian protected chiefs should also receive pay 
from the British Government,^ In 1893, a minor crisis developed, 
when Jenner tried to persuade Nassib Pundo to cross over to the
p
British side of the river," Jenner hoped to arrest’him on the
charge of murdering a Somali, and certain nefarious practices,
3but Nassib declined to surrender voluntarily, Furthermore, he
was supported by Dulio, the Commissioner for the Benadir Coast,
who claimed that it would be extremely difficult to explain to
Italian protected Gosha how their chief came to be arrested by 
4the British.
A similar problem occurred when the British appointed and paid
an Ogaden, who lived at Bardera on the Italian side of the river,
R
to be their representative at Serenli. In practice, then, co­
operation between the two administrations tended to be minimal. At 
one point McDougall remarked that?
So long as the Italians pursue their present policy, or 
so long as the river Juba designates the Italian frontier 
below Bardera, effective administration of Jubaland 
Province is practically impossible,because the liver 
divides the Ogadens as well as the Wagbsha.6
^Carlo della Valle "Giumbo etc.", 39. ASMAI. Cartella no. 2/7-10.
2C,Rossetti, "Nassib Bunda sultano di Goscia", Italia Coloniale,
I no. 10 (1900), 7.
3H. to S., 6 March 1899, 10.2/191.
Dulio to Hardinge, 28 May 1899, ASMAI. Posiz. 68/1-13.
5H. to S. , 23 July 1900, P0.2/289.
6McD., to E. , 7 Aug. 1901, P0 . 2/450.
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What actually did, in the end, stimulate a greater degree of
collaboration were the repeated crises in the British sphere,
which the Italians always dreaded would spill over into their
territory. 11 In 1895, 1894 end 1901, during the one Herti and the
two Ogaden uprisings, the Italians reacted unpredictably, but
always with the aim of isolating the armed uprisings to the British
side of the river.
When the Herti rebelled in 1893, the I.B.E.A.Co. controlled
the Italian station at Giumbo, and had access to both sides of 
1the river. The problem of Anglo-Italian cooperation did not,
2therefore, seem to arise. But Lovatelli was so concerned that
the fighting might spread to the Italian sphere, that he marched
3from Brava with a small force of viroboto and occupied Giumbo.
It seems reasonably clear that he was acting without instructions
and also without authority. The Company, therefore, made his
position difficult, and, by the time the Italian Government had
been Informed of the plan to establish a garrison at Giumbo,
4
Lovatelli had retired from the post. Filonardi, head of the 
Italian Company administering the Benadir, was subsequently per­
suaded to accept the British, Company* s presence at Giumbo and the
"I
Giumbo was on the Italian side of the liver and the IBEACo. set up 
a post there without the explicit permission of the Italian Co.
It was abandoned in 1895? IBEACo. to E0., 23 Feb. 1895? FO.2/96.
2
Lovatelli had been sent to Bast Africa by the Italian Gov. to advise 
on the formulation of policy, sees IR’.L.Hess (1966), 40ff.
to P., 29 July 1893? PC/CP/68/19.
R^. to P., 4 Sept.. 1893, EO./2/96; Eilonardi, tele. 22 Aug. 1893, 
ASMAI. Posiz.55/6-42.
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matter was allowed to drop*
In 1898? however, the situation ms far more difficult for
the Italians. The rebellion in the British sphere was led by
Abdurrahman Mursaal, the son of Bheik Mursaal, head of the Ogaden
in the Italian sphere. Perducci feared that if he helped the
Kismayu administration, Sheik Mursaal would join his son in the
rebellion; so the Italians adopted a neutral position, with a
2
bias towards the Ogaden. Ahmed Murgham wrote promising that no
disturbances would be caused in Italian territory, and he was
3
allowed to trade freely in Giumbo. Anglo-ltalian relations were
very strained when several attacks were thought to have originated
4from the Italian side of the river. Nevertheless, Perducci 
successfully prevented the outbreak of any large-scale hostilities
5to the north of the river Juba, and this had teen his main objective.
However, the re-adoption of a similar policy of neutrality, 
with a pro-Ogaden bias, was not possible in 1901, when the second 
Ogaden punitive expedition was undertaken. Relations with the 
British had certainly not improved, and Perducci had no desire to 
be accommodating. In 1899? Jenner hoisted a British flag on Mombasa
1P. to R., 8 Sept. 1893, FO.2/96.
2P. to M.,17 July 1898, ASMAI. Posiz. 63/1-11; J. to H., 30 June 1900, 
F0.2/289.
3P. to P., 26 July 1898, ASMAI. Posiz. 68/l-H.
4J. to H., 19 April 1898, F0.107/93.
The Gga.den did extend a few raids into Italian territorys one Italian 
askari was killed and others wounded. H. to S., 6 April 1898,
P0.107/100.
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island, in the river Juba, theoretically at the request of the
]
Wazegua who inhabited it* * Afterwards Perducci decided it was
Italian, and Bertazzi, a junior administrative official, was
ordered to visit the island as often as possible, so that their
2
claim could be kept alive. A series of small disputes followed 
all of which tended to sour relations.
The basic difference to the Italians between the outbreak 
in 1898 and that in 1901, was that during the former they had been 
on good terms with the Ogaden, whereas, during the latter, they were 
not. In 1900 Sheik Mursaal bin Omar had fled to the British Pro­
tectorate, and Ogaden on the Italian side of the river attacked
3the Ifagosha whom Perducci supported. How far Perducci in fact 
helped the Ogaden in 1901 is a matter of dispute. The British ad­
ministrators at Kismayu pointed to the fact that the Ogaden were 
allowed to trade in Giumbo, and adduced from this that Perducci secretly 
supported them.^ But it is worth pointing out that the Italian 
post was supported by very few troops, and it is debatable whether 
Perducci had sufficient strength to carry out a blockade. It was 
also 'irecognised that many repo rfcs of Ogaden trading were exaggerated
1J. to E., 19 Feb. 1899, FO.2/190.
2P. to 1 ,  7 Oct. 1899, ASMAI. Posiz.68/1-4.
5E. to S., 6 Sept. 1900, F0.2/290.
is. to L., 5 May 1901, F0.2/447; E. to L., 14 June 1901, F0.2/449-
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by the Herti in the hope that these stories would lead to a
relaxation in the prohibition of trade at Kismayu, which was
1applied to them as well.
The most important accusation levelled against Perducci;, was
contained in a statement made hy an Ogaden to McDougall, which described
a conversation with the Italian Resident;
After compliments. To inform the Ogaden that he,
Perducci, would supply them with all their wants 
from Brava, with which port he had established a 
regular camel transport. He further informed us 
to remind the Ogaden of the advisability of recon­
sidering their promise to pay a fine in cattle to 
the Serkali /BritishJ Government, because they were 
really now endeavouring to induce the Ogaden to pay 
diya /blood-price/ by hela or hida (?) diplomacy, 
and that Government would surely afterwards lure 
their Ogaden chiefs into a shouri /meeting^ 3X1 & seize 
them all and imprison them. He thus warned the Ogaden 
not to pay the fine. He also said that Sultan Ahmed bin^
Murghan would ultimately be deported to Ulaya /^purope^ .
What credence should be given to this statement? Perducci himself
admitted having received envoys from the Ogaden chiefs at Afmadu,
asking for his advice in July, but said that he sent them back
3
without an answer. The conversation reported by McDougall's 
informant, Ali Jebril, took place at the end of May, and it would 
hardly have been necessary to send envoys in July to ascertain 
Perducci’s views, if these were already well known* Moreover,
W.J.Monson, 1 Intelligence Diary, Ogaden Punitive Exp edition”, 
11 June 1901,. K). 2/449.
^MbD. to T., 10 June 1901, F0.2/449.
3
’'Extract from a report from Chevalier Badolo to Royal Consul 
General at Zanzibar”, 20 Sept. 1901, P0.45/570.
262
All Jebril's account was a secondhand one, sad the Somali who
told him the story had only visited Jamama, a small Italian
military post some distance from Giumbo* Jamama was often visited
by Ogaden where they bought cloth and coffee beans, but there is
no evidence that Perducci visited this outpost in May, while
1
there are many references to his having been at Giumbo.
Yet whatever the truth of these allegations, they were 
believed by the British authorities and complaints were made 
to the Italians at the highest level. The incident was investigated 
and Perducci was prompted to show more definite signs of friendliness 
towards the British. Within two months a new policy of collaboration 
was under way.
Towards the end of July 1901, McDougall visited Gosha in
a new steamer. This was the first trip up the river since 1893?
and the possibility of exercising greater control over the Aulihan
and Wagosha, through regular voyages up the Juba, occurred once
again. This time, however, it was absolutely necessary to confiscate
2
all canoes on the river. In September, Perducci and McDougall set
out together and travelled some two hundred miles up the Juba, 
taking possession of all the canoes they oould find. After this
*^ McD. to 33., 2 July 1901, F0,2/449? Harrison to Hatch, 11 Feb.£902, 
F0.2/570.
“TIcD. to E,, 7 Aug. 1901, TO.2/450.
%cD. to E., 10 Oct. 1901, TO.2/451.
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a policy of regular patrols, and frequent visits to the f ew
parts of the river that were fordable, was all that was necessary
to make the frontier a reality; and this policy was successfully
1carried out in 1902.
The effect of this Anglo-T. tali an cooperation appears to have
been dramatic. According to McDougall:
The elders of the Ogaden, with Sheik Abdi Lib an at 
their head, have assembled in Afmadu, and are discussing 
the question as to whether the Italians have transferred 
their territory to the British Government.^
Thi$ joint action on the liver Juba stimulated the Aulihan
to pay their fine more quickly, and put an end to unrestricted
Ogaden access to the Italian Protectorate. Afterwards canoes were
registered, numbered, and a small tax ms levied on them; their
use was restricted and controlled. In theory a.new era of Anglo-
Italian cooperation was to be ushered in, but, in practice, much
of the old suspicion remained. In 1)06, the Italians refused to
surrender Ali Nahar's murderers, and even employed them in Government
service; the British, of course, had done the same with Somali
3
chiefs considered persona non grata to the Italians.IT -    III II II TIT 1 1 1 r-^TTTTTT- I II  
1McD. toE., 14 March 1902, E0.2/570.
^IcD. toE., 7 Aug. 1901, E0.2/450.
P^. to H., 29 Aug. 1906, PO/jUB/2/3/l; Prinetti to Currie,
10 Jan. 1902, 3?0.45/587; P. to M., 17 Fov. 1905, ASMAI. Posis. 
69/1-3; H. to H., 11 Jan. 1902, P0.2/569.
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let, despite the limitations of this cooperation, it did 
secure some measure of control over the Anglo-Italian frontier 
south of Bardera- It did mean that, logically, the advance of 
administrative posts inlandwould follow the river, rather than 
some line projected through Afmadu. In a sense it made the current 
arguments for and against setting up a post at Afmadu utterly 
irrelevant. The wells were only 80 miles from the coast and, 
when there was to he an advance, Serenli two hundred miles nil and
on the Juba, was the obvious site for a sbatioa.
u
The full utilization of the river Juba necessitated a fairly
radical mental readjustment at the beginning of the 20th century.
HcICenzie had seen that it was the key to a rapid advance into the
interior, but after 1893 constant preoccupation with the coast, and
with Afmadu, had obscured this simple fact. 3?or years administrators
laboured under the illusion, that progress into the interior involved
a 'very slow advance into a desert, whereas the means were at hand
to outflank this area aid even to surround it. Perhaps the fact
that there was no adequate steamship had some bearing on this attitude,
but it was surprisingly long before the river Juba's importance was 
1recognised.
Predominant contact with the coast entailed a very simplified 
picture of the interior* When Hardinge had tried to describe the 
ethnic composition of Jubaland in 1895s be had envisaged Herti on
'Butler, Minute, 8 July 1909, 00.533/66.
£ 6 5
the coast, Ogaden in the interior, and Boran hi the f ar interior
behind them. The first mention of the Marehan Somali ms in
April 1899, and it was not until that year that, for the first time,
other pastoral peoples such as the Ren&ille, the G-arre, the Ajuran,
2were to come into contact with traders from Kismayu. From that 
date it was possible to glimpse some of the complexities of the 
area beyond Afmadu. Yet, from the'point of view of the coast, the 
interior must have appeared very static,' though in fact it was 
seething with movement, with population pressures, aid with conflicts 
every bit as vital to those concerned as any that occurred on the 
littoral.
H. to 0. , 30 Oct. 1895, PO/jUB/2/l/l. 
2J. to H., 2 April 1899, FO.2/196.
ETHIOPIA. GREAT , BRITAIN..AND THE BORAKf
In the interior of Jubaland, the dynamic of pastoral migrations 
was greatly accelerated towards the end of the 19th. and. the beginning 
of the 20th century by the growing* weight of population pressures. 
There were two main reasons for this: the Amharic movement south­
wards, tand the impact of Muhammad Abdille Hassan's j1 had in the 
1north. In many ways the effect of Sheik Muhammad's wars was to 
revive and. intensify a pattern of migrations that had been in 
progress for at least a century, and which had probably been in 
the process of slowing down. This renewed pressure from the north­
east was not a momentary affair, and when a large-scale population 
movement got underway in the 20th century it generally consisted of 
men who were armed, and who had either been trained in rebellion or 
were consciously fleeing from its effects. It was a migration, 
therefore, that also involved a traffic in arms and the possible 
dissemination of ideas that might be considered dangerous to a new 
administration in the upper Juba area.
At first sight, the Ethiopian expansion that took place under 
Menelick merely substituted a northern for a north-eastern pressure
^See also; T.H.R.Cashmore (1965), 318
on the pastoral j)lains of Kenya, but m  fact the difference
was more fundamental. In contrast to the Somali push south-west,
the Amharic movement was unconnected with the desire to obtain
additional pasture, nor did it involve direct competition between
rival pastoral groups. It was aimed solely at securing the' conquest
and subjugation of the indigenous peoples, and the indirect ratter
than the direct utilisation of their land. While traditional pastoral
warfare in north-east Africa had its own momentum and strategy,
it invariably led in one way or another to the substitution of
stock which made use of the available pasture. With the Amhara,
however, there was no stock substitution, aince they brought none
with them; instead, they deprived the Boran of their cattle when
they offered resistance, aid later treated them, it was said, as
"cattle producing machines" for the purpose of securing adequate
1tribute and taxation.
There is much that is still obscure about the Ethiopian 
advance southwards into Borana, and it is often accepted that the 
Boran were conquered in 1896. It has been maintained, that towards 
the end of that year Ras Darge evaded Liban and Dirre, overrunning 
the Boran and setting up an Ethiopian post at Arero which dominated
P.Maud, "General account of the tribes frcm lake Stephanie to the 
Ganale river and the Abyssinian relations with them’,' 1903? E'O.l/48.
^Ras Barge was Menelick* s uncle and he ms given the Province of 
Arussi. The campaign is sometimes attributed to him, and sometimes 
to his son Asfau.
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1
Tertale, Lib an and Dime.
In May 1897 Gleichen and Wingate, two Intelligence Officers
2attached to the Rodd Mission, also came to the conclusion that
the '’country up to the shores of Lake Rudolf /had7for some time
/Been7effectively occupied" by the Ethiopians., In fact, the
Rodd Mission accepted Menelick’s claim that the greater part of
Borana and Arussi had been subdued, aid this claim was never sub-
4
sequently challenged. Yet there can be little doubt that both
Wingate and Gleichen were deceived about the exact limits of
Ethiopian expansion in 1896, and that while the subjugation of the
Boran had undoubtedly been planned, it had nevertheless not been
5achieved even by the end of May 1897* It seems that rumours 
about Ethiopian conquests, perhaps deliberately circulated in an 
attempt to influence negotiations, were accepted at the time in
^Haberland (1956), 146; Opt. P.Maud, "Mr. A.E.Butter1s expedition; 
contents of Report", EO.l/48.
2Rennell Ro dd, who earlier had been Consul at Zanzibar, headed the 
first British diplomatic mission to Menelick. Its purpose was 
both commercial and diplomatic. The key topics for discussion 
were Ethiopia’s borders with the Sudan and British Somaliland, 
see; Sir J. Rennell Rodd, Social and Diplomatic Memoirs 1894-1901 
(London, 1923)* 112ff; H*G.Marcus, "The Rodd Mission of 1897",
J.E.S., III no. 2 (1965)*
^Wingate & Cleichen, Memorandum, 7 May 1897, PO.l/32,
^Count Cleichen, With the Mission to Menelick 1897 (London, 1898), 315; 
H.G.Marcus, "A.History of the negotiations concerning the border between 
Ethiopia and British East Africa 1897-1914", Boston University Papers 
on Africa, African History, II (Boston, 1966), 240-2. The only exception 
is to be found, an MoD. to S, , 30 Aug. 1897, EO.2/44, and this letter is 
based on Cavendish' s evidence, for which see next page.
^The Rodd Mission left Ethiopia at the end of May 1897*
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good, faith, and have since acquired the appearance of historical 
validity.
Admittedly the main reasons for doubting the traditional 
account are negative. In the first place, the southern Bora f^eain- 
tained Intermittent contact with the ICismayu administration through­
out this period. Yet, when a Boran caravan arrived at Kismayu in
1May 1896, there was no news of an Ethiopian attack." Again, when
a Government Interpreter met a Boran Gaila at Bardera in July
p
1896, no mention was made of any aggression. Finally, in
February 1897j when traders from the Liven visited Kismayu, there
3was still no hint that the Boran were in immediate danger. However,
when the Ethiopians did attack them, from July to October 1897,
4*the Boran were certainly not slow-'to ask for help from Kismayu..
Had there also been a previous attack, it seems inconceivable 
either that no knowledge of this should have reached the coast, 
or, equally, that there should not hive been an earlier request 
for assistance.
Furthermore, the raid undertaken by Ras Barge towards the end
of 1896 appears to have been directed primarily against the Arussi,
as one would have expected, and Hardinge cannot lave been far wrong
in assuming that instead of actually overrunning Borana, the raid
3only came close to Dirre and Liban. Finally, Cavendish, who was 
^Capt. O'Oallaghan to Adra., 26 May 1896, FO.107/68.
2J. to 0. , 22 Sept. 1896, PO.107/60.
3J, to H. , 27 Fab. 1897, F0.107/77. Jenner writes 'Libin'.
to S., 2 Sept. 1897, P0.107/81.
5H. to S., 17 March 1897, PO.107/76. Also: , J..to C., 2 April 1899,
mexploring southern Borana at the time, mentions that while the
(Jail a around Lugh were attacked, Boran further to the west remained
1unaffected by the raid.
The conquest of Borana was not, in fact, undertaken until
June 1897, when Dejjazmaoh Volde Gabriel left Addis Ababa at the
2head of a sizeable expedition. He was accompanied by Leon 
Darragon, a famous French explorer, and what little is known about
3
this expedition is based on his accounts. Wolde Gabriel folio wed
a route just to the east of lakes Zwai, Shala, Abaya and Chamo,
arriving at Sogida by the end of July. Lack of rain prevented the
expedition from proceeding further south and so without delayjit
returned northwards. Indeed, the outward and return journey was
completed so rapidly - with only a few exceptions Wolde Gabriel
did n ot halt in the same place for longer than a single night - that,
at first sight, it seems incredible that conquest rather than ex-
4ploration should have been the chief objective. However, the six 
FO.2/196; 0. to S., 20 May 1907, F0.37l/l92.
'I
H.S.H.Oavendish, "Through Somaliland and around and south of lake 
Rudolf", S.J.. XI (1898), 376.
A. Colli Felizzano, "Nel Paese Salla", B.S.G.I. (1905), 101. Although
the Province of Borana was given by Menelick to Fitaurari Hapta 
Giorgis, H, to S. , 5 June 1899, FO.l/44, Be did not conquer it as 
maintained bys H. Marcus in Boston University Papers cn Africa, ed. J. 
Butler (Boston, 1966), IX, 242; 0. Keller, Alfred Ilgs Sein Leben und 
Seine Werke (Leipzig, 1918), 166.
3G. Roncali, "Viaggio del Signor Darragon dallo Scioa al paese die 
Borana e viceversa", B.S.G.I., XI (1898)* L. Darragon, "Voyage11, 
Comptes Rendus des Seances de la Societe de Geographie de Paris (1898),
u i. .j i rji ij t~p i ~ htjh ji — i in— t m— m  .t.tt o t i-i ---it— — -MiMfn.a iJr>fc*niiffii>ii-. ltnfcivin vn- V T 'T Tru ■f rn vir m i f T n H 'nn'r—  ~T~"T-"Tir—  tw- r* -*t vtC***! ~t — r1 “i ir itr i— if 'nn~'T '■ — ■>—  » r
(1898), 138. . . . .
^Lord Delamere’s journey across southern Borana took him within 20
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days that were spent in Afalata1 s capital at Anole left the 
Boran in no doubt as to Wolde Gabriel’s intentions; and, though 
the expedition only stayed a few days at Anole, a small garrison 
remained behind protected by the certainty of further reinforce­
ments after a few months.
What made an extremely rapid advance through Borana possible
was of course the almost total lack of resistance encountered
by the Ethiopians. There were two main Boran leaders, Guyo Ana,
head of the Gona Boran, and Af alata, head of the Sabhct Ana is known
to have skirmished with the Ethiopians but was quickly defeated,
while Afalata apparently capitulated without resistance and was
1therefore allowed to keep fourteen villages for himself. The 
reason why Ana attempted to resist Ethiopian encroachment and Afalata 
did not is unknown, but there is cue point worth noting. Prior to 
the advent of the Ethiopians, Afalata’s position amongst the Sabho 
had been extremely precarious, and it ms strengthened rather than, 
weakened by official Ethiopian recognition of his title. The legi­
timate head of the Sabbo should have been Geydu who was born after 
his father’s death and his mother’s marriage to Afalata. In theory, 
Afalata should only have been Regent for a certain number of years, 
but he had tried to maintain that Geydu was his son and relations
miles of Sogida, and he missed the Ethiopian expedition by no 
more than a day or two. It is quite possible that news of a powerful 
caravan rather than lack of water deterred the Ethiopians proceeding 
further south. E. Huxley, White Man's Country (London, 1955), I,33ff.
to SM  2 Oct, 1897, FO. 107/81; Opt. Maud, "Mr. A.E.Butter’s 
expeditinn", 1903, EO.l/48,
2 7 3
1
between the two were not amicable. Thus, while Afalata 
remained on good terms with the Ethiopians, Geydu on the contrary 
did not, and Ethiopian support for his step-father was probably 
an important factor leading him to adopt a more recalcitrant 
position.2
As a result of the B97 expedition, Ethiopian garrisons were
3
set up at Gardula in IConso, and Abera in Jam Jam, The station
in Jam Jam ms under the command of the powerful Dejjasmach Balcha,
3
but it was too far removed from Borana to have a direct impact*
The station at Gardula, however, became the main military centre 
in southern Ethiopia. For many years it controlled the area as 
far south as lake Rudolf and to the east of the Omo; it also 
supported the smaller staticn of Arero in the Liban.^ The exact
date when the Ethiopians established a station at Arero is uncertain,
but it was definitely not before the end of 1898, as is sometimes
5
alleged. Eor about a year there ms an Ethiopian garrison in 
Anole, and it was only after this was abandoned towards the end
T^. S.Thomas (1917), 86* P. Maud, '’Exploration in the southern border­
land of Abyssinia", G.JXX III (1904), 566.
2Z. to H., 20 May 1906, K).37l/l92; J. to 0. , 5 April 1899, EO.2/196.
5J. to H., 15 Jan. 1898, E0.2/91.
^Erlanger, "Sulla spedizione e relative soggiorno in Abyssinia e nei 
paesi Gall a e Somali", B.S.G.I. , III 4th series (l902)s 540, end 
"Bericht uber meine Expedition in Nor dost Afrika in den Jaliren 
1899-1901", 21. G.E. B., II (1904)- Balcha was a close relative of Menelick.
Felizzano, B.S.G.I. (1905), lOlff; Maud, fl.J. (1904). 566.
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of 1898, or the beginning of 1899? that Afalata was forced to 
move his headquarters to Arero and that a staticn was s6t up 
there•^
Can it be assumed, therefore, that the Ethiopian conquest
of Borana had been completed by the end of 1898 at the very
latest? By that date, at any rate, the permanent residence of
Ethiopian troops in the Boren capital had also been accompanied
2
by their dispersal in small numbers throughout the country.
Then, in October 1897? a deputation of Boran elders arrived in
3Addis Ababa and formally submitted to Menelick. Both Ana and 
Afalata were given minor official posts and assimilated into 
the Ethiopian bureaucratic structure. They were both made responsible 
for collecting tribute in their areas, and were given a few Ethiopian 
soldiers who came under their command.
But this does not mean that all the Boran had been conquered; 
and one clue to the limits of Ethiopian rule can be found in the 
continuing requests from the Boran for assistance against the Amhara. 
From 1898, the Boran were constantly asking the ICismayu administration 
to help them, and a deputation of Boran elders visited the Jubaland
V. to H. , 51 Aug. 1898 and H. to S,? 9 Sept. 21 Sept., 50 Sept.?
1898, F0.107/9b| L, to E., 9 Aug.. 1901? E0.2/445; Cederqvist to M»,
2 July 1901, AS/EEM/XS/319.
2
Maud, MMr. A.E.Butter1s expedition11, 1905, EO.l/48; Bonaldson- 
Smith, Memorandum, 6 Aug, 1900, EO.l/44.
3E. to S., 7 Nov. 1898, FO.l/34.
4?,. to H,, 14 April 1906, I'0.37l/l92.
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coast in 1900.1 However, it is noticeable that while the earlier 
requests for help came from Ana and Geydu in southern Ethiopia, 
all requests after 1899 came from Boran hi Yf&jir, in ’the extreme 
south, or from other wells ±a the East Africa Protectorate.
By the end of the century, then, it was only the Boran:iia the high­
lands who had been effectively conquered, those in the 'golbo',
2
the lowlands, were merely raided.
It is far from easy to decide precisely what Ethiopian 
ambitions were directed towards the savannah lowlands of northern 
ICenya, but it appears that conquest was not one of their primary
3
objectives. It was argued by P. Zaphiro that the Ethiopian move­
ment into the 'golbo' was at first motivated by the search for
ivory and the desire to collect tribute from the G&rre and Gabra,
A  .
and this seems a reasonable assumption. For it was only later, 
when the right to collect tribute from the Garre was contested 
by the British, that the Ethiopians attempted to secure a more 
formal claim to the area.
In practice most rumours of Ethiopian bands pushing deep into
J. to T., 24 Oct. 1900, F0.2/293; T.H.R.Cashmore (1965), 320,333.
2Cederqvist to M., 13 March 1899, AS/EFM/IS/306; H. to S., 22 March 
1899, E0.2/190; Mohamed bin Agid "Report", PC/gp/78/65; H, to J.,
7 Oct. 1902, F0.2/574; M.S.¥eirbys "King Menelick* s Dominions and 
the country between lake Gallop and the Kile Talley", G.J,, XVI 
(1900), 295.
He was the first border Agent along the Ethiopian/East Africa 
Protectorate border.
4C. to C., 20 May 1907, FO. 37l/l92. Of. J. Borelli, Sthiooie
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the arid savannah later turned out to he false, aid there is no
example of Ethiopian troops permanently garrisoned in the 'golbo*.
Thus, while large concentrations of Ethiopian fighters were
noticed at Gof, Gorille or Moyale, they were never noticed further
to the south,^ " Penetration of the ’golbo* was conspicuously
unhurried, and when it did occur it seems to have been undertaken
with limited objectives in mind.
In the first instance, these objectives were closely linked
to Wolde Gabriel's assumption that the Garre, Gabre and Ajuran
were either Boran she gats or sub-sections, and consequently that
Ana and Afalata ought tohave been collecting tribute from them.
But the Ajuran and Gabra refused to make any payments and retreated
southwards instead, and the Boran were in no position to influence
2
the G&rre who were anyway completely independent of them. So 
in 1898 a large, well organised party of Ethiopians raided Buna 
and Takabba in order to obtain tribute from the Ajuran.' Then, 
two years later, another large raid was organised this time against 
the Garre, and El Wak was occupied by Ethiopian forces for just 
over two months,^ As a result of this occupation, Ali Abdi, head
Meridionalei Journal de mon voyage au pays Amhara, Qromo et Si dam a, 
Sept. 1885“¥ov7l888" (parls7^1890) , 344-'5.
A^darn Musa '’Report", 14 Eeb. 1900, E0*2/285; Mohamed Agil, "Report", 
July 1899? PC/CP/78/65.
^Gpt. Maud, "Mr. A.E.Butter’s expedition", 1903? EO.l/48.
■^Pestalosza to M., 20 Aug. 1899 and Dulio to M. , 23 Oct. 1898,
ASMAI. Posiz. 68/1-12; Adam Musa, "Report", E0.2/285; Butter,
"General account of the tribes from lake Stephanie to the Gan ale river 
etc", 1*0.1/48.
4idem footnote 2.
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of the Garre, began to pay tribute regularly for a short while,
but after delaying cne payment, El Wak was again attacked in 
1December 1901.
Nevertheless, what is most striking about the period 1897 to
1902 is the relative infrequency of these raids into the savannah -
plains of northern Kenya. Almost every raid can be identified
and followed in detail, whereas after 1902 there is a significant
increase in the number of incursions, as attempts were made to
2prove more than a merely superficial contact with the area.
Throughout this period, the stereotype of Ethiopian incursions
remained fundamentally ’ the same and was based on the construction
of .temporary camps, which could be inhabited for perhaps as long
as two months, while the surrounding country-side was ravaged.
Tet, precisely because incursions into the 'golbo' had at first
been infrequent and the Ethiopian conquest of the Boran had thus only
half been accomplished, there ms a strong inclinatinn on the part
of the southern, peripheral., Boran groups to move even further south
4and ait of reach of ihe Amharic invaders. The feasibility of this 
movement, however, depended to a 1 arge extent 011 the degree of
1McD. to S., 15 Jan. 1902, F0.2/569.
22. to H., 20 May 1906,- F0.37l/l92.
’K.H.Tate, "Statement by Mohammed bin Habib", 18 March 1902, F0.2/571.
C^f. Cerulli* s remark that the Boran in Kenya came fbom Ethiopia 
after the ^mharic invasion, though this is an exaggeration; "Le
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rapprochement between the Boran and the Somali, and also,
perhaps surprisingly, between the Somali and the ICismayu administration.
Relations between the Boran and Somali appear to have been
unduly complex, aid they were very far from comforming to a pattern
of simple hostility. From 1879 till the end of the century, Hawiye
1
Somali lived near Anole under Afalata1s special protection,
and Jebril Farah, one of the most important Oga&en elders at
Afmadu, claimed to have lived for several years amongst the Boran.
Moreover, Jebril Farah told Craufurd, then the Sub-Commissi aier
at ICismayu, that "many Somalis aid Arabs have lived in Boran
on good terms with the natives’1, end this statement seems to
2
have been sub sfcantially true. But, although most Somali living 
amongst the Boran were traders, and throughout Africa, it lias long 
been usual to extend special protection to those engaged in trade, 
there were also Somali shegats living with the Boran. These were 
Somali who had formed an alliance with the Boran or had be come 
their clients, and who together with them at times fought other 
Bomali sections.
popolaaioni Galla dell Africa orientale inglese”, E.G., XIII 
(1917), 6.
A. Donaldson-Smith, Through Unknown African Countries (London,
1897), 185. ' ‘ “
2C. to H., 23 April 1896, JO.107/52.
%
These Somali she gats included the Ajuran and at times the Garre.
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On the other hand, these friendly Somali/Boran contacts
were offset by frequent parod raids* As a result of the terrible
cattle plague in 3891, Darod Somali from fan gal , near Afmadu,
successfully attacked the Boran further north with a view to
1obtaining stock from them, Abdi Ibrahim, head, of the Abd Wak,
also led a raid at about this time which reached Buna, where
2Yaltano ICuno fs Sakuye and Ajuran shegats were defeated. There
was also a successful raid by the Msg ah age-set which was trying
3to prove its valour. Then, at the beginning of 3393, the
Bardera Somali attacked El Wgk, though the Boran poisoned the
wells and the mid was therefore a complete failure.^ Before
the end of the year, however, the Somali had again raided the
Boran, this time successful3;y judging from the considerable amount
bof ivory that they were later selling,'
Yery little is known about most of these raids, and many can 
only be onferred by indirect evidence, such as the sudden acquisition 
of ivory or slaves by the Darod Somali. Thus, while the administration
1M. to S., 5 Sept. 1891, FO.84/2153.
2
Yaltano ICuno was head of the Boran at Buna until 1911, ¥.0.P.Hope, 
"Report", in G. to 0,, 1 Aug. 1910, 00.533/76, and Bida ICuno was 
head of the Sakuye at Buna, 0. to G. , 20 Mav 1907, F0.37l/l92j 
R. Turnbull, Kenya Police Review (Oct. 1957), 310.
3J. to H., 29 April 1898, F0.107/93; J. to H., 18 Dec. 1898, F0.2/188.
4U. Ferrandi, "Lettera al Presidente", B.S.S.I.. VI (1893), 277. 
Crauflird, "Report for quarter ending March 189411! PC/CP/68/l9.
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at Klsfoayu discovered in May 1894 that the Ogaden and Herti
had just captured large numbers of Gall a slaves, nothing
was known about the fighting that this news necessarily pre-
1
supposed must have taken place; and although between 1894
and 1897 there is no direct mention of a single Darod raid, the
fact that the head of the Ajuran at El Wak was killed in 189 5 suggests
2
that there had probably been a fight.
The turning point came in 1898, when the Bombe age-set 
carried out a disastrous raid against the Boran. The reason why 
the Somali raid was so unsuccessful is unknown, but quite possibly 
the Darod unexpectedly found themselves fighting against southward 
moving Ethiopians instead of Gall a. At aiy rate, after the failure 
of this attack, the Boran themselves began to move southwards, 
and for a number of years there were no further Somali raids.
^hen Adam Musa and Mohamed Agil^ visited El Wak in 1899, they 
found many Boran there who had only recently moved south, so as 
to avoid the Ethiopians. There were also large numbers of Boran 
at Takabba and Dobel, both well complexed in the (golbo’, towards
1C. to P., 10 Oct. 1894, PC/CP/68/l9.
R^. Turnbull. Kenya Polioe Review (Oct. 1957), 310,
They were both Somali political officers employed by the 
Kismayu administration and sent on different expeditions inland.
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which the Boran from further north were evidently moving ii some
numbers. In 1898, Jenner mentioned that the nearest Boran wells
to Fangal were a,t Wajir, while, a year later, there were evidently
so many Boran at Wajir that they had moved as far south as Diff.^
When a deputation of Boran elders arrived in Kismayu in 1900,
they stated that there had been . a considerable migration towards
2
Wajir and the area to the south* Furthermore, the Boran also
succeeded in coming to terms with the various Somali sections that
3normally used the wells around Biff. This arrangement, however, 
was short lived, for the second Ogaden levolt in 1900 led to the 
deliberate destruction of a Boran caravan that earlier had been 
trading at Kismayu, ^ Ironically, therefore, the Boran at Wajir could 
not come to terms with the Somali at Afmadu until these Somali had 
re-established good relations with the Kismayu administration.
It is curious, in fact, how very crucial therelationship 
between Afmadu and Kismayu appeared to the southern Boran. Perhaps 
the main reason for this was that the Somali around Afmadu were 
always liable to limit or prevent Boran contact with the coast, and
Adaffl Musa "Report", 14 Feb. 1900, FO.2/285; Mohamed bin Agil, 
"Report"^ July 1899, PC/CP/78/65; Cederqvist to M., 14 June 1899, 
AS/BFM/IS /307; C. to M., 16 March 1900, AS/EFM/lS/314; C. to M,,
2 Aug. 1900, AS/eFM/is/313; J. to H., 18 Dec. 1898, FO.2/188.
2J. to T., 24 Oct. 1900, FO.2/293.
3J. to 1, 1 Nov. 1900, FO.2/293.
Terducci to Dulio, 20 Mov. 1900, ASMAI. Posiz. 68/1-17.
access to the coast was important to the Boran. 0ontact between 
Borana, and. ICismayu had been established before the Amharic move­
ment southwards, and the principal motive on both sides had been 
trade. In 1894? as soon as news reached Afalata that the I.B.E.A.Co.
had made peace with the Ogaden, he sent messengers to ICismayu asking
q
for p emission to trade directly with the coast; and the sub se­
quent partial cessation of Parod raids against the Boran between 
1894 and 1897? in addition to the increased trade in and export 
of ivory, can be directly attributed to the peaceful relationship 
that existed at that time between the administration at Kismayu 
and the Ogaden at Afmadu.
When Afalata* s messengers had reached Kismayu towards the 
end of 3894? the I.B.E. A.Co. * s administration there was drawing 
to a close. Earlier, in 1893? after the Herti revolt had been over­
come, the liwali of Kismayu had suggested that a caravan should 
be sent to Borana, so that trade could be started and advantage 
taken of the temporary peace with the Somali. But at that time the 
Company's chief administrator had felt that the undertaking was 
likely to prove too expensive, and a year later this feeling must 
have been doubly reinforced since the Company*s debts had increased
1C. to P., 21 Mov. 1894, PC/CP/68/19.
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and no quick return could be expected fr cm sending one caravan
to Borana,^ As a result no immediate action was taken.
Nevertheless, Craufurd1 s instructions when he transferred
into the employment of the B.A.P. on 1 July 1895? stated
clearly that he was to find out about the Boran and if possible
2
open up trade with them. As a first step in this direction,
Craufurd got .in touch with the Sheik of Bardera at the beginning 
3of 1896, The only information he seems to have obtained was to
the effect that the Boran did not trade in slaves, which ms not
exactly true. But it suited Harfinge and Craufurd to believe the
story, though they both had their doubts. Craufurd was subsequently
asked to let Afalata know how satisfied the British Government
had been to hear of his prohibition of the slave trade, and to
assure him t hat ;
a perseverance in this policy will greatly strengthen 
the friendly relations which wg hope shortly to establish 
wi th him,4
In order to establish contact with the Boran, Craufurd re­
commended sending Jebril T'arah at the lead of a siseable caravan.^
B.-T. to P., 27 April 1893 and P. to IBEACo. 12 July 1893, FO.2/58.
2
Craufurd, who had been Superintendent at Kismayu under the Company 
accepted the post of assistant to Jenner, the new Sub-Commissicner, 
for a few months.
h  to H., 21 Jan. 1896, FO. 107/49. 
4H. to S., 29 Feb. 1896, FO.107/49.
5C. to H., 23 April 1896, FO.107/52.
Hardinge supported this suggestion and thought that the journey
could develop from being purely financial one into a "diplomatic^
Mission1' that might have a very beneficial impact on Galla/Somali
relations. Expenses were put at £300, but it was estimated that
1presents worth more than that sum might easily be brought back. 
Lord Salisbury eventually sanctioned the visit, on condition 
that all expenses were miet out of estimates for current contin­
gencies. But it had taken more than four months to get permission
for the scheme and by that time Jebril Ifarah had fallen seriously
2
ill, so the plan had to be abandoned.
However, in ^ ay 1896 an ivory caravan unexpectedly arrived
at ICismayu after travelling from Bardera along the Italian side
3of the liver Juba. Jenner realised that it was important to open 
up trade with Bardera, and the caravan was provided with an escort 
on the condition that it would return along the British side of 
the river. Thirty Ogaden were specially enlisted and the cost of 
the operation was 1,200 Ks.^ The caravan set out for Bardera in
5July and the escort arrived back in September with a Boran Gall a.' 
1H. to S., 9 May 1896, FO.107/52.
2C. to J., 2 July 1896, PC/CP/74/44; S. to H., 5 June 1896,
F0.107/48.
Opt. 0'Oallaghan to Afljn., in Adm. to F0., 16 June 1896, F0.107/68.
4J. to 0., 31 July 1896, PO/OP/74/45; 0. to S., 10 Oot. 1896, 
F0.107/60.
5J. to 0., 22 Sept. 1896, F0.107/60.
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Although it seems unlikely that the caravan had originally
X
come from Borana, the ivory it carried undoubtedly had. It
was clear that Bardera was a most important terminal for Boran
caravans, and lenner began to realise that some sort of stati on
at Serenli, on the British side of the river opposite Bardera,
was a prerequisite to establishing contact with the Boran. He
suggested placing "an intelligent native", Adam Musa, at Serenli
with fifty Somali police for protection, and ever-optimistically
estimated that he would "quickly acquire an extending influence
2
over the natives of Bibin and Boran".
Since Bardera ms over two hundred miles from Kismayu,
Jenner also began to think of building a half-way house to make 
the journey there easier. As a result, a Government stationwas 
opened at Mabungu Kisungu, and though this was partly designed 
to facilitate the administration cf the Wagosha, it was also
3
meant to act as a food depot on the route from Kismayu to Serenli.
When, at the end of 1896, Lugh and Bardera were threatened 
from Ethiopia, Jenner began to press for a much speedier and more 
expensive advance inland. His letters became increasingljr full of 
emotional pleadings on behalf of the Boran whom he realised would
The suggestion that the caravan came frcm Borana was made by 
O’Callaghan, Adm. to Eo., 16 June 1896, E0.107/68,
2J. to C. , 22 Sept. 1896, FO.107/60.
30. to J., 28 Sept. 1896,PC/CP/74/44; J. to C., 31 Julyl896,
P0.107/60.
soon be attacked by the Amhara;
We must sooner or later interfere to save the fine 
nation of Boran G-allas, whose country equally with 
Zanzibar forms part of a British Protectorate, from 
the horrors of the slave raid, the slaughter of 
their warriors, the castration of their youths, the 
capture of their women.., Prom a military and financial 
as well as from a philanthropic point of view it seems 
better to make our advance while we have a comparatively 
strong nation united under a friendly chief to help us, 
and whilst we can be developing trade and securing an 
increase of revenue partially reimburse ourselves for 
the expense, than to wait until the nation is broken 
up into disunited sections aid the trade is gone.I
Hardinge of course realised at onoe that the Treasury would
never sanction the expense involved in defending the Boran however
desirable this might have been, but he did recommend opening a
2
station at Serenli. In fact Jenner’ s proposals for defending 
the Boran were given short shrift, but by a curious irony both 
Hardinge and Salisbury later advocated essentially the same pro­
posals themselves. For, despite the emotionalism which clouded 
Jenner1 s arguments, it was abundantly clear in the last analysis 
that only force could secure the northern frontier of the East Africa . 
Protectorate which Britain claimed to be legitimately hers; and, 
though Salisbury made a point of defending frontiers wherever possible 
by diplomacy rather than by force of aims, there was one important 
exception in north-east Africa and that was the Sudan.
1J. to H., 27 Feb. 1897, FO.107/77.
2H. to S., 4 April 1897, FO,107/77.
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1'In March 1897. Salisbury decided to send Major MacDonald"
at the head of an expedition to the Sudan. It has been suggested
that the name given to this expedition - the 'Juba Boundary
Commission* - was a blind aimed at diverting attention from its
secret objective, which was to gain control of Fasho da and the 
2
Upper Mile. On the other hand, two scholars have recently 
pointed out that in the earLy stages of its planning the expedition 
had a dual purpose. It was intended to combine the capture of Fasho da 
with the exploration and. delimitation of the Anglo-ltalian sphere 
of influence in southern Ethiopia.''
The idea of a ’Juba Boundary Commission’ was originally 
Lord Salisbury's, and though it was ultimately used to disguise 
MacDonald's real goal, it does not seem to have been suggested 
in the first instance- merely as a 'cover'. Salisbury had thought 
of several ways of getting to Fashoda and Barrington, Salisbury's 
Private Secretary, passed these ideas onto MacDonald or alls7 for 
his comments.^ MacDonald took up Salisbury's suggestion of com­
bining the march to Fashoda with the delimitation of the Fast
Major McDonald surveyed the Uganda Railway -in 1892, and in 1893 
he investigated Opt. Lugard's actions in Uganda,
2R.Robinson & J. Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians (London, 1965), 
362; Gr.U. Sanderson, "Foreign. Policy of the Hegus Menelick, 1896-1898" 
J.a!h.. V no. 1 (1964), 94.
""J.P.Barber, "The MacDonald Expedition to the Mile 1897-1899n,
XXVIII (1964), 1 ff; A.T.Matson, "MacDonald's Expedition to the Mile 
1892-1899", U.J. » XXIX (1965), 98ff, The old theory that MacDonald 
was only concerned with the exploration of the Juba is no longer 
tenable. Cf. Moyse-Bartlett (1956), 7;-2.
McDonald to Barrington, 27 March 1897, FO.2/144.
Africa Protectorate’s northern boundary with Ethiopia, and he drew 
up two separate plans for putting this into practice. Both schemes 
involved marching from Kismayu up the river Juba, and both nec­
essitated additional reinforcements and provisions being sent
1from Berbera to Polo. The necessity of sending supplies from
Berbers, however, proved to be a fatal drawback to the scheme
2 3and Hill minuted.* !!I dont think Lord Salisbury will like this11.
Evidently he did not, for the plans were not adopted, yet it is
easy to understand how tempting it must have been for Salisbury
to try and solve two problems at me shot.
It was Salisbury who had suggested to MacDonald that he would
be nsurveying and laying down the Boundary" of the East Africa
Protectorate and Ethiopia, that he would be making treaties with
the local tribes, and that he would be setting tip stations at Polo
4
and to the north of Lake Rudolf. Had these suggestions in fact 
been carried out, the Boran would have been protected and Jenner* s 
ambitions for expansion towards the Daua amply fulfilled. But this 
attempt to combine the two different goals failed. In the first 
place, Salisbury needed to get MacDonald to Fashoda without too 
much delay, and it was quickly appreciated that delimiting the
"^McDonald "Juba Boundary Commission11, 27 March 1897, FO.2/144*
2Minute n.d. on MacDonald "Juba Boundary Commission1*, FO, 2/144*
3Hill was head of the Africa Department at the Foreign Office,
4
This clear from MacDonald’s remark at the beginning of his Report 
of 27 March; "I can now make it clear how I propose to carry out 
Lord Salisbury’s ideas", F0.2/l44.
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E.A.P.’s northern frontier would take some time. Then, although
Salisbury’s plans were flexible enough for MacDonald to have
surveyed the boundary on his return from Pashoda, the problem of
supplies was insuperable.
Although the MacDonald expedition had no direct influence
on developments along the Ethiopian^, A, P. border, it did have
an important psychological impact throughout the area. In
Jubaland the expedition’s arrival ms eagerly anticipated and it
1-was expected to lead to the real subjugation of the Somaliv;(
Menelick also feared a direct clash with MacDonald and went out
of his way to ensure that this did not happen.
A further by-product of the abortive Juba Boundary Commission
was the suggestion from the Director of Military Intelligence
that a post should be set up at Dole, so as to prevent Ethiopian
3incursions into British territory, When Salisbury asked Hardinge 
whether the idea was feasible, his answer was virtually no, since 
he felt that the lower Juba had to be tackled before the upper Juba 
could be approached. The control of Afmadu and the opening of a 
station at Serenli were seen by Hardinge to be essential prerequisites
Cederqvist to I., 2 Jan. 1898 and 28 Deo. 1898, AS/EFM/lS/305;
0. to M., 8 April 1899, AS/eFM/iS/306.
A
H. to Sanderson, 22 Sept. 1897, E0,l/35«
5S. to H., 20 Aug. 1897, K). 107/74.
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that could neither he by-passed nor avoided before a statiaa
was opened at Dolo. On the other hand? Jenner had been authorised
to visit Serenli in 1897? and the possibility of a fairly rapid
administrative advance inland was not ruled out.
This idea of a gradual extension of the area under administrative
control along the river Juba was one that Hardinge developed and
added to, but towards the end of 1897 it became totally irrelevant
in the face of the first Ogaden rebellion. Jenner was unable to
visit Serenli, and the establishment of a station there had to 
2be postponed; Hardinge also reiterated his belief thati "Any
extension up the Juba must entail, as a preliminary condition,
3the submission of the Ogadens".
As a result of the Ogaden r evolt, Jenner enlarged his own 
ideas about the minimum sise necessary for the proposed admini­
strative station at Serenli. The possibility of a Somali attack 
on the station had to be -taken into account and, instead of planning 
to make do with Adam Musa and a few Somali, irregulars, Jenner 
now wanted one or two British administrative officers to be posted
A m
there, backed by a siseable Somali levy. These suggestions were
1H. to S., 12 Oct. 1897, JO.107/81.
2H. to S., 10 May 1898, P0.107/93.
3H. to S., 9 April 1898, FO.107/92.
4H. to S., 31 July 1898, F0.107/95.
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accepted by Hardinge who began to link the advance towards Serenli
with the need for a more effective resistance to Ethiopian ambitions
in the area, and he w?ote to Lord Salisbury^ f July 1898;
In view of the present pretensions cf Abyssinia, 
it is somewhat important for us to show our control 
of the Juba regions is effective and not merely 
confined, like that of the Sultans of Zanzibar, to 
a small strip in the vicinity of Kismayu.
By the beginning of 1899? Hardinge had already begun to plan
beyond the con structionnof a single station at Serenli. On 6 January
he;; sent Salisbury a telegram strongly advising the utilisation
of military officers for administrative and political duties in,
as he put it, Mthe new districts which in the course of the next
2two years may be created on the northern frontier". Whether 
Hardinge was only thinking in terms of expanding northwards towards 
Dolo, or whether he also envisaged an expansion westwards towards 
El Jakj is not known; but in so Jar as he was advocating an effective
d.efence of the E.A.P,'s northern frontier, Hardinge too was im­
plicitly endorsing Jenner’s earlier plan to defend the Boran, 
who were after all in the British sphere of influence.
Hardinge probably imagined that Salisbury favoured an expansion 
towards Dolo, whereas that only made economic and political sense 
to Salisbury in so far as it fitted into a much wider framework
II. to S., 10 May 1898, ]?0.107/93.
H. to S., 6 Jan. .1899, FO.2/194.
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that also embraced the Sudan. At the time when MacDonald’s
expedition was being organised it seemed feasible to combine the
problem of the A.P.’s northern frontier with that of the southern
Sudan, But once that plan had fallen through, Salisbury felt
inclined to postpone as long as possible any extension of active
3
authority towards the northern frontier of the H.A.P, ‘
He vert holes s, at the beginning of 1899 Jenner visited Serenli
2and told the elders that a station would shortly be opened there.
When Jenner returned to the ooast, he learnt that the decision 
to open a station had been postponed indefinitely. However, sine 
he had already given the Somali around Serenli a very firm im­
pression that a station would soon be opened there, he maintained 
that some Government piesence at Serenli was unavoidable if there 
was not. to be a serious loss of face. Instead of advocating the 
establishment of apolitical station at Serenli, Jenner now suggested 
that Farah Ibrahim, an Aulihan elder, should be made a Government 
agent. He was to-be paid a small stipend andgiven ten Snider rifles; 
his duties were to be limited to the collection of customs duty.
1F.O. to C., 25 July 1899, FO.2/195. 
2J. to H., 12 March. 1899, FO.2/196.
H. to C., 2 April I899, PC/CP/ll0/9; F. to H., 4 April 1899, 
and J. to 0., 27 April 1899? PC/CP/78/65: Jenner "Memorandum",
6 July 1899, FO.2/196.
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This was an ingenious solution, the oost was negligible, the
risk non-existent; yet it could still he claimed that some
administrative advance inland had taken place.
At the same time, Jenner was told that the Government had
no. intention of extending its frontiers northwards or of increasing
its liabilities, and he was wa rned that the Boran should not be
1encouraged to think that they could receive any help. This 
explicit reference to the Government1s desire to limit its involve­
ment was more than necessary. In February 1899, Abdi Hersi, 
an Ogaden from Afmadu, arrived at Kismayu after visiting the
Boran. He brought back news of a large Ethiopian garrison at Anole,
2and he also passed on numerous Boran appeals for help. As a 
result, Jenner decided to send Mohammed Agil with 40 Somali police 
to give moral support to Geydu 'and Afalata. The Boran were to be
offered British flags and invited to assist the Government in
stopping the export of slaves to the Italians, they were also told 
that the Kismayu administration had come to terms with the Ogaden. 
As far as the most southern Boran were concerned, this last piece 
of information must have been the most important, aid it was one 
of the first points that they themselves asked about.^
10, to S., 14- Jul. 1899, PC/CP/68/l6.
2J. to H., 23 Feb. 1899, F0.2/190.
3J. to C., 5 April 1899, FO.2/196.
hdam Musa "Memorandum", 14 Feb. 1900, FO.2/285.
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Muhammad Agil got within one days1 march of Anole and then 
turned hack. The presence of Ethiopian troops there made it im­
possible for him to establish direct contact with the Boran leaders.
Later he claimed to have been careful not to give the Galla the
X
impression that they might get Government assistance. At the 
same time, Muhammad Agil frequently told the Boran that he re-
to
presented the British Government, aid h^4lso sent Afalata two
Protectorate flags so that the Boran should know that they were
2under British protection. It was precisely this sort of adventurism 
that the Foreign Office was most anxious to discourage.
Nevertheless? by the summer of 1900 Jenner w^s once more 
recommending the occupation of Wajir and El Wale? and the establish- 
ment of a small police post at both places. This time Hardinge 
seems to have received the idea favourably? though he suggested 
that no steps should be taken until the follot-ring year.^’ Jenner* s 
murder in 1901, however? wrecked these plans. In any case, Salisbury 
had already tamed that? pending a settlement with Ethiopia, great 
discretion had to be shorn along the^iorthem frontier so as not to
1C. to S., 10 July .1899, TO, 2/197.
TIohamed Agil "Report", PC/CP/78/65.
3J. to H., 6 July 1900, FO.2/289.
4H. to J., 23 July 1900, FO.2/289.
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commit British policy, aid in the circumstances the establishment
of even the smallest posts at Wajir and El Wak could not have
1been considered discreet.
After 1901, however, the idea of counteracting a gradual
Ethiopian advance southwards by extending north-westwards the
area under effective administration received no further support
either from the Foreign. Office or from the Protectorate itself.
In the first place, the new Commissioner, Sir Charles Eliot, was
strongly opposed to any further advance whatsoever. Moreover, the
second Ogaden revolt in 3901 led to a contraction rather than an
expansion cf the area under control* Nor did the river Juba seem
any more to provide the sole route inland towards the frontier,
and Eliot pointed out; Min the event of our wishing to open up
relations with the Boran country, we could probably do so quite
2
as well from Kenia and Ukamba as from Jubaland".
After 1901, therefore, a solution to the frontier problem 
was sought through diplomacy instead of by way of effective 
occupation. Though, by this data also, the British representative 
in Addis Ababa had come to the conclusion that a diplomatic solution 
was bound to be unfavourable to Great Britain, that effective 
occupation alone would provide the basis for a satisfactory solution
1S.. to H. , 4 Sept. 1900, P0.2/282.
T8. to L., 29 April 1901, P0.2/576.
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and that in any case it was hound to he the main criteria for
1eventually deciding the frontier.
The Rodd Mission of 1897 had not in fact discussed the frontier
between the S.A.P. and Ethiopia, since at that time Britain con-
2sidered that this was a matter for discussion with Italy alone. 
Nevertheless, Menelick informed Rodd of claims which he lad made 
in a circular letter dated .April 1898 and sent to the European
•z
powers. Ethiopian claims instead of being merely latitudinal 
were basically tribal, unlike the territorial pretensions of Britain, 
Germany and Italy hi Africa, which tended to be circumscribed, 
by straight lines drawn across a map whith little parallel con­
sideration for geographical or ethnic factors.
In 1891 Menelick alleged that tie Arbore, Boran aid Arussi 
came within the confines of Ethiopia, and this was to be the ir­
reducible minimum of all later proposals. Nith time, however,
Menelick became more specific about those peoples he considered 
to be sections or sub-sections of the Boran, and inevitably he 
adopted Wolde Gabriel’s mistaken id_ea that the Garre were related 
to the Gall a. Because of this, his claims at times appeared to be 
without foundation., but having conquered the highland Boran the
1H. to 19 Oct. 1901, EO.l/39; H. to Clement Hill, 24 Aug. 1901, 
EO.l/49.
2P,0. to Rodd, Feb. 1897, FO.l/32.
3Rodd. was unaware of this circular and claimed that in fact it had 
never been sent to Queen Victoria, but a copy can be found in 
the P.O. Confidential Prints enclosed in 1,0. to P.O., 9 Julyl891, 
P0.403/155. But I have not been able to find the original. R. to S., 
4 May 1897, FO.l/32.
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Ethiopians naturally felt that those they considered to "be
Boran she gats should also he included in Ethiopia.
Rodd also gave other reasons for not opening discussions
on the E. A.P./Ethiopian border. He claimed that he had received
no instructions on the subject, but he also felt that the matter
did not call for urgent settlement, to which he added the further
assumption that;
these questions should be left for future solution, 
which I do not doubt will be easy matter when approached 
in a spirit of mutual conciliation and goodwill.
This was a view that was to be repeated later, and there was
certainly a feeling that since the border was essentially of
secondary importance, the problem itself could not be that in- 
2
tractable.
At the beginning of 1898, Harrington, formerly Vice-Consul at 
Zeila, was accredited British agent to the Emperor. He was given 
his instructions on 2 March 1898 by Cromer, the British Agent 
and Consul-General at Cairo, and was warned to avoid committing 
himself to any recognition cf frontier claims in southern Ethiopia 
or to any protests about these, without first seeking the advice of 
the British Government.^ In comparison to the negotiations and
1R. to Menelick, 14 May 1897, TO.l/32.
Tt.A.H.Dye, "La delimitation de l'Bthiopie", Bull, du Oomlte Ae 
1'Afrique IPraaoaise, X (1903), 7.
^F.O. to Treasury, 29 Wov. 1897, BO.l/35.
40. to H., 2 March 1898, FO.l/35.
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settlement of the Ethiopian/Egyptian border and the British 
Somaliland/Ethiopian border, the southern Ethiopian boundary 
question was given low priority. Moreover, Harrington's instructions 
effectively ruled out any sort of speedy settlement, and the 
necessity to refer back to London time and again for instructions 
meant that several important opportunities for a compromise solution 
were allowed to lapse through months of slow correspondence.
Harr in gt oi' s first recommendation ms to suggest pushing 
forward outposts in ^ he/country between Webi river and Rudolf".1 
It was significant that from the start Harrington implicitly 
recognised that diplomacy alone was not going to secure the boundary 
Britain wanted. Furthermore, after the failure to combine 
MacDonald's expedition to Fashoda with a survey of the frontier 
and the establishment of posts there, it shouldhave been obvious 
that effective occupation was unlikely to precede a diplomatic 
agreement, and that in these circumstances every effort should have 
been made to achieve as sonn as possible a diplomatic solution.
However, when diplomacy did not yield the results required, 
the tendency at the Foreign. Office was to postpone discussions, 
despite the fact that it was generally agreed that time was on the 
side of Menelick, and that discussions would ultimate]yhave to be resumed.
1H. to S., 19 May 1898, FO.l/35.
Menelick, at any rate, seems to have been genuinely anxious 
to arrange a compromise settlement, and there is 1 ittle to 
indicate that he regarded Borana as part of the sacred trust
1of ancient Ethiopian territory that could not be bargained over.
But when Menelick discussed the southern border with Harrington
in May 1898, the British representative was forced to admit that
he had no instructions. In fact Harrington seemed to suggest to
Menelick that negotiations were perhaps unnecessary, since the
only criteria for deciding to whom the disputed land belonged was
effective occupation, which was something to be established on
2the spot and not at the negotiating table. Nevertheless, in June 
Menelick proposed to compromise slightly and agreed that the 
Turkana and Marehan Somali could remain in the British sphere.
He insisted, however, that the darre, Sahhq G-abra and Tertale
3
should remain within the Ethiopian borders.
This last suggestion ms  based on a number of misconceptions. 
Firstly, there was no tribe called the Tertale. Yet, as a further 
concession in 1900, Menelick stipulated that the I’ertale should 
be included in Ethiopia if they were found to be a sub-section of
For the opposite view see? E„ Marcus, in Boston University Papers 
on Africa, African History, ed. J. Butler (Boston,1966)7 II? 242.
2H. to S., 26 May 1898, FO.l/36.
H. to Cromer, 3 June 1899, FO.l/44. These proposals are mentioned
by H. Marcus, supra. But Marcus simply repeats contemporary claims 
and views with all their inconsistencies and without in any way 
clarifying their contradictions. He also seems oddly unfamiliar with
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the Bor an. In fact, however, the ICarayu were a sub-section
of the Boran, aid fertale was a toponym. For were the Satho or
Cabra tied to a specific locality, "but they were scattered
amongst the Boran. Basically, therefore, Menelick ms still
claiming sovereignty over the Boran and the G-arre, yet
Harrington now urged Salisbury to accept these proposals so as
to put some limit on the Ethiopian expansion actually taking place,
and he explain eds
I could see that effective occupation would be the 
basis of settlement, and I could see the Abyssinians were 
getting the better of this game,'
As a result, Menelick* s scheme ms forwarded to Sir A. Hardin ge
for his comments, which in the event turned out tote completely
unrealistic and unhelpful. He wrote;
I think Menelick’s proposals rather audacious. He 
shoves our northern frontier two parallels of 1 atitude 
back, and annexes Lake Stephani, Reshiat and the whole 
or two thirds of Boran. He talks about effective occupation; 
but a.) he is not a party to the Berlin Conference, and 
b) his effective occupation consists of the establishment 
of a few posts, by raiding parties.^
Jenner also wrote a Memorandum to the same effect, and Harrington’s
final say cn the subject was thats "Sir A. Hardinge seemed to me
to treat the subject of a frontier as if Menelick were the ordinary
3squeezable petty African-potentate".
1H. to S., 3 June 1899? F0.l/44.
‘“Hardinge, Memorandum, 20 0ct. 1899 , HO. if44.
■%. to Sanderson, 17 Feb. 1900, FO.l/44.
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But by tliis time Sir Thomas Sanderson, Permanent Under
Secretary of State, had decided that Menelick's proposals were
not sufficiently attractive to form the basis of a settlement
and Harrington was informed accordingly*^ Then, when war broke
out in South Africa in 1900, the whole subject was shelved and
Sanderson wrote to Harringtons "It is an elementary maxim that
one should not attempt too many things at once - and South Africa
2is quite sufficient to keep our hands full"*
At the same time, Menelick himself was anxious to settle the 
frontier without increasing his claims, though he candidly told 
Harrington that lie had been advised that he would obtain a more 
satisfactory frontier agreement with Britain while the latter was 
engaged in the South African war„ In May 1900 Harrington 
wrote to say that he had had four long discussions with Menelick 
regarding the southern boundary, and that the Hmperor had put forward
4
several new proposals.
Sanderson, Minute, 27 March 1900, FO.l/44.
2S. to H., 30 March 1900, K>.l/44.
to S,, 20 June 1900, FO.l/37.
Si. to S., 16 June B00, FO.l/44.
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These proposals seemed to be extremely favourable to 
Harrington; in fact, he considered them to be the most favourable 
terms that Britain could obtain and he urged their acceptance.
Yet the proposals themselves were essentially no different to 
those that had previously been put forward, For Menelick still 
conceived of the frontier as following tribal limits, aid he 
made no alteration to the list of tribes he felt ought to be re­
garded as Ethiopian, What he did do, however, was to limit his 
prior latitudinal claims, a concession that was worthless sins> 
these were subject to the still unknown ethnic borders. The sop, 
however, proved sufficient and Harrington was authorised to 
conclude an agreement along the lines that Menelick suggested.
Clearly the most important job now lay. in the determination 
of the tribal frontiers. Towards the end of 1900, Major Gwynn was 
chosen to assist Harrington in his negotiations, and also to 
help delimit the Sudan/Ethiopian and the E,A.P./Ethiopian borders,"^
But Gwynn found that he could only handle the Sudan/Ethiopian frontier, 
and it was not until 1902 that Harrington secured the services of
Captain Maud for the purpose of surveying the southern Ethiopian 
2borderland.
Maud's instructions were that he should collect sufficient 
information to provide the basis for a settlement of the frontier.
1SandeBson to G., 27 Sept. 1900, K>.l/3S.
2
Sanderson to 1.0., 2 Aug. 1902, FO.l/47.
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He was also told that the frontier itself should not' "interfere
with he7 local tribal organisation i.e. does not divide
tribes between the two spheres". On the other hand, Maud faced
very real difficulties in collecting his information. He himself
admitted that the presence of Ethiopians travelling with their party
southwards "had the effect of terrorising the natives and either
completely sealed their lips or made their information totally
2misleading and unreliable". How then did 1b  collect information 
of anjr value or reliability?
Maud found that the Ethiopians had been putting pressure 
on the Garre to make them say that they were Boran; and at Gabra 
Murri and El Mole, near Banissa, he discovered that the Ethiopians 
had constructed villages merely to give the impression that they 
were settled in the area. It would seem in fact, that Maud was 
not ±i a positinn to ferret out detailed and accurate information 
about the tribal limits of the Boran. The presence of Ethiopians 
in his party effectively precluded this. Indeed, Maud admitted 
that he had great difficulty getting in touch with people without 
Ethiopian officials actually being present, aid, though he went 
to great lengths to achieve this, he does not appear to have been 
very successful.
C^pt. Maud "General Instructions"* n.d. in FO.l/47*
M^r. A.B*Butter's expedition. Contents of Report by Opt. Maud, 
FO.l/48,
3 0 4
Ultimately, Maud seems to have ignored his instruct ions that 
the boundary was to be decided along tribal lines. Instead,, he 
advocated a border that was clearly definable by its physical 
features, the river Daua to the east, and the Goro escarpment to 
the west. Maud appears to have based his proposals on the principle 
of effective occupation, claiming that they reflected the limits 
of direct Ethiopian control. In this wsy he justified what would 
otherwise have appeared to the British Government as an over 
hasty concession to the Ethiopian Government^ But he also claimed 
that by coincidence, the limit of Ethiopian occupation not merely 
coincided with an admirably definable physical frontier, but also 
with an ethnic one.
In this respect Maud ms doubtless hoping to convince the 
Ethiopians of the validity of Ms proposals, since tribal limits 
were supposed to be their determining factor. Tet here Maud was 
clearly oversimplifying and distorting the reality. While claiming 
that there ware ^ ery few Boran to the south of the Goro escarpment, 
he could not overlook the fact that they were widely scattered in 
significant numbers further south. He even admitted that there 
were Boran at Aja, Buttelu, Buna, Elussi and Wajir, all of them 
places well to the south of the escarpment. However, the essence 
of Maud’s argument was that because the Boran to the south of 
the Goro lived intermixed with other peoples, who had previously
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"been- their clients, they were no longer true Boran,' He admitted 
that prior to the Ethiopian advance southwards, Boran power 
had extended as far south as ¥ajir, hut claimed that since that 
advance they had lost their influence south of the Goro. Finally, 
because the southernmost Boran did not send tribute north, he 
correctly concluded that they were independents of the Am bar a; and 
he then added a blatant non sequitur. that they must also be different
■■■■* LS- I J iT in* *  "V»«■ Ittf .^ V.uiIn
to those Boran under Ethiopian control. The embarrassing fact was
that the Ethiopians had only subjugated part of the Boran,
so that if tribal limits were to be recognised, 'the boundary was
going to be dr aim much further south. Jet by ignoring his instructions,
Maud recommended a frontier that cut right across ethnic groups,
dividing some tribes into two and separating others from their
wells or their grazing. It was a frontier that was bound to cause
intense local friction, its inherent defects would see to that;
if you make an arbitrary division, even if this is 
on a clearly defined natural feature, you shake up 
the native's ideas of boundary and property utterly, 
and you make a frontier which the natives have never 
recognised and probably never will.
Another important element of Maud's recommendations was that 
whatever frontier was finally negotiated, it would have to be
-j
Of, B.J,Webster, "The Boran Rendille and Samburus The Nomadic tribes 
of the N, F. P, H, in The Peoples of Kenya, no. 16 (.1944)? 2,
2
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defended by military posts, since Menelick's "very Independent 
officers who rule the Boran country" could not be relied on to 
respect it. He recommended three posts; one at Jara, a second 
near Korondil, and a third near Ml I'/ak or Hugh. Bach post was 
to have at least 100 rifles, and the post near Lugh 193. Opti­
mistically, and later events would show how wrong he was, he 
claimed.! "the remainder of the line would I think take oare of itself". 
He also supported the idea of a British inspecting officer with
50 troops, which he regarded as essential. In theory the cost
1of these proposals was to be met from a hut tax.
Clearly Maud had been right to stress that M s  proposals did
no more than take into account the limits of Ethiopian occupation,
because even so they appeared more than Britain was prepared to
concede. As Harrington explained, in March 1903s
Matters in our so called sphere of influence are 
even worse than I expected. Abyssinian influence 
extends beyond Menelick*s proposals as far south 
as 3' 30 N. No doubt when the frontier question 
come sup for discussion we shall find. Menelick's 
proposals not worth the paper they are written on.
* It seems to. me that we shall be face to face with 
two alternatives either to accept, with a view to 
saving what otherwise will be lost of our sphere 
of influence, a considerable dimunition of our East 
African Protectorate, or else go in for the expensive  ^
means of making good our claims by effective occupation.
-I
Cpt. Maud, Contents of Report, EO.l/48. Maud had evidently over­
looked the problem of taxing nomads who had no fixed abode.
2H, to Sir Thomas S., 19 March 1903, Khl/47.
It was becoming increasingly obvious to those who favoured 
a diplomatic solution, that this alone could not be counted 
on to prevent the Ethiopians frcm continuing their movement south­
wards. As Clement Hill minuted of a negotiated frontier?
will be of little value unless we occupy it in such a manner as
to be able to defend the tribes on our side".
To Eliot at any rate the prospect of giving up a large part 
of the E.A.P. did not seem particularly serious. Although a 
loss of prestige appeared to be involved and Britain seemed to 
have made a concession, Eliot was quick to point out that in fact 
all that was involved was recognition of a fait accompli. He also 
supported laud* s suggestion that there should be three frontier
posts, and suggested that this was the only way to maintain the 
2frontier. At the Eoreign Office, also, the necessity of
defending the frontier once it had been agreed on was being in­
creasingly recognised?
There are the strongest reasons of policy and real 
economy for not now shirking the expense and responsibility 
involved in affording protection to the tribes under our 
authority. The policy of drift and retirement had invariably 
led to immeasurably larger sacrifices of money, blood and 
prestige (which means security) than would have been re­
quired by an early recognition of our responsibilities. 3
*i
Minute, n. d. on H. to T,, 19 March 1903? FO.l/47*
Tl. to L., 17 July 1903, FO.l/47.
Crowes, Minute, 22 Aug. 1903, FO.l/47.
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This was a view that was thoroughly endorsed by Lansdowne, the
Foreign Secretary, though some doubt remained as to where the
money would come from.'*'
Yet the immediate problem was not so much whether to defend
the frontier, but whether to negotiate a frontier at all. In
November 1903? when it was thought that Menelick would accept
Maud's line, Eliot began to suggest that it would no^ be better
for Harrington to keep his hand.s- free and not to commit himself.
The question of giving protection to tribes in the Protectorate
was one that Eliot was quite prepared to shelve. Harrington reported
that there were tribes to the west of Lugh demanding British pro-
tection, and that he had sent them letters saying that they were
in British territory. This was obvious^ a little premature.
Some may well not have been in the 33.A.P. yet others obviously
were, such as the tribes around El ¥ak, and in so far as the
latter were concerned Eliot adamantly maintained, "X dont see how
we can give /them/ effective protection", and he tried to ensure
2that such offers were not made again.
Thus a policy of drift though formally denounced seems in 
practice to have been accepted. But if the British Government was 
not prepared to accept the Maud line as a basis for negotiation, 
there was no reason why the Ethiopians should do so either. Throughout
1
Lansdowne, Minute, 22 Aug. 1903, 3?0,l/47.
Tl. to L., 4 Hoy. 1903, FO.l/48.
309
November and December 1903? reports filtered jn of an Ethiopian
advance southwards that by all accounts went far beyond the
frontier recommended by Maud. These reports stated that the
Ehtiopians had reached a place called Gedu, apparently not marked
on any maps, but thought to be ten hours march.north of Wajir.^‘
By the middle of December it was claimed that there were 1,000
Ethiopians at Gedu, all armed with rifles, and the occupation
of Wajir and El Wak, two extremely important and strategic well
complexes, seemed to the British authorities to be only a matter 
2
of months away. This news forced Lansdowne's hand. Urgent 
telegrams were ‘’dispatched to Addis Ababa stating that the British 
Government did not expect the Ethiopians to take any action pre­
judicial to the solution of the frontier while negotiations were 
pending, and two weeks later 1b Informed Harrington that he -would 
in fact be willisng to start negotiations on the basis of Maud's 
recommendations.
The decision to negotiate brought a timely reminder from Sir
William Nicholson, the Director-General of Military Intelligence.
He pointed out that, according to all previous experience, no 
frontier agreement had ever produced the desired effect where it 
was not followed up by effective occupation. He reminded Lansdowne 
1
Presumably Ghedu, an area or district to the south of El Wak.
2E. to L., 19 Nov. 1903 and 24 Nov. 1903, NO.l/48; It. to E. , 
19 Bee. 1903, NO.l/48.
to H., 7 Deo. 1903, NO.l/48.
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bhat Opt, Maud had recommended three frontier posts along the
border, but anticipated that Lansdowne would not accept the extra
expense. He suggested, therefore, that Boran chiefs on the British
side should watch the frontier, and that a camel corps from Kismayu
1
should occasion ally visit the boundary.
In 1904s it seemed to Italian observers that Harrington and
the Emperor had agreed in principle about the frontier, but in
2
fact negotiations did not go well. Maud*s recommendations did
not sufficiently take into account the proviso that tribes should
be divided between spheres of influence. To Menelick, on the
other hand, the crucial questions were who constituted the Bo ran
and. what were their boundaries. Once these matters had been deter-
mined, the frontier could be agreed upon. In the meantime the
inevitable controversy over whether or not the Garre were Gall a
4an o r ig in ,  c o n tm u e d .
This failure to reach an agreement, coupled with continued 
Ethiopian raids deep into British territory, left Britain in an 
unacceptable position. In the first place, Harrington got Menelick 
to agree that, though there had. been no agreement, the Maud line
I. to 1. , 8 Deo. 1903, FO.l/48.
2Pecori to M, , 15 Aug. 1904, ASMAI. Posiz.70/2-16.
3
S.H.E.Ca-penny* "The proposed Anglo-Abyssjnian boundary in East Africa", 
Scottish Geographical Magazine, XXI (1905), 265*
'Sfhile the British negotiators always maintained the Garre were 
not related to the Galla, the Jubaland administrators all seem to 
have thought that the Garre were islamised Galla, J. to H.,
2 April 1899, FO.2/196.
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would be accepted as a provisional frontier and that as such
the Ethiopians would respect its integrity. Secondly, Harrington
put forward again an earlier suggestinn that neatly obviated the
necessity of erecting expensive military posts along* the border.
In 1901 he had suggested placing a British representative on
the frontier to gather information.^ Opt. Maud had also put forward
p
the idea of a travelling inspector backed by an armed escort. "
In 1905, Harrington now suggested that some British representative
should be placed on the frontier to ensure that it was not violated
by the Ethiopians, and also to be able to report back any overt
d ■violations and gather Information about them. Before the end of 
the year, a Greek citizen called Zaphiro had been appointed, and 
the first tentative step had been taken towards administering the 
frontier. The Boran were at the centre of the frontier problem, 
both politically and geographically, but Zaphiro had also to deal 
with the effects of Ethiopian expansion on both sides of them; in 
the east towards Lugh and the river Juba, in the west towards lake 
Rudolf.
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Chapter- VI
j
Ethiopia and lake rudou?
The Ethiopian advance into Borana was preceded by a similar
movement further west, • towards lake Rudolf, that M ' a  direct
impact on the Samburu, Rendille, Gelubba and other pepples in
the area. This advance towards lake Rudolf was consistent with
Menelick* s claims of 1891 that the Arbore and lake Rudolf were
part of Ethiopia, but it also reflected a fear that Macdonald
might try to stake a claim there first. In 1896 the Ethiopians
raided the lake Rudolf and lake Stephanie area getting as far
south as the arid lowlands where they attacked the Gabra Algan.
The Rodd Mission ms given to understand that a permanent station
had been set up in Reshiat, but when Cavendish passed through the
2
area in April 1897 he found none there. In fact, the main advance 
southwards did not begin until January 1898 when Ras Wolde Giorgis 
of Kaffa accompanied by Boulatovich, a Russian explorer, led an 
army to the northern tip of lake Rudolf, By the end of March, 
the Ethiopian standard had been raised at the mouth of the Omo,
1McI>. to S., 30 Aug. 1897, no. 7, EO.CP. 7032; Mr. A.E.Butter's
Expedition, Contents of Report by Opt. Maud, FO.l/48.
^cD. to S., 30 Aug. 1897, EO.CP.7032.
Menelick claimed that he sent Wolde Giorgis south to anticipate 
Macdonald's possible intrusion in the area, and said; "I'll send 
Ras Wolde Giorgias with 20,000 men - they can check his passport", 
quoted in G.N.Sanderson, J.A.H*, V (1964-) 94. But if the numbers 
sounded impressive the state of the troops was not', and Wolde
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and. before Wolde Gioirgis returned north two posts had been set
up: one at Kerre, the other further east anongst the Amar Kokke,^
The fort at Kerra was placed under Fitaurari Imani, who commanded
a small number of troops, aid these he used to subdue the local
2population and also to raid the Boran. But in 1899 the country 
bordering the Omo, which had been governed by Bejazzmach Tasamma, 
was put under the control of Count Leontieff, a Russian explorer 
and adventurer who had entered Menelick’s services, and the latter 
set out at the head of a large expedition to more thoroughly
3
subdue the area. By October 1899, Leontieff lad reached the
south-western edge of lake Rudolf, where he set up what he called
"Poste Menelick II"* However, this only appears to have been a
temporary camp which was soon abandoned, though Leontieff claimed
rather grandly that as a result "the occupation /had/ become
completely effective".^ The severe droughts of 1898 and 3899
also made the posts amongst the Amar Koklce and at Kerre untenable
and they were abandoned in 1900, when their troops were assimilated
Giorgis found it difficult to remain even four days on the edge of 
the lake, see; A.IC.Moulatoyich, "Iz Abissinii cherez stranu ICaffa na 
ozero Rudolfa", Izvestiya Xmperatorskavo Russkovo Geograficheskovo 
Obshchestva. (XXXV (1899), 280.
1
A.K.Boulatovich, ’’Dali Abissinia al lago Rudolfo per il ICaffa’1, B.S.G.X., 
I 4th series (1900), 337; E. A. Wallis Budge, A History of EthiopiaTTLondon, 
1928), II, pp. 533-4; G. Jesman, Russians in Ethiopia (London. 1958),
94; H. to S., 7 Nov. 1898, FO.1/34.
2H. to C., 28 March 1899, FO.l/36.
3H. to S., 14 June 1899, FO.l/Sl.
4 s"I1occupation devient tout a fait effective", Leontieff, "Exploration
des Provinces equatoriales a1Abyssinia", La Geographie, II (1900).
116, 118. ~
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into the garrison at Gardula.
Ironically, therefore, Leontieff s expedition went hand in
hand with an abandonment of direct control over the lower Omo,
instead of the increased domination of the area which had been
intended. The post amongst the Amar Kokke was permanent^ abandoned,
but by 1903 the Ethiopians had re-established a post just north
of Kerre at Labide0, and it was from this area that fresh advances
2
were made in the following jrears. Moreover, though the post at 
Labuko ms some distance from lake Rudolf, the fear of Ethiopian 
raids was felt far to the south of the area directly controlled 
by their troops.
Despite the physical abandonment of posts immediately north 
of lake Rudolf, Leontieff subsequently gave considerable publicity 
to his trip to the Lake and the permanent posts he claimed to 
have established there. The first occasion was at the International 
Exhibition at Paris in February 1900, He lad contributed a considerable 
amount of ethnographic material for the Jibuti pavilion, and, 
when he was interviewed by the Paris correspondent of The Times, 
he claimed that he had effectively occupied the area around lake 
Rudolf, stating; "the country is being regularly governed... and
J,S,Harrison, "A Journey from Zeila to Lake Rudolf", G.J., X7III 
(1901), 289. ”
TlaucL "Exploration in the southern borderland of Abyssinia", G.J., 
XXIII (1904), 565.
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1
Senegalese have drilled the natives". Later in the year, when
Leontieff went to Kngland, he visited Stanley and hoasted that
he would soon establish a post at the southern end of lake
Rudolf hacked by forty troops, Stanley at once wrote to Sir
Glement Hill in alarmist terms about the British sphere of interest
being threatened, but Leontieff s schemes were not taken very
2serious^ at the Foreign Office,
In June 1899? Harrington had asumed that Leontieff s ex-
pedition posed no special problem to the frontier negotiations
then in progress. He had written to Lord Salisbury of the
destination of the expedition;
So far as can be ascertained this country, though 
perhaps not properly subjugated is well within the 
limits of Abyssinian effective occupation. At any 
rate it is well within what Menelick proposes as a 
frontier and claims to have effectively occupied.^
Moreover, Harrington ms aware that Leontieff s expedition had
ended on a note of disapproval. He had been summoned back to
Addis Ababa where Menelick had wanted to degrade him for crossing
into Ras Wolde Giorgis1s territory. The Mmperor also recalled
those troops that Leontieff had left behind in the lake Rudolf 
4area,
-i
The Times, 12 Feb. 1900, Leontieff had recruited 130 Senegalese in 
Dakar and he brought them with him on his expedition, as well as 
a small number of Cossacks whom he claimed had been in the Imperial 
Guard.
2Sir H.A.Stanley to C.Hill, 12 Sept. 1900, FO.l/38.
3H. to S., 14 June 1899, FO.l/51.
4H. to S., 9 Feb.1900, FO.l/37.
But by March 1900 it appeared that Leontieff might visit 
lake Rudolf again, and Harrington felt that it was time for the 
British Government to ’’take ©me steps to show that thejr consider
1 nsuch country as being within their sphere ofinf 3nence". ihe
meeting with Stanley, which took place a few months later, led
Sanderson to suggest that Leontieff should be given moral support
by the Government in return for an assurance that he would respect 
2
the frontier* One reason why Leontieff’s threat never caused 
much concern, however, was because of his known duplicity* In 
July 1900 he had seen Sanderson at the Foreign Office for a con­
fidential chat. Then in October he saw Harrington in London and 
said he wished to talk to him privately, and they arranged a meetin 
in Paris* On both occasions the motive was the same, aid the con­
versation similar. Basically, Leontieff was asking for British 
support in the eventuality of Menelick1 s death which he felt would 
occur soon. He said that he would shortly be visiting the Omo and 
lake Rudolf, this time taking boats there* When Menilick died, he 
wished to declare himself independent and saw the necessity of 
getting support fran some European power* He said lie had chosen 
Britain because he liked the country and he claimed he was playing
1H. to S., 24 March 1900, I'0.l/37-
Sanderson, Minute, n.d. on S. to H., 12 Sept. 1900, FO.l/38.
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for his own hand. But though it was quite clear how Britain
could be useful to him, Harrington made the point that it was
difficult to see how Leontieff could be useful in return. And
his mild threat to establish posts around lake Rudolf and claim
effective occupation there was worthless, for, as Harrington
calmly pointed out, Menelick had withdrawn all claim to the larger
part of the lake. This news apparently took Leontieff by surprise
and completely upset his calculation.
A s3cond reason why Leontieff was not taken too sexiously was
the obvious lack of rapport between him and Menelick, yet he could
not be entirely ignored. At the beginning of 1901, Leontieff
prepax^ed to send another expedition to lake Rudolf, and at that
time it was certainly feared that he intended to cross into
2British claimed territory. In June the expedition set off very 
tamely. Leontieff had intended to assemble several boats on the 
river Omo and cn the lake, but this had been forbidden by Menelick,
A month later it was being reported that Leontieff was on very bad
terms with Menelick and with Ilg, his foreign adviser. It is clear 
that the main cause of friction was Leontieff s desire to exploit 
the Omo area for his own ends. Without Menelick's permission he
•4
Harrington, Memorandum, 11 Oct. 1900, HO.l/37.
H. to L., 24 May 1901, FO.l/51.
Lord Cromer to L., IX June 1901, and H. to L., 6 July 1901,
FO.l/51.
had founded the Abyssinian Exploration Company declaring that
the Equatorial Province of Ethiopia, had been given to him
by the Emperor. He offered to lease land for 50 years and
also to begin mining for gold, though both acts would lave been
illegal. In July Menelick informed Harringfccn that the Equatorial
Province would be taken away from Leontieff. A few months
later the Abyssinian Exploration Company went Into liquidation,
Menelick declared that Leontieff had no right to mine gold,
2
and his financial adventures seemed to be at an end. However,
in 1902 the Foreign Office became aware that Leontieff s interest
had in fact been sold to a syndicate called Goldfields of Ethiopi
Ltd. Their promoters had approached Lord Delamere asking if he
would become a director, aid Delamere had' referred their offer
to Clement Hill at the Foreign Office because they claimed
rights to land he thought came within the British sphere. The
Company succeeded in sending the eiqplorer Cavendish to southern
Ethiopia, but it appears to have accomplished little else and
3it never discovered or mined any gold. -
1H, to L., 6 July 1901, FO.l/51.
2T, H, Sanderson to the Law Officers of the Crown, 7 Sept. 1901 and 
H. to L. , 16 Dec. 1901, FO.l/51*
Delamere to Clement Hill, 22. Feb, 1902 enclosing A.E.Tinsbrell to 
Lord D., 5 Feb. 1902, FO.l/40.
Yet, precisely because Leontieff failed to establish any 
new, peimanent garrison in the region of lake Rudolf and because 
the posts already there had to be withdrawn, raiding still con­
tinued. In fact, by 1902 annual elephant hunts by large numbers 
of armed Tigrhan soldiers were taking place to the east and west
of the lake, and in the process tribes were attacked, cattle
1capturedu- and villages rased.
The Ethiopian advance towards lake Rudolf in the 1890s altered
the balance of power in the area. By and large it is true to say
that those tribes which had previously been in a dominant position
emerged weakest, and that those which had been the wealthiest lost
most. Towards the end of the 19th century, two tribes appear to
have been dominant in the areas the Arbore and the Rendille, The
former concentrated their power in the highlands around lake
Stephanie, while the latter were camel pastoraiists inhabiting the
lower ground. When the American explorer Donaldson-Smith visited
the Arbore in 189 5, he described them as a large and warlike tribe
2
independent of the Boran Galla and rich in cattle. They dominated
3the Amar Kokke and other bordering peoples. ‘Indeed, during the
^Baird to L., 19 Aug. 1902, F0.l/40. See also; J. Barber, The Imperial 
Frontier (1968), although this book deals with the Ethiopian advance 
to the west of Lake Rudolf it also covers the thrust southwards to the 
east. But its u ssfulness is severely limited by its reliance on to*o 
narrow a cross-ection of source material and in particular on the Entebbe 
archives.
^A.Donaldson Smith, Thfcough Unknown African Countries (London, 1897),
262; "Expedition through Somaliland to Lake Rudolf", G.J., XVIII
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seven years "between Von Hohnel*s discovery of lake Rudolf in
1888 and the first push southwards by the Ethiopians in 1896,
the Arbore were one of the main causes of impoverishment of
1the peoples to the east of the lake. But the arrival of the
Ethiopians in 1896, led .tobthe devastation of their villages.
Their reappearance a year later led to the gradual elimination
of their cattle until, by the end of the century, they only
survived in small numbers, totally impoverished and without any
of their former power.
Like the Arbore, but unlike the Boran, the Rendille did not
at once migrate under the pressure of the Ethiopian advance south-
wards. To some extent this must have been because the Amhara did
not penetrate far enough into the lowlands to constitute a dominant
threat, but it must also have been because they suffered greater
pressure in the south from the Turk ana, and to a lesser extent
from the Somali in the east. They had no entirely safe area to
retreat to, and they had to accept a steadily shrinking frontier.
When Von Hohnel explored the area in 1888.he found the Rendille
2
well integrated with the Gelubba at the northern end of lake Rudolf. 
(1896), 224.
H.S.H. Cavendish, “Through Somaliland and around and south of Lake 
Rudolf", G.J., XI (1898), 381.
2
L. Von Hohnel, "The Lake Rudolf region, its discovery aid subsequent 
exploration; 1888-1909", J.R.A.S6 XXXVII (1938), 29.
The population of the Gelubba was estimated to be between two
and three thousand and it was said that they preferred Samburu
wives. There were three settlements of Samburu and Rendille
1amongst then, just to the west of the Omo. Yet it is clear
that the Gelubba did not get on equally well with Samburu sections
not habitually connected with them, and in 1886 they fought certain
Samburu clans that were contesting their grazing grounds from the 
2
south. When Bottego visited the area, he ;also found Rendille
to the north-west of the lake, but living on slightly higher ground
3£han the Gelubba. This close interconnection between the Rendille 
and the Gelubba led at least one explorer to conclude that they 
were one and the same people, and that the agricultural Gelubba 
were in fact a sedentary offshoot of the Rendille who had got tired 
of nomadic life.^ '
Even before the Ethiopian raids of 1896, both the Gelubba and 
the Rendille had been seriously weakened by Boran (or Arbore) raids, 
and by the outbreak of rinderpest and a smallpox epidemic; and as a
1H.S.H.Cavendish, G.J., (1898), 383- 
2
L. Von Hohnel, Discovery of Lakes Rudolf and Stefanie (iondon 1894) 
XI, 163-4, 166-7.
Von Hohnel, J.R.A.S. (1938), 32.
A.Arkell-Hardvrick, An Ivory trader In Worth Kenya (London, 1903),
228; W.A.Chanler, Through Jungle aid Desert (London, 1896), 303, 
313- Chanler estimated that there were 20,000 Rendille amongst 
the Gelubba1.
^Donaldson-Smith (1897), 262, 295-6. He claims the Arbore and 
Boran lived intermixed.
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result of these last two disasters they were on the verge of
famine.'*' In March 1898, the Gelubba were raided by Wolde Giorgis,
and when Austin visited them a few months later he found them
starving, partly as a lesult of the raid and partly because the
p
rains had failed. In 1899 they were again raided, this time by
Leontieff, and, when the American explorer Donaldson Smith visited
them in 1900, he found them very poor and weak in comparison to
their state in 1895 when he had first seen them. The following
year, however, they appear to have slightly recovered and were
successfully growing com again, though when they were visited in
1905 they still presented the abject spectacle of an impoverished
tribe frequently raided by the Ethiopians and thoroughly subjected 
4to them.
Paradoxically, what seems to have contributed most to the
revival of the Gelubba was the re intro duct ion of an Ethiopian fort at
*’* .6 
the mouth of the Omo in February 1909* For as long as they were
raided the Gelubba had no altem ative but to pay their tribute
or have it forcibly taken from them. Either way they lost and
H. S. H. Cavendish, G.J., XI (1898), 382.
p
H.H.Austin, With Macdonald in Uganda (London, 1905), 194; 
A.K.Boulatovich, Xzvestiya Imperatorskovo Ru ssko vo Geograficheskovo, 
XXXV (1899), 279-80.
3
A.Donaldson Smith, "An Expedition between lake Rudolf and the Nile", 
G.J., XVI (1900), 607. Other travellers confirmed this: H.H.Austin,
"A glimpse of Western Abyssinia", J.R.A.I., XXXVII (1938), 362-3;
0. Neumann, "From the Somali coast through southern Ethiopia to the 
Sudan", G.J.,, XX (19G2), 386.
.H. Austin, Among Swamps and Giants in Equatorial. Africa (London, 1902),
collaboration brought no positive benefit, but only a negative 
and hyperthetical diminution in their suffering. Yet, once there 
was an Ethiopian, post in their midst, their role quickly changed 
to that of raiders. By throwing in their lot with the Ethiopian 
garrison, by obtaining guns from them and by raiding with them, 
the Gelubba gradually attained an ascendency over neighbouring tribes 
and especially the Samburu and the Ren dill e. They not merely re­
gained their former power, but seem to have increased it considerably 
and they were the ohe tribe along the shore of lake Rudolf capable 
of resisting Turk ana raids successfully, The acquisition of guns 
and ammunition may also have given the Gelubba a certain independence 
of the Ethiopians themselves. It certainly gave them the initiative,
and raids were increasingly undertaken by the Gelubba alone or with
1a few Ethiopians participating. In 1913? for example, one of the 
most provocative raids that almost got as far as Mt. Marsabit was 
undertaken by 30 Gelubba and 8 Tigreans* It illustrates both the 
startling reversal of their former fortune and also the iclative
153ff; J.¥,Brooke, "A journey west and north of Lake Rudolf",
G.J. XXV (1905), 528, 529.
^G.¥,Gwynn, "A Survey of Southern Abyssinia", G.J., XXXVIII (l91l),
124; Stigand, To Abyssinia through an unknown land (London, 1910), 
215-6.
"^ Shackleton, "The Merille or Gelubba", 1939, lo.lt/32; J.K.R.Thorp,
"The Gelubba of the Gmo Delta" , p. 6. According to Thorp it was
not until 1913 that the Gelubba started raiding on their own,
and there is some confirmation for this view in L. to H., n,d. in H. to
Chief Sec., 20 May 1913? GO.533/119. ^or a description of a fairly
similar process to the west of lake Rudolf, sees J,Barber (1968), 101.
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lack of Ethiopian control over them.1
Throughout thisperiod, almost nothing is known of the
relationship between the Gelubba and the Turkana, though Ton Hohnel
2
mentioned that they were on bad terms with each other and Cavendish
also discovered that the Gelubba at one time paid tribute to the
Turkana to avoid being raided by them, presumably in the early
1890s. When Austin visited the Gelubba in 1898, he noted that
their principal villages were at Lumian, IComogul and Nongolibe,
all of them places to the west of Sanderson's Gulf and in the
4Vicinity of the Turkana. In 19.03 members of the East Africa
Syndicate who visited! the region to the west of lake Rudolf came
across Gelubba grazing to the west of IComogul, less than twenty
5
miles from the nearest Turkana villages. There may have been 
close ties between them, but Bourg de Boaas's observation in 1901 
that they belonged to the same tribe was clearly an overhasty judgment
based on too fleeting a visit to the area. ^
A
ICittermaster to Thomas, 1 May 1913, C0.533/H8. Eor Gelubba
raids ajainst the Gabra, see Ghapter IX.
2Von Hohnel (I894), II, 168.
3See; E. Gerulli, Peoples of South West Ethiopia and its borderland 
(London, 1956), 83.
tl.H. Austin, "Lake Rudolf", G. J., X1Y (1899), 151.
5"Sketch Map of the region west of lake Rudolf by members of the East 
Africa Syndicate Expedition, July 1903-E@b. 19041’, G.J. (19O5).
Bourg de Bozas, “D1 Addis Ababa au Nil par le lac Rudolphe", La 
Geographie, VII (1903), 98.
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At the same time, the Turkana do appear to have gradual^
consolidated and extended their hold over the western littoral
of lake Rudolf. This process cannot be followed in detail,
but their relationship with the Amhara which was complex must have
been a crucial factor. On the one hand, the Turkana were frequently
raided by the Ethiopians - and- so weakened by them - on the other
hand, from around 1914, if not earlier, the Ethiopians began to
sell the northern Turkana rifles which greatly strengthened their 
1
position. Thus the Amhara were at once the strongest allies of
2u
the Turkana, but also their greatest potential enemies. Yet 
by 1934 the Turkana had seised oontrol over virtually the whole of 
the western shore of lake Rudolf. By that date they had a settlement 
at Todenyang, on the northern tip of the lake, though intriguingly 
enough Akal, the Turkana chief there, was of Rendille extraction.
It seems clear from oral evidence that there has been considerable 
intermarriage between the Gelubba, Rendille and Turkana, as well 
as cross-culturation, and that hostility between them ms only 
one facet of their inter-relationship.^ Indeed, it is quite possible
H.Hayne, "The Turkana", J.A.S., XVIII (1918-19), 260; R.F.White,
•'Rotes on the Turkana tribe," S.N.R. , III no. 3 (1920), 221; H.Darley, 
Slaves and Ivory (London, 192ST^passtm.
2See; J. Barber. (1968), 178ff.
Von Hohnel.J.R.A.S. (1938), 32n.
P.H.Gulliver, The F^amily Herds (London, 1955), 260; J.¥.Brooke,
G.J. (1905), 529.
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that rivalry and hostility between the Turkana and the Gelubba 
has been exaggerated.
The extension of Turkana control to the northern tip of lake 
Rudolf may have been connected with the fact that the Gelubba 
expansion after 1909 took place almost entirely to the east of 
the river Ohio. It is not inconceivable that as a result of this 
expansion, the Gelubba gradually vacated their grazing grounds to 
the west.
The tribes most affected by the Gelubba expansion eastwards
were the Samburu and the Rendille. let their Delation ship with the
Gelubba from the 1890s onwards is extremely difficult to reconstruct.
It has been suggested that, as a result of the smallpox epidemic
aid the Ethiopian raids at the end of the 19th century, the Rendille
migrated southwards from the area around the northern end of the 
1
lake. But if this was so they seem to have been able to return
again at the beginning of the 20th century. Moreover, there were
Rendille sections that had completely integrated themselves into
the clan structure of the Gelubba, and these remained in the area.
The Namaraputh sub-section of the Shir, a Gelubba clan, were almost
entirely Rendille, and when the Gelubba began to raid after 1909
2they were led by a Rendille chief,
•}
P.Spencer, "A Surveyof the Samburu and Rendille tribes of Northern 
Kenya1', Unpublished MSS.
2
J.S.S.Rowlands, wAn outline of North Turkana History from the records 
of Lokitaung", Unpublished MSS; J.K.R.Thorp, "The Ghelubba of the 
Omo Delta", p. 6.
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In 1902, Tate was told that the Rendille had a base amongst 
!Lthe Gelubba.’ In fact their settlement at Nongolibe (Ngilibbi?)
under chief Lingirriomai ms said to lave been much larger than any-
2thing found amongst the eastern Rendille near the Lorian Swamp.
At the same time, it seems probable that Ethiopian raids often
made it impossible for the Rendille to visit the Gelubba. Thus in
1907 it was reported that Rendille who used to live to the north
and east of lake Rudolf had moved as far south as Mt. Mar sab it
because of Ethiopian ra,ids. But it is interesting that the Rendille
apparently wanted to return north and were trying to get British 
3protection. However, the following year when they returned
north without any support from the administration, the Sale and
Ragoumo sections of the Rendille were very badly defeated by the
Ethiopians. Raids continued until November with increasing severity
4when they reached as far south as Mt. ICulal.
It is not surprising, therefore, that S'tigand did not encounter 
any Rendille further north than the Hurri hills in 1909.'5 
fact that the Gelubba were now also joining the Ethiopians in their
•]
R.II.Tate, "Report on an expedition to Eastern Rendile", 16 Nov. 
1902, NAHM. MSS., p.26.
2H.R.Tate, "Nairobi to Samburu and Rendile", East African Quarterly
I (1904), 100.
3H. to G., 19 Nov. 1907, F0.371/192.
^Bois, B.C. Rumuruti, to Collyer, 21 Bee. 1908, CO.533/37;
Zaphiro, '*Report"s 23 Aug. 1908, EO,37l/l94; "Information on the 
Rendille", Appendix E. in Ctp. Bois to II.S.Bagge, 10 Aug. 1908,
dc/mbt/5/i .
'’See: Stigand (1910).
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raids must also lave lad some impact cm their former relations
with the Rendille. The following year there was another Amhara
raid down the east side of the lake which led to the temporary
1
abandonment of Koroli by the Samburu and Rendille. Moreover,
in 1911 the Rendille camel herds were much reduced in size by what
the Chief Wtezinary Officer of the E.A.P. diagnosed as coccidiosis -
2a disease similar to rinderpest but fatal to camels. The following 
year it was being reported that there were no Rendille north cf
rz
Longedotte, while in 1913 Kittermaster, the Provincial Commissioner,
reported that there were no Rendille between Loiyangalani and the
frontier further north. ^  The very severe raids which took place
in 1913 would appear to have made this inevitable. The Ethiopians
got as far south at Mt. Marsabit and Mt. ICulal, while Ctp. Lloyd
Jones of the King's Afrksan Rifles was wounded m  a clash with
5
one group of raiders.
Many yaars later, it seemed to a Provincial Commissioner of 
the Northern Frontier Province that this had been the turning point 
when the Samburu and Rendille were forced south for the last time 
never to return north again. There are in fact only two pieces
1Hope to Chief See., 10 May 1910, PC/to"4/l/3; Opt. G.E.Philipps,
"Intelligence Report", LQ Oct. 1910, in HoLis to H., 14 Jan. 1911, 
00.533/85.
“Tt.J.Stordy, "Reports", n. d.,CO. 533/104.
Llewellyn, "Report and Dairy of operations against an Abyssinian 
raiding party on lake Rudolf", May 1912, CG.533/l65.
^ICittermaster, "Continuation of report cn reconnaissance to the north 
of Mt. ICulal and the wounding of Lloyd Jones", Sept. 1913, 00* 533/123-
r
Lloyd Jones, Havash (London, 1925), 284-5; L^„~J. to Adjutant,
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of evidence to suggest that in the period immediately preceding
1913 the Rendille were grazing further north* and neither are
entirely satisfactoly. Pirst, G. Archer, a young administrator
in the Protectorate, wrote an article published in 1913 in which
he claimed th&t the Rendille watered their cattle amongst the
Gelubba. But it is far from clear what precise date he is writing
about, and it would not be improbable that he was referring to the
1
pre-1909' period. Secondly, there is the very specific statement
of J.C.Cotter and James Pay? two settlers who visited the Samburu
2
in 1912 and got as far north as Laisamis, 'The Samburu apparently
3
told them that they lived as far north as Merille. If this is 
taken to mean' Garba Merille, just to the west of lake Stephanie, 
then it contradicts all other contemporary evidence and it would 
be hart to reconcile with the accounts of severe raiding at that 
time.^ But it seems more likely that the Samburu were referring
K
to Seri Merille, just to the south of Laisamis or to a small wadi 
of the same name that ran to the east of the wells. For it would
20 Nov. 1913, CO.533/125.
SE.G.Stone, Evidence before the Commission at Rumuruti, 18 Aug. 1932,
ICBC.EM.XI, p.1489.
^G.P.Archer, "British East Africa",. G.J; , XLXI (1913)? 432.
2J.C.Ootter, Evidence before the Commission at Rumuruti, 18 Aug. 1932, 
ICLC.IM., II, p.1506.
3Merille is of course another name for the Gelubba, but the reference 
here seems to be to a toponym.
^Garba Merille appears in the 1965 SK 57^ Route Map of Kenya. Its present 
importance lies in its proximity to the neroLy negotiated Ethiopia/Kenya ■
would seem that 1909 was a far more important turning-point, 
and that this was based not so much on the attitude of the 
.Amhara towards the Samburu and Rendille, but to their changed 
relationship with the Gelubba.
Throughout this period, the Rendille also experienced pressure 
from the Somali to the east, though this does not seem to have 
been a matter of great importance. For a considerable period of 
time the Rendille managed to more than hold their own, while their 
contact with the Lorian Swamp appears always to have been inter­
mittent and of secondary importance to them. At the beginning of 
the 1890s, the Ogaden attacked the Rendille near the lorian 
Swamp and were defeated by thejii. Apparently another expedition was 
sent to revenge this defeat, though whether it was successfil or 
not remains unknown.^ Another expedition was undertaken against 
the Rendille in 1896 when a certain amouiitof ivory was captured*
But the Rendille were tough -opponents and in 1900 the Abd Wak
2
abandoned a raid against them. It is not known when the Rendille
border. I have been unable to find it on any other map, even 
the detailed 500,000 series, or those compiled by Maud, Gwynn etc.
5
Cf. "Intelligence Report cn the Samburu tribes", Appendix 0. in 
Bois to Bagge, 10 Aug. 1908, DjG/MBT/5/l.
XS. to IBBACo., 26 May 1890 & S. to E.-S., 28 May 1890, P0.84-/2062. 
2
In 1900 there was still a Rendille village on the Lorian Swamps 
Adam Musa, 14 Feb. £)00, in H. to S. , 5 Marchl900, P0.2/285.
were finally forced to abandon the Lorian Swamp region. Ihe
gradual dessication of this area may have led them to leave
voluntarily, though in 1902, Lassergi, head of the Rendille at
Mt, Marsabit, told Tate that there were a considerable number
of Rendille just to the north of the Lorian but that they were
1gradually being pushed westwards by the Somali.
Yet far more important than the Somali threat from the east
was the Turkana threat from the west. It is symptomatic that
while Yon Hohnel1 s guide expected to find the Samburu and the
Rendille near lake Stephanie in 1888, none were there because
2they had all gone south to fight the Turkana. At that date the 
Turkana were clearly the dominant threat and the battle fought 
in 1888 appears to have resulted in a serious defeat for the 
Rendille who moved towards Mt, Marsabit and the Uaso Nyiro.^
This defeat seems to have been the prelude to increased Turkana 
raiding towards Mt. Kulal and ICoroli. It was serious enough for 
the Rendille to have claimed in 1893 that, in order to avoid these 
raids, they .would have liked to leave nSamburulandM had that been
H.R.Tate, Bast African Quarterly (1904)> 98; "Information on 
the Rendille" (1908"), DC/MBT/^/l.
Von Hohnel (1894), II, pl84, p.215.
3J. Barton, nHotes on the Turkana tribe of British East AfricaJ' 
J.A.S.. XX (1920), 110; W.A.Chanlar (1896), 503.
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possible.’*' Nor were the Rendille the only people to be affected. When
in 1896 the Gabra retreated south to avoid Ethiopian raids, they
soon moved north again after they had been attacked by the Turkana
2whom they feared more. However, by the end of the decade, it was 
reported that substantial numbers of Rendille had been enslaved 
by the Turkana, though the first people to attempt to move to a 
new grazing ar® were not the Rendille but the Samburu.-'’
It has been suggested that relations between the Samburu and 
the Rendille underwent a marked change between 3880 and 1900.^
Whereas earlier the Samburu had suffered most from the rinderpest 
epidemics of the 1880s, and had been reduced to poverty and poli­
tical dependence on the Rendille, they are said to have recovered 
in the following decade. The Rendille, on the other hand, who had 
been untouched by the rinderpest - since they owned camels - suffered 
far more severely than the Samburu from the smallpox epidemics of 
the 1890s, when it is said that they were much reduced an numbers
and had to rely on the Samburu for support against their enmies.
a
These conclusions are unfortunately tesed ca little more than a
Von Hohnel to Crackna.ll, 20 Dec. 1895, TO. 107/5.
Opt. Maud's Report on the Butter Expedition, FO.l/48.
^E.S.H.Cavendish, G.J. , XI (1898).
P^. Spencer, MSS., pp. 6-7.
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a comparison of the accounts of Chanler, who visited the Samburu
in 1893, and Arkell Hardwick, who visited them in 1900.*** While
they may be. correct .there are small pieces of evidence that
suggest that the contrast may be overdrawn. Arkell Hardwick
himself mentions the wealth of the Rendille in 1900,while another
explorer ,Cavendish, mentionedkhow poor the Samburu still were and
2also how dependent on the Rendille. Yet, if the Rendille really
were suffering economically at the end. of the century from a
lack of numbers, at a time when the population of the Samburu was
increasing, this might partly explain why the latter were the
first to migrate, though clearly there were other factors also
which were involved.
While the camel owing Rendille could retreat to a harsher
and drier habitat, the cattle owing Samburu had no such option
open to them. In 1897 the Samburu were found to the south of the
Uaso Nyiro for the first time since the 1860s, but their movement
3
south of the river was strongly contested. At ICianjai there were 
remnants of the Laikipiak Masai, who had earlier been (fefeated b y ' 
the M e m  social sj^stem and together the;/ raided, the Samburu. ^
^Chanler (1896), passim; A. Arkel 1 HardwTick (1903)? passim.
2H.S.H.Cavendish, S.j. (1898), 390.
3
Precis of specific proposals and applications affecting the Boundaries 
of the Native reserves in the N.p.p. 1934? KLG.EM., IX,p.1448.
^"History of Mem", anon. n.d. but c. 1910, in PC/CP/l/9/l.
3 3 4
The Samburu were also raided by other Masai settlements at Mnyiso
and Mzara, and they were afraid of Purko Masai attacks, though
the settlements of the latter cannot he identified and it is
i
difficult to gauge the threat they posed, Nevertheless, the 
cumulative effect of these attacks was to make it very difficult 
forjtheyS&mburu to hold their own south of the Uaso Uyiro, More­
over they were also attacked by Somali askaris in the pay of two 
German adventurers who were trying to make a quick profit from
cattle stealing and ivory poaching, hr. Kolb and Von Bastinelle
2
attacked both the Rendille and the Samburu.
By 1902; the Samburu push southwards had ended in failure.
The hostility of tribes to the south of the Uaso Uyiro was one 
reason. It may well have beenjthe crucial one, though it is worth 
nothing that there was an extremely severe drought at the turn 
of the century, and when in 1903 the Samburu moved north again it 
was the lack of rain that they gave as a reason. Indeed, when Tate 
visited them that year, he found that they had abandoned Laisamis 
and were one hundred and fifty miles to the north of the Uaso Nyiro 
at Reti,^
T^ate, East African Quarterly (I9O4), 91™2.
p
Sanberlich to Gilkison, 1 June 1900, MO.GB.LXII.
3H.R.Tate, G.J. (l904), 225-6.
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The Samburu attempt to move southwards would appear to have
had little to do with the Turkana. In 1888, the boundary between
1the Turkana and the Rendille had been along* the Trrawell river*
The defeat of the Rendille that year enabled the Turkana to
push down the western sife of the lake, but even in 1900 and later
the Samburu and Rendille were to he found to the south of lake
Rudolf where the Si Barta plateau was divided between them.^  There
was a ‘wide: divergence between the area raided bytthe Turkana and
that controlled by them. For example, in 1903 it was claimed that
the Gorai Boran were moving towards the east in order to avoid
Turkana raids, though these camel pastoralists were not to be found
further south than Turbi or further west than the Hurri hills.
This seems to indicate that the Turkana were penetrating* a very
considerable distance to the east of lake Rudolf. Tet that same
■2
year the Samburu were found at Mt* ICulal, Sil and Indumumara.
The Samburu did not attempt to move southwards again uhtil 
after 1904* when the Purko Masai slowly abandoned their northern 
grazing grounds.^ While the Protectorate administration imagined
^Von"Hohnel (l894)Tl±* p. 23*6.
2<fhe El Barta plateau remained the dividing line between the Rendille 
and the Turkana until after 1911. In 1909 Stigand was asked to arbi­
trate in a dispute over the boundary but refused. Stigand (1910),
84? J.O.W.Hope, "Intelligence Report", June 1911, 00.533/88; Welby, 
G.J., XVI (I9OO),
3
Opt. Maud's Report on the Butter Expedition, PO.l/48.
2
"Precis of Specific Proposals,..", ICLO.EM., II, p. 1449.
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that the Uaso Byiro was still the southern border of the Samburu
in 1908, they had in fact already moved as far south as the
2
river Lakiundu between the Igare Idare and the liver Xsiolo.
By 1909 there were a number of villages belonging to the Samburu
south of the Uaso lyiro and thereafter their expansion tended to
be westward, ‘In 1910 their villages were found just to the east of
lake ICelele, the following year they were encountered at Baragoi
3and on the Leroghi plateau. With the resettlement of the Purko
Masai in 1913> the Samburu encountered for the first time the
determined resistance of the Protectorate Government to their
migration south-westwards. Several attenpts were made to move
them further north across the Uaso Nyiro if possible,^" In 1914
they were allowed to settle old scores with the Turkana, and
5participated in a Government expedition against the latter.
It was hoped that once the Turkana menace had been reduced the
Samburu could safely move northwards, but the First World War
made it impossible for the administration to offer the Samburu
a
C^pt. Bois to Chief Sec., 11 Sept. 1908, 00.533047.
p
‘’Intelligence Repo rfc qi the Samburu tribe ”, DC/MBT/5/1.
^6.H.Adams, "Memorandum", ELO.BM. , II, p, 1907; J.B, Carson, “Among 
the Samburu", Bast African Annual (1946/7), 41; Mr, Blayney 
Percival, Evidence, 30 Nov.. 1932, Nairobi, KLC/EM.. II, p.1550.
^"Precis of Specific Proposals.,", KLC.EM., II, p.1449.
5 -Spencer, MSS., p.8.
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any protection against Ethiopian raids which penetrated down to
the very southern end of the lake. In the end Ethiopian pressure
had a decisive influence cn the Samburu and though they were refused
permission to migrate south of the Uaso Nyiro in 1915? they
nevertheless did so in large numbers and abandoned Marsabit 
1completely.' It is ironic? therefore, that the one part of the 
frontier that Maud had maintained would look after Itself had by 
1916 been violated more persistently and more Seriously than any­
where else.
Thus the Sam bur i migration northwards which had begun in 
the 1840s was to be reversed fift^years later. The reasons for 
this can only be guessed at; overpopulation may have been one 
cause and drought another. But it is clear that the Amharic 
expansion towards lake Rudolf in the 1890s precluded a further 
Samburu advance in that direction? whale the Somali also blocked 
any possible expansion eastwards. Nevertheless, the movement 
of the Samburu southwards was only achieved slowly an6- in the 
face of stiff opposition. Initially the S&mburu were resisted by 
the Purko Masai and remnant Laikipink groups? and they were also 
attacked by two Qerman adventurers and their Somali askaris armed 
with guns. By 1902 their push south had been halted? yet two
1
A.A.0.Ashton? "IJaso Nyiro Annual Report", 1915? PC/KD/l/4/l.
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years later they began to move south again. This time the 
Purko Masai were gradually abandoning the area. The Samburu 
movement was unchecked, but equally important it proceeded 
unnoticed or unremarked by the Protectorate administration. 
When finally in 1913 an effort was made to move them north 
again, it was already too late and this was underlined by the 
growing Ethiopian violation of the frontier.
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Chapter VII
ETHIOPIA, ITALY ATO THE UPPER . JUBA SOMALI
Ethiopian expansion towards the Juba led to the development 
there of a far more complex situation than had been the case in 
their advance down the Omo or into Borana. For though, the Ethiopian 
expansion southwards led all the tribes between lake Rudolf and 
the river Juba, who were directly threatened, to appeal for Euro­
pean protection and support, few in fact managed, to actively 
involve a European power on their behalf. Thus the Samburu in 
the west welcomed the appearance of the British to the south,
though this did not lead to their being given any immediate support
1against the Amhara.' The Rendille were also anxious to obtain
British protection, and in 1900 it was reported thats **/the Rendille/
very much desire the English Serkal /Consul/ should come and take
over /their/ country’*.• And Farah Ibrahim, head of the Aulihan
Ogaden opposite Bardera, was equally alarmed at the possibility
of an Ethiopian advance in his direction and appealed for British 
3assistance. Yet none of these requests led to any administrative
1P. Spencer, MSS.
it.H.Tate, "Statement by Mohammad bin Habib", 18 March 1902,
in Eliot to Bansdowne, 13 April 1902, F0.2/571.
rz
Hardinge to Salisbury, 21 Sept. 1898, F0.107/96.
advance inland within the Bast Africa Protectorate. A request
for help from the Sultan of Lugh, on the other' hand, did lead
to the involvement of the Italians in the upper Juba, and to a
direct confrontation between them and the Amhara.
This early Italian penetration inland was probably connected
to, and certainly facilitated by, their earlier, rapid" exploration
of this area. The Anglo-Italian Convention of March 1891 provided
1a new stimulus for Italian explorers,' while the desire to dis­
cover the sources of the Omo and Juba rivers (two outstanding 
geographical problems then still unsolvM in Africa) was also a
further attraction. However, none of the earliest expeditions
2
were successful in their aim of reaching the upper Juba. It was 
not until 1892 that Ugo Perrandi managed to travel from Brava to 
Bardera, thus rivalling Ton Der Decken1s journey of I865, or until
rz
1895 that Ruspoli managed to reach Lugh. Ruspoli, moreover, had 
to fight his way southwards and his reception at Lugh was not
•j
M. loll, nLes explorations Italiennes dans la peninsule des 
Somalis11, Questions Diplomatiques et Goloniales, I (1897), 415,
See p.
2
These included both Perrandi*s and Ruspoli* s first expeditions, as 
well as one by Baudi di Tesme, sees Spedizione de Daudi di Vesme, 
ASMAI, Posiz.70/l-l; E. Ruspoli, Pel Paese della Mirra (Rome;1892); 
Spedizione del Principe Ruspoli 1891-2, ASMAI. Posiz. 70/1-5;
P. Bonola, "Les explorations Italiennes dans le pays des Somalis", 
Bull, de la Soc. Khedivlale de Geoxy.n 3 VI11-IX 4th ser. (1896), 558*
CL Dainelii, Gli explorati Italianl in Africa (Turin. 1960), II,pp.580
0. Perrand, Les Com alls (Paris, 1903), 7*
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encouraging. After, entering the tom, members of the expedition 
were kept prisoners there for over a month.^ Luckily Ruspoli had 
been followed by another Italian expedition led by Bo ttego, which 
set out from Berbers to explore the Juba in September 1892, and, 
after splitting into txfo, one section under G-rixoni reached Lugh 
in the middle of March 1893? rescuing the Italians there. G-rixoni, 
however, only stayed in Lugh two days and then marched down, the
2
Juba to the coast with the sick members of Ruspoli’s expedition.
Ruspoli had arrived at Lugh at a time when the menace of
Ethiopian expansionism was becoming increasingly self-evident ii
that area. The Ethiopian advance into Arussi, to the north of
Lugh, had. begun in 3882 when Ras Darghe had been sent to conquer
that region. Yet, presumably Ras Barghe was not entirely successful,
for Menelick had to dispatch further expeditions in 3.885 and 1886.^*
Then, at the beginning of 1891, a large Ethiopian raiding party
5
devastated the area around the upper ¥ebi Shebelle. Thereafter,
A. Rossi, ,TLa secunda spedizione Ruspoli in Africa’1, luova Antologia, 
LXKXEII, fasc. 668, 4th ser. (1899), 637ff.
Sees T. Bottego, II Gfuba Ksplorato (Rome, 1895)®
^J.S.Trimingham (l952), 208.
^'O.E.Oadwell, "Report as to the southern limit of Abyssinia",
14 Rov. 1890, enclosed in Intelligence Department to F.O., 17 Rov. 
1890, FO.84/2095.
L.Jopp to E.-S., 10 Feb. 1891, P0.84/2146; Bven-Sraith to 
Salisbury, 24 Peb. 1891, F0.84/2152. ^
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raids continued every year for the purpose of levying tribute 
and subduing more thoroughly the south-eastern Gall a. Given 
these conditions it might have been expected, therefore, that 
Prince Ruspoli would have been welcomed at Lugh as a potential 
ally against the Amhara, There were two reasons why hems not.
In the first place, the behaviour of Ruspoli1s expedition 
resembled that of the Amhara too closely to inspire confidence.
There had been numerous complaints from the time of his first 
expedition, when he had refused to pay his porters.3' On his 
second expedition, the Sheik of Hargeisa accused Euspoli of
2
using force to obtain camels and also of ill-treating Somali clans.
But, and this was the crucial point, the people around Lugh also
maintained that ‘Euspoli employed force without justification and
3did-1 not come in peace. Secondly, Ruspoli* s arrival at Lugh 
provoked a mixed reaction that needed handling with great tact.
The Sultan of Lugh, Hassan Nur, and his Chief Secretary, Muhammad 
Urkei, both seem to have been anxious to get Italian help against 
the Amhara. ^ Yet the wadad, the religious leaders, felt it necessary 
to be hostile, probably for reasons of prestige, ■ The situation was
1J°pp to Ass. Sec., I.O., 9 Aug. 1892, FO.84-/2257*
^Jopp to Gecchi, 4 Jan. 1893? ASMAI. Posis. 70/l-4*
^Sultan of Lugh to Ruspoli, n.d., ASMAI, Posis. 70/l-4- 
Yannutelli and C. Citerni, L* Omo (Milan, 1899)? 28.
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therefore extremely delicate, and the chief wadad forbade Ruspoli
1
and his followers to enter Lugh as they were Christians,
Ruspoli, however, does not appear to have possessed much tact*
2
On the contrary he had a reputation of being a "caractere violente”.
In a fit of temper he had shot and wounded one of his companions,
3
and it was pointedly noted that there had not been a, dual. It 
was Ruspoli’s deliberate rejection of the wadad1s request that 
precipitated a crisis and led to the temporary imprisonment of 
members of the expedition.
On the other hand, many exploring caravans also encountered 
brief resistance when they were genuinely mistaken for an Ethiopian 
raiding party. Later in 1893 the Carre and Gabra resisted Ruspoli 
for this reason, and in 1897 Bottego similarly had to fight the 
Arussi Gall a. ^  There were also other examples of tribes too 
frightened of Ethiopian raids to identify peaceful intruders in 
time. However, after Grixoni left for the coast, Ruspoli did 
succeed in establishing friendly relations with the Sultan of Lugh, 
and the Italian then continued his exploration westwards until he 
was killed by an elephant in Arbore country.
''A. Rossi, Nuova Antologla (1899), 637ff•
2
However, Gee chi, then Italian Consul at Aden, dismissed these allegations 
with the remark that he did not believe that an aristocrat could be 
violent.
^Italian Consul, Port Said, to Ministero, 14 Hay 1893, ASMAI. Posis.
70/1-4.
4
P. Eerrandi, Lettera al President©, B.S.G.I., VII 3rd ser. (I894).
321-2; V. Bottego (1895), 127.
O^f. H.S.H.Cavendish, G.J., XI (1898), 376.
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Ruspoli’s expedition achieved two things. In the first place 
it put Lugh o n the map. Ruspoli, of bourse, exaggerated its im­
portance and claimed that it was probably the most valuable 
commercial centre in the Somali peninsula. Moreover, this claim 
was not just made in the relative obscurity of an article in some 
Geographical Journal, but also in letters to bus father, then 
Mayor of Rome, which were given due publicity ii the national news- 
papers.^ Secondly, it was also widely claimed, that Nassau Nur had 
asked for Italian assistance against the Amhara and that Ruspoli
had signed a treaty with him, which placed the Sultan and Lugh
?
under Italian protection.
Although Ruspoli appears to have signed nothing more than a 
treaty of friendship with Hassan Nur, it was not without its sig­
nificance that the treaty should have been negotiated about the 
same time that Italy assumed responsibility for the Benadir ports."
Ab early as 1891 it had been thought that the Ethiopian thrust 
into Arussi was aimed ultimately at Merca.^ By 1893 -it had
become evident to the Italians that the Amhara were trying to
5reach the coast and conquer the Benadir ports. Lugh was a strategic 
Ruspoli to his father, 1 June 1893? Tribuna, 2nd. Nov. 1893*
Q
~”La spedizione Ruspoli", B.S.G>I.VI 3rd ser. (1893), 847,
U. Eerrandi, Secondu spedizi one Bottego (1903), pp. 8-9.
3'The Sultan wrote to Ruspoli* vogliamo fare uno scritto col tue re, 
per essere fra noi amici", this was the basis of the Treaty. 
"Spedizione del Principe Ruspoli - trattato col Sul^ano di Lugh”, 
ASMAI. Posiz. 70/1-4.
Jopp to E.-S., 10 Feb. 1891, F0.84/2146.
5perrandi to Cottoni, l?eb*a 1893, enclosed ii Rodd to Roseb^fy,
post of considerable importance and, in these circumstances, 
it soon came to be considered the first line of defence for 
the Benadir ports and the Italian sphere of Influence in southern 
Somalia. ^
Italian -interest in the defence of Lugh gradually increased
from the time of Ruspoli's visit, though concrete assistance ws
slow to materialise. The second half of the Bottego expedition
arrived at Lugh in July 1893, when the Sultan again ashed for
2
help, b ut little could be provided. Nevertheless, there
continued to be intermittent contact with Italian explorers. Thus,
in February 1894? Luigi luce a passed through Lugh on his way back
3from the Arbore, but when after several months no help was forth­
coming Hassan Nur wrote to Filonardi, head of the Italian Chartered 
Company that administered the Benadir Concession, requesting troops.
He sent his son to Mogadishu with the letter, but when the latter 
arrived there in October he was told that the Company had no troops 
to spare. ^  By February 1895? the explorer Ugo Ferrandi was writing 
to Cecchi, the Italian Consul at Zanzibar, to say that the Ethiopians
were only three days march away from Lugh devastating the country-
15
side, and that help was urgently required. This letter had some impact
17 March 1893, IK). 1077T. ™ ~
Filonardi to Mj.nistero, 25 Oc. 1895»-.ASMAI. Posis.70/l-8.
N. Noll, Questions Diplomatiques et Colonialss, I (1897), 418.
. Ros si, Hu ova, Antologia (1899 ) ? 637ff.
Ferrandi, Be gun da Sp e dizione Bottego (Rome, 1905), 15 *
'Cecchi to Ministero, 5 Feb, 1895, ASMAI. Posiz, 70/l~8.
Within a month an agreement was reached between the Italian
Foreign Ministry and the Rome Geographical Society which had been
about to send Bottego on a second expedition. Bottego x-jas now
given the dual task of following the boundary of the Italian sphere
of influence and founding a station at Lugh.' At first it was
emphasised that this was to be a 1 commercial station'1 with a
Political Resident? and that Bottego was to encourage trade to pass 
2
through Lugh. Nevertheless* by the end of the year* emphasis was 
being placed on the function of lugh as a 1 military station*, with 
a Political Resident supported by a number of troops. The new 
Italian post at Lugh thus had a dual purpose from the start. 
Initially it was supposed to provide some protection ibr the coastal
towns against Ethiopian raids, but it was also to have an economic
3lraison d1etre of its own.
Filonardi later tried to excuse his dilatory handling of Hassan 
Nur*s requests for assistance, which had brought the Benadir Company 
into disrepute. He explained that the Sultan of Lugh* s first letter 
had merely requested Italian troops but not Italian protection.
This was contrasted with a. second letter that did. ask for Italian 
protection, and which Filonardi claimed opportunely coincided with
^President Rome Geog. Soc, to Bottego, 5 May 1895, ASMAI. Posiz. 67/l-7. 
2
U.Ferrandi (1903), 16; Ministero to Bottego, 12 April 1895, ASMAI. 
Posiz.67/l—6; Ferrandi to Oecchi, 18 August 1896, ASMAI.Posiz.70/l-8.
Filonardi to Ministero, 25 Oct. 1895* ASMAI. Posiz. 70/l-8.
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plans to send Bottego on an expedition.^
However, when Bottego arrived at Brava in September 1895 
with 250 armed men and a large quantity of ammunition, it seemed 
that he had arrived too late. For on October 4th, and before Bottego 
had set out for the interior, news arrived that over 2,000 Ethiopians 
had already reached and occupied Lugh since the beginning of September, 
They had met with little resistance. The Gasan Gudda and the Gob a- 
wein, despairing of Italian help, had fled the town which was vir­
tually abandoned before it was taken. Only a few Somali traders 
remained behind and they had to pay the Arahara a tribute before their
lives were spared. Moreover, the Ethiopians had succeeded in cap-
2
turing the son of Hassan Mur.
As Bottego approached Lugh on 18 November, the Amhara abandoned
the tom and there was 110 confrontation between the two forces.
Soon afterwards, Bottego signed a treaty with Hassan Mur which
3placed the tom under Italian protection. After remaining in Lugh 
for over a month and with the rainy season coming to an end, the 
likelihood of a further Ethiopian raid diminished, so Bottego decided 
to continue with the other cbjects of this expedition. On 26 December
3?. to I., 22 March 1896, ASMAI. Posiz. 70/l-8.
"U.Ferrandi (1903)? IS; L. Vannutelli and 0. Citerni, L1 Omo (1899)?
44; F. to M., 25 Oct. 1895? ASMAI. Poaiz. 70/1-8.
^The Treaty was signed on 9 Bee. ASMAI. Posiz. 67/1-10; Dr. Con scritta, 
"L'Aaione della Compagnia Filonardi in Somalia prima della occupazione 
Italians1 (Unpublished Thesis, Rome n. d.), 140ff.
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the day before Bottego left Lugh, the Sultan and all the in­
habitants of the town swore their allegiance to Ugo Perrandi 
who ms then nominated the first Political Resident and left in 
charge at Lugh with 45 askaris.^
Bottego1s arrival at Lugh in 1895 discouraged further 
raids that year and, given the normal timing of these incursions, 
this meant that Lugh would be safe until the following September
or October. Thus in March 1896, Per ran di could report back that
2
all had been peaceful, nevertheless, the Italian defeat at Adowa 
that same month ms to have a considerable impact in Italian Somali­
land. On the one hand, it discredited Italian undertakings along 
the Benadir coast and, on the other hand, Italian prestige suffered
3
around Lugh. The Italians were still welcomed along theupper 
Juba as a counterweight to the Ethiopians, but confidence in their 
power collapsed. One result of this was that the Sultan of Lugh 
tried to get British help in addition to Italian assistance.^
Another was that when Lugh was threatened by the Amhara later 
that year, the local tribes fled instead of giving the Italians
5
their support.
L. Vannutelli & 0. Oiterni (1899)> 112-3- The number is also stated 
to be 45 in IT. Per ran di (o903), 16. See R.L. Hess, Italian Colonialism 
in Bom, all a (London, 1966), 58*.
T^. to President© Rome Geog, Soc., 1 March 1896, ASMAI.Posiz.70/l-8.
E.Pini, “Eritrea e Benadir", L1Esnlorazione Commercials (1899)*
298-9; N. Noll, Questions Diplomatlques et Ooloniales, I (1897),418,
to Presidente Rome Geog. Soc., 15 Sept. 1896, ASMAl.Posis.70/l-8.
5N.Noll, Questions Diplomatlques et Ooloniales, I (1897), 418,
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By the Beginning of September 1896, Ferrandi ras anticipating'
another Ethiopian advance towards Lugh. The possibility of
abandoning the town was discussed and then xejected, Ferrandi
was g'iven the opportunity of leaving if be so desired, but instead
he chose to stay and merely requested additional troops." About
two months later, on 13 November, the Ethiopians under Wolde
Gabriel began probing the defences of lugh. Rafts were constructed
but before a full-cale attack ms mounted Wolde Gabriel suddenly
2
decided to push further east into Rahanwein country. The follow­
ing day, the English explorer Cavendish arrived at hugh to find 
the ground covered with cartridge cases and hoof marks, the country­
side had been devastated. As he approached the town, he found the 
Italian flag hoisted and troops manning the walls uncertain as 
to whether his p arty were Ethiopians or not. Although Ferrandi1 s
position whs not desperate, he had nevertheless run very low in
3
ammunition and food, A few days later, however, Mamini arrived 
with 56 askaris, and a quantity of ammunition and other supplies. 
These were the troops that Ferrandi had requested in September and
^Ferrandi to Cecchi, 3 Sept, 1896, ASMAI. Posiz,70/1-8;
U. Ferrandi (1903)? 146.
*TF. Ferrandi (1903)? 162. See also* R.L.Hess (.1966), 63.
Cavendish, G.J„ (.1898), 374.
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which had succeeded in reaching Lugh only after the main danger 
1was over.
It is impossible to tell whether Wolde Gabriel abandoned
his attack against Lugh because of the approach of Oavendish's
expedition or whether he felt he would meet with less opposition 
2
further east. He captured Baidoa without any resistance being
offered. Thereafter Wolde Gabriel's movements cannot be followed
in detail, but it appears that the expedition was lured further
and further into Rahanwein country, where the Ethiopians were
decimated by famine and thirst. Finally, they had to abandon
their raid. Only a few hundred returned home ait of an expedition
of over one thousand men. On their way back, they again looked,
as though, they were about to attack Lugh. and then felled to do so.
In 3D me. respects this expedition of 1896 was a turning point,
4The Italians, however, reeling under the disaster at Lafole never 
seem to have realised the extent or the importance of this Ethiopian
-j
G. Mamini, "Itinerario e note del viaggio Brava-Lugh etc.",
B.S.G.I., SI 3rd ser. (1898), 207-8.
2
Cavendish claimed he arrived at Lugh the day following Wolde's 
withdrawal but Ferrandi suggests that i t was five days later, see;
TJ. Ferrandi (1903)? 162.
^U.Ferrandi (l903)> lSTX; Lulio to M,, 31 Dec. 1896, ASMAI. Fosiz. 
55/7-50. See also R.Ii.Hess (1966), 64-5.
A
This was when Cecchi, the Italian Consul at Zanzibar, sat out in Fov. 
to counter the Ethiopian advance into Somalia but was surprised 
and attacked by Somali; Oecchi was murdered.
defeat, probably also because they themselves load not really
been involved in it. Yet, in Addis Ababa, the whole expedition
was shrouded in the greatest secrecy and Rennell Rodd, the
British Representative there, heard of the "severe defeat" that
1the Ethiopians had suffered,
.Ironically, the effect around Lugh of VJolde Gabriel'1 s
expedition was to restore confidence in the Italians. Somali
clans such as the Ajuran now openly pledged their support and sent
presents. Moreover, there were no further Ethiopian raids against
Lugh until 1907, though the post often looked vulnerable to attack.
Once the period of crisis seemed definitely to have passed,
Ferrandi wss replaced as Political Resident by Said Mohammad, a
brother cf the liwali of Brava, 'the change over coincided with
Lord Lelamere’s arrival at Lugh one his first sporting trip to
the East Africa Protectorate, and Dr. Atkinson, who had accompanied
■R ^his expedition, returned to "rava with Ferrandi. However, during 
1898 and 1899 the value of Lugh as a military outpowt was seriosly 
questioned. For during both these years the post was outflanked
^Rodd to Salisbury, 3 Hune 1897» FO.l/32.
*TJ.Ferrandi (1903)? 190.
•5
Hotisie sulle sorte della spedizione inglese di Lord Belamere", 
ASMAI. Posiz.70/l-9; "Opt. Ferrandi1s Journey from Lugh to Brava", 
G, J, , XXI (1903)? 168; U. Ferrandi, La Lugh alia Oosta (Ho vara, 
1902), 5-6; Lsttera al Presidente, B.S.G.I., X 3rd ser. (l897)>
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on several occasions, and more than once the Ethiopians got
as far south as Serenli on the right-hand side of the river,
either raiding or spying out the land,^ "
Indeed, the garrison at Lugh did not appear to act as a
deterrent to Ethiopian advances along either side of the river
Juba. When in September 1898 hoi do Gabriel undertook an expedition
against the Rer -^ fgab, he passed by Lugh and sent letters to
Said Mohammad, the Resident there. Said Mohammad replied tersely
that he would resist any attack by force, though the letters written
in Italian and Amharic had assured him of Wolde Gabriel’s intention
to avoid a conflict. Having come so close to Lugh, the Ethiipian
commander was moi*ely sending the Commisario his best l’egards,
but at that time there was no one at Lugh who could understand
either Italian or Amharic, and the Amharic letter had to be sent
2
to Zanzibar to be translated.
The problem of Lugh was its isolation and the poor morale
of troops there. In years when the harvest was bad, food had to
be transported to the post from the Benadir. The askaris stationed 
in the town were frequently on half rations, and they generally 
demanded to be sent back to the coast at the Earliest possible 
moment. Said Mohammad, ad so wanted to be replaced saying that he
^Rapporto dal Renadir, 2S Nov. 1898, ASMAI. Posiz, 70/l-12; 
Pestslozza to M.} 26 Aug. 1899? ASMAI. Posiz. 70/2-13; Perducci 
to Pestalozza, 7 Aug. 1899? ASMAI. Posiz. 68/1-12,
2Dulio to M., 10 Sept. 1898, ASMAI. Posiz. 70/l™12.
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had served his term. To these problems there was no easy 
solution as long as the Italian- administration ms tied to the 
Benadir . ^
Eventually, Italian fears that Lugh might succumb to an
Ethiopian attack led to the de term in at inn to set up a post at
Bandera* which could support Lugh at short notice and would also
2ease the long supply lines. The Sultan cf Bardera* Sheik Abdio, 
had received an Italian flag from Ferrandi at the beginning of 
18 93? and he tad also signed a treaty of friendship with the Ruspol i 
expedition later that year. But it was not until Badolo’s ex» 
pedition in 1902? to examine the defences of Lugh and to open a 
station at Bardera* that any further progress was made.^
Thus the garrison at Lugh cnly, seems to have been of marginal 
military importance to the. neighbouring Somali. For It neither 
offered them effective protection again sb Ethiopian raids nor 
did it appear seriously to deter the Amhara from pushing southwards. 
On the o ther hand? the town ms not as commercially successful 
as had originally been hoped* though It was due to their economic
^Rapporto dal Benadir? 28 Nov. 1898* ASMAI. Posiz. 70/l~12.
p
Carminati to Ministero* 16 Nov. 1901? ASMAI. Posiz. 75/5-47;
0. to M * 27 March 1902? ASMAI. Posiz. 75/5-46; both are quoted 
in R.L.Hess (1966)* 75'.
"Treaty between Ruspoli and the Sultan of Bardera"? 3 April 1893? 
ASMAI. Posiz. 70/1-4.
heport of Badolo's expedition to Lugh; Dulio to M., 25 Aug. 1902 , 
ASMAI. Posiz. 70/2-20.
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ambitions that the Italians made their greatest impact on the
Somali tribes to the west of the river Juba.
In the first place the Italians had discovered Lugh when
it was an full economic decline* Ruspoli had exaggerated its
wealth and importance and so had other Italians who favoured a
forward policyii that area. The problem of Lugh's decline was
largely connected with the unsettled state of affairs along
the upper Juba,' which acted as a deterrent to trade. The migration
of new Somali clans into the area naturally upset the equilibrium
which was so important for commerce. Moreover in 1893 Lugh was
largely destroyed by fire, while the Ethiopian advance southwards
1further dislocated trade in the area/
Italian attempts to prop up and, indeed, to revive the trade 
of Lugh meant that they became increasingly interested in its 
economic catchment area, which naturally they wished to control.
The crucial fact, however, was that Lugh remained essentially 
the terminal point of two caravan routes, one of which lay wholly 
in the British sphere of influence. Thus there was the problem of 
deciding how fir Italian political influence should be extended to 
the rightt bank of the Juba and the area beyond, which, though 
technically in the East Africa Protectorate, was still unadministered r 
by Brrlfeih.. It was also obvious to all Italian administrators at
A
II. Ferrandi (l903)s 387-
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Lugh that since the British could control the Boran end of
the trade, they could just as easily divert it from Lugh; and
this led to the same sort of political and commercial rivalry
along the upper Juha Between the two administrations as occurred
further do mi the river*
In fact, Italian administrators Became oBsessed with
the possibility that trade might Be diverted from Lugh, and
every British advance up the river Juha was construed as a potential
1
threat to their legitimate interests* These fears were not entirely
unjustified. As early as 1893 it had Been obvious to Bun das,
the explorer, that when the Juba was op ened|ip, trade'/ would be
2
diverted to ICismayu from Both Bardera and Lugh. And while the
I. B. S. A. Co. did not have the funds to put such a scheme into 
operation, one of Jenner*s aims from 1896 onwards was to encourage 
the economic development of JuB aland.
Xet when in 1896 Jenner tried to establish contact with 
Afelata, head of the Boran, the Italians oversimplified in concluding 
that this was purely a manoeuvre to divert trade from Daeir own 
sphere of influence, aid their pleasure at Jenner’s failure was 
misplaced.^ Again, when it was learnt two years later that Jenner
0. Rossetti, !tLa via del Basso GiuBa”, II11al 1 a Go 1 oniaie, I no, 11. 
(1900), 6. _ ' —  ~ ~
^Opt. Bundas, G.J., I n.s. (l893)s 220.
^Consul at Zanzibar to Ministero, 30 Aug. 1896, ASMAI. Posiz.
68/l~7; Ferrandi to Presidente Rome Geog. Soc., 10 Oct. I896,
ASMAI. Posiz. 70/l-S.
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hoped, to open administrative posts opposite Bardera and Lugh,
the motive ms thought to have been purely commercial and un-
1friendly towards Italy, Later the Italian consul at Zanzibar
noted the tendency for progressive expansion, north-westwards in
the British sphere and recommended that the Italians should take
2a corresponding interest In their own side of the river. However, 
other methods of dealing with British competition were also put 
forward.
In the first place, Ferrandi had been specifically instructed
by Oecchi to combat British influence amongst the Boran and along
the upper Juba. Although Ferrandi was primarily preoccupied with
the defence of Lugh, he ms also troubled that any success he
might have reviving tirade with the Boran would ultimately benefit
3the British alone. For he was quick to point out that all ivory 
traded at Lugh came from the British sphere. The solution that 
Ferrandi tentatively proposed was that Italian influence should 
be extended westwards aid Italian control with it. By way of 
justification he maintained not only that the Boran had. full confidence
^Pestalozza to Ministero. 6 May 1898? ASMAI, Posiz. 6S/1-11.
2p. to M., 20 Aug. 1899, ASMAI. Posiz. 68/1-12.
%. to 0., 20 Aug, 1896, ASMAI. Posiz. 68/1-7.
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in the Italians, but also that they hoped that one day Italian 
influence would spread to the west of lugh and act as a counterpoise 
to the British, To nullify the growing British inf luericejin the 
area, Ferrandi suggested establishing a station in the middle 
of the upper Da.ua. Naturally the problem centred on whether such
 ^ "J
a station would ever fall into British hands.
Of course there was nothing very extraordinary in these plans.
They were throw out informally and merely indicate the conflict
of national interests as experienced by a junior but zealous
administrator, i/hat was more unusual, perhaps, was the initial
support given to these ideas by Gecchi, the Italian Consul at
Zanzibar, in a curiously artful and dishonest my. Gecchi pointed
out that the terms of the 3891 Anglo-Ttalian Agreement could be
revised by common agreement for hydrographical reasons. He then
suggested that Bottego's expedition had altered the geographical
criteria by establishing that the Daua and not the Canale Doria,
as had previously been supposed, was the main source of the Juba.
Thus Cecchi claimed that it would be possible to construct a fort
2
on the upper Juba. On the other hand, Bottego* s findings seem to 
have been the result of chauvinstic zeal instead of being based
to Pr. Boma Geog. Soc., 8 Oct, 1896, ASMAI. Posiz, 70/l~8.
20. to P., 19 Sept: 1896, ASMAI. Posiz. 68/l-7.
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on scientific data* Moreover, the British never agreed that
the Daua formed the boundary of their sphere of influence
according to the 3891 Agreement with Italy.
Secondly, Gecchi drew attention to the fact that it was
the power in occupation that had a right to land previously
unexplored, as though this somehow was pertinent to the situation,
The observation, however, was gratuitous seeing that both Italy
and Great Britain had already limited their freedom of action
1by agreeing to different spheres of influence. But before
the matter could be discussed further Ferrandi had been replaced.
Thereafter, Italian claims that the frontier should run along
2the river Daua were made through diplomatic channels.
However, Italian administrators still experienced the necessity 
of extending their political influence to the west of the Juba, 
though in a less ostentatious manner than Ferrandi had proposed.
^or it had always been necessary for lugh either to control both 
sides of the river Juba or, at the very least, to arrive at a modus 
vivendi with the tribes occupying theOddo and the edge of the 
river Daua. Without this basic minimum, trade with the Boran was
10. to P., 19 Sept. 1896, ASMAI., Posiz. 68/1-7.
2
These discussions lasted until 3904. The issue was an extremely 
complex one but it never had any tangible effect on the Juba 
area and p ertains more to diplomatic history. The correspondence 
is in FO.l/47 and ASMAI. Posiz. 68/l-7.
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simply not possible. Thus, the rulers of Bugh had always been
on good terms with the Garre who controlled both sides of
the river Daua, The Garre virtually monopolised trade with
the Boran and they are said to have recognised the nominal susereignty
1of Lugh by paying annual tribute to the Sultan. Equally,
the Marehan had been assimilated into this system aid by the
end of the 19th century they were themselves trading with the
2
Jam Jam aid the Garre, Moreover, they livedin close proximity
3
■with the Gobawein, even sharing villages with them such as 
Ben tel. ^  The Italians also found it necessary to establish 
close ties with the Garre, but at first they were more concerned 
with their relationship to the Digodia.
From the middle of the 19th century, Ogaden pressure along 
the upper Webi Shebelle had led to the gradual movement of the 
Digodia westwards from El Bai, By the end of the century the 
Digodia were centred in the area between the Ganale Doria and
6the Webi Gestro, and also along the Juba to the north of Lugh.
1A. Rosai, Nuova AntoligLa, LJQQCm (1899), 438.
2U. Ferrandi (1903), 133.
3
The Gobawein and the Gasar Gudda were the tribes that inhabited 
Lugh. They were traders and agricultural 1st s.
Lottego (I895), 358.
R
' Gerreh District Political Record Book, PC/NFd/4/l/l■
Bottego (1895), 132 and Map.
The Digodia were amongst the richest pastoral!sts in this
area, owning large herds of camels and some cattle. Initially,
their arrival in the region of Lugh had involved no more than
small groups. These had established good relations both with
Jthe Rahanwein and also the Gasar Gudda. ' However the cumulative
effect of the Digodia migration must ultimately have had some
disruptive impact, though the Italians argued 1 ater that it was
largely through the mist alee s of All Hassan Mur, Sultan of Lugh,
2
that they became his bitterest enemies after 1887,
This enmity between the Digodia and the Gasar Gudda threatened 
to undermine the commercial position of Lugh, For Ethiopian pressure 
from Arussi led to a dispersal of the Yaben sections of the Digodia,
and cue group moved towards and intersected the Important trade
3routes to the Boran, thus preventing trade from taking place.
This group, the Her Muhammad. Livin, began to move westwards about 
1890. Instead of trying to force their way southwards through the 
Garre Harre, they moved parellel with the Daua until they were 
stopped by the Boran, By 1893 they had crossed, the river Daua
1Puccioni, "Appunti sulla distribution! gecgrafica della popclaslone 
della Somalia", 3.S.G.X., Till 5th oer. (l°19), 154; "Degodi", anon 
n,d. in DC/MDA/4/4.
p
"U. Ferrandi (19O3), 98; Bottego (1895), 391.
M.S.Thomas (l91tf), 87.
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The Digodia Migration*
Ganale Doria
H* Daua
Male a M w rriM®SSQ ^ # El Bax
Mandera
‘T^AVJ
Humkale
Matjrill
•Buna |f ♦El Wafc
Mar da
Yago
Wajir
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somewhere around Muddo Eri aid were moving' south towards Takkaba.
'the area to the north aid around Takabba was jointly grased
2hy the Boran aid the Garre. No doubt it was easier to move
through this border area threatening neither group.
South of T at abb a, the Her Muhammad Livin allied themselves
with the G-aren and Oelberis sections of the Ajuran , aid then con-
3tinued on to Yako reaching ¥ajir in 1904- the reason for this 
close alliance between the Ajuran and the Degodia is not-known, 
but it seems to have afforded obvious advantages to both parties.
On the one hand, the Ajuran had only recently suffered, at the hands 
of Ahdi Ibrahim who had stationed himself at Buna for a year 
and terrorised the surrounding country-side.^ The Ajuran must 
have been seriously weakened by this intrusion;, while the Boran, 
their traditional allies, failed to offer them any effective
5protection. Latex- in 1895 an Ajuran headman at El Wak was murdered. 
The prospect of strengthening their position by assimilation was 
considerable and the Her Muhammad Digodia were until 1916 known
-j
Aa Rossi, Nuova Antologia, (1899), 438; E.G* Jennings, "Memorandum", 
ia KL0.EM."T t ? pTiesOT ~
wAn Ethnological Treatise on the Gurreh Tribe"p. 19,
pc/ned/a/i/s .
•
R.G.Turnbull, "Some Notes on the Histo ly of the Digodia up to 1912", 
(1953), PC/HED/4/1/1.
R^* G.Turnbull, "The Werdeh", Kenya Police Review (19 57), 310.
^ibid.
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as the Mohammad Ajuran." At the same time the Digodia gained 
access to the wells at Wajir as clients to the ^ -juran. But by 
moving south fairly rapidly they only disrupted the caravan rentes 
west from Lugh for a short time. However the Her Mohammad were 
only one group, and there were others that followed them.
Thus there is a tradition that a group of Digodia tried to 
push through the Garre Marre aid managed to cross the Daua near 
Dolo. Here they came into contact with the Marehan and in 1892 
were victorious over them, establishing themsel'ves in the Humbale 
ares. With the help of the Gasar Gudda and the Gobawein. however, 
the Marehan managed to defeat the Digodia both at Male a Re and in 
the Humbale driving them to the north of the Daua. This brief war'? 
is said to have taken place between 1892 and 3394 and was brought to 
an end. by the mediation of Sherba Alio Omaro and Ali Abdi, both 
Garre headmen who recognised the threat posed by the Marehan and 
valued the Digodia as fighting men. Some apparently remained amongst 
the Garre as .she gats, bptl-the majority recrossed the river near 
Herboi. After remaining two or three years in O.ddo under the 
authority of a young wobur of the Digodia, Mils group again turned 
south, crossing the Daua at Ramu and pushing on to Muddo Sri,
Takabba and finally Wajir, where they are said to have arrived in 1908.
-|
R. G.Turnbull, "History of the Digodia", PC/lIFD/d/l/l.
2Jbid.
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What this tradition illustrates is the verj considerable
amount of disruption caused by the Digodia to the west of Lugh,
though this may have beenunwittingly exaggerated. So far, the
alleged Digodia invasion of Humbale, the defeat of the Marehan
and the two years of warfare there, is ^ ill uncorroborated by
any supporting evidence, Moreover, from 1893 onwards Male a Re
and that stretch of the river Daua was frequently visited by
explorers, bat none of these mention the presence of Digodia to
the south of the river, and all without exception pinpoint the
1
Marehan hi the Humbale area. It is not very likely that anyriaajor
clash between the Marehan and the Digodia which also involved
the Garre should have been so completely overlooked at the time.
Equally, the area known as the Gddo today was also visited by most
travellers to the area around Lugh, but in the last decade
of the 19th century none menticn the presence of Digodia in this
region, though again all say that the area was controlled by the 
2
Gare Mar re.
It is difficult to escape the conclusion that whatever Digodia 
penetration into Humbale occurred, it must have been repulsed quickly
■]
These included: Bottego, Citerni, Lord Delamere, Cavendish,
Ferrandi, Rossi, Ruspoli, V&nnutelli etc.
2
One complicating factor is that the term Oddo may have been used in 
the oral traditions to describe the area between the Ganale Doria 
and the ¥ebi Gestro. It was used in this sense at times by Leon 
des Avanchers. Moreover, at the endof the 19th century this is precisely 
where the Digodia were to be found.
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and thus have escaped the attention of explorers who visited
this area approximately once every six months. And, secondly,
when the Digodia did retreat, it was not just to the north of the
Daua but to the east of the Ganale Doria as well.
Yet other p arts of the tradition can be substantiated.
For instance, there is evidence of a second movement westwards
by the Digodia cf the Gelibleh sub-ection. When precisely this
started is .largely a matter for conjecture. In 1895 there were
reports of fighting between the Digodia and the Garre to the
north of the Daua, which could have been connected with a movement 
2towards Ramu. Some time about the turn o f the century there 
were also Digodia living amongst the Garre as she gat s. Lastly 
there were several Digodia chiefs in Takabba and Muddo Eri in 
1906, and this group apparently did not arrive at Wajir until 1908.^ 
The second group of Digodia, like the first, also became 
clients of the Ajuran. But it would be a mistake to imagine that 
by forming this alliance, the Ajuran severed their close ties 
with the Boran. Between 190 6 and 1908 there were still a considerable
1
F. G. J ennings, ’’Memorandum ”, KLC. EM p, IX ? p, 1650.
2 sA.Donaldson Smith, G.J., VIII (1896), 152-3. 
h.S.Thomas (1917), 87.
4C. to G., 20 May 1907, F0.37l/l92.
number of Ajuran chiefs who were living amongst the Boran and 
the Salcuye - some of them in Ethiopian territory- who nevertheles 
still had their main wealth at ¥ajir. Initially, at least, the 
Ajurcn-Degodia alliance didnot conflict with Ajuran-Boran 
friendship.^
There was little the Italians could do about these Digodia 
movements westwards, ^hey could not prevent them, nor coul d they 
neutralise their disruptive impact on trade between Lugh and 
the Boran. The Italians were more successful, however, ‘ when it 
came to dealing with the Digodia to the east of Lugh, who were 
potentially more dangerous than those further to the west. When 
the Ethiopians had approached Lugh. in September 1895, one group 
of Digodia had moved down the left side of the river since they
2
were unable to cross the Juba as it m s  still swollen by rains. 
Eden Muhammad, head of the Digodia, had tried to g?t permission 
from the Sultan cf Lugh to cross the Juba in December, and the 
initial reaction of Ali Hassan Mur had been to oppose this at 
all costs. But when Bottego arrived at .Lughin December 1895, 
he quickly saw the importance of establishing good relations with 
the Digodia, Bottego appears to have done two things. On the one 
hand, he carried out a raid against the Arussi with whom the
Zaphiro to Harrington, 15 Sept. 1906, K).37l/l92.
*JJ. Ferrandi (1903), 316.
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Digodia had several scores to settle and thus earned their
gratitude. Secondly, the Digodia were not prevented from
]
crossing the Juha?rfurtherJ:io the south of Lugh.
Thus there were two main Digodia movements; one initially •
westwards aid parallel to the Daua, the other southwards, down
the river Juba, both ultimately converging on^ajir. The Digodia
began crossing the Juba between Marda and Marille in small numbers
2from 1893 onwards. ' For the rest of tie century the Digodia continued
to move very slowly down the Juba, frequently crossing it and
la r as sing the Marehan. When Jenner visited Lugh in 1899 be asked
Muhammad. Abdullah, the Italian representative there, to restrain
the Digodia. The problem, as the llwali admitted, was that he was
not strong enough to prevent the Digodia-from crossing the river.
He advised the Marehan to come to terms with the Digodia and
suggested that hi the event of a raid from a common enemyy - such *“
as the Aijihara ~ the Digodia should be allowed sanctuary in Marehan
country. He then promised, that when a station ms opened at Bardera
(and that was still three years away) the Italian Government would
see that the Marehan did not lose their land, presumably by then
3restraining the Digodia,.
L^. Yannutelli and C. Citerni (l899)> 101, 113» 128ff,
^Bottego (1895),. 475; Political Records, SC/HDA/4/4.
3J. to H., 2 April 1899, in C. to S., 20 May 1899, TO.2/196.
Italian support for the Digodia, though nominal, made it
impossible for them to e stablish f riendly relations with the
Marehan, but it in no way affected their aelationship with tie
Garre, who initially at least saw the advantage of Digodia
support against their Marehan neighbours. And the Italians were
not altogether unsuccessful in extending their influence over
the Game. Thus they paid Ibrahim Yero, luaad of the Garre Marre,
a monthly stipend, and they taxed the Garre Kuran. They also
paid subsidies to Gobawein chiefs, such as All Addo who lived
to the west of the river Juba, and they taxed the Somali in 
1Dolo. Yet they never managed to gain .control, over the Boran 
trade.
At first the Italians had tried to get two friendly Somali, 
Sheikh Muhammad and Muhammad Moor, to organise the trade with 
the Boran, but Ethiopian competition proved too severe. For whatever 
influence the Italians acquired over the Garre, it could always 
be more than matched by the Amhara. After the Garre Kuran had been 
attacked by Dejazmach Wolde Gabriel and Asfao of Arusiland, they 
began paying taxes to both these Ethiopian governors, as well as 
to Fitaurari Hapta Gloria. The Amhara, also took away with them 
several important Garre hostages such as the son of Ohaban Alio,
2^. to P.Q.Kismayu, 29 Aug, 1906, 00*533/27? G. , 20 May
1907, F0,371/192.
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the old head of the Garre Kuran, Other Garre were pressed into 
Ethiopian service, inparticular Aba Woresa, a young and exceedingly
i'
able supporter of Ali Abdi, head/yf the Tuff Garre, who was employed
■ f
by the Amhara to control the caravan irade with the Boran,
Initially he was placed in charge of the customs and levied a 5°/o 
ad valorem tax. But the post was so important that Menelick appointed 
several followers of Nagadras Haile Giorghis to set up customs houses 
in ICarayu and Tertale. Aba Woresa then did no more thai make sure 
that every ccaravan passed through Le, where customs officials 
would be told of their approach.
The Italians failed because they were unwilling to use their 
tropps to the west of the Juba, or to offer the Garre protection 
against the Ethiopians. They had force enough, but perhaps the 
frontier really did act as a deterrent and, while the extension 
of political influence westwards was considered permissible, the 
use of military force was not. In 1906, however, the Garre were 
offered protection against the Amhara not by the Italians but by 
the British. The appointment of a British Border Agent- in 39O5 
added, a new element to the relationship between the border tribes 
and the Ethiopians. Yet by then Ethiopian penetration southwards 
had reached alarming proportions. Thus, in Hay 390,5, some 600 Amhara
to C., 14 April I9O6; Z. to H, , 16 April 1906; C. to G. ,
20 May 1907, JO.371/192.
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under Wolde Gabriel and accompanied by Geydu visited 331 Viak and
Muddo Arele. Geydu was brought with the expedition, so it was
rumoured, to point out the limits of his domain.'5' It was also
being said, a few months later, that the Ethiopians were forcing
the Boran to carry material with which to build stations at Wajir,
El ¥ak and Madowa (Mandera?) opposite Lugh, and that they had
2
already marked out stations in these places. Then in January
1906 it was repo ited that the Ethiopians under Guide and Dima had
occupied El Wak-with 190 riflemen and were robbing the inhabitants
3
and taxing the people there. During that month there were several
expeditions to VJajir, Muddo and El ¥ak "to shoot elephants and
A.
collect tribal levies". ' Yet, when Sir John Harrington complained 
strongly to Menelick about these incursions, the Emperor maintained 
that they were only raids by elephant hunters who were acting 
without permission and against orders, but that he did not have 
the power to check them. Menelick in fact did not see why he shoul d 
be forced to maintain oS.der unilaterally along the frontier, aid 
with regard to the raiders Menelick asked; "thy the Protectorate
-]
S. to Dep. Cornu.,Mombasa, 13 July 1905, CO-533/3- 
2S. to H.-S., 4 Sept. 1905, C0.533/U.
:X. to C., 26 April 190 6, CO.533/s. 
b. to G., 20 May 1907, PC. 37l/l92.
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authorities do not capture them?". It was a shrewd point 
for it drew attention to the E.A.Po's own lack of authority in 
the area. Thus Zap hi no* s appointment was extremely opportune.
1
Sir John Harrington to Cromer, 8 May 1906, 00. 57)3/Q
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OHAP'JER T i l l  
THE IMTERTMTIOH OF BRITAIH OH THE BORDER
On 15 November 1905 Zaphiro left Addis Ababa for the junction
of the Daua and GranaLe rivers. His instructions were to patrol
the border from east to west, to find suitable sites for frontier
posts, aid, lastly, to discover whether the Garre were of Boran
or Somali origin. It was hoped that Zaphiro11b presence on the
frontier would act as a deterrent to Ethiopian raids which he was
asked to stop, though one man with a tiny escort patrolling over
five hundred miles of difficult frontier could hardly achieve
much in that direction. More important, in this connection was
the information that Zaphiro was supposed to gather from tribes
in the British sphere concerning Ethiopian incursions. For his
job consisted first and foremost of gathering intelligence which,
when passed on to the legation at Addis Ababa, would support and
facilitate diplomatic representations made there. This was the
rationale behind his linke with the legation in Addis, whence he
received all his orders, though he was paid by the East Africa 
1
Protectorate.
It is clear that Zaphiro also received further instructions 
from time to time, but no copies of these have survived. Thus he
"Instructions for Frostier Inspector", n.d. in FO.371/2.
was asked to investigate the trade in arms along the Juba as
well as to divert trade to Kismayu and away from Lugh and the 
1Italian sphere. Zaphiro was also given to understand that he
would remain exclusively in Ethiopian territory and he was only
to cross into the East Africa Protectorate upon the explicit
2
orders of Harrington. However, in 1906, because of the hostility 
which his appointment had aroused amongst the southern Ethiopians, 
which in turn influenced Menelick^ Harrington had to prohibit 
Zaphiro from residing in Ethiopia at all and he then chose Moyale 
as his headquarters.
Although 3n appointing Zaphiro Harrington* s main aim was to 
check Ethiopian incursions across the border, it seems clear from 
Zaphiro* s in st m e  tins that Harrington was also particularly pre- 
uccpied with Menelick’s claim that the Garre were an offshoot of 
the Boran, since their ethnic origin was the criteria for deciding 
the positioi^)f the frontier. By sending Zaphiro first to the junction 
of the Daua and the Ganale Doria it was obviously this question 
above all that he wanted to have settled as quickly as possible.
But the position of the Garre to the south of the Daua was 
more complicated than Harrington supposed. When Zaphiro reached
^Harrington to Grey, 9 July 1906, EG.371/3. 
2H. to , 20 Sept. 1906, PC/jUB/2/3/l. 
5H. to S., 16 May 1908, F0.371/394.
the upper Juba, he discovered that the Garre had been exposed 
to considerable Ethiopian and Italian influence, while Muhammad 
Abdille ^assan had written to &li Abdi, head of the Tuff Garre, 
saying that he might require their assistance.^ Yet Zaphiro 
seems to lave devoted most of his energy to systematically under­
mining Italian influence not just in tie British sphere, but in 
southern Ethiopia as well. He objected to the fact that the in­
habitants of Lugh cultivated cereals on the west side of the 
river and that Somali chiefs in the British sphere were paid 
by the Italian authorities. He also claimed that pressure had 
been put on some Somali to move to the Italian side of the river
and further that they had been told not to obey orders from the
2
British Government.
To combat Italian influence, Zaphiro sought the support of 
the Garre and he quickly found an ally in Aden Chaban Alio.
Having recently returned from Addis Ababa, where he had been held 
hostage, he tad become head of the Garre Kuran, but his position 
was not very strong and it is possible that he was not popular. 
What Aden Ghaban succeeded in doing, however, was to gain Zaphiro* 
support for the extension of his power eastwards over the Garre 
Marre and the. Gobawein, claiming that for centuries they had paid
^Zaphiro to P.C.Kismayu, 29 Aug. 1906, 00.533/26; P.Maud,
"Explocation in the southern borderland of Abyssinia*', G.J.,
XXTTl (1904), 570.
2C. to S., 20 May I9O7, K>.37l/l92.
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tribute to his people but that now due to Italian influence he
had no control over their chiefs, Ibrahim Yero and Ali Addo.
Zaphiro supported these mythical claims and erected two customs
posts at Dolo and Woralo, in Gobawein and Garre Marre country,
1and placed them under his control.
The expansion of Aden Chaban's power eastwards seems to
have resulted in a conflict between him aid Ali Abdi over their
respective spheres of influence. Zaphiro successfully mediated
in this dispute and confirmed Ali Abdi as head of the Garre south
of Muddo to Takabba and El ¥ak, while Aden Chaban was made head •
2of the Garre on the Daua from Dolo to Muddo.
This compromise was not really to Ali Abdi’s advantage, but 
no doubt he was in a weak bargaining position having already re~ 
ceived support from Zaphiro against the Amhara. At the beginning 
of March 1906, a party of Boran visited Takabba, where Ali Abdi was 
staying, with an order from the Ethiopians at Arero demanding seventy 
sheep, thirty cows and twenty camels to be delivered within two 
days. At the same time Aba Woresa brought a message from Geydu 
ordering ten ozen, ten cows and four camels to be delivered immediately. 
On Zaphiro!s instructions Ali Abdi did nothing, and later Zaphiro wrote 
a letter to the Ethiopian garrison explaining that the Garre were to 
the south of the Maud line, and thus in British territory. This seems
Z^. to P.C.Kismayu, 10 Dec. 1906, GO.533/28.
^Menorandum, n.d. (clearly by Clerk though insigned) in E0.37l/l92. 
3Z. to H., 14 April 1906, £0.371/192.
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to have deterred, further tax or tribute gathering expeditions.
Most of Zaphiro’s other steps were aimed at reducing Italian 
influence.
Zaphiro admitted quite openly that his motive in erecting 
a post at Dolo was not just because it was a suitable site for 
a market and fort, but also because it would prevent the Italians 
having any influence over tribes in the British sphere. As he 
observed with affected understatement, "I don't think the officer 
at Lugh will like it", then adding condescendingly: "I am very 
sorry for him".
The Italians were certainly quick to appreciate the potential 
harm that the post at Dolo could do their trade, but they also claimed 
that Zaphiro's actions were irregular as well as unsatisfactory.
For not only did Zaphiro prohibit the export of all ivory to Lugh 
from the British sphere, but he appeared to be trying to regulate 
its export from Ethiopia as well. While he granted onejassport to 
a Somali in Borana authorising him to trade with Lugh, the Italians 
collected a file of M s  chits all saying that trade between Ethiopian 
Borana and Lugh was prohibited.^ As a result, strong complaints
^Zaphiro "Report", 10 Aug. 1907» F0.37l/l92.
Z. to P.O., Jubaland, 10 Dec. 1906, Co.533/28.
"Extract from Confidential Report", Gov. Benadir to Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, 18 Oct. 1906 in CO.533/35.
4Passport, Mohamed Safari, 15 March 1907, signed by Zaphiro at Mega, 
ASMAI. Posiz.70/5-28; "Azione inglese nel Boran e sul Giuba" and 
"Azione inglese sul Giuba", 1906-7, ASMAI.Posiz.70/3-27.
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were made "by the officials at Lugh and on the Benadir, and
these were ultimately transmitted to the British Foreign Office
via the Italian Ambassador in London.
At about the same time, the Acting Commissioner for the
E.A.P. had also come to the conclusion ’’that there are very real
1
grounds for complaint cn the part cf i&heItalians”. It gradually
became clear that Zaphiro had somewhat exceeded his ± l struct ion s.
In the first place, he had no authority to interfere in the trade
between Ethiopia and Italian Somaliland. Nor was he justified in
charging customs duty on exports from the British sphere. Zaphiro's
stand as an extreme Anglophile who wanted to ’’see the whole map of
Africa painted red” led him to act imprudently on several other
occasions, and in a way that was ultimately embarrassing to the
2British Government.
Zaphiro's actions were strongly supported, however, first 
by Harrington and then later by the Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward 
Grey. While fully admitting that Zaphiro had exceeded his in­
structions, Harringtcn counterattacked by claiming that the Italians 
were also to blame by paying chiefs in the British sphere in order 
to divert trade to Lugh, adding: "There is no doubt the Italians 
very much dread our taking any steps to show our authority in what
Bacfcson to Sec. of State, 17 Jan. 1907, CO.53/27.
2C. to G., 17 Deo. 1907, FO.371/192.
5G. to Count A. de Bosdari,18 Feb. 1907, ASMAI. Posiz.70/3-28.
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1
is our am territory along the Juba”. In the end Read at
the Colonial Office noted 2apM.ro's vindication by observing
that, while the Acting Commissioner of the E.A.P. thought Zaphiro
to be in the wrong, "the P.O. have had the alvantage of a personal
2conference with Sir J. Harrington and do not share this view".
Considering the protests that were made in London by 
the Italian Ambassador, it is rather ironic that the Italians them­
selves should have indued in much the same tactics as Zaphiro.
No doubt what the Italians resented most were the orders that 
Zaphiro gave to the G^rre chiefs not to allow exports to go 
through Lugh. Since the trade route f ran Borana to Lugh passed 
through Carre country this was a matter of considerable concern.
Thus, at the end of September 1906, it was reported that two Casar 
Cudda merchants from Boran had been stopped by the Garre on Ali
3Abdi's orders, and they were forcibly prevented from reaching Lugh. 
Equally, it was known that Zaphiro had given the Boran orders that 
they were to trade with Kismayu instead of Lugh or Bardera.^ How­
ever, at the beginning of 1907 the Governor of the Italian Protector­
ate was himself giving instructions to Nur Blmi Ualo, head of the
1H. to 0., 31 Jan.1907, 00.533/35.
"Tiead, Minute, 14 March 1907, 00.533/27.
^"Report from Resident at Lugh", 18 Sept. 1906, 00.533/35.
%. to S., 29 Rov. 1906, CO.533/19.
Garre in the Italian sphere, to try and divert trade away from
ICismayu to Lugh.^ There was therefore a certain amount of
intrigue on both si&s. The Anglo-Italian border had to be respected
but Molinari, the Resident at Lugh, was nevertheless asked by the
Governor of Somalia whether acting secretly and with prudence he
2could not counterbalance the actions of Zaphiro. The iead of the
Gona Boran apparently let Molinari know that he was ready to help 
3
the Italians. There is also an interesting letter in the Italian
files written by a trader at Lugh to Sherif Osman and Sherif Hassim
bin Nurgal seeking information as to the whereabouts of Zaphiro
and his irregulars. The reply indicated that Zaphiro moved around
a great deal, that the Digpdia were afraid of him, and lastly that
the people of Mereh (?) would have preferred to be under Italian
4rather than British administration. In these circumstances it is
amusing that Zaphiro should have been accused of actually helping
the Italians by a Director of the Boma Trading Company, ^
"My own opinion of Zaphiro *s methods", he wrote,
"formed on a two months sojougm on the frontier is 
that lie is deliberately driving the whole of the 
border trade into the hands of the Italians at Lugh.
^Governor to Minister, 25 Jan. 1907, ASMAI, Posiz.70/5-28,
2Gov. to Molinari, 10 July 1908, ASMAI, Posiz.70/3-28.
^Molinari to Gov., 30 Dec, 1906, ASMAI. Posiz.70/3-28.
^Sherif Osman and Sherif Hassim bin Sherif Nurgal to Said Hamid bin 
Said Mohammed, 30 Dec. 1906, ASMAI. Posiz.70/3-28.
This Company was formed in 1907 by a Major Ward for the purpose of 
developing trade with Ethiopia andcn. the border of the B.A.P.
Sardolphi to Hornyold, 30 June 1907, CO.533/51.
Zaphiro’s methods were certainly open to criticism, though 
on different grounds. He m s  encouraging the Somali and Boran to 
sell their goods at Itismayu at precisely the time th&t the admini­
stration there was trying to enforce an embargo on all trade.^
There had been absolutely no coordination between Zaphiro and 
the administration in Jub aland. The first time that Kirkpatrick, the 
Provincial Commissioner of Jubaland, heard of Zaphiro was when a 
group of Boran unexpectedly turned up at Kismayu saying that he 
had sent them to 1rade there. In August Kirkpatrick wrote to the 
Governor of the E.A.P., Hayes-Sadler, asking who this man was. But 
even the Governor did not know. He thought it might have been an 
employee of the Emperor Navigation Company, a small commercial 
concern that was operating steamers on the Juba up to Bardera,
yet he was not sure; and it was not until the middle of December
2
that he wrote back to the Colonial Office making enquiries. In 
the meantime Zaphiro had written to Kirkpatrick. "Harrington told 
me to 23? ort to ICismayu if Italians at Lugh attempt to exert influence 
in our sphere", he began,then giving a little information about the 
nature of his appointment. But Zaphiro's attempt to promote a
’political RecmLs Book, Marsabit, PC/KFD/4/l/2 or DC/MBT/7/1/2.
2K. to H.-S., 29 Fov. 1906; H.-S. to Sec. of State, 19 Dec. 1906,
CO.533/19.
3Z. to K., 29 Mg. 1906, CO. 533/27.
policy diametrically opposed to the one teing followed in Kismayu
was not conducive to collaboration,
Zaphiro’s method of running the border was also highly
individualistic, even ingenious, given the limited resources at
his command. In the first place, he tried to impress upon the
Ethiopians the power of the British Government, in the hope that
tliis would act as some restraint on their activities; secondly,
he threatened tribes in the British sphere that unless they obeyed
his orders, he would lead a large force of Ethiopians across the
border against them. This stratagem was only partly effective.
Zaphiro's successor on the frontier claimed that he did not prevent
the Ethiopians from crossing into British territory, though his
1threats kept tribes on the British side quiet.
Zaphiro’s main problem consisted in the lack of force at
his command. He always had an escort, which varied in size from
time to time, but it was only composed of irregular Ethiopians,
2who were recruited ii A&dis Ababa. Surprisingly, the Ethiopians
3
did not in the least object to this, though it made Zaphiro 
*|
W.E.H.Barrett, ’’Records of Moyale Station", PG/nEd/i/^/I or
DC/MLE/2/4.
2
Zaphiro never had more than 40 irregulars as an escort.
3Furthermore In 1908 Opt. Breading of the K.A.R. went to Addis 
Ababa and recruited a Company of Ethiopians who later fought on 
the border against Tigre. Sees LI or d-Jones (1926), 135ff and 
Cpt. Breading, "Report on recruiting tour in Abyssinia", 10 Sept.
1908, Go.534/8..
383
■unpopular with some (f the border tribes end led to misunderstandings
over his relationship to the Ethiopian Government. But this escort
was never large enough to really overawe or intimidate recalcitrant
tribes. So Zaphiro tended to threaten that he would organise and
conduct Ethiopian raids if bis orders were not obeyed. Thus, in
1December 1906, he threatened the Wart a in the British sphere that 
he would call in Ethiopians from IConso unless they agreed to give 
the Government one tusk from every elephant that they killed and
p
exported the other to ICismayu. The threat was apparently effective. 
The following year Zaphiro wrote to Ahmed Murgham threatening that 
if the road to ICismayu was closed to traders, he would come with 
Ethiopians to open it. In reply he received an obsequious letter. 
This policy, therefore, did seem to have some effect, but it was 
not based on pure bluff. For, even more surprisingly, Zaphiro had 
already received sanction from the legation in Addis to put this 
sort of threat.-' into effect. In dealing with the troublesome Ren-
t
dille, Clerk, who worked ±i the legation, advised Zaphiro:
You may take some Abyssinians and raid them as a 
punishment. If the Abyssinians know that they may 
loot the cattle etc. they will be ready to accompany 
you. It is however a question that must be left
1
Wart a were a despised group of elephant hunters. 
Z^. to P.G.ICismayu, 10 Dec. 1906, 00.533/28.
3z. to H., 5 Dec. 1907, K>.371/394.
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largely to your discretion and you should bear 
in mind that under no circumstances are the 
Abyssinians to be allowed to carry off women 
and c hildren.
Where Zaphiro seems to have been most successful was 
in checking the spread of Ethiopian influence over the Garre.
His presence on the frontier effectively brought to an end the 
semi-official expeditions south-eastwards that were intended 
to push the Ethiopian sphere of influence as far as Wajir and El 
Wak. But he was far less successful in handling two rather different 
sets of problems that occurred particularly along the centre 
and western end of the boundary.
In the first place, there was thewhole question of how to 
handle those nomadic tribes that were to be found on both sides 
of the frontier. Decisions had to be taken concerning their freedom 
of movement aid how their migrations f rom one country to another 
could be supervised, encouraged, or prevented. Access to wells 
and to grazing had to be discussed, and it msnecessary to formu­
late some policy concerning their taxation, and in particular 
how double taxation could be avoided. Yet these were issues that 
Zaphiro was particularly ill-equipped to understand, since he main­
tained that the boundary was essentially an. ethnic one which a priori 
ruled out the possibility of this type of problem; and consequently
1Z. to H., 5 Deo. 1907, FO.371/394.
Zaphiro tended to avoid these questions. Nevertheless, it was
one that had to be faced by his successors and above all it
concerned the Boran.
Zaphiro1s view was that the Maud line indicated exactly
1where Boran country ended. He assumed that the Boran had not
begun to move further south until they had been conquered by
the Ethiopians, after which he considered they had become agents
of the Amhara conniving at still further Ethiopian expansion.
So, although on one occasion Zaphiro admitted that the Boran moved
south during the rainy season and north during the dry period,
he was unable tea dissociate in his mind this purely ecological
grazing movement from preconceived idaas of Ethiopian imperialism,
and when he did find the Boran to the sxuth of the boundary, he
always suspected that there was an under lying political moti've v—
and that their search for grazing was simply a convenient cloak
2for other objectives. At the same time, Zaphiro evidently hoped 
that Borana could be secux-ed for the British through negotiation, 
and this probably also coloui^ ed his views. "Efforts ought to be 
made", he wrote to Harrington, "to secure the Boi^ ana country. It is 
a rich country and the natives are shamefully ill-treated by the
1Z. to H., 30 May 1906, E0.37l/l92.
2Z. to H., 14 April and 20 May 1906, E0.37l/l92.
1Abyssinians.,f
The most that Zaphiro would admit to was that the boundary ran
slap through the middle of the Gabra Algan, who grazed between
the Tertale hills and Gebel Burolli, And Zaphiro admitted this
because most of their permanent wells were situated on the Ethiopian
2side of the frontier and access to them was imperative. Indeed, 
without seasonal access to -wells north of the frontier, their grazing 
to the south wculd not lave been viable. The same was also alleged 
to be true of the wells at Gaddaduma which although in Ethiopia 
were said to be primarily used by the Garre on the British side of 
the line. But, rather typically, Zaphiro took no Initiative in 
these matters.
The second problem consisted of stepping incursions across 
the border. When Zaphiro first arrived on Hie frontier, the novelty 
of his presence had a considerable impact of its own. Then the bold­
ness of his conduct, his willingness to command and to bluff was 
temporarily effective. When Zaphiro had first arrived :tn Tertale, 
at the beginning of 1906, he had heard that there were several Ethiop­
ian raiding parties to the southed the line. After hurrying to Gorai
1Z. to H., 15 Sept. 1906, B’0.37l/l92.
2H. to 0., 19 Nov. 1907, F0.37l/l92.
*2
G. to H., 27 Jun. 1909, CO. 533/66. This is also discussed further 
in the following Chapter.
he succeeded in turning hack thiee hunting expeditions.'1'
Speed ms important, hut when Zaphiro1 s real weakness was 
better appreciated raiders paid less and less heed to his demands.' 
The border was long enough for it to be easy to elude him and 
his escort. Moreover, hunting expeditions took place during the 
rainy season when water was plentiful, when raiders were not tied 
down to permanent wells, but possessed a maximum amount of 
manoeuvrability.
Zaphiro had rather less success trying to control ivory
3
hunters in 1907 than the previous year, but his complete failure 
did not become apparent until 1908, when Zaphiro complained that 
there had been a change in Ethiopia's policy towards the border.
It was alleged that Menelick, then seriously ill and seemingly 
on the point of death, had given ivory hunters permission to cross 
into the British sphere to shoot elephants. By the end of the 
year, Zaphiro reported that there were over one thousand Tigreans 
south of the frontier. Perhaps even more serious, they were quite 
clearly not all hunters in the strict sense of the term, for many 
were also soldiers employed by Ras Mangasha, Ras Zibhat and Agos 
Tafari.4
1C. to G., 20 May 1902, K).57l/l92.
2See: Lord Hindi ip, British East Africa. Past, Present and to come 
(London, 1905), 50.
%. to G., XI lov. 1907, ^0.571/192.
^Zaphiro "Report" of 25 Aug. and 2 Oot. 1908, P0.571/594.
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This was obviously an important development, though it 
may be doubted whether Menelick ever sanctioned these expeditions. 
TShat really mattered was that growing lawlessness on the frontier 
now went hand in hand with a breakdown in the structure of authority, 
hue to Menelick* s illness, commands given at the centre of government 
were apt to be ignored in outlying provinces, sad this meant that 
Anglo-Ethiopian cooperation in Addis Ababa produced scant results 
on the southern frontier.
This was particularly disappointing because it vitiated
the whole purpose of Zaphiro’s appointment. Once the chain of
command from Addis to the frontier was broken, Zaphiro1 s contacts
with the legation at Addis ceased to bring any dividends; and in
the previous two years it tad yielded a few results, small though
these may have been. Thus, towards the end of 1906, Glerk had
written to Zaphiro enclosing a letter from Pitaurari Hapta Gdorghis
to Fitaurari Woldi, indicating the provisional frontier with a
list of place-names and with instructions that hunting parties
should not be allowed to go south of the line, and that tribute
1was not to be oollected in the British sphere. Zaphiro, however, 
did not make use of this letter because he claimed that most of 
the place-names in it were well to the south of the frontier. But 
in April 1907 another letter was sent with similar instructions
1C. to Z., 12 Deo. 1906, F0.37l/l92.
only this time defining the border more satisfactorily.^"
Yet the large-scale incursions of 1908 and 1209, when
Zaphiro was writing of 2,000 ligrean hunters in the British sphere,
2could not be off-set by any amount of cooperation at the top. 
Although in 1909 ^itaurari Hapta Gdorghis ordered Boran chiefs 
to build houses just to the north of the border and stationed 
one hundred soliders there tcjintercept raiders, his authority
■z
on the frontier was too weak for his orders to be obeyed.
Zaphiro's failure to prevent Tigrean hunters from crossing 
the frontier, coupled with the obvious defects of diplomatic re­
presentations at Addis, naturally led to increased discussion both 
about Zaphiro's appointment, as well as other schemes for protecting 
the frontier. Harrington had always envisaged the appointment of 
Zaphiro as a purely temporary expedient, and that is why it was 
limited to only one year. Moreover, at the time of his appointment, 
Harrington promised Lansdowne, the Colonial Secretary, that as 
soon as he obtained additional information, and when the boundary 
question was definitely settled, hewDuld:
submit a scheme for the protection of the boundary 
from the Abyssinian side with a view to enabling 
your Lordship to decide as to whether the boundary
C. to S., 20 May 1907, K).37l/l92.
2H. to G., 24 Sept. 1909, P0.371/595.
3H. to G., 11 June 1909, F0.371/595.
can be more efficiently and economically controlled 
from Addis Ababa than by the British East Africa 
authorities.l
However, at the end of 1906 no scheme had been produced and the
Colonial Office had not yet been forwarded any of Zaphiro*s
reports. Harrington found it absolutely essential to keep Zaphiro
on at his inspection work, and his appointment was therefore ex-
2tended for a further year.
This, however, was not so satisfactory. Eor a bitter campaign 
was mounted against Zaphiro in Ethiopia, aid it became so virulent 
that Harrington decided to 3©call him from the frentier and to re- 
place him with an Ethiopian caravan leader called Adga. But 
as lawlessness on tie frontier increased it was thought wiser to 
leave Zaphiro there after all.^ Then at the beginning of July,
when Harrington was ai his way to England, Menelick successively
5complained about Zaphiro and requested his recall. It was rapidly
becoming urgent to start planning on the assumption that Zaphiro
would not long continue at his post.
Yet when Harrington leached England at the end of July he
minuted that Zaphiro was far too valuable to be dispensed with,
6and that no action was necessary. This apparent complacency was
1H. to L., 30 Nov. 1905, 3?0.37l/2.
2H. to G., 10 Dec. 1906, F0.371/3.
3h . to Maxwell, 21 April 1907; C. to G. , 15 May 1907, K>.37l/l92.
The appointment of Adga was described by John Boyes as "setting 
the cat to watch the cream", The Company of Adventurers (London, 
1928), 291.
4H. to G., 2 June 1907, F0.37l/l92.
^Hohler to G. , 2 July and 4 July 1907, F0.37l/l92.
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due to a scheme that the Colonial Office had already dram up
for entrusting control of the frontier to British officers, and
which had been jointly approved by the Colonial and foreign
Office. At the beginning of I9O7, Sir Charles Eliot’s earlier
proposals of 1903 for defending the northern f rontier had been
resurrected, almost certainly by Harrington himself. These --plans
were based on the assumption that Mt. Marsabit would be occupied
by about 20 police under one officer, and that from this advanced
base two other officers backed by 100 troops would patrol the
border. These proposals were also favoured by Hohler in Addis,
though 1 at the Foreign Office it was coolly observed that Eliot’s
1proposals had earlier been open to objection.
However, whether by accident or design , Read at the Colonial 
Office also seems to have been thinking along the same lines, 
and after reading a summary of Zaphiro ’ s Reports In July, he supported 
the idea of some sort of frontier control along lines similar to 
Eliot's proposals, and suggested that Lo id Elgin, then Colonial 
Secretary, should discuss the matter with Harrington and other 
members of the Foreign Office. By the end of the month it had been
Ttinute, n.d. an Hohler to G., 4 July 1907, F0.37l/l92.
1H, to a. , 2 June 1907, I‘'0.37l/l92.
agreed between Read and Harrington that there should be two
or three officers on the frontier and that Zaphiro should be
1
under one of them.
A copy of these proposals was also sent to Hayes Sadler,
2
who agreed to them, while suggesting that Ainsworth should
be appointed to Marsabit. But at the Colonial Office it was f elt
that it would be a|pity to take Ainsworth away from his important
work "in the civilised part of the Protectorate1'. Read also made
the important point that the frontier officers would be under
Harrington's controls "as he mil be at headquarters in Abyssinia
and in a position to induce Menelick to recall raiding parties
3of Abyssinians". In fact, the question of control was crucial
for ultimately it was to determine who should pay, though at
the time this wasnot fully appreciated and the scheme had already
been costed at £4?000 by Hayes Sadler.4
Thus, when Zaphiro submitted his ownplan in December for
stations at Dolo, Moyale and lake Rudolf, each occupied by 100
soldiers, there were already signs of growing opposition to this 
5
type of scheme. The most serious aid persistent obstacle was
1C.0. to F.O., 25 July 1907, TO.371/192; Head, Minutes, 12 July 
and 26 Aug. 1907 on Zaphiro's Reports, GO.533/35*
2J.D.Ainsworth had joined the staff of the I.B.S.A.Go. in 1889, in 
1906 he was Sub-Commissioner Naivasha Province and inf.1907 Sub- 
Commissioner Nyansa Province.
%ead, Minute, n.d. on S. to E., 18 Sept. 1907, CO. 533/31.
4S. to S., 18 Sept. 1907, CO.533/31.
5Z. to E., 5 Deo. 1907, ^O. 371/394.
certainly financial. ]?or when Lord ill gin1 s proposals were sent
to the Treasury, the latter demanded more information at the
end of December before giving an opinion, and added the warning
1
that i i was not thought desirable to increase expenditure.
Then towards the end cf January, the Treasury demanded still 
further information, this time observing that if expenses were 
charged it would surely be to the Diplomatic and Consular vote.
At the beginning of April the Foreign and Colonial Offices agreed 
to^ approach the Treasury for funds to increase the size of Zaphiro's 
patrol. r^he previous month Harrington had been making anxious 
enquiries as to whether any decision had been taken about pro­
tecting the frontier, where he claimed the situation ms becoming 
daily more difficult.^ By the end of April, however, the Treasury 
also turned down this last request, and the Colonial Office's 
resolution to appeal to the Treasury again only led to a second 
rebuff in May. The Treasury, in fact, did not want to spend any
Treasury to C.O., 23 Deo. 1907, BO.533/36.
^Treasury to C.O., 21 Jan.1908, CO.533/51.
^P.O. to C.O., 2 April 1908, C0.533/5o.
H^. to S., 27 March 1908, TO. 371/394:.
Treasury to C.O., 27 April 1908, CO.533/51; Treasury to F.O.,
22 May 1908, TO. 371/394.
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money on the frontier until it was delimited and that was not 
expected to be completed before 1909-1
The second obstacle was that Churchill, then Under Secretary 
of State at the Colonial Office, had brought back several schemes 
of retrenchment from his 1907 East African tour, one of which in­
volved the abandonment cf any attempt to exercise control along
2
the E.A.P.-Ethiopian frontier. When Churchill was in Nairobi 
he had been approached by Cpt. Riddell, a Director of the Boma 
Trading Company, who sought an interview in order to ^ t permission 
to trade on the border. Shortly afterwards, Churchill, Hobley 
and Hayes Sadler, arranged a meeting with three directors of the 
Company and being suitably impressed gave them permission to 
trade along the frontier. Churchill was influenced by the directors' 
arguments that they did not want soldiers and officials on the 
frontier, as this would disturb the tribes there. One director 
argued that any administration of the northern frontier would be 
disastrous for the success of the Company which wanted peace, 
and claimed with obvious exaggeration that administration could only 
lead to conflict.^ Although Churchill was astute enough to realise
1G. to H., 20 Sept. 1908, FO. 371/394.
C^leric, Minute, 7 March 1908, 17).371/394*
3He was then the Sub-Commissioner for Ukamba Province, 
itfard to Churchill, 27 Jan. 1908, 00.535/51-
3 9 5
that these arguments were far from disinterested, he neverthe­
less maintained that they did represent the facts.
Churchill's view ms that the activities of the Boma 
Trading Company had an important hearing on any plans that 
might he dram up to control the frontier. This was indisputable, 
the more so since the Company had plans for erecting what it called 
fortified trading-posts along the holder itself, aid at the end 
of December it was trying to get permission to trade through Ethiopia. ^ 
But Churchill went a step further by suggesting that the Company's 
presence on the frontier made any further control unnecessary and 
he strongly argued not just for retrenchment, hut the actual abandon­
ment of what he termed the worthless deserts of northern Kenya:
I therefore see no necessity to police the frontier 
at present... I think it much better for the Government 
to abstain from any extension beyond the Guaso Kyiro 
river and to make that their final frontier in this part.
When Churchill spoke to Asquith at the Treasury earlyjEin January 1908
about the southern Ethiopian border and ‘the Boma Trading Company,
it was obvious that Elgin's scheme had been sabotaged by M s  
3assi stant.
■hard to See. of State, 22 Deo. 1907, ]?0.37l/l93.
Churchill, Minute, 28 Jan.1908, CO.533/51.
^Churchill, Minute, 28 Jan. 1908, CO. 533/51. But see G.H.Mungsam
(19&6)who argues that because Churchill supported the Boma Trading
Company he indirectly contributed to opening up the border area,
p.190.
3,96
But once it had become clear that the Colonial Office 
would not get any money from the Treasury for its scheme, Lord 
Elgin shrewdly tried to get the Foreign Office to dioulder the
an easier task by a Foreign Office proposal that 
frontier officers should police the border on Ethiopian soil,
p
thus making them all the more dependent on the legation at Addis.
And Lord Elgin told the F.O. that in no circumstances could 
frontier inspectors be under the control of the E.A.P., for if the 
frontier tribes became dependent on them the Protectorate would then 
be led to assume effective administration over the area - "a result 
which isnot at all desired". Indeed, Elgin made it absolutely 
clear that bis scheme was no longer to be connected in any way 
with a forward administrative policy, which he wanted to avoid in 
the immediate future also, because of the problem of communications 
and the great distance between Nairobi and the border area. He 
stressed three priorities on the frontier: first, to protect the
tribes in the British Protectorate; secondly, to divert trade to 
ICismayu arid Nairobi and, thirdly, to have two or three reliable officers 
on the border capable of collecting intelligence. Elgin argued that 
all these tasks could be pei'forme.d quite adequately by officers 
controlled fron Addis Ababa. But Elgin's coup de grAce was his casual
burdens This was
C. to Read., 1 Feb. 1908, CO.533/51.
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reference to the Treasury's suggestion that the foreign Office
1should pay for all this.
Harrington had no objection to the frontier inspectors 
being under the control of the Legation at Addis and suggested 
that two inspectors and one hundred men would probably be sufficient 
to check further incursions. Yet it was highly unlikely that Mene­
lick would allow them to is side an Ethiopia, while there wa s no 
chance of the Foreign Office being willing to pay for what it
2
considered to be an essentially Colonial Office responsibility.
By the aid of the year the Foreign Office was gently prodding the
C.O. by enquiring what steps they would take to check incursias
3and mentioning the general lawlessness on the frontier. But
Elgin had ruled out any administrative advance towards the border,
4and so for the time being there was nothing to be done. The 
impasse over the question of finance could not be circumvented, 
yet once again pressures were building up for some action, this 
time from a new source.
1C0. to FO., 2 March 1908, FO.371/394; Read., Minute, 22 Feb. 19O8, 
CO.533/51.
2H. to G., 16 May 1908, FO. 371/394.
3F.0. to C.O., 18 Dec. 1908, CO.533/50.
^ead, Minute, n.d. in 00.533/47; 0.0. to F.0,, 6 Jan. 1909 and 
Clerk, Minute, 12 Jan. 1909, E’0.371/595*
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Towards the end of 1908, Major G-wynn who was delimiting
the frontier sent hack some strong, lucid dispatches.^ He
described the unsettled state of affairs on the frontier in
great detail. He warned that if permanent occupation of the
frontier was delayed, a very serious situation would arise,
not because of the threat of Ethiopian raids, but because of the
growing number of rifles coming into the country. This recognition
that the gradual arming of the Somali ms the chief danger on
the border was not new, for Zaphiro had already mentioned it,
but attention had never been drawn to this problem quite so 
2
forcibly. There was so much in ter-tribal fighting in fact
that Grwynn was forced to tell the Somali that administration
was coming soon, so as to get them to accept the fragile authority 
3of Zaphiro. Gwynn naturally wrote back saying that he also 
hoped for a permanent force on the frontier by the end of 1909.^ 
'Gwynn was especially scathing in his remarks about the 
Boma Trading Company which had recei"ved permission to trade on
1
The delimitation of the frontier and 1he diplomatic background 
to this is discussed later in this chapter.
2G. to 0., 11 Deo. 1908, 00.533/54.
3G. to 0., 28 Dec. 1908, GO.533/54.
4G. to C.O., 30 Deo. 1908, CO.533/54.
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the Ethiopian border in the middle of 1908. By November it
had opened what one director called "two thoroughly equipped"
2
stations at Moyale and Dolo. But Gwynn wrote that their 
post at Dolo did little good and that it was insecure, yet he could 
not recommend its withdrawal because of the bad effect this would 
have cn the local tribes. It was clear that the Somali did not 
understand the position cf the Company’s officers, but tended 
to look on them and to appeal to them as though they were Govern­
ment officials. They also got on very badly with Zaphiro, and 
Gwynn thought it was most unfortunate that the Company had ever 
been allowed to trade in the area, though now the only solution 
was some form of peimanent occupation.^ As one official noted 
at the Colonial Office: "Major Gwynn seems to think that there 
is danger of the Boma Trading Company landing us in trouble if 
we leave the country to them".^
Gwynn wanted frontier inspectors to be appointed at once
5so that there was no gap in the protection of the frontier. However,
1
H. to G., 9 May 1908, CO.5 33/ 50; Further Notes on Marsabit District, 
DC/MKD/7/1/2.
Riddell to Sadler, 17 Nov. 1908, CO.533/47. Also: Ward to Sir
Francis Hopwood, 23 Nov. 1908, 00.533/56.
■^ G. to C., 12 Dec. 19^8, CO.533/54; Zaphiro, Repo it, 10 Aug. I9O7, 
DC/MLB/21 (A).
4Col. Seely, Minute, 12 Sept. 1909, 00,533/59.
5Ellis, Minute, n. d. CO.533/54.
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these proposals needed money and the problem still remained
as to where to find it.^ - But in January 1909, Hayes Sadler,
who was not yet aware of Gwynn*s proposal, suddenly recommended
establishing a post at Marsabit at an early date, to counteract
the serious Ethiopian incursions along lake Rudolf. Sadler
had become convinced like Zaphiro that Ethiopia was adopting a more
aggressive policy towards the E.A.P. He also observed that the
position of the Boma Trading Company was a further argument
2
in favour of strengthening the Protectorate^ position. Three 
weeks later Sadler was requesting permission to proceed at 
once with the formation of a station at Marsabit.-^
Although under Elgin it had been decided not to set up a 
post at Marsabit because this would have involved an extension 
of administration, under the new Colonial Secretary, Lord Crewe, 
the Colonial Office was cautiously reverting to the idea cf a 
gradual extension of administration along the northern frontier, 
though one precondition was a consultation with W. S. Clark at
the Foreign Office, who bad first-hand knowl edge of the area. ^
1Read, Minute, 4 March 190.9, 00.533/54.
2Sadler to Sec. of State, 12 Jan. 1909, CO.533/57.
3S. to Sec. of State, 2 Feb. 1909, CO.533/57.
^Read, Minute, n.d. on S. to Sec. of State, 12 Jan. & 2 Feb. 1909,
GO.533/57. j
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Harrington supported Sadler's plan as well as Gwynn's recommendations,
but this new evidence that the Colonial Office ms once more
thinking of a forward policy only drew a cautious reflection at
the Foreign Office: "they must not be encouraged to think that
we shall pay".^ It was a reflection moreover that was not entirely
out of place, for the Treasury had only sanctioned the retention
of Zaphiro's services three months after his contract had expired;
2money was clearly still a problem.
What was needed to get Treasury backing at this moment was 
detailed plans from Sadler for administering the frontier. In 
April 1909, however, Sadler was offered the post of Governor of 
the Windward Islands and he left the Protectorate for good. Until 
Girouard the new Governor, arrived in September, the affairs of 
the Protectorate were left in the bands of Jackson, and during 
this period of hiatus no important decisions were taken about the 
Northern Frontier.
In September 1909 Zaphiro was recalled. He had served for
four years cn the frontier without leave, and m s  now ill and ex-
4 rthausted. At relatively short notice Jackson, the Acting Go-uemor
*1
Langley, Minute, 25 March 1909> FO,37l/595.
2H. to s., 27 Feb. 1909, FO.371/595.
3G.H.Mungeam (l96S), 205.
4H. to G., 11 June 1909, ^0.571/595;
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of the E.A.P., agreed to send Barrett to perfoim Zaphiro*s duties 
during his absence. Barrett arrived at Moyale on October 23rd
not only without instructions - except that he was to r elieve
2
Zaphiro - but even uncertain from whom he was to receive orders.
^he situation on the frontier was also particularly difficult
at this time. Just before Zaphiro left, Wolde Gabriel had called
an assembly of all the Boran chiefs and told them that the British
had no right to the Golbo lowlands, except for the Garre districts.
Zaphiro, likewise, called a meeting of all the Golbo tribes which
seems to have been cfevoted to accusing the Ethiopians of aggression.
This situation ms exacerbated by Zaphiro* s withdrawal, for it
further encouraged the local Ethiopian officials to press for
3a more favourable frontier.
Moreover, Barrett arrived at Moyale with a totally inadequate
escort. Zaphiro had used Ethiopian irregulars and it had been
t
planned that on reaching Addis le would recruit more and send them 
to Barrett. But Barrett quickly came to the conclusion that he 
would not employ Ethiopian irregulars, and his suggestion that a 
frontier force should be foimed from the King’s African Rifles,
C. to J., 11 Aug. 1909; J. to C. , 23 Aug. 1909, FO. 371/595.
2H. to G., 18 Hov. 1909, ffO.371/595.
to G., 23 Oct. 1909, FO.371/595.
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though sensible enough, could not he put into practice straight 
1away.
These developments were viewed with some anxiety at Addis,
where it was felt that Zaphiro* s irregulars ought to have been
kept on. In the first place, the Ethiopians were uneasy orer
the placing of regular troops on the frontier, and it ^ sre them
the impression that the Protectorate was going to adopt an
2aggressive policy. But, secondly, Thesiger, the new resident, 
was convinced that the Ethiopians would not allow Barrett to patrol 
wells to the west of Moyale in Ethiopian territory with regulars. 
This would have made it impossible for Barrett to ensure that 
tribes on the British side had adequate access to wells they tradi- 
tionally used in the Ethiopian sphere. However, by this time 
new proposals had been made for securing the frontier more 
thoroughly.
With quite remarkable speed, in fact less than two months 
after his arrival in Nairobi, Girouard began to unfold sweeping 
plans for the administration of the northern frontier. In November
^Gpt. Barrett* s Reports, DC/MLE/2/4; G, to C., 15 Nov. 1909,
CO. 533/63. However, within a month of arriving in East Africa 
Girouard sent Cpt. Aylmer with a detachment of troops to support 
Barrett, but even a detachment was much too small.
%. to G., 10 Jan. 1910, JO. 371/821.
to G., 10 Jan. 1910, F0. 371/821.
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he telegraphed Crewe to say:
I consider the time has now come to supercede Zaphiro 
and substitute control by affioers of this Protectorate 
on the Abyssinian boundary. I regard this as essential 
both for administrative reasons aid owing to the growing 
importance of trade in hoses and cattle. I suggest 
that /the/ frontier district should be formed with 
stations at Meru, Marsabit and Port Harrington ^oyale/.
He argued that it was clear from Gwynn's correspondence that the
time had arrived to take the frontier administration firmly in
hand. He proposed that the frontier district should be a separate
entity, and that its senior officer should report direct to the
secretariat. "The policy1', he wrote in a dispatch, "would be to
work through chiefs and tribes along the boundary, strengthening
and protecting those who are friendly.1
But soon Girouard was proposing two additional frontier posts
to Moyale, one at Polo and the other in the vicinity of lake Rudolf.
Between these posts he envisaged patrols on pretty well continuous
inspection. The cost of the three stations was estimated at £3,000,
though it was far from oertain that all three would be established
at the same time. The Colonial Office approved the scheme and the
115 Nov. 1909, CO.553/63.
2G. to C., 22 Nov. 1909, 00.533/63. 
\  to C., 2 Jan. 1910, CO" 533/71.
4.0 5
Treasury agreed to £3,000 being added to the 1910-11 estimates.^-
By April, Gdrouard had appointed Hope as the first Officer
in Charge on the newly ccnstituted Northern Frontier District,
and the latter set off at once on an inspection tour of Moyale 
2
and Marsabit.,. Girouard had already accepted Barrett's recommendati oi 
that:
the administraticn should be as simple as possible 
and for the first few years at least need mean little 
more than the prevention and ^ttlement of tribal 
quarrels. ^
The speed at which effective administration was to be introduced 
was still a raster for argument, but the first problem was to de­
cide which frontier Hope was to patrol.
Girouard* s plans had all hinged on the adoption of the 
revised f rentier, which had been suggested by Gwynn and supported
4  TTby the Government. He maintained that if Gwynn's line was not 
accepted by the Ethiopians, then he would not attempt any sort 
of administration north of Marsabit. Moyale would have to be 
abandoned, Barrett would have to be recalled, and he would have to 
revert to Zaphiro, and his antiquated methods. 11 This would in my
^Treasury to G.O., 5 March 1910, GO.533/81.
2
G. to O.C. of N.F.D., n.d. encl. in G. to C., 8 April 1910, CO.533/72.
•7.
Opt. Barrett, Memorandum, n.d. in F0.371/821.
^Gwynn delimited the frontier in 1908 and suggested modifications 
to Maud's line. Thus there were two proposed border lines, Maud's 
known as the Red line, and Gwynn's known as the blue line. Ethiopia 
accepted neither.
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opinion", he concluded, "involve a disastrous loss of prestige 
and would perpetuate the existence of an Alsatia on our northern 
frontiers which cannot fail to he a continual source of trouble 
and annoyance in the future". No doubt there was a certain 
amount of bluff here. The implied threat of retrenchment, 
the reference to a loss of face were probably designed to exert 
maximum pressure to secure backing for Gwynn* s proposals. At 
any rate the Colonial Office did not wait for the outcome of 
these Anglo-Sthiopian negotiations before informing the Foreign 
Office at the beginning of January 1910 that they had now made 
arrangements for the administration of the frontier, and that in 
future officers were to receive their instructions from Nairobi 
and not from A^dis Ababa. Moreover, when Gwynn’s line was not 
accepted by t he Ethiopian Government, Girouard did not alter his 
arrangements to administer the Northern Frontier District (N.F.D.) 
or indeed change his plans an any way.
Nevertheless, the problem of the frontier was a serious one. 
When Hope arrived at Moyale in October 1910, he discovered that the 
Government post there, and his headquarters, were almost certainly 
in Ethiopian territory even according to Maud's line. As Hope put
1G. to 0., 5 Jan.1909, CO.533/71.
C.O. to F.O., 4 Jan. 1910, TO.371/821.
4 0 7
it, things were going to be awkward.'1' Administration of the 
frontier was being undertaken while the border itself was still 
in dispute and this was largely the result of the 1907 An glo-Ethiopian 
Treaty.
In 1907 it had seemed that there would be a diplomatic 
*■>
break through after nine years of fruitless negotiation over the
E.A.P. Ethiopian border. Por Menelick egreed tcjfsign a Treat^rith
Great Britain virtually accepting Maud’s line as a frontier with
the E.A.P. There were the usual last minute hitchess approval to
sign came too late for by then Menelick seemed to have changed
his mind, while all copies of the proposed Treaty were lost by
2
the Legation in A<idis as well as by the Ethiopian Government.
Nevertheless an Agreement was signed in December, though one of
its clauses stipulated that the border should be delimited by a
joint Anglo-Ethiopian Boundary Commission. The Commission, moreover,
had paer to make such modifications in the frontier line as geo-
graphical or other conditions necessitated. However, the 1907
3Agreement was to be binding pending delimitation.
By March 1908, three months after the Agreement had been signed, 
Harrington began to feel that there was a certain urgency in getting
XH. to G., 10 Oct. 1910, CO.533/83.
2G. to C., 21 Jan. 1907: C. to G., 11 and 12 April 1907, F0.37l/l90.
5C. to G., 11 April 1907, F0.371/395; H. to G., 1 Jan.1908, F0.37l/395.
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the Commissioners appointed, Menelick requested either Delme 
Radcliffe or Gwynn be appointed British Commissioner and this 
infoimation was passed on to Lord Elgin. The Colonial Office 
was opposed to the appointment of Delme Radcliffe, whom they 
considered to be an intriguer, so Gwynn w&s chosen,^ He left 
England in May at the head of a small team composed of Cpt.
Waller, the Assistant Commissioner, Cpt. Gordon, the Transport 
Officer, Dr. Drake Brockman, the Medical Officer, aid two assistant 
surveyors. Yet when they arrived in Addis Ababa, Menelick had still 
not appointed an Ethiopian Commissioner, and there seemed little 
likelihood that he would. At the time Menelick was seriously ill, 
and no one could be found who would act on their own initiative,
■5
and take responsibility for the decisions that needed to be made.
At the beginning of November, the Foreign Secretary decided 
that Gwynn should wait no longer, but should begin delimiting 
the frontier even though an Ethiopian Commissioner had still not 
been appointed, ^  After Gwynn had left, Hervey, from the British
1H. to S., 27 March and 17 April 1908; F.O. to C.O., 2 April I9O8; 
C.O. to F.O., April 1908, FO.371/395.
2C.W.Gwynn, GjJ. (1911), 114.
%. to G., 16 Oct. and 23 Oct. 1908, FO. 371/395.
4G. to H., 16 Oct.1908, ^O.371/395.
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Legation in Addis, managed to obtain a personal interview
with Menelick. Apparently the Emperor had already ordered
Dejazmach Balcha and Fitaurari Hapta Giorghis to send reliable
men to help Gwynn, but that was all. So Hervey told Menelick
that though only one Commissioner had been appointed the boundary
1
would still be officially recognised; and Menelick agreed.
This amount of the meeting was a particularly important 
one, for later much misunderstanding seems to have stemmed from 
the conversation. Presumably Hervey was referring here to the 
boundary that Gwynn was in the process of delimiting, inclusive 
of any modifications he might recommend. But there is a certain 
amount of ambiguity in the wording of the letter, or at the very 
least considerable vagueness, and it is far from dear whether 
Menelick was agreeing to abide by the 1907 Agreement (which made 
no provision for a unilateral delimitation of the frontier) or offering a 
carte blanche to Gwynn. From Hervey's account, the Foreign Office later 
concluded that Menelick had given a firm undertaking to support and 
recognise any alterations to the boundary that Gwynn might make 
which were compatible with the terms of the Treaty.
Moreover, -frhen Gwynn wrote back from Moyale in January 1909, 
it became dear that he ms going to recommend quite considerable
1H. to G. , 5 Deo. 1908, 00.533/66 or F0.371/395.
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and. important modifications to the frontier. In the first 
place, Gwynn modified the boundary around Kuffole, giving 
to Britain a small but valuable area that included the important 
wells of Gaddaduma. Minor deflections were also made to the 
north-west of Roka, where further wells were given to Britain.
Then Gwynn discovered that Moyale had been placed an correctly 
on Maud's map with the result that Eaphiro's post was in Ethiopian 
territory. So once more Gwynn re-routed the boundary to Britain's 
advantage. Inieturn he gave the unimportant and seasonal wells 
at Gall ago to the Ethiopians.
It was not very hard to see which country was getting all 
the advantages in these recommended boundary alterations, and 
Gwynn did write at one point that the Emperor would not be pleased. 
Nevertheless he defended his recommendations on two grounds.
First, he claimed that; "a literal acceptance of the treaty line
would have giwen us a frontier line absolutely impossible to patrol 
or watch”. Secondly, he claimed that Maud had been misinformed 
both about the habitat and the inhabitants of the Golbo. For the 
wells, at Gaddaduma were not at the foot of the escarpment but at 
the edge of the highlands, and according to Maud1 s reasoning they 
should have been used by the highland tribes which meant the Boran. 
But Gwynn claimed that the wells were primarily used by the lowland 
tribes and that generally theyjhr outnumbered the Boran there.^
G. to H., 27 Jan.1909, CO.533/66.
However, Gwynn's observations suffered from one major defect.
The failure of the rains in 1908 and an outbreak of rinderpest
amongst the Boran led to abnormal population movements, which made
it extremely difficult for Gwynn to leam what the usual clan
1
concentrations would have been. And it seems more thai probable
that the large concentration of Garre ab Gaddaduma in 1909 was 
2
far from usual.
Hervey had been careful to point out to Loed Grey that
Gwynn* s line differed maikedly from tie 1907 Agreement. The
Foreign Office, however, supported Gwynn*s line with the observation
that it was "almost identical" with the cne accepted locally
by the Ai^ hara when Zaphiro had beenon the frontier. Someone was
3
clearly misinformed.
The problem remained, therefore, of how to present Gwynn* s 
proposals to the Ethiopian Government. The main justification, 
for altering the frontier was that it was unworkable in practice.
The fallacy of this argument, indeed its basic dishonesty, lay 
in the conclusion that the only remedy consisted In the actual 
transfer of sovereignty over land and wells. Of course this remedy
1
General Report by Major Gwynn respecting the Apglo-Abyssinian 
Boundary Commission 1908/9, 3 Nov. 1909, 00.533/69.
2G. to C., 27 Jan.1909, K . 371/596.
3F.O. to C.0.,1 April 1909, CO.533/66.
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suited, the British, they were bound to gain the most from it,
but it was not in the interests of Ethiopia and it was not the
only solution. It would have been quite possible to site British
frontier posts wit Inn Ethiopian territory, This would not have
been so convenient for Britain but it would have been a more
1equitable solution.
Meanwhile Menelick decided to send his own border commission
to the south. It indicated that the Ethiopians were suspicious of
Gwynn and this made it very unlikely that they would accept his
proposals. At first the Foreign Office felt that it would be
bestto play a waiting game, but Zaphiro sonn came up with the
suggestion that the implications o£ Gwynn1 s line should be hidden
by an indefinite verbal description. This plan ms  strongly resisted
by Gwynn, however, who maintained that it was out of the question
2
to 'doctor* or suppress new maps of the frontier.
Yet the Ethiopians refused to accept Gwynn's line and its 
forcible occupation ms ruled out f or a number of reasons. On the 
one hand, it would have antagonised Menelick at a time when it was 
hoped to open trade routes from Addis to Gambala and the Sudan.
Then Menelick was still very ill and it was not thought wise to 
antagonise the Shoan faction in case of his death. lastly, there was
1
this solution was suggested at the FO. but quickly dismissed, see: 
Clark, Minute, 23 March 1909? FO.371/596.
Z. to E., 21 July 1909; G. to P.O., 27 July I9O9, FO.371/596.
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possibility that Germany would have offered Ethiopia strong
1diplomatic support* So Britain iried to find a diplomatic
solution to the problem.
But diplomacy achieved nothing, The Ethiopian demanded a
new Joint Commission and refused to accept Gwynn's unilateral
suggestions. It was also denied that Menelick had ever agreed
2
that a single Commission should be conclusive. It soon became
gpparent to Harcourt, the new Colonial Secretary, that there was
little to be hoped for from tie discus's! ons at Addis. He therefore
sent instructions that the frontier officials of the N.F.D. should
be instructed to occupy Maud1 s line at once, to hold on to Moyale,
and finally to inform Addis an the event of occupying Gwynn1 s
line. Thus, one year after the frontier had begun to be officially
administered, border officials were given their first definite
instructions as to precisely what frontier they were to defend.
3and occupy; it was about time.
This compromise, however, was not really much of a solution. 
Officially it was Maud's line that had been accepted, but the 
British were not prepared to give up Moyale and they continued 
to occupy it without reference to any Agreement. They refrained
1Macleay, Minute, 31 Dec.1910, FO.371/821; fhesiger, Minute,
21 Jan.1910, FO.371/822.
2T. to G., 21 Jan.1910, FO.371/822.
3H. to G., 21 Feb. 1911, F0.37l/l042.
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from seizing any wells in the Ethiopian sphere, but they 
maintained their right to do so if raids continued. So the 
frontier was to remain a problem, and a source both of tension 
and of conflict. It was unfortunate that the advent of border 
administration could do nothing to solve the frontier quarrel, 
any more than diplomatic discussions had done before. On the 
contrary, the extension of administration if anything increased 
the acerbity of the dispute. Only now the stakes were higher, 
the conflict more dangerous. Border incidents did not diminish 
but escalated dangerously, and in the end Gwynn* s line was forcibly 
occupied, leaving a legacy of distrust aad discontent.
415
Chapter IX
THE BORDER PROBLEM; THE_J30Rffl1_ j y ^
The E.A.P*/Ethiopian border problem involved other issues 
apart from the dispute over the frontier to be adopted. For with 
the creation of the Northern Frontier District (N^.M)‘.) in 1910, 
the Protectorate Government became increasingly involved in the 
problem of its own border peoples. In 1910, however, there was 
still a considerable degree of detachment, aid it was not even clear 
if the official policy of ’’observation (with no intention of en­
forcing compliance to our orders)" was to be followed on the
i
frontier as well as throughout the N.F.D. and Jubaland. The
initial assumption was that* the policy of observation was to be
limited largely to Jubaland, and in particular to the station at
Afmadu, where it was feared that the Muhammad Zubeir might be
hostile and where there were not enough troops to deal with them.
Along the border, on the other hand, it was assumed that there
2
would be effective administration.
Thus, it only emerged gradually that there was to be no 
effective administration anywhere in the N.F.D. or Jubaland, not
^Girouard to Hope, 8 April 1910, 00.533/72.
2Thesiger, Minute, 11 May 1910, 00. 533/72.
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even along the Ethiopian border itself. The main stumbling block 
as usual was the lack of funds. It was stated that effective 
control of the border was to be introduced as the opportunity . 
presented itself, and this meant when the money was available 
and as cheaply as possible.^
This position was one that many people felt to be unsatis­
factory, including lord Crewe, the, Colonial Secretary, Both Gwynn 
and Thesiger in Addis had also favoured effective administration 
of the frontier. Zaphiro thought that frontier posts were a mistake, 
especially weak ones. He pointed out that previously he had been 
able to letire gracefully in the face of superior force, but a 
permanent post would involve loss of prestige if it oould not 
provide protection for the people in its vicinity and if it could 
not repel the Ethiopians. Zaphiro could not envisage an intermediate
stage between his own irregular form of influence and effective 
2
occupation. Moreover, the number of troops at first sssigned to 
the N.F.D. were hardly sufficient to guard one frontier officer, 
quite apart from, the other duties they might be expected to assume,
n
Butler, Minute, 12 May 1910, CO.533/72; Further Notes on Marsabit 
District, DC/MBT/7/l/2; G.F.Archer, G.J.. XLII (1913), 421. See 
alsos H.Moyse Bartlett (1956), 212.
2Butler, Minute, 24 June 1910, CO.533/72.
^Thesiger, Minute, 11 May 1910, CO.533/72.
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Then the Inspector General of the King*s African Kifles (K.A.E.) 
argued that by sending political officers and troops to the 
frontier a so-called^policy of observation became impossible.
The necessity of preventing Ethiopian raids remained. Moreover, 
it was impossible to remain entirely detached from the problems 
of the frontier tribes, and having too few troops on the spot was 
inviting disaster.^
The weakness of the Protectorate Government on the frontier 
was also a factor that encouraged its repeated violation, for it 
led to the feeling that Britain was not really serious about en­
forcing the boundary. As Thesiger explained:
The Abyssinians cannot understand xthat the question 
of the expense for the maintenance of another one 
or two hundred men can enter into the consideration 
of a power like Gt. Britain, and they attribute our 
omission to have a proper police force at the disposal 
of the frontier officers solely to. indifference. 2
And it was not the ivory poachers who most threatened the stability
of the frontier. It was, on the contrary, the growing official
disrespect of the border that posed the greatest problem, and this
was based on differing Anglo-Ethiopian interpretations of the 1907
Agreement and the effects of Gwynn1 s recommendations. Ultimately,
however, the problem of the frontier and of the frontier tribes
overlapped so that the two could no longer be treated separately.
-j
Thesiger, "Memorandum on military aspects of the southern Abyssinian 
Boundary", 23 May 1910, 00.533/72.
o
Thesiger, "Report on the situation in Abyssinia", 1912, P0.57l/l571.
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It became impossible to ignore the fallacy behind Maud's 
conclusion that ethnic and physical boundaries coincided along 
the frontier, and that the escarpment that divided the highland 
from the lowland also divided Boran from Garre and Gabra from 
Rendille. It was an idle pretence - but it had enabled Britain 
to secure a more favourable boundary than would otherwise have 
been possible - and Zaphiro had maintained the myth as best he 
could. However, when Gwynn visited the area in 1909» he was the 
first person to mention the existence of the Golbo Boran.^ These 
were lowland Boran who were in the British sphere, who traditionally 
lived below the escarpment, and who had every right to remain there.
This information completely invalidated Maud and Zaphiro's assumptions 
about the frontier and introduced a new set of problems. Zaphiro 
had admitted that the Gabra were to be found on both sides of the 
frontier, but the difficulties this created were not really faced 
up to until 1910 when Thesiger, the British Representative in Addis, 
noted:
The establishment of the Red line (Maud1s line) 
cut off from Abyssinia a considerable section of 
the Borana aid Gabbra tribes whom we recognised 
to be Abyssinian subjects. Had the Agreement been 
a territorial division of British from Abyssinian 
subjects we might claim that by the recognition of
1 Girouard. to Crewe, 27 Jan. 1909, FO.371/596.
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the Red Line all natives south of it became British 
subjects and vice versa. We did not do this, however, 
but agreed upon a tribal division by which Bo ran a 
and Gabbra were to be left to Abyssinia, 1
The crucial problem did not really centre, however, on
the citizenship of those Boran and Gabra who normally lived in
the British Protectorate. The most difficult question was connected
i
with the policy to be adopted towards the Boran and Gabra that
crossed from Ethiopia into the E.A.P, Thus in April 1910 a
number of Boran moved into British territory saying that they
had once lived there. But Ethiopian officials at once demanded
2their return which was refused. Later Geydu, the head of the
a
Boran, and/few Ethiopian soldiers approached Barrett, the P.O.
Moyale, and asked that the B0ran be returned to them, again this 
■3
was refused.
The situation was especially delicate for a number of
reasons. In the first place, most of the Boran in the E.A.P.
crossed over into Ethiopia at least once a year, either to gain
access to water and grazing or to visit their chiefs and religious 
4leaders. They were therefore particularly vulnerable to Ethiopian
1T. to G., 9 Nov. 1910, CO.533/83.
2G. to C., 3 June 1910, 00.533/74.
to C., 7 June 1910, CO.533/74.
to G., 29 Oct. 1910, CO.533/78.
reprisals, and towards the end of the year Ethiopian dtficials 
began to seize Boran who came to Gaddaduma from the Protectorate. 
Secondly, there was the confused status of Boran who lived in 
the no-man's land between Maud's line and Gwynn's line. Ethiopian 
officials continued to regard these Boran as Ethiopian citizens 
and levied taxes on them.^
Towards the end of 1910 a number of compromises were sug­
gested. A proposal, that Boran living between the two disputed 
frontier lines should either return to Ethiopia or pay the Ethiopians 
tax for ten years and remain under the control of the E.A.P.,
was eventually changed to an egreement not to levy any taxes at
2
all on people living within that area. Then Thesiger put forward 
the view that Britain was under an obligation to return all Boran 
who crossed over into the Protectorate. He also suggested that 
all Gabra and Boran in the E.A.P. (even those at Wajir) should be 
returned to Ethiopia, since according to him they were Ethiopian 
citizens. His plan was to arrange for the Ethiopian recognition 
of Gwynn's line in return for the exchange of wells at Muggado 
and Gorai aid the repatriation of the Boran and Gabra. It was
also to be stated explicitly that future refugees would not be
3
handed over. This was a plan that gained the support of Girouard,
l
1H. to G., 19 Oct. 1910, CO.533/83.
“Tlacleay, Minute, 51 Dec. 1910, CO.533/835 Moyale District 
Political Records 1902-1942, DC/MLE/2/4.
toe., 9 Oct. 1910, CO.533/83; T. to Grey, 29 Oct. 1910,
CO.533/78.
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who thought that it could produce a lasting settlement,^
The situation, however, grew more serious in 1913 when 
Barrett reported large parties of Boran crossing into the Pro­
tectorate, These Boran did not claim to have lived previously 
in the Protectorate, hut complained of Ethiopian oppression which
they gave as the reason for their mass movement,. They were also
2chased and attacked by some 80 Ethiopian soldiers. The situation 
seemed to be particularly dangerous since Gerezmach Gashi threatened 
that unless the Boran were handed badk Ethiopia would preate trouble. 
He also added that if the Boran had any complaints they should have 
made them before Fitaurari Waldfc. And it wasjfelt that the frontier 
force was inadequate to protect the Boran in the event of the 
Ethiopians really deciding to recapture them.^ Then, at the begin­
ning of May, some thirteen more Boran cattle bom as crossed into the 
British Protectorate. It was clear that the southern Ethiopians 
were not going to tolerate this situation for long.
Anticipating a crisis, Barrett felt compelled to compromise:
HI know the Government does not want war with Abyssinia suddenly
^Girouard to 0., 29 Nov* 1910, 00.533/78.
2B. to H., 20 May 1913, 00•533/118.
^H.G. Dickinson to Barrett, 23 April 1913, GO.533/118.
^Hope to Chief Sec., 9 Oct. 1913, FC/NFB/4/3/l.
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forced on them1', be wrote perhaps rather over-dramatic ally.
He therefore proposed that Gerezmach Gashi and Geydu should 
tour the area with him persuading the Boran to return, and promising 
that they would be given a written guarantee of good treatment if 
they did so. This proposal was accepted by Belfield, the Acting 
Governor, but it was received with open disapproval at the Colonial
p
Office. As I*ides minuted:
X dont know why our officials should be in such a hurry 
to hand these Boran back to Abyssinia... As the Abyssinian 
Government is in a state of chaos it seems to be unnecessary 
to consider their susceptabilities.3
Read also thought that Barrett had exaggerated the risk of war
and that whatever the risk, it was more likely to be increased
through acting feebly.^ " Indeed, opinion was unanimous that the
Boran should not have been handed back and that stronger action
should have been taken. A telegram was drafted to this effect.
The Colonial Office also pointed out that in the case <f the Uganda/
Congo boundary negotiations great stress had been laid on not having
to hand back people who threw in their lot with the British. It
5
was felt that this was a norm to be observed elsewhere.
1B. to Chief Sec., 1 May 1913, C0.533/U8.
2B. to H., 20 May 1913, CO.533/118.
3Pides, Minute, 21 May 1913, CO.533/118.
^Read, Minute, 17 June 1913, CO. 533/118.
%oyale District Political Records, 1902-1942, DC/MLE/2/4.
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As it was, events in the first week of Mqr added anew
dimension to the problem and Barrett never had to send the Boran
back to Ethiopia. The situation improved, in one sea se at least,
and Barrett did not invite Gashi or Geydu to go along the British
2frontier with him. nevertheless, in the r ecriminations that 
followed, Barrett found himself defending his earlier suggestion 
even as late as August, by which time the whole matter had become 
purely academic. By that date there was no longer any real 
Ethiopian pressure to have the Boran repatriated. E^Lier some 
Tigrean hunters had tried to entice a group of Boran across the 
frontier, but otherwise there was little disturbance.^ By that 
date too there was no question of the Boran being encouraged 
to leave the Protectorate, though later it was suggested that 
Ethiopian Boran should not be allowed to graze with Protectorate
5
Boran since it caused trouble. Yet it was certain that most of 
the Protectorate Boran would migrate northwards at some time or 
other, largely because they wanted to make use of wells in Ethiopia. 
They were always warned that they would be arrested by the Ethiopians
At the very beginning of May, Opt. Aylmer was killed by a group of 
Tigre raiders. This raid had nothing to do with the Boran but was 
more connected with the Gabra and is dealt with in the next section. 
However, this misfortune led to reduced tension alaag the border,
2B. to Chief Sec., (A) 26 May 1913, CO.533/119.
5B. to OC.NFD., 27 August. 1913, 00.533/124.
4B. to Chief Sec., (B) 26 May 1913, CO.533/119.
^V.G. Glen day, Handing Over Report 1915, PC/nI'D/2/6/1.
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if they did so, hut the decision was then left entirely up to
them and they were never prevented from leaving the E.A.P.*^
At the same time, the problem of the Boran was never far
removed from that of the Gabra. There were two lots of Gabra!
one secticn under chief Gallarassa, who lived at Waye, moved
and grazed to the west of Moyale; mother section under chief
Chiromo was centred on Gamud, and the area to the south and
east of Moyale. Since chief Gallarassa*s village was only a few
hundred yards from the frontier, he was particularly vulnerable
to Ethiopian raids. Moreover, the cattle sections of the Gabra
frequently crossed the frontier and for part of the year they
were generally concentrated around Magado in Ethiopia. The
camel Gabra sections, on the other hand, were found further south
at Turbi and around the Hurri hills. They also tended to migrate
to the Lorian Swamp by a route to the east of Mt. Marsabit, with
the result that they came into less contact with the Ethiopians.
In 1908 the Gabra lost most of their cattle through rinderpest,
but Zaphiro came to their assistance and gave them stock taken in
3'a raid on Wajir. Then in 1912 Gallarassa* s camel sections lost 
at least 25°/o of their herds through disease,^ " They were not
1Hope to Chief Sec., 25 Aug. 1913, CO.533/124.
2
Later attempts to persuade Gallarassa to move to Marsabit, 
especially after it had been evacuated by the Samburu failed.
T. S. Thomas (1917), 86.
3Bope "Report", 30 July 1910, CO.533/76.
^G.]?.Archer, Handing Over Report, 29 Jan. 1912, CO.533/103.
therefore particularly rich in stock.
Nevertheless both sections of the Gabra were periodically
harrassed by elephant hunters from the east and from the west,
though for a time it did seem that the Ethiopians were making some
attempt to control the situation. Early in 1910 one hundred
Ethiopian soldiers under the command of Garazmach Tezamma arrived
on the border with instructions to arrest all hunters there.^
But they were unable to operate in the vicinity of lake Rudolph
which was the area that was most raided.
Both sections of Gabra were also troubled by Ethiopian
tax collecting expeditions. In May 1910, Hope reported that
Ethiopian soldiers from Arero had crossed the frontier and levied
2
taxes on the Gabra at Gadder, to the south-east of Moyale. Yet 
Hope, the Officer Commanding Troops in the N.P.D., never anti­
cipated a really serious situation developing as a result of these
Ethiopian incursions, though Girouard did ask him t o draw up a
3scheme of needs in case of trouble. When the Gabra began to 
migrate in large numbers across the frontier in 1913, however, 
the position became much more dangerous and the Protectorate ad­
ministration was no better prepared to deal with it.
1G. to C., 3 June 19X0, CO.533/74. 
2G. to C., 12 July 1910, CO.533/75. 
h. to C., 1 Aug. 3910, CO.533/76.
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In 1913 large numbers of Gabra crossed the border near
the Hurri hills and moved on to Maikona. It was estimated that
fully half of all the Gabra previously in Ethiopia were involved
in this migration. Dudda Koritcha, one of the head chiefs of
the British Gabra, later reported that they hal been attacked by
Ethiopians shortly after crossing the frontier. They were then
raided again at Maikona. About sixteen Gabra were killed and some
24,000 sheep were stolen: about ten bomas of sheep. The raid was
undertaken by Dejazmach Maridand a certain amount of looted stock
was subsequently recovered by Fitufcrari W©ld£, who also took dis-
ciplinary action against Majid himself. But at about the same
time the Gabra at Nalatcha were also raided twice* The first raid
was carried out by, eight Gelubba, six of whom were armed with
rifles. Six days later there was a larger raid, again carried
out by Gelubba.^ Then on 25 April, the Samburu were raided around
Mt. Kulal by thirty Gelubba and six Ethiopians, and though the
latter speared to be soldiers of Fitaurari Makonnen, whose district
lay between lakes Stephani and Rudolf, there was not enough evidence 
5
to be certain.
^H.B.Sharpe, Marsabit Political Records Book, 1928, PC/NFD/4/1/2.
2B. to Chief Sec., 1 May 1913, CO.533/1X8.
■^"Memorandum on Mr. Thesiger's Journey to the southern frontier of
Abyssinia and Nairobi’*, in T. to Grey, 15 May 1914, F0.37l/l880.
4B. to OC.NFD., 14 July 1913, CO.533/121; J.R.K.Thorp, "The Gelubha
of the Omo Delta11, Rhodes House.
K^. to Sec., 1 May 1913> F0.37l/l572; "Memorandum" in T. to G.,
15 May 19^4» F0.371/1880. ...
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Events came to a head on 1 May when an Ethiopian raiding
party was surprised by Captain Aylmer, who was shot and mortally
wounded an the engagement that followed.^ Aylmer* s death was in
many respects a turning point. For one thing it immediately eased
Ethiopian pressure on the frontier. Fearing a reprisal,Ethiopian
officials became markedly more cooperative and more anxious to
2ensure that further raids were not carried out. In a way Aylmer* s 
death was the price that had to be paid for an ineffective control
of the border, as Thesiger later pointed out, but, one e paid, it
■5
significantly helped to remove the earlier tensions.
Aylmer*s death also raised a broader problem. A question 
that was hotly debated was whether it necessitated any revision of 
policy towards Ethiopia, and as a result it became particularly 
important to discover who had been responsible for Aylmer's death. 
The initial telegrams had all stated that he had been killed by 
Tigrean hunters.^ Moreover, shortly after Aylmer's death Barrett 
encountered a group of Tigrean hunters near Koobi Sigud and he was 
convinced that this must have been the band that had fought Aylmer;
1Barrett to Chief Sec., 4 May 1913, PC/NFD/4/l/5 or MLE/l5.
Barrett to OC.KS'D., 27 Aug. 1913, CO.533/124.
5T. to Tilley, 7 June 1913, K).37l/l572.
TMure to Sec., 28 May 1913 and Browning to Harcourt, 10 June 1913,
CO.533/119.
he noticed particularly that none were Ethiopian soldiers."*’
A week earlier a group of Tigre led by the hunter Aba Nyencha
had moved from Gaddaduma to Ajao, It is quite possible that
it was this group that Barrett encountered, but if so they had
had nothing to do with Aylmer's death since they had left
2
Gaddaduma after 1 May.
Quite early on Hope had concluded, on the other hand, that 
the evidence pointed to soldiers under Dejazraach Balcha and 
Balambaras WetLde Gabriel as the culprits. But it was suspected 
that the Garre were spreading these stories themselves, and that 
they wre trying to shield Tigrean hunters by throwing the blame 
on to Ethiopian soldiers.^ There was no doubt that the Garre 
and Tigre were at this time very closely allied and even took 
part xk joint raids. In fact they were far more closely associated 
than any administrative official yet realised. Nevertheless, 
by the beginning of June Barrett also had come round to the view 
that the people responsible for shooting Aylmer were soldiers 
belonging either to Dejazmach Balcha or to Balambaras Wflfl.de Gabriel
1B. to Sec., 26 May 1913, C0.533/H9.
^Dickinson to Chief Sec., 12 May 1913, CO.533/120.
'’Hope to Chief Sec., 17 June 1913, CO.533/120.
4B. to Chief Seow, 26 May 1913, CO.533/119.
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and by the end of the month he was convinced that the responsibility
1
lay with the soldiers belonging to Balambaras Waide Gabriel.
When Thesiger, from Addis, investigated Aylmer* s death several
months later, it was being conveniently attributed to a certain
Basha Jangur, an officer under Dejazmach Balcha, who was said to
have gone hunting c& his own initiative and to have been surprised
by Aylmer. It was also said thab he had died a few weeks later
from wounds received in the engagement between Barrett and the
2
Tigrean hunters at Koobi Sigud.
This explanation conveniently laid the blame at the door 
of a dead man. Xt was a story that seemed designed to fit all 
the facts, but fitted them rather badly. Tor officials on the 
frontier were confident of their ability to distinguish Tigrean 
hunters from Amharic soldiers, although at times both may have 
been intent on the^  same business. Either this confidence was mis­
placed or Basha Jangur and,his followers adopted disguise - a 
suggestion never made in any of the correspondence. Had Basha Jangur 
not died so soon and had the story not connected him with Barrett1 s 
brief encounter with Tigre at K. Sigud, it would have been a lot 
more convincingJ nevertheless, the story was accepted without 
criticism, and this meant that complaints had to be made against
1B. to Chief. See., 4 June and 25 June 1913, PC/NFD/4/3/l. 
^"Memorandum", in T. to G., 15 %y, 1914, FO.37l/l880.
Dejazmach Balcha, a very powerful Ethiopian. The wisdom of
this was naturally questioned.
Towards the end of May, and before the Golonial Office
had yet received news of Aylmer!s death, they had requested the
Foreign Office to make strong representations in Addis about
earlier and less important incursions. The answer which the
Foreign Office returned was hardly encouraging, and was based
on a minute by Langley an Assistant Under Secretary:
It is not a favourable moment for any application 
to the Abyssinians as the administration is in a 
state of chaos and no one will take the responsibility 
of doing anything. 2
But when in June news of Aylmer!s death reached London some action
had to "be taken.
Thesiger1 s view was that precisely because the central
government in Addis Ababa was so weak, it would fail to react to
any request unless this was backed by maximum pressure; and he
wished to threaten to bredc off diplomatic relations if British
demands were not complied with. He also suggested that these
demands should not be trifling. In the first place he ordered
the Ethiopian Government to send an expedition without delay to
1C.O. to F.O., 27 May 1913, F0.37l/l572.
%inute on CO. to FO., 27 May 1913, F0.37l/l572.
3T. to G., 7 June 1913, F0.37l/l572.
capture and destroy all hunters on the "border,, and suggested
that they should he allowed into the. British Protectorate so
1as to be able to finally destroy all' Tigre. He alsowanted 
to press for a rectification of the frontier, which in effect 
meant the acceptance of Gwynn's line. Finally he asked whether 
he was authorised to insist, that 300,000 dollars be paid to 
Aylmer's family as compensation and that no less than ten of 
the guilty band involved in his death be executed, half in Addis 
Ababa and half in Moyale.^
The general reaction at the Foreign Office to these pro­
posals was that they -vere excessive, thesiger in fact had pitched 
his demands, far higher than those made by the Colonial Office, 
and Tilley, senior clerk in the Africa Department, held that it 
was not possible to hold Ethiopia entirely accountable for an
incident that happened outside its .territory and where Britain
3was responsible for maintaining order. The Colonial Office only
pressed for a rectification of the frontier onihe assumption that
4Gaddaduma would be occupied*
1T. to Girouard, 5 June 1913, F0.37l/l572.
2T. to Grey, 4 June 1913, F0.37l/l572.
%lley, Minute, n.d. on T. to Grey, 4 June 1913, C0.37l/l372.
4C.O. to P.O., 21 June 1913, F0.37l/l572.
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When Thesiger met the Council of Ministers in June they
attempted to postpone discussion of the incident, and this led
ivim once again to urge that a definite stand should he taken
against this way of dealing with European affairs. He argued that
the Council would agree to the British terms, "if th^feel they
are forced to the wall. They realise they c annot afford to lose
1British friendship". But at the foreign Office this analysis 
was accepted with scepticism, and there was some surprise at the 
suggestion that British f riendship was so important to Ethiopia.
At the same time the Colonial Office did not press for 
any extreme diplomatic pressure. Bellfield, the Governor of the
E.A.P., maintained that Aylmerrs death did not necessitate any
3revision cf policy towards Ethiopia. The possibility of a military
campaign was soon ruled out:
Colonal Graham (O.C.Troops, Jubaland) thinks the case 
is one for diplomatic representation because military 
action would probably end in a stalemate. I am not 
sure that diplomatic representation would fare better.
Tilley of course was right. The only way to obtain leverage was
by a combination of military and diplomatic pressure. When the
1T. to Grey, 19 June 1913, K>.37l/l572.
^Tilley, Minute, n.d. on I. to G., 19 June 1913, I'0.37l/l572.
to Harcourt, 23 June 3913, C0.533/H9.
^Tilley, Minute, 15 July 1913, S0.37l/l572.
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Colonial Office refused even to strengthen their position on
1the frontier, the diplomatic initiative was hound to he abortive.
It was the refusal to place effective forces on the frontier 
that ultimately undemined the Colonial Office's demand for a 
rectification of the border. Public, opinion ii Ethiopia was 
strongly gainst the cession of territory, and, without an ulti­
matum of some sort, the Council of Ministers could not be forced
2
■to £gree to Gwynn's line. But even if a territorial concession 
had been made, it was doubted whether the E.A.P. would have had 
enough troops to take advantage of it. Any concession would 
have been strongly resisted by the local Amhara, and the majority 
of wells could be defended by a small number of men entrenched 
among the surrounding rocks. This applied especially to Caddaduma 
where the Tigre were largely in control. It is hardly surprising,
i
therefore, that in September Bowring, the Chief Secretary of the 
E.A.P., recommended that the threat to occupy Gaddaduma be abandoned.^ 
When Thesiger visited the frontier in 1914, he was scathing 
in his criticism of the Protectorate administration. At Moyale 
he found 40 K.A.K. and 30 irregular police. But both groups were 
armed with worn out Mart mis and a miscellaneous selection of rifles
-j
Thesiger met the Council of Ministers three times, twice in June 
and once in July. Accounts of these meetings can be found in 
F0.371/1572.
to G., 31 July 1913, F0.37l/l572.
to 8., 8 Oct. 1913, F0.37l/l572( B. to I., 5 Nov. 1913, CO.533/124. 
4B. to H., 9 Sept. .1913, 00.533/121.
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captured from Tigrean hunters. (In one or two cases the baok
si^its were missing, in all the rifling was worn, stocks were
loose, and ejectors jammed after a few shots. At Marsabit the
Assistant District Commissioner had collected 16 Martini rifles
that did not work, though being something of a.mechanical expert
he managed to get eight to fire by interchanging parts. Thesiger
strongly condemned this state of affairs since police and troops
were called upon to fight Ethiopians armed with modem magazine
rifles, and he elso advised a thorough reorganisation o f the
frontier administration with the establishment of effective control.
If this was not done, he predicted that there would soon be a very
1costly expedition with serious complications.
Thus Aylmer's death drew attention to the dangers of ob­
servation on the frontier, but it also led to increased alarm at 
the growing incidence of Tigrean raids and the gun-running that 
was associated with them. Since the Tigre were centred at Gaddaduma 
it had originally been boped that this problem could te solved by 
simply enforcing Gwynn's line. But when the occupation of Gaddaduma 
by force was ruled out Read suggested that the East Africa Pro­
tectorate should adopt the Sudan policy of establishing consular 
trade agents in Ethiopian territory. This system had worked well
1 "Memorandum", m  Tv to G., 15 May 1914, E0.37l/l880.
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at Gambela and was apparently highly recommended by Sir Reginald
Wingate and JJajor Doughty Wylie. As a result of this suggestion,
Wingate shortly afterwards sent Armbuster, the Oonsul for north-west
Ethiopia, and an Inspector under the Sudan Government, to the
Colonial Office to discuss the possibilitybo'f establishing one
2or two consular posts in southern Ethiopia.
Towards the end of November 1913* Harcourt wrote to Belfield
for his views, and the Governor replied that he was in complete
agreement with the proposal. Thesiger also suggested independently:
"the appointment of a Protectorate officer as Consul for Abyssinia
to reside at the headquarters of Fitaurari WaldjL either at Mega
or at Gardula". And he pointed out a further benefit from this
plan. Whenever Fitaurari Wefl.de was asked to investigate a claim,
he was wont to reply that he was too ill or too busy. A consul'
could force matters on to his attention; he could also collect
4evidence on the spot and avoid interminable delays.
In 1914 Thesiger appointed Hodson consul for southern Ethiopia
5
under a section of the Abyssinian Order in Council of 1913. He
1Kead, Minute, 7 Aug. 1913, CO.533/119.
^Read, Minute, 16 Aug. 1913, CO.533/120.
3B. to H., 8 May 1914, CO.533/136.
^"Memorandum", in T. to G., 15 May 1914, F0.37l/l880.
^"Abyssinian Affairs", PC/NFD/4/3/2.
arrived at Nairobi on 2 December and then set out for Addis to
1obtain his credentials before going to the frontier. The main
problem still remained the inadequate force with which the
frontier was defended, and not everyone had an accurate idea
of Hodson's role, as this letter to Belfield shows:
It is clear that his /Hodson's/ appointment will be 
of intense value to your frontier officers at Moyale 
and elsewhere, he will be able to facilitate their 
food supplies.
But Hpdson's real value did not lie in the catering field, and 
by the end of the first World War it was being readily acknowledged 
that his presence on the frontier had been extremely beneficial.
Nevertheless, the appointment of a frontier consul and the 
gradual strengthening of the border administration did not in any 
way lead to the eradication of the old frontier problems. Raids
4
continued all along the border, and in 1922 the Boran around Moyale
were given guns with which to defend themselves against the Tigre,
5
now generally referred to as shifta. The border tribes such as the
1B. to H.t 2 Deo. 1914, CO.533/143; Walker "Intelligence Report",
8 Feb. 1915, FO.371/2227.
2C.H.Walker to B., 9 Feb. 1915, 00.371/2228.
3The Consulate at Mega was so valuable that it was kept on till 
I960. Campbell to Balfour, 31 Jan. 1918, FO.371/3126. But the 
General Committee of the E.A.P. Legislative Council voted 25 to 4 
against continuing to pay for Hodson in 1920, since they did not 
feel that he achieved sufficiently tangible results?. Bowring 
to Milner, 27 May 1920, FO.369/1350.
^Coryndon to Churchill, 2 Sept, 1922, F0.37l/7150.
Shifta is the Boran for bandit or robber. Political Records,
pc/hfd/4/1/2.
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Boran and the Gabra were always to remain a problem as they
migrated backwards and forwards from the Protectorate to Ethiopia.
After the Pirst World War, however, the Officer Commanding in the
N.P.D. had the discretion to refuse to admit refugees. In general
those without stock were allowed to remain, but few people travelled 
X
without cattle. The real problem however centred on the Tigre.
In 1917, Tigre bandits forced Ethiopian troops to evacuate
Gaddaduma and Godala; they then established their control in the
area and proceeded to raid the Boran mercilessly. The gradual
strengthening of the E.A.P.1 s forces cn the frontier naturally
increased the temptation to occupy Gaddaduma, but Thesiger proposed
to the Ethiopian Government that a joint campaign be undertaken
against the Tigre. The agreement was that either force would be
allowed to cross the frontier, and that British troops would occupy
Gaddaduma temporarily. Thus Gaddaduma was successfully occupied in
2
1919 and the power of the Tigre temporarily broken. The wells
were evacuated by the British after five months, though Protectorate
3officials wanted to remain in control there. The wells were re- 
occupied again for a short time in 1921 and then more permanently
^Coryndon to Jones, 7 April 1924, CO.533/309*
^Kittermaster, Handing Over Report, 1919, FC/NPD/2/i/i ; Hodson to 
Campbell, 5 May 1919, P.O. Mega Consulate Records.
^A.W.Hodson, Seven ye'ars in Southern Abyssinia (London, 1927), 158, 
172.
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in 1924, but even this did not lead to a solution of the Tigrean 
problem.^
Controversy over the Tigre, however,‘was also for a time
closely associated with the Garre. When Aylmer had been killed,
it was said that the Garre were shielding Tigrean bandits implicated 
2in the murder, and Fitaurari Wdde blamed them for most of the 
border troubles saying that they invited the Tigre into the E.A.P. ^ 
There was undoubtedly much truth ha this, though at first sight it 
seems inexplicable in a Somali clan that was considered to be friendly 
towards the Government and extremely loyal.
The Garre in fact had always succeeded ha making a very good 
impression on Protectorate officials, and Zaphiro had written: uWe 
shall have no trouble from them, they are a good people".^ But 
their geographical position on the river Paua exposedphem to con­
siderable pressure from the Ethiopians, the Aulihan, Marehan and 
the Digodia. If they were friendly towards Zaphiro and other Pro­
tectorate administrators, it was surely because they were a weak 
tribe surrounded by more powerful neighbours. Zaphiro1 s presence 
on the frontier brought to an end Ethiopian attempts to acquire
On both occasions there were border incidents to provide a motive.
In 1924 the choice seemed to be between occupation of the wells and 
preparing a case against Ethiopia for mis-government to be put before 
the League of Nations. The former action ms jreferreds Lord Arnold, 
Minute, 11 July 1924 and Bottomley, Minute, 24 June 1924, 00.533/309.
^Barrett to Chief Sec., 26 May 1913> C0.533/ll9.
^H.O.W.Hope, Handing Over Report, 1 Jan. 1914> PC/NFL/2/l/l.
4C. to G., 20 May 1907, F0.37l/l92.
political control over them, hut he was powerless to <ffer them 
protection against their Somali neighbours and this became in­
creasingly necessary after 1907. From then on the Garre relied 
heavily on Government support and when this was not sufficiently 
forthcoming, they could not afford to be particular intheir choice 
of allies.
Raiding between the Marehan end the Garre got progressively 
worse after 1907. There were frequent skirmishes, and some of 
these were serious, In 1908, Shirre Jama led a galti Marehan raid 
which resulted in the death of Garre chief Gababba's only son, as 
well as a brother, and their loss of a considerable quantity of 
stock.^ But throughout the first eight months of 1908 there was 
also a gradual migration!.of Rer Afgab Aulihan into the E.A.P. as 
a result of Ethiopian pressure; and, once across the river Juba,
2
they began systematically raiding both the Marehan and the Garre. 
When Gwynn arrived at the Juba/Daua confluence towards the end of
1908, he managed to arrange a temporary settlement but it did not
3long survive his departure.
During 1909 Marehan and Aulihan attacks against the Garre 
continued, and what made these so devastating at this juncture was
1Girouard to H., 21 Feb. 3912, C0/533/l02; C. to G., 20 May 1907,
F0.371/192.
2Ward to Hopwood, 23 Nov. 1908, 00.533/56; T.S.Thomas (1917), passim.
3G. to 0., 12 and 28 Deo.a 1908, 00. 533/54.
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the relatively large number of rifles owned by both these Somali
1
groups, while the Garre by comparison possessed few or no guns.
The psychological effect of rifles was so great, according to
Gwynn, that no resistance would be offered to a raiding party
armed with them. This greatly increased the temptation to raid,
it also led to fewer deaths; but, by a curious anomaly, it led
to the injured party contracting the largest debt. For the Garre
killed far more Rer Afgab through acts of vengeance, and they
always owed the Aulihan considerable diya. This was <ne fact
that made any settlement between them particularly difficult to 
2arrange.
Events reached a turning point in 1910. Supported by the 
Ajuran the Garre managed to defeat the Marehan on one o ccasion, 
but otherwise they were not so successful. Owing to insufficient 
water at the wells of El Wak, they were forced to move their stock 
to Tagleh and Dadableh close to Marehan territory. Here they had 
to endure further raids. ^ On several occasions the Garre wrote 
to Hope, the Officer Commanding in the N.F.D., complaining of the 
Marehan and requesting assistance. Hope, however, was not in a 
position to do anything and could only advise patience; but the
^Honyold to Gwynn, 18 Jan. 1909 and Gwynn to C.Q., 3 Nov. 1909, 
00.533/69.
2General Report by Major Gwynn re. the Anglo-Abyssinian boundary 
Commission 1908/1909, 00.533/69.
3
W.E.H.Barrett, Intelligence Report from the Abyssinian frontier, 
29 Jan, 1910, 00.533/72.
4J.0.W.Hope, Intelligence Report, May 1910, 00.533/75.
patience of the Garre was almost exhausted and at the beginning 
of the year 19 Garre villages moved into Ethiopia, since they 
did not consider their life and property safe in the British Pro­
tectorate,1 Those that remained behind were anxious to retaliate 
against the Marehan and Hope had much difficulty in restraining 
them. He wrote to the Chief Secretary in June saying that he 
had promised the Garre a reply by August, and that every month 
that passed only increased the gravity of the situation. All 
Abdi had told him that his people were getting out of hand and 
that they were buying as many arms as possible. Reports were
coming in that the Garre had forty elephant tusks and were trying
2to exchange these for rifles.
The fUll implications of this limited Garre migration into 
Ethiopia and their acquisition of guns was not immediately apparent. 
Inter-tribal fighting continued and the Garre were still worsted 
in their encounters with the Marehan. In 1911 there were reports 
that the latter had captured over 500 camels belonging to the 
Garre, and Col. Thesiger, the Inspector General of the K.A.R., 
was asked to consider the likely effects of a Government sponsored
1W.E.Barrett, 29 Jan. 1910, CO.533/72.
Hope to Chief Seo. 12 & 17 June 1910 and 10 Deo. 1910, PC/mFd/4/i/3;
Intelligence Report Moyale, 4 May 1910 in G. to C., 7 June 1910,
CO.533/74; Hope, Intelligence Report, June and July 1910 and G. to 
H., 1 Aug. 1910, CO.533/76.
raid by 4,000 Garre against their aggressors. He came to the
conclusion, however,, that it would be undesirable, since Marehan
sections considered to be friendly towards the Government would
also have been attacked.^
Nevertheless, there was evidence of a growing crise de
conscience over the Government's policy towards the Garre. Col.
Thesiger also argued that a policy of non-intervention could not
be continued for long. The Garre were depicted as a friendly tribe
that had always assisted the Government and was prompt in providing
2
baggage animals. Yet the administration refused to allow them to 
retaliate against the Marehan, and the question was whether it did 
not in the process incur a certain responsibility for protecting 
the Garre and for recovering stock stolen from them. This then 
was the dilemma, for in 1912 the administration of Moyale was ex­
tended eastwards so as to provide the Garre with some protection, 
while they were promised that in 1915 the Marehan would be taken 
in hand. ^  Yet precisely because Government support had been so 
long in arriving, the Garre had now placed themselves in an am­
biguous position vis a vis the Protectorate authorities.
^Intelligence Reports, Oct.-Nov. 1911, PC/jUB/l/l7/l; "Memorandum 
on the effect on the military situation of the N.F.D. and Jubaland 
which a raid by the Gare on the Marehan would be likely to have", 
Col. G. Thesiger, 4 Deo. 1911, PC/NFD/4/1/3.
2Annual Report of the E.A.P. for 1912-1913 in CO.533/125.
*5
Col. Thesiger, Memorandum on the NPD., 29 Jan. 1912, CO.533/103. 
^Annual Report 1912, CO.533/125; G. to H., 21 Feb. 1912, CO. 533/102.
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The main reason for their limited migration into Ethiopia
in 1910 had not been to secure the support of the Amhara there.
They had moved to Banissa and Gaddaduma, both of which places
were usually controlled by Tigrean elephant hunters and bandits.-*-
Thus the 1910 migration led to a Garre-Tigre alliance in which the
former were offered very considerable assistance by the latter,
who frequently accompanied the Garre on their raids and fought
with them. But the Garre also benefited in another way, for the
main centres of the arms trade in southern Ethiopia were closely
associated with the Tigre. Through their alliance the Garre had
easy access to rifles, and ttough they bought a few from Somali
traders, it was from the Tigre at Gaddaduma that they got their 
2main supply.
It is easy to see how the Garre benefited from their 
association with the Tigre; but there had to be some quid pro quo 
and this seems to have consisted in the protection the Garre ex­
tended to the Tigre when they entered the E.A.P. They would be 
sheltered and hidden by the Garre, and shielded from contact with 
Protectorate officials. In fact it only gradually dawned on the 
N.P.D. administrators that the Garre and Tigre were working hand 
in glove.
V.O.W.Hope, Intelligence, 11 Jan. 1911, in G. to H,, 2 March 1911, 
CO.533/85; H.C.Dickinson "Report", 5 Oct, 1912, CO.533/109.
^Hope to Chief Sec., 26 May 1913, CO.535/119; Deck to T., 25 Jan. 
1911, and Deck to P.O. Jubaland, 24 Jan. 1911, PC/lO\D/4A/3.
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The first really definite suspicions occurred in May
1913 when it was thought that the Garre were shielding Tigre
implicated in Aylmer's murder* By the end of the month, Hope
felt that he had almost proved that Ali Abdi was guilty of collusion
with the Tigre,^ In September he had him brought before Fitaurari
Wcfl.de who accused him of helping the Tigre and becoming blood-
2brothers with them. But Tigre-Garre relations suddenly de­
teriorated at this time after an important Garre chief had been 
killed by them at Derkali. And so although Hope had initially
wanted to have Ali Abdi deported to Nairobi, he now suddenly
3changed his mind.
' However, when Thesiger, the British representative at
Addis, visited the frontier in 1914» he. investigated a number of 
border incidents and amougst these was one involving the Garre.
Ali Abdi did not deny the main points against him, and so his 
deportation was recommended and sanctioned in May 1914.^ A year's 
detention in Nairobi was said to have had a salutary effect on 
hijfii. He swore an oath of loyalty before the Sheik ul Islam and 
was then allowed to go back to the N.F.D. But the truth was
1H. to Chief Sec., 25 Aug. 1913, CO.533/124.
2Hope . t o  Chief Sec., 4 Sept. 1913, CO.533/125.
'’Hope, Handing Over Report, PC/NFD/2/l/l; Hope to Chief Seo.,
4 Sept. 1913, CO.533/125.
4B. to H., 14 May 1914, C0.533/l36j T. to G., 15 May 1914, E0.37l/l880.
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that the administration was finding it far harder to control
the Garre through their sub-chiefs, and it was hoped that Ali
X
Abdifs return would make matters easier.
Ali Abdi, however, was no more able to ignore political
realities in 1915 than he had been three years earlier. Initially
the Garre-Tigre alliance had been formed against the Marehan,
but it was soon turned to good effect against the Digodia who
proved the most serious menace to the Garre. The first Garre-
Digodia skirmishes were reported in 1911, but it was not until
2the following year that really serious raids began.
During 1912 there, was a constant influx of Digodia from 
the Oddo and the northern bank of the Daua to the south of the 
river. There were raids aad counter-raids, yet Aylmer managed 
to patch up a settlement whereby both parties returned raided 
stock. However, the following year there was increased Digodia 
pressure on the Garre -who were raided at Dulessa and Yabitcha.
A large number of Garre are said to have fled to Gaddaduma, 
and these included chief Dababa from El Wak. ^  The eastern Garre 
were unable to resist the Digodia and they abandoned their tradi­
tional grazing areas along the Daua; those to the west, however,
1B. to H., 13 May 1915, CO. 533/154.
2G. to H., 2 June 1911, CO.533/88.
'’Gerald Reece, Gurreh Annual Report, 1928, PO/nFD/i/3/I; Political 
Records, DC/MDA/4/5.
'’political Records, DC/MDA/4/5;
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had more success since they were helped "by the Tigre. When 
Ali Abdi was deported in 1914 it was precisely for taking part 
in a joint raid with the Tigre .against the Digodia.'** When he 
was freed a year later, on the other hand, the same problems 
existed and there was still no real alternative to the Tigrean 
alliance.
In 1914 a serious attempt was made to extend administration
to the area south of the river Daua. In May that year, Deck was
appointed Assistant District Commissioner for the newly constituted
Garre Sub-District, and he succeeded in persuading the Garre from
Ethiopia to return to the Daua. But in July Deck was recalled and
the Garre returned at once to Gaddaduma. When Butler, his successor,
arrived in August, the Digodia were in complete control of the
2southern side of the river. Moreover it proved impossible to 
restrict the Digodia to the eastern part, of the district. This was 
partly due to the growing influx of the Digodia into the E.A.P. 
which could not be controlled, and partly to galti Marehan pressure 
on them to move westwards. The only solution that could be offered 
was to supervise this Digodia movement and to permit them to in­
filtrate into Garre grazing areas. The Garre were unable to resist
*1
W.G.Thesiger, "Memorandum on the Yaben Raid" 1914, C0.533/l56. 
^Political Records, DC/MDA/4/5.
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this, but they embarrassed Butler by claiming that Hope had
promised them in 1913 that if they returned raided stock to
the Digodia - which they had done - then they would not be com-
1pelled to receive Digodia into their country again. Yet this
was a promise that Butler could not keep, for there was simply
not enough room for the Digodia.
When Grlenday succeeded Butler in September 1915, it was
obvious that the majority of the Garre dn Ethiopia would not
return to the E.A.P. unless materially assisted by the Government.
After some encouragement a few did return, but the situation
suddenly changed when Glenday was ordered to evacuate the area 
2in March 1916. All protection ms  immediately removed from 
the Garre, and within two days of his departure the Digodia began 
to cross into the E.A.P. in large numbers and to move towards
3
Garre grazing areas. It was anticipated that the Garre would 
be incensed with the Protectorate administration for leaving 
them unprotected, but on the contrary they proved more than a 
match for their adversaries when the government did not interfere
A
with their methods. Ali Abdi and Gababa obtained the support 
>•
T.D. Butler, Gurre District Annual Report, 1914-15, PC/NPd/i/3/i .
^Political Records, DG/MDA/4/5; U.S.Thomas, Precis for week ending 
15 April 1916, CO.533/168.
to Chief Sec., 16 April 1917 (P.80/la/l7), CO.533/182.
T.S.Thomas, Precis for week ending 20 May 1916, CO.533/168.
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of the Tigre and immediately took the offensive against the 
Digodia. In March 1916 they suffered a defeat, hut in July 
and October they were overwhelmingly successful and they drove 
the Digodia out of the Protectorate. Further attempts by the 
latter to enter the E.A.P. were unsuccessful and the Garre re­
established themselves on the river Daua. Ali Abdi sent the 
Government a message to say that having defeated the Digodia,
he was now in a position to help them against the rebellious 
2Aulihan.
When Glenday was sent baok in 1917 to administrate the
river Daua there were no recriminations. This time Ali Abdi was
not blamed for his reliance on Tigrean troops to defeat the
Digodia. The attitude of the administration was now one of humble
contrition. It was felt that the Government should try to "make
amends for outrages endured by /the Garrg7*.. during the past few 
•3
years". The Garre succeeded in maintaining their position 
on the river Daua, but henceforth they nelied on the Government 
instead of the Tigre. Glenday inflicted a resounding defeat on 
the Digodia in 1917, and the following year a strong force of
B^, to Chief Sec., 5 Aug, 1916, C0.533/170; T.S.Thomas, Precis, 
15 Dec. 1916, CO.533/172.
to Chief Seo., 30 July 1916 , 00.533/169.
Bowring to Long, 14 June 1917, CO.533/182.
1
askaris was sent to defend the Garre,
Yet the Garre/Digodia conflict remained unresolved. The 
large number of Digodia who lived amongst the Marehan posed a 
threat that could never be entirely eliminated, and as the Garre 
came to rely more on the Protectorate administration so the Tigre
2be’gan to form an alliance with their previous enemies, the Digodia. 
Moreover, throughout this period those Digodia sections that had 
earlier moved to Wajir were also a complicating factor. For during 
1914 they were allowed to move north again as far as the river 
Daua. Here it was thought they would offset Digodia pressures to 
the north <£ the river, but this proved to be a mistaken assumption. 
Eventually they moved south once more and this meant that an 
additional flank of the Garre was exposed to possible pressure.
The problem of the Garre was far more complicated than 
that of either the Gabra or the Boraa, but there were good reasons 
for this. Their relationship with neighbouring tribes was more 
complex and they were also closer to the area of maximum population 
pressure. However, there was also one other Somali group that was 
even kore exposed than the Garre to external pressure, though it
1K. to Chief Seo., 16 April 1917 (P.79/la/l7), CO. 533/182;
K. to T., 26 July 1918, FO.371/3127.
Cambell to K., 23 Oct. 1918, FO.371/3127; K. to Chief Seo.,
16 April 1917 (P.8l/la/l7), 00.533/182.
Political Records, DC/ltDA/4/ 5.
was better able to defend itself. This was the Marehan who 
lived close to Dolo and along the Juba to the east of El Wak. 
They posed a problem that was every bit as complicated as 
that of the Garre, yet it was a very different sort of problem. 
While the troubles of the Garre stemmed from their relative 
weakness and their search for allies, those of the Marehan 
were caused by their strength and independence of spirit. And 
whereas the Garre solved their problem to some extent when the 
administration withdrew, it was oily through the intervention 
of thes Protectorate Government that the Marehan threat was 
kept within bounds.
Chapter X 
T m  MA11TTAM M V , THE AULIHAI
The Marehan were undoubtedly the strongest Somali clan in 
the region of the Juba/Daua confluence. In fact they were the 
only people who successfully defied the threat of Ethiopian 
hostility. About March 1905 some 600 Ethiopians under Wolde, 
and accompanied by Geydu, visited 11 Wak and Muddo Arele. Geydu 
had been brought to point out the limits of his country and when, 
on the edge of Garre territory, the Ethiopians threatened the 
Marehan, the latter sent back a bow and poisoned arrow. This 
was a challenge to fight aid the Amhara wisely chose toigaore it. 
But not having suffered from Ethiopian aggression, the Marehan 
saw no reason to welcome the advent of Zaphiro1 s inspectorate 
on the frontier, while their dominant position on the upper Juba 
went hand in hand with a refusal to acknowledge any superior 
authority.
Thus the Marehan were the only people along the border over
whom Zaphiro did not gain some control. Consequently his attitude
towards them was unfavourable:
They are all fanatic? they never paid tribute either to 
the Abyssinians or to the British Government ... from 
these tribes we shall have some trouble for the first 
few years until the British Government has made some
4
Salkeld to Dep. Comm. Mombasa, 15 July 1905, CO.533/3*
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arrangements for checking them*
And the necessity to check them becane particularly apparent
as inter-tribal raiding increased.
In the first place, the growing lawlessness on the frontier
was largely attributed to the Marehan. A cycle of retaliatory
raiding was set ia motion and as a result skirmishes became
endemic. The Garre, the Aulihan and the Marehan were all involved 
2in raids. Relations between the Marehan and those Somali clans
that were trying to force their way into the British Protectorate
was also at times particularly bitter. Thus there were violent
clashes between the Marehan and the Digodia in the north and be-
tween the Marehan and the Rer Afgab Aulihan to the east. Although
the latter had allied themselves with the Angara in their attack
on Lughii January 1908, they soon afterwards fell out with the
Ethiopians and throughout the remainder of 1908 crossed into the
4E.A.P. in large numbers.
Of course, it would be an oversimplification to imply that 
theMArehan initiated all the raiding that occurred. In resisting 
the Digodia and the Rer Afgab, they were doing no more than defend
1C. toG., 20 May 1907, PO. 37l/l92.
7T.S.Thomas (l917)» 92; Hope to Chief Sec., 12 June 1910, 
PC/M’D/4/1/3.
3Z. to G., 10 Dec. 1906, CO.533/28.
^Salkeld to Sadler, 9 Jan. 1908, CO.533/41; H.A.Ward, to Hopwood,
13 Nov. 1908, CO.533/56.
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their rights over a certain area. Their relationship with 
their traditional neighbours, the Garre to the west and the 
Aulihan to the south, was also far from being one-sided. "When 
in 1909 the Marehan twice raided the latter, the first time 
killing Hassan Warfa, an Aulihan chief, Hope and Salkeld were 
of the opinion that this unrest was to be partly attributed to 
the Aulihan themselves and, in particular, to Abdurahman Mursaal 
who had been extremely keen to raid the Marehan. The latter knowing 
this had struck before the Aulihan - who by themselves were weak - 
had managed to form an alliance with the Rer Afgab. Thus towards 
the end of 1908, Gwyan had failed to establish more than a temporary
2cessation of raiding between the Rer Afgab, the Garre and the Marehan.
With the aid of Sheik Abdul Bari Sherif, Gwynn had managed to see all
the Marehan chiefs together at a baraza where he had told them
that the Government would sonn come and that in the mean-time they
should settle their disputes before Zaphiro. He had hoped that the
imminence of outside control would have acted as a stabiliser,
but it had not been long before raiding recommenced. Moreover,
when a station ms opened at Serenli in June 1910, the agreement
that was patched up between the Rer Hassan section of the Marehan
and the Aulihan to the south of the Juba proved to be equally transient.
1T.S.'£homas (1917), 42.
2G. to G.,11 and 28 Deo. 3908, 00.533/54.
3T. S.Thomas (l917), 4 3.
At the same time this in ter-tribal fighting also had wider 
implications. In their skirmishes with the Rer Afgab and the Digodia, 
the Marehan paid scant attention to international boundaries. They 
frequently crossed the Italian border and in I9O9 this led to a 
complaint from the Italian Ambassador in London. It could of 
course have been pointed out that the Somali on the Italian side 
of the river also made raids into the E.A.P., but the reaction at 
the Colonial Office was conciliatory an the extreme and one official 
minuted:
We have no sort of administration on our side of the Juba, 
and altogether we have not got much to say for ourselves.
The only thing I can think of is to suggest to the P.O. 
that they Jmight tell the Italians that the question of
the administration of the frontier will engage the attention 
of the newly appointed Governor of the E.A.P.l
This at least was honest and very different to the misplaced moral
arrogance displayed a few months earlier by Redd, another official
in the C.Q, Por, commenting cn a report from the Rome correspondent
The Times which had described the Ethiopian attack against Lugh,
he had written: 1 What is really needed, I think, is that the
Italian standard of administration should approximate more closely 
2
to ours'*. The Italian complaint, however, made it more difficult 
for Protectorate officials to remain entirely complacent in the face
1Butler, Minute, 8 Oct. 1909, 00.533/56.
2Read, Minute, 9 Jan. 1908, CO.533/41; The Times. 9 Jan. 1908.
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of inter-tribal feuding. The policy of non-interference in clan
disputes became harder to cfefend when there were also the wider
considerations of international relations to be taken into account.
In January 1910, theie was another outbreak of serious raiding'
between the Marehan aid the Rer Afgab. First, the Marehan attacked
the latter at Shidileh not far from Dolo. As a result, the Rer Afgab
*
raided Dolo from Italian territory. Since they found no Marehan 
in the vicinity, they moved down the river recrossing the Juba at 
Lolleshid '(Hillishid) talcing with them large quantities of Gobawein 
stock. In fact the entire Gobawein population to the south of 
the Juba fled to Lugh, leaving their stock behind.^ Then in April 
Abdurrahman Mursaal was reported to be at Fan wen, on the edge of 
the Marehan territory, with a group of Aulihan and Rer Afgab. It 
was being rumoured, probably by his enemies, that he intended to 
start an anti-government policy and to break away frcm the admini­
stration. Dubhar XJgas, head of the Rer Afgab, was said to be in 
Sidinia (Sidimo?) planning a joint attack on the Marehan with Abdur­
rahman; the Garre had also been invited to participate but they 
2
had refused.
The failure of the E.A.P. to control the frontier was leading 
to it being increasingly ignored. The Somali had obviously long
■j
¥.H.H.Barrett, Intelligence Report from the Abyssinian Frontier,
29 Jan. 1910, CO.533/72.
2
Intelligence Report from the Abyssinian Frontier received 10 May 
1910, in G. to G., 3 June 1910, CO.535/74.
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ignored it, but now the Ethiopians were once again beginning
to cross thejborder near Dolo. In April 1910 Ethiopians under
Hussein canned at Dolo and entered the British Protectorate
in pursuit of some Her Afgab. Shortly afterwards, a group of
Rer Afgab, Digodia and Galla entered Gobawein territory near
Lugh accompanied by Dadi, an Ethiopian official, and nine other
1Amhara. This was evidently a raiding party searching for loot.
Then, as- a result of Marehan raids across the Juba, the Italian
officer at Merille also crossed the liver and fought the Marehan
at Ilo Merere (Hillamera) in British territory, capturing many
prisoners and stock. ^
Yet the factor that made it so necessary to control the
Marehan was not just that they were engaged in raiding, but that
many were armed with guns. What had made the Ethiopians hesitant
of attacking them, and what made them such formidable opponents,
was the relatively large number of rifles in their possession.
In this respect they differed from all the surrounding tribes.
At the end of 1908 the Marehan elders themselves admitted to possessing
■5
500 to 600 guns. Just over a year later, it was being suggested
1G. to C., 7 June 19X0, CO.533/74.
2idem, footnote 2.
3G. to C., 28 Deo. 1908, CO.533/54.
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that at a low estimate the Marehan mu&t have possessed at least 
X
1,000 guns. Most of the later figures were merely guesses and
when in the middle of 1910 Hope suggested 800 guns, his low figure
2
reflected an optimism that was later proved to be false.'"
What had become obvious to Gwynn as early as 1908 was that 
a greater danger lay in the increasing number of guns in the hands 
of the Marehan than in the threat of Ethiopian border raids.^ 
Moreover, in the short run the Marehan weie also a potential threat 
to the post at Dolo. Gwynn had considered that the Boma grading 
Company fort at Dolo was insecure but dared not recommend its 
withdrawal because of the adverse psychological effect this would 
have on the Somali,^
The Marehan obtained their guns from two sources. One was 
by trade, the other from the migration southwards of fully aimed 
Marehan clans. Since the Marehan -were rich in cattle, they were 
certainly able to engage actively in the arms trade, and Zaphiro 
had already concluded that there was a considerable traffic in 
arms across the river Juba. let it may be doubted whether this
t
trade was itself a major factor before ©11 in the arming of the 
Marehan, Most of the guns traded across the Juba came originally
1
Intelligence Eeport from the Abyssinian frontier, 4 May 1910, 
in G. to G., 7 June 1910, 00.533/74.
‘TIope, Report, 30 July 1910, 00.533/76.
3Cf. the view of Ass. D.C.Mansergh in 1907 that it would be a nbig 
problem", M. to Salkeld, 19 Hov. 1907, 00.533/41.
V  to c:, 12 Deo. 1908, 00.533/54.
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1 -pifrom Jibuti via Ethiopia. They were French and their price
increased progressively the further west they were sold. At
Serenli a rifle could he bought for seven milch cows whereas
2
at El Wak the price was eleven milch cows. On the one occasion 
when definite figures were available, and when the Garre were
said to be buying very heavily, a sale of 26 guns was recorded,
3but this appears to have been exceptional. It would seem more
probable that before 1911 this trade was very limited. This can
be inferred from the very few guns in the hands of Somali clans
apart from the Marehan. Then, even amongst the Marehan, the Rer
Hassan did not possess large numbers of guns. In fact, it was
generally agreed by all observers that most of the guns were in the
hands of the galti Maiehan who had brought these with them from 
4further north.
Another dimension to the problem m s  added by the fact that 
almost all the galti Marehan had previously fought in Northern
R
Somaliland under Sheik Muhammad Abdille Hassan. Nor could it be 
assumed that because they had left Sheik Muhammad, they were now 
opposed to his aims. The galti, as far as one can judge, only appear
•)
For a general picture of the arms trade in East Africa in the 
period 1885-1902, see: R.W.Beachey, "The arms trade in East Africa", 
J.A.H., III no. 3 (1962).
2
G.E.Phillips, Intelligence Report, Oct.-Dec. 1910, in Hollis to 
Harcourt, 14 Jan. 1911, GO.533/85.
3Intelligence Report from the Abyssinian Frontier, 10 May 1910,
CO.533/74.
^Zaphiro, Report, 10 Dec. 1910, CO.533/28; S. to C., 28 Deo. 1908, 
CO.533/54.
5Hope to Chief Sec., 7 June 191,0, PO/WD/4/1/5. "
to have been dissatisfied with the material spoils from the 
,jihad further north. In coming south they intended to acquire 
cattle, and the galti under Shirre Jamaa, a former headman of
1
Sheik Muhammad’s were noted for their indiscriminate raiding.
While the migration of the galti Marehan towards the Juba
did not in itself imply any necessary extension of Sheik Munaramad’s
rebellion, the British were very concerned at the possibility of
links between the galti and the Sheik being renewed. At the beginning
of 1910, Abdulahi Moho Igo was reported to be raiding ten days to
the east of Lugh, but a few months earlier he had sent a letter
to the Marehan saying that the Sheik had appointed him governor
2
of Jubaland. This news was treated very seriously. So too was
the news from Aden Ali of the Habr Awal that several hundred galti
Marehan had very recently come from Sheik Muhammad and had settled
to the south of the Juba. These Marehan had already attacked the
Shagal and had also crossed the Juba between Bardera and Lugh
raiding into Italian Somaliland. It was even said that they intended
to raid the whole of Borana. ^ Certainly the Garre were a prime 
4target.
h 1.S.Thomas (1917), 92; G. to C., 11 Deo. 1908, 00.533/54;. I.N.
Dracopoli, Through Jubaland to the Lori an Swamp (London, 1914), 44.
S/.E.H.Barrett, Intelligence Report from the Abyssinian frontier,
29 Jan. 1910, CO. 533/72.
to C., 7 June 1910, CO.533/74.
4J.O.W.Hope, Intelligence Report from the Abyssinian frontier,
May 1910, 00.533/15.
Froik the very beginning, when the problem m s  first recognised,
Gwynn had suggested disarming the Marehan. Having made peace between
the various sections ;at the end of 1908 he had wished to ensure
its continuation.*** Yet the Marehan had wisely refused to surrender
their rifles unless offered armed protection in return, and at that
time Gwynn1s other proposals for securing the frontier had to be
shelved because of the difficulty in getting Treasury approval
2
for the expense. In the process, the suggestion that the Marehan 
be disarmed was forgotten. In May 1910, however, Col. Thesiger, the 
Inspector General of the IC.A.R., once again drew attention to the 
problem by noting that the new administration of the frontier and 
the plan to occupy Dolo would necessitate the disarmament of the 
Marehan. With too few .i;roap>s on the frontier and the Marehan being 
well armed, Thesiger argued that a policy of observation w as inviting
3
disaster; and he was supported in this view by Barrett, a new
4District Commissioner on the frontier.
A few months later, Hope, the new Officer Commanding ±l the 
N.F.D., also pointed out that the Marehan had to be taken in hand
1G. to C., 28 Deo. 1908, CO.533/54.
Gwynn, General Report, 00.533/69.
3G.Thesiger, "Memorandum on military aspects of southern Abyssinian 
boundary question", 23 May 1910, CO.533/72.
4Cpt. Barrett, Memorandum on the southern f rontier, in T. to G.,
4 Feb. 1910, F0.371/281.
without delay. He considered the disarming of the Marehan the
most serious problem to be settled, aid suggested sending a company
from Serenli to Dolo in September - whoi the Juba was in full
flood and could not be crossed - to show that the Government
meant business. But he also formed the over-hasty and naiveim-
pression that disarmament would be quite easy. Girouard had to
warn him that for the time being the policy was one of observation,
and so, despite a growing consensus that the Marehan needed to be
1
disarmed urgently, nothing was done.
Thus there began more than three years of debate, during 
which time the problem was allowed to grow. The main stumbling 
block was undoubtedly the speed with which administration had been 
introduced into most of Jubaland and the J.P.D. Having decided 
to double the area administered inihe E.A.P. in one year, Girouard 
was not in a position to sanction further expense. As it was, 
the administration that had been approved had been spread too thinly 
over too wide an area; too much had been undertaken too quickly 
and a costly expedition to disarm the Marehan was out of the question 
in 1910.
At the beginning of 1911? Girouard was still insistent that 
there was no need to disarm the Marehan, despite advice from Salkeld
^Hope, Report, July 1910, in G. to 0., 1 Aug. 1910, GO.533/76; 
Hope to Chief. Sec., 7 June 1910, PC/m>A/l/3.
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and Thesiger (in Addis) to the contrary, and he now began to
suggest that it was more important to gain the confidence of the
Marehan than to take any action against them. At the Colonial
Office there was general agreement with Girouard and Read minuted:
2"No case has been made out for disarmament".
But when Girouard next wrote about the Marehan it was in 
two rather contradictory letters, both dated 24 June. In one he 
suggested united action with the Italians on the river Juba so as 
to prevent the Marehan from crossing the river. In the other he 
claimed that it was impossible to prevent the tribes from arming 
themselves and also that it was unfair to leave tribes in the 
British Protectorate unarmed, unless the administration could pro­
tect them. He then suggested arming tribes along the border with 
old rifles which, somewhat incongruously, he thought would help 
in the "pacification of the frontier". It was this muddle-headedness 
that led Lord Lucas, then Under-Secretary for the Colonies, to minute:
Sir P. Girouard is as usual difficult to follow.
On 23555 he suggests disarming on 25404 be suggests 
arming - anything in fact that will relieve him of 
his responsibility of keeping order himself. The 
drawbacks to disarming a tribe seem obvious... I 
should do neither the one nor the other... IfFe would 
like to be given an idea of his policy ... wecannot 
deal with these matters piecemeal.4
1T. to G., 27 April 1911 and G. to H., 25 May 1911, CO.533/88;
Blois to Salkeld, 12 April 1911, PC/jUB/l/17/l. Of. Archer to 1'. ,
12 Sept. 1911, PC/hK dA A / 3. r
Ttead, Minute, 24-June 1911, CO.533/88.
3G. to H., 24 June 1911, no. 348 and 349, CO.533/88.
Lord Lucas, Minute, 20 July 1911, 00.533/88.
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A further suggestion -was now made by Col, Braading, the new Officer
Commanding Troops in the N.F.D., who thought that small detachments
which had been planned at Bolo and Ba-nissa were inadvisable. He
wished to put civil officers in these posts backed by a few troops.
He also thought that Saikeld1 s and Hope's proposals to disarm
the Marehan would not work. For the first time it was mentioned
that the Somali would be unlikely to hand ever their guns without
bitter resistance; it was a good point, and an important cne,
1
but surprisingly it was soon lost sight of.
Naturally, Girouard backed Breading's judgment concerning
the disarmament of the Marehan and advised that only two courses
were open to the Government, Either the policy of observation
could be continued and internal tribal affairs left alone, or all
administration could be withdrawn as had happened in British Somali- 
2
land. These alternatives, however, were reaJQy far from realistic, 
for six months later Girouard himself was suggesting, andiideed 
implementing, an entirely difference policy. This was based on the
resultiS- of Col. Thesiger* s journey of Nov. 1911 with Archer across
3Marehan country.
A few weeks after the latter had returned to Nairobi in
January3912, a small conference was held in which the N.F.B. was
discussed. Both Thesiger aid Archer had prepared Memoranda, and
Col. Breading, "Memorandum on the situation in the N.F.B.", 11 Aug. 
1911, CO 533/89.
Q
Sir P. Girouard, Memorandum on the N.F.D. and Jubaland", 11 Aug.
1911, in G. to H., 25 Aug. 1911, CO.533/89.
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Thesiger maintained that it was no longer possible to continue 
with a policy of non-intervention. He pointed out some of the 
anomalies of the system. The administration restrained the 
Garre from raiding the Marehan, but then allowed the Marehan 
to raid them in return. He claimed that this was having a very 
bad effect on those tribes which were thought to be pro-govern­
ment - precisely because their attitude was dependent on their 
receiving protection. At the same time, Thesiger did not think 
that this was the right moment for disarming the Marehan, Instead, 
he suggested that the first step was to gain some control over 
them. He recognised that this would necessitate additional 
troops and thought that another company or two sections of 
camel corps would suffice.'*'
Archer also thought that disarming the Marehan would in­
volve a serious risk of hostilities, aid he concluded that the 
wisest course was to let the whole matter re^t until political 
officers had got into closer touch with the clan. Archer also 
agreed with Breading that the posts at Dolo and Banissa served
no useful purpose, and he also thought it would be wiser to rely
2on political officers in those areas.
Given these very similar and "very cautious approaches to 
the problem,both with their very clear insistence that disarmament
^Thesiger, "Memorandum on the I.I'.D.", n.d. in G0.533/l03. 
^Archer, Handing Over Report, 29 Jan. 1912, C0# 533/103.
was unwise at the moment, it is somewhat surprising to find 
Girouard writing that during the conference both Archer and 
Thesiger advised that the Marehan had to be disarmed at once.
Gould Girouard have oversimplified their views or did they
both change their minds in the space of two weeks? Girouard,
at any rate, wrote at once to Lord Harcourt, the Colonial Secretary,
to say that, anticipating Government approval, he had told Hope
to returhato the frontier with a message for the Garre chiefs,
that administration would be extended to Marehan country in
1913- Archer was also told to gpt in touch with the Marehan and
to inform them of this. It was clear that what Girouard was attempting
was not the disarmament of the Marehan, however, but their closer
administration; limited iiterf erence in tribal matters was to be
the new norm.'*'
At the beginning of October 1912, a patrol under Hope moved
into Marehan territory. Within two reeks it ms being suggested
that the patrol would end by December, when one company would be
left to garrison Marehan country and the other would return to 
2Serenli. The rapid success of the patrol seemed assured, but 
early in 1913 it became apparent that it had not produced the good
G. to H., 21 Feb. 1912, 00.533/102. Another important outcome of 
this conference was that the HFD administration was given control 
over its police, sees T.H.R.Cashmore, Unpub. Thesis (1965), 347.
2B. to H., 17 Oct. 1912, GO.533/107.
1
results that had "been anticipated.- At the "beginning of 
J nuary, Hope seemed optimistic enough. He had just concludedcl
a tour of Marehan country and he felt' that they were inclined
to obey the government and keep quiet, though more disturbingly
he also said that they might revert to their old raiding habits:
The Marehan are not yet convinced, he wrote, that the 
government intends to remain in the country and I have 
heard from several sources that the galti think that 
if they keep quiet for a month or two the government 
will withdraw. 2
let on the surface everything was satisfactory. Hope pointed out 
that energetic patrolling wt>uld continue to be necessary for 
it would be a pity to risk an outbreak of trouble by reducing 
the number of troops too soon. Paradoxically, it was now also 
important to protect the Marehan from their former enemies, 
such as the Hahanwein, who were threatening to settle old scores 
this would only have started another round of fighting. At the 
time Girouard felt that matters were satisfactory, but as it 
happened Hope’s forebodings turned out to be only too true.
On March 6th, Mure telegraphed from Lugh that the Par Hgas 
Marehan had been openly defiant. He requested permission to take
1B. to H., 17 Oct. 1912, 00.533/107.
2T.S.Thomas (1917), 47.
3Hope to Sec., 14 Jan. 1913, 00.533/116.
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immediate action against them, and this was given two days
later when he was told to take whatever action he felt to he
necessary. On 12 March Mure telegraphed again to say that a
laxge party of Rer Ali Aulihan had crossed the Juba and that
the Far TJgp. s had seized them. The Rer Ali had thirty rifles and
about 900 camels, but the Far Ugas refused to hand them over and
were unfriendly. By the ead of April, however, he had concluded
a successful punitive expedition against the Far IJgas. Then cm
2 May, Mure suddenly xequested permission to disarm all the Marehan
sections. He said he thought it necessary and that the opportunity
was favourable. Yet he gave no further reason and the request was
contained hi an extremely short three sentence telegram of less 
1than 24 words. This request involving an important policy decision
was passed on to Col. Graham, the OGT in the Protectorate who
gave this amazing reply:
Mr. Mure is the man on the spot, and he will naturally 
have discussed the project with Opt. Soams and has 
doubtless gauged the feelings amongst the Marehan and 
what effect such action wmld have. I think the proposal 
is ©und and disarmament will have to be carried out 
sooner or later. 2
But the proposal ms not sound. Of course disarmament would 
have to be tackled some time, though to attempt this with cnly 150
-j
B. to H,, 19 July 1913, 00.533/120 plus all the enclosures.
^idem.
troops was little short of foolhardy. let even more fantastic, 
once the Governor had given his approval, the Chief Secretary 
sent Mure a telegram approvinghLs scheme.*^  It was not until 
18 July that Ear court was sent a telegram saying that there were 
no grounds for anxiety, but that the situation in the north 
could become serious. Bowring, the Acting Governor, explained 
for the first time that on 8 May the disarmament of the Marehan 
had been approved; "Without telling usi 11 ", Harcourt minuted, 
adding "a stupid telegram and a dangerous situation".
The situation was indeed serious and complicated. The only 
cause for optimism lay on the fact that the Marehan were divided,
and, given careful handling, the government need only expect to
be opposed by a few sections. There were two main Marehan seg­
ments; the Rer Hassan and the Rer Isaq. The Rer Hassan were generally 
found further to the south and it was said that they wished to cut 
themselves off from the latier. The two sections did not get on 
well, and there had been occasions when they had raided each other ?  
The head of the Rer Hassan was Ahmed Aden Roble, and it was assumed 
from the start that he wDuld help the government.^
The Rer Isaq were divided into four main groups. The Rer 
Farah Ugas under Farah Got, who though old was still very much 
in command. He was, however, assisted by two sub-chiefs, Guhad FiHnl,
1
idem.
^Harcourt, Minute, 18 and 19 July 1913, C0.533/l20,
^Cpt. Bois, "Notes on the Marehan", PC/nF3)/4/6/i .
^Gol. Thesiger, "Memorandum on th§ NFD", 29 Jan. 1913> CO. 533/103.
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who was young with a quick brain, and Haili, who was old and 
without much say. Then there were the Ali Dera under Sheik 
Ismail, though it was claimed that he bad little control over 
his section, and the Ahmed Wet who were led forcefully by Shirre 
Jamaa. The latter had always refused to meet a government official. 
Lastly there were the Her Tallhe, a small section of little im- 
po rtance,^
But the most important division within the Marehan was be­
tween galti, the new arrivals, and the geydu, those who had been 
in the area some time. Most of the new arrivals belonged to Her 
Isaq sub-sections; many had fought under Muhammad Abdille Hassan
and almost all had arrived without stock. They raided, not only
2other tribes, but also other sections of the Marehan as well.
Government policy was based on the assumption that the galti 
were only to be found amongst the Her Isaq, that they alone were 
responsible for raids against the Aulihan, the Garre and the 
Gobawein, and that other Marehan sections^ere friendly towards 
the administration. This, however, was an oversimplification.
It was also felt that Sheik Ismail was the only important Rer Isaq 
sub-cl an head who was friendly and that with Government backing
ltdem.
p
Opt. Blois, Motes on the Marehan, JPO/M'D/4/ 6/l.
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his influence would increase. Yet because of serious ill-
health, his influence was in fact not very great and he ms
unable to be of any assistance to the administration.^
The Protectorate Government obviously needed to exploit
the inherent divisiveness amongst the Marehan sections, though
before an attempt ms made to disarm them the administration
had succeeded in arousing a very widespread sense of hostility
amongst most of the important segments. Hope had antagonised the
Ahmed Wet when he had mediated in a dispute between them aid the
Her Par ah Ugas. He had ordered the Ahmed Wet to pay blood-money
for a man killed, and they had stalled ssnding in too few cattle.
He had then arrested five of their chiefs when the diya was paid
at once. But Hope's decision in the dispute and hiejmanner of
enforcing it meant that he forfeited any goodwill the Ahmet Wet
2
may have had for the frontier administration. Yet having alienated 
the Ahmed Wet, Hope and Mure then proceeded to lose the support of 
the Farah Ugas by ordering them to hand over some Rer Ali Aulihan 
whom they were virtually keeping prisoners. The limited punitive 
expedition of March 1913 Had been aimed against the Farah Ugas in 
order to make them c omply with this order. Admittedly there was
1Hope to Seo., 14 Jan. 1913, GO.533/116.
Hope to Chief. Seo., 14 Jan. 1913, 00.533/116.
little chance of an alliance between these two important sections,
for they were engaged in a struggle over which should be considered
1the senior section. Y§t both were now firmly antagonistic towards 
the government. Thus the immediate background to disarmament could 
hardly have been considered particularly favourable, what followed 
was fiasco.
When Mure asked for, and received, permission to disarm all 
the Marehan sections in May 1913, he appears to have planned their 
disarmament one at a time, and he decided to begin mth the Rer 
Ahmed Wet. On 19 May they were ordered to surrender their arms 
and it is dear that Mure never considered the possibility that 
the Marehan might have resisted just such an order. At any rate, 
this was the impression that ^he later gave to Graham, while at 
the same time he wrote levealingly that "the employment of force
■z
was not then contemplated". He appears to have completely mis­
understood the nature of Ms earlier success over the Rer Farah 
Ugas and to have drawn the wong conclusions from it.
As late as May 25th it was being confidently and unrealistically 
predicted that the Ahmed Wet would surrender half their rifles, 
but by the end of the month reports began to reach Serenli that 
the Ahmed Wet and the Ali Dera were preparing to resist the government. ^
1Gpt. Soames to G., 16 March 1913, CO. 533/118.
p
Major Hickson, "Report on the Marehan Patrol, May-Sept.1913", CO.533/123.
^Mure to Sec., 11 June 1913, CO. 533/120; Graham to French, 14 July 
1913, CO.533/136.
"^Extract from Cpt. Soames's Diary, CO. 533/123.
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To Mure the explanation seemed to lie in false rumours that 
the government intended raiding' the Ahmed Wet, yet the admini­
stration1 s intelligence was hoth patchy and unreliable. Wo good 
reason was found for explaining why the Ali Dera should have 
thought of joining with the Ahmed Wet. It was assumed that Sheik 
Ismail was responsible for forming an anti-government alliance, 
despite the fact that he was then extremely ill and died in the 
middle of June.^‘
It was also at first naively assumed that the Rer Far ah
Ugas and the Bon Marehan were friendly towards the government
simply because they had sent in messages pledging their loyalty
to the administration, though from their subsequent actions it
2was obvious that they had beqn simply playing for time. The 
Farah Ugas had herds of cattle that were clo se to Semeli and 
so vulnerable to attack; they doubtless wished to remove them 
to a securer area. Mure was certainly more realistic when he 
wrote that all the Marehan sections had combined against the 
government, and that the best policy was to wait until they 
broke up.
Towards the end of May, when both Mure aid Cpt. Soames 
realised that the Marehan as a whole were firmly opposed to
idtm.
^Major Hickson, "Report11, CO. 533/123. 
%ure to Sec., li June 1913, CO.533/120.
surrendering their arms they decided to withdraw; but on
June 7th orders were neceived to disarm all sections of the 
1Marehan. Yet by this date most sections had moved a very
considerable distance from the government post at Serenli aid
2
there was no possibility of surprise. The Rer Ahmed Wet and
the A n  Dera were grazing at Humbali, Arras, Makalla and on
the river Daua. The Bon Marehan were also *very far north,
while the Farah Ugas were at G-arba Harre and Bur gu dud* Apart
from the Farah Ugas the other Rer Isaq. sections were thought
to possess 43^ guns and the Rer I-Iassan 200, but these were vague 
3guesses.
In July two government agents, Deria Ohakal and Sheriff 
Abdul Bari were sent to inform the Marehan that they had to sur­
render their arms, but the Marehan ridiculed the idea and threatened 
the agents. They sent letters to Serenli saying that they wanted 
peace yet they refused to disarm. Moreover, there were rumours 
that the Marehan were buying particularly large amounts of ammunition 
and that they had sent envoys to the Garr$, Digodia and Boran asking 
leave to enter their territory if pursued by the British. There 
was also a possibility that the Marehan would unite. For at the
•1
Extracts from Gpt. Soames's & Major Hickson's Diaries, 00.533/123.
2
In Jan. 1913 the Marehan were transfered from the Northern Frontier 
District in Jubaland, and so had to be approached via Serenli.
■^ Extracts from Cpt. Soames's diaries, C0*533/l23.
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beginning of July, just one -week after Sheik Ismail died, Haj 
Muhammad crossed over from Bardera into the Protectorate. He 
was a Mrehan with a reputation for holiness, he lad spent several 
years in Mecca and it was said that he had been a disciple of 
Sheik Muhammad Abdille Hassan. He was soon to provide the Ali 
Dera with the leadership that they lacked. But there were further 
reports, all of them unconfirmed, that he was trying to combined 
all sections of the Marehan and that he bad sent envoys north
■*1
to get support from the ^heik.
It was a situation that needed careful handling and there is
little evidence that it received this. On August 27th Bowring
telegraphed to say that the disarmament of the Marehan ought
to be enforced but that this required additional troops. He added
2that he had consulted with Graham, The minutes on this telegram
were scathing. Sir John Piddes wrote:
Mr. Bowring's telegram is quite inadequate. Either there 
are reasons which have made disarmament imperative in 
which case he should have stated them; or there are not 
in which case he should not have made the proposal.5
More information ms requested, as was the substance of Gol. Graham's
view’s.
Extracts from Major Hickson-' s diary, GO,533/123.
2B. -bo H., 27 Aug. 1913, 00.533/121.
3Fiddes, 29 Aug. 1913, 00.533/121.
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This led Bowring- to telegraph again his opinion that 
disarmament was necessary and also the contents of a Memorandum 
by Graham which stated, for the first time, that the Marehan 
had been given an ultimatum. They had been told to disarm by 
15 August; not only that, but Graham with apparent unconcern 
had written: U/I_7 don't think they will"!'** Harcourt's reaction 
was acid:
In my opinion the matter has not been handled satis­
factorily by the Government. I understand that an 
ultimatum was sent to the Ahmed Wet and the A n  Dera 
to bring in their rifles by the 15th August although 
it appears that you we aye not in a position to enforce 
that ultimatum.
Harcourt pointed out that shortly before Bowring had stated
that there were sufficient troops, and now he was requesting more.
2The tone of the letter was bitter and stinging in its rebuke. 
Bowring* s muddled and semi-coherent replies did not help matters.
He argued that the military position in Marehan com try was 
normal and the reason for disarming the Somali was purely political. 
Now that the ultimatum had been given it had to be enforced, 
since not to do so would appear weak; this, despite the fact that 
Graham claimed he had never intended to enforce the ultimatum anyway.
1G., Memo., 25 Aug.1913. CO.533/121.
2H. to B., 26 Sept.',. 1913, CO. 533/121.
•^B. to H., 1 Sept. 1913 and G., Memo., 25 Aug. 1913, CO.533/121.
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Not surprisingly, Sir G. Fiddes, then Assistant Under-Secretary,
advised: UI would write stiffly about this”, and Harcourt agreed
adding, " think we have been badly treated by our local representative".***
By November Belfield, the Governor, had come to the conclusion that
Col. Graham had committed a grave error of judgment and that he
had not succeeded in justifying his action. The most that Graham
could say in his defence was that it had been necessary to give
the Maiehan a time limit "for reasons of prestige", and that he
had not thought of attacking them if they had not complied. This
of course left unanswered the question of how he had proposed to
deal with the loss of prestige in the event of his orders being 
2disobeyed.
One result of these recriminations was that active measures 
against the Marehan were delayed. Major Hickson was ordered to 
disarm the Marehan by peaceful methods and naturally enough he 
claimed that this was not possible. It was not until the end 
of December 1913 that permission was given very reluctantly for 
operations to begin against the Marehan. By then there was the risk 
of a general Marehan revolt if firm action was not taken promptly.
Col. Graham was told to deal with the situation as he thought 
best and to bear in mind that vigorous action at the outset could
V. Minute, 2 Sept. 1913, CO.533/121.
2G. to Sec., 1 Nov. 1913 and B. to H., 14 Nov. 1913, C0.533/l24.
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prevent prolonged hostilities. Since a short campaign was 
essential, the poor communications between Jubaland and Nairobi 
posed a problem. Telegrams we re sent in code from the Italian 
wireless station at Bardera, yet many arrived mutilated and 
barely comprehensible; some were quite unintelligible. On 
November lq5th a telegram from Jubaland was eo badly mutilated 
as to be undecipherable. The reply, however, suffered the same 
fate, and this sort of mishap led to frustration and delay.'1'
It always seemed unlikely to the Protectorate administration
that the Garre, the Aulihan or the Muhammad Zubeir would join
2
with the Marehan. But one disturbing development towards the 
end of 1913 was the very large number of Ajuran who were crossing 
from the Italian Protectorate into Marehan country. It was esti­
mated that 30 Ajuran villages with 400 rifles had moved into the 
British Protectorate. Moreover there were other Ajuran ready to 
cross the Juba under Isslo Saddik who were said to possess 300 
rifles. If these figures were correct, then the number of rifles 
in Marehan territory had suddenly almost doubled; and it was unlikely 
that the Ajuran would submit to disarmament any more than the 
Marehan, while their presence jn the Protectorate was just one more
B. to H., 9 Jan. 1914 and B. to S., 28 Deo. 1913, GO. 533/132.
2Read, Minute, 18 Dec. 1913, GO.533/125; H. to B., 23 Hov. 1913,
GO. 533/132.
additional factor exacerbating an already difficult situation.
In November, Hoskins, the new Inspector General of the K.A.R. 
held two barazas at Serenli: the first with the Malimigs, a sub­
section of the Rer Hassan, the second with the chiefs of the Rer 
Earah Ugas. He concluded that the Ahmed Wet, the All pera and 
almost aLl the Rer Hassan were hostile, but that the Rarah Ugas 
were probably prepared to help pay off old scores, while the Bon 
Marehan and the Rer Tullha were waiting to see how events de­
veloped. Tet as Hoskins readily admitted, the collection of in­
telligence was extremely difficult. He also thought that the Marehan 
were rapidly increasing the number of rifles in their possession, 
though he attached little importance to his maintaining that they 
did not know how to use them effectively. The problem of collecting 
reliable intelligence was that there were no Somali speaking
officers. Interpreters had to be used all the time and they were
2
not always trustworthy. One of the most important, Ibrahim Aden 
Effendi, had been- found guilty of working in collusion with the 
Marehan who were often unusually well informed about the government's 
intentions. Later it was discovered that he ms married to a niece 
of Sheik Ismail.
Hlajor Hickson's Diary, 00.533/123.
H. to B., 2 and 23 Nov. 1913, C0.533/l32.
■^ Thomas to Chief Sec., 22 Sept. 1913 and "Evidence in the case of 
Somali Ibrahim Aden commonly known as Ibrahim Effendi", PG/nFD/4-/i/5.
The growing catalogue of complications made depressing reading
at the Colonial Office. "X am weary of this business", Harcourt
minuted, and Sir John Anderson, the Permanent Under-Secretary,
added: "a very unsatisfactory position. We must wait as proposed
but we may be let in for a big affair. I hope Colonel Graham is
better in the field than he has shown himself as an advisor".'*'
2
But Graham did not distinguish himself in the field. On January 
19th a convoy left Serenli for Gare Bahare. Three days later it 
was ambushed and attacked. The tenacity aad determination of the 
attacking force was considered qui te exceptional and it was certainly 
unexpected. Lieutenant Bentinck was wounded aid the convoy, too 
small to divide, was forced toleturn ignominiously to Serenli.5 
Graham himself later admitted that the numbers, arms and spirit 
of the Marehan had been hopelessly underestimated. The position 
was that there were 205 rank and file at Gare Bahare. They were 
without transport but they had food till mid-May, and 300 rounds 
per man. Yet contact with them was impossible. The Marehan con­
trolled the roads and prevented messages being sent. As a result
Anderson, 3 Peb. and Harcourt, 4 Peb. 1914, CO.533/132.
^Moyse-Bartlett (1956), 255 ff., has written a very anodyne account 
of the Jubaland expedition of 1913 which completely glosses over 
the imcompetence of Col. Graham and other difficulties. This seems to 
have been due to his exclusive reliance on the K.A.R.files and his 
failure to consult the CO.533 series.
3B. to H., 26 Jan. 1914, CO.533/132; B. to H., 13 Feb. 1914, 00.533/
133; "Marehan Porce. Report of operation between 19-24 Jan.1914", 
W.G.Stonor, CO.533/134.
Graham did not even know if the garrison was being beseiged,
though he assumed that it was, and in these circumstances he
1
requested reinforcements.
This request, when forwarded to London, once again led a
weary Harcourt to comment on Belfield's failure to keep him
informed. He replied sarcastically that he assumed the failure
to relieve Gare Bahare was due to lack of transport rather than to
any lack of troops, but it was clear that Graham felt his problem
to be a lack of men. Belfield1 s problem at this juncture, however,
was that most of the telegrams that Graham was sending arrived
partially mutilated so that it ms difficult for him to get a
2
clear idea of the situation in Jubaland.
By February it was being admitted that the situation at Serenli 
was very serious indeed. The Gare Bahare detachment was cut off, 
and Graham felt that he could not get through without active Aulihan 
support. Moreover, if the Somli presented a united front he did 
not think he had enough troops. Having anoe been over optimistic, he 
now seems to have wanted to prepare in advance for the worst possible 
contingency. For the likelihood of a general Somali alliance had 
become so remote as to have no practical bearing on the course of 
events. The Aulihan, however, proved sufficiently reliable and with 
their assistance Graham reached Gare Bahare on February 23rd. Three
1G. to B., 4 Feb. 1914 and B. to H., 16 Feb., 1914, CO.533/133.
2H. to B., 17 Feb, 1914 and B, to H., 19 Feb. 1914, CO.533/133.
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days later he left for Makalla, andcn 6th March he arrived 
at Lugh.^
The sudden success of the Marehan expedition seems to have 
been as unexpected as its earlier failure. Yet there ms.no 
crushing victory. Graham very sensibLy remained content with a 
show of force, and quietly abandoned the whole object of the ex­
pedition. He came to the conclusion that he did not have enough 
troops to enforce disarmament, and after a short stay at Lugh he 
returned to Serenli. When he moved up to Gare Behare in April, 
all the Marehan sections had surrendered a few rifles, except for 
the Rer Hassan. A small fine ms imposed and by June it was decided
that all opposition was at an end. The total number of guns sur-
2rendered was a derisory 192. ^
An important element in the final success of the Marehan ex­
pedition had been the activs support given to the government by 
the Aulihan. It was surprising, therefore, that even before the
expedition had finally come to an end, Gol. Graham was writing that
%
some action would soon have to be taken against the latter.
But the truth was that their relationship with the Marehan was
1B. to H., 20 Feb. 1914, CO.533/133; I.E.S.Ward, "Appreciation of
the Military situation", 18 Feb. 1914 and B. to H., 7 & 9 March 1914,
CO.533/134.
2B. to H., 29 June 1914 and S. to Sec., 23 April 1914, 00.533/138.
3G. to B., 7 April 1914, CO.533/137.
extremely complex and rery far from conforming to a stereotype 
of simple hostility.
Nevertheless, there was considerable friction between the 
Marehan and the Aulihan, and the causes were multiple. In the 
first place, there ms  direct competition over grazing. The 
northernmost Aulihan sections often skirmished with the southern­
most Rer Hassan and it is interesting that, from the time of the
very first imports of this fighting, the Aulihan were always de-
1
picted as the aggressors, Yetinitially they must have been weaker 
than the Marehan and, though capable of harassing a section or 
two, they cannot have posed any very seiious threat. With the 
migration of the Rer Afgab Aulihan to the south of the Juba from 
1908 onwards, however, the situation radically altered. ®he Rer 
Afgab upset the balance of power between the Marehan and the Auli­
han, and by greatly strengthening the latter encouraged them in
2their aggressive thrust northwards.
In the following three years, Abdtirrabman Mursaal, head of 
the Aulihan, frequently planned raids against the Marehan in con­
junction with those Rer Afgab sections that still remained behind 
in the Italian Protectorate; while those that had crossed into the
C^pt. Bois, Notes cn the Marehan, PO/NFD/4/6/l. 
2Ward to Hopwood, 23 Nov. 1908, 00.533/56.
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1El. A. P. generally fought with him.
Other causes of enmity could be traced to the support
offered by the Marehan to the Muhammad Zubeir ±l the latter* s
dispute with the Aulihan in 1907/8, when Omar Murgham had been 
2killed. Then in 1909 Hassan ¥arfa,a highly popular Aulihan 
chief, was killed as a result of a Marehan raid and the blood
*5feud that followed also embittered relations between the two groups.
It is possible that the differing relationship of the Aulihan and
the Marehan galti to Sheik Muhammad's ,jihad further north was
yet another factor leading to friction. For it was generally agreed
that the Rer Afgab- had migrated south in order to escape from the
detrimental effects of the Sheik's wars, and that they had been
the victims of his raids; the^certainly had no sympathy with his
4cause. The galti Marehan, on the other hand, were closely linked 
to Sheik Muhammad's movement and many had fought with him. ^
^The numbers were far from negligible and in July 1910 Hope wrote 
of 1,000 Rer Afgab fighting with the Jubaland Aulihan: Hope,
Intelligence Report, GO.533/76; W.E.H.Barrett, Intelligence,
29 Jan. 1910, 00.533/72; G. to C., 3 June 1910, 00.533/74; Hope, 
Intelligence, 10 May 1910, 00.533/75; G. to H., 2 March 1911, 00.533/85,
2Elliott to G., 1 Feb. 1914, CO.533/138.
3T.S.Thomas (1917'), 41-2; E. to G., 1 Feb. 1914, Co.533/138.
T.S.Thomas (1917). 92; G. to 0., 3 June 1910, CO.533/74.
R
See my article 011 Sheik Mohammad Abdille Hassan's impact in Jubaland,
J. A.H. , X no. 4 (1969), for further details.
But the government's attempt to disarm the Marehan in 
1912/1915 introduced a new and complicating factor iito their 
relationship, ho doubt the Aulihan welcomed the possibility 
that their powerful neighbour, whose interests often clashed 
with theirs, would be seriously weakened. let the Aulihan also 
feared that the disarmament of the Marehan would be a forerunner 
to the disarming of all other Somali clans, and when the Rer 
Hassan appealed to the Aulihan for help against the government, 
they played upon this fear aid argued that it was in the latter's 
self-interest to join with them. The Rer Afwa Aulihan gave a 
favourable reply but refused to commit themselves to any definite 
scheme; the Rer A n  also vaguely promised support but urged delay.1 
At the time, however, there does not seem to have b eon much en­
thusiasm to get involved in what was still a localised dispute 
between the administration and the Marehan, Yet as an insurance 
against future complications, the Aulihan made a secret treaty 
with the Muhammad Zubeir in September 1912, in which they agreed
to combine against the government if any attempt was made to disarm 
2
either of them.
However, it appears that the threatened disarmament of the 
Marehan became an extremely divisive issue amongst the Aulihan.
1E. to G., 20 May 1914, CO.533/138.
2E. to S., 1 Feb.- 1914, CO.533/138.
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From the middle of 1915? there were reports of Her Tullha
Marehan living peaceably amongst the Her Afwa Aulihan and
1
buying arms from the latter. On the other hand, there was 
also evidence of a desire amongst the Her Afgab to assist Govern­
ment troops against the Marehan, while Abdttrrahman Mursaal attempted 
to steer a moderately pro-govemment course. Yet in December 1915 
this led the Aboukr Jibrahil Aulihan (which included the Her Afwa,
Her Ali and Her ICassim) to bre.ak away from Abdurrahman. They made
secret arrangements with the Marehan to live in peace with them
2and to forego all claims for past raids. As this was by far the 
largest Aulihan section around Serenli, the government could only 
count on the support of the Her Afgab aid the Her Vfafata both of 
whom continued to back Abdurrahman. This bad been one factor delay­
ing Col. Graham's advance on Gare Bahare. For he could not obtain 
sufficient Aulihan support and even Abdttrrahman ms suspected of
•2J
playing a double-game and passing information on to the Marehan.
With the return to peace and the settlement of fines, almost 
the firstt question to be put to the civil administration that was 
about to be introduced was what sort of relationship would there 
be between the Marehan aid the Aulihan, Would the Marehan be
1Extract from Major Hickson's Diary, 11 Aug. 1915, GO.535/123.
2E. to S., 1 Feb. 1914, 00.533/138; G. to B., 7 April 1914, 00.533/136. 
3B. to H„ 20 Feb. 1914, CO.533/133; G. to Chief See., 12 Feb. 1914, 
CO.533/134; Intelligence, Precis of Information, 1 Feb. 1914, 
00.533/138.
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administered from Serenli which they associated with Abdttrrahman
and Aulihan control, and what was to happen to those Aulihan
1living in Maiehan country. These questions revealed deep
fears that were not stilled by the absence of convincing answers.
During 1915 raids between the Aulihan and the Marehan
reached new proportions, and the claims and counter-claims between
them became increasingly complex. Elliott, the new head of the
constabulary at Serenli, tried to make peace between them aid
failed. His offer to arbitrate was accepted by the Marehan but re-
2
jected by the Aulihan; and as a result hebegan to put pressure 
on the Aulihan to stop them raiding. This gave the Aulihan the im­
pression that Elliott was biased against them, and in January 1916 
it was being reported that they -mxe ver^disturbed at not being 
allowed to regain stock looted from them. The Rer Afgab asked 
for permission to recross back into the Italian Protectorate, and 
Abdttrrahman told Elliott that all the Aulihan wanted to leave the 
E.A.P.^ Elliott, however, took his time before giving a decision 
and Aulihan|>atience ran out. On 1st February they attacked the 
Marehan and it was said that they seized about 70Q camels.^ Elliott's
<1
Memo on a Baraza with the Marehan, 16 June 1914, CO.533/139.
2
T.H.R.Gashmore, Unpublished thesis (l966), 361.
^Power to Ghief Sec., 4 Jan. 1916, CO. 533/167; ’’Evidence at Court 
of Enquiry in the sack of Serenli", in P. to Chief Sec., 10 March
1916, Co.533/167.
4Rayne, to OCT.Nip., 14 ffeb. 1916, Co. 533/167.a
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reaction was to refuse permission to cross, over to the Italian
side until all the looted cattle had been returned. Moreover,
he issued an ultimatum that it had to be returned within three
days or the Aulihan would face the consequences, and Abdttrrahman
ms warned that if the ultimatum was not complied with he would
be ssnt to ICismayu and imprison ed.^ -
Elliott's decision to force a confrontation may have been
good policy, but his utter failure to realise the risks involved
indicates a faulty judgment. The day after the ultimatum had been
given, Abdttrrahman consulted with ten other Aulihan elders and
proposed attacking Serenli. The preparations were hasty and were
not made entirely in secret. For a Herti trader learnt of them and
went to Elliott to warn him. It was claimed that in reply Elliott
2
took an egg and dropped it saying "So end all Somali attacks".
The Herti then crossed over to Bardera where he informed the
Italian Commissioner of the planned Marehan attack. The Commissioner
also warned Elliott who replied brusquely that he could look after
his own affairs. On the day of the attack Abdttrrahman sent Elliott
a black bullock, a black goat and a black sheep. It was a menacing
sign signifying hostility, but again Elliott dismissed its sig~
*
nificance. He rejected a suggestion that the troops be allowed to
^Llewellyn, Intelligence, 1 May 1916, WAj/l6.
p
E,A.T.Duttcn, Lillibullero or the Golden Hoad (Eansibar. 1944), 290.
sleep with their rifles that night, and yet perhaps, after all, 
he m s  not totally blind to the impending danger. For that night 
he gave his orderly a rifle, and the latter had been without a 
gun for months. Maybe this small act - so out of keeping with 
the otherwise total abandonment of all precaution - offers a 
clue to the true state of Elliott's mind; or perhaps it was without 
significance. Yet the orderly himself was surprised at this act 
and nev^r discovered for certain why he had been given a gun,1 
while on February 3rd 1916, Serenli was sacked, Elliott was killed.
For Elliott the Aulihan problem consisted almost entirely 
of their relationshjp to the Marehan. Yet, in fact, the Aulihan 
problem seen in its totality was rather broader than this. For 
other sections had moved further west to Wajir a-id to the Lorian 
Swamp. In 1915/1916 there was a confrontation in this area too, 
one that was perhaps less dramatic, but nevertheless it was to 
exercise the minds of future administrators to a far greater ex­
tent than the crisis at Serenli which did rot really have any long 
term implications.
Power to Chief Seo., 29 Feb. 1916, 00.533/167; Llewellyn, 
Intelligence, 1 May 1916, WAj/l3.
Chapter XX 
WAJIR AND THE WESTWARD MOVEMENT
When Zaphiro had handed over to Barrett in 1909, he had 
pinpointed two main trouble spots along the northern frontier?
Wajir and the upper Juba.1 Wajir was an important well complex.
The supply of water there seemed inexhaustible and it^ -ras the 
only water for about 70 miles in any direction; it was also on
2the caravan route from Moyale and southern Ethiopia to Kismayu.
The wells themselves were spread over twenty miles from north 
to south, and from the end of the 19th century they had been shared 
by the Boran, the Sakuye, the Ajuran and the Gabra.
The main problem at Wajir was to maintain the status quo in
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the face of a continuing Somali migration towards the wells and 
the relative weakness of the Boran and Ajuran there. But the con­
vergence of the Somali towards Wajir - from the north, the east 
and the south - was only part of a much more general westward move­
ment, and this was the crucial problem in the area.
C^pt. Barrett's Reports, 1909-12, Political Records, DO/MIjEl/2/4.
2In 1912 a trade route between Wajir and Nairobi was opened; see;
CHaywood, To the mysterious ILorian Swamp (London, 1927), 184.
^T,S.Thomas (1917), 80.
It was a question of trying to stabilise a shifting nomadic
frontier. It was a].so a question of trying to allocate pasture,
and then ©fusing to allow further modifications in the predetermined
grazing areas. Above all, it was a question of preserving a balance
of power, of assuming the role of protector of the weakest tribe,
and p leventing its further domination. Yet, from whatever angle
one looks at it, the ultimate goal ms aLso to crystalise an '
essentially fluid situation and to ignore the inevitable flux that
was part andparcel of nomadic pastoral life.
The first Somali to reach Wajir were not Barod from the south
but Hawiye from the north. In 1904 a group of Yaben Digodia arrived
as she gats to the Garen and Gelberis sections of the Ajuran. At
that date there were three- main chiefs at Wajir? Ido Noble of the
Ajuran Gelberis, Bare Sadeko of the Ajuran Gashe, and Aleka Gun a
of the Boran. Ido Roble's section ms by far the strongest and
q
the first Digodia arrivals attached themselves to him.
Then, two years later, small groups of Muhammad Zubeir began
to appear from the south led by Ali Guled. They were followed by
their Habr Suleiman she gats and* they occupied the southernmost of
2the Wajir wells. Later it was to be suggested that these Somali all
^Zaphiro to H., 20 Mayl906, F0.37l/l92; R. Turnbull, The Barod 
Invasion, p. 6, and "Some Notes on the History of the Digodia up to 1912 
(1953), PC/NFD/4/l/lo
^Hope, Intelligence Report, 10 Dec. 1910, 00*533/85.
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lived in peace with the Boran aid Ajuran; they tare not particularly
numerous then, the water was plentiful, and there was room for 
1everyone. But the situation changed in 1908 with the arrival
of relatively large numbers of Somali from around Bardera. These
consisted of Rer Matan and Rer Muhammad sub-sections cf the Digodia
under Gora Han, who had allied themselves with the TJgas Guleid section
of the Muhammad Zubeir under Abdi Mulu. They had crossed into the
British Protectorate near Serenli several years earlier in order
to seek refuge from Ethiopian raids, and then they had been driven
2westwards by the Aulihan, At about the same time a relatively large 
group of Digodia Fai arrived from the north. ^
This fresh influx of Somali led to increased tension between 
them and the Boran. Most of the Digodia now arriving at Wajir were 
becoming she gats to the Muhammad Zubeir, and there ms a growing 
polarisation between the B°ran and their clients, on the one hand, 
and the Darod with their shegats, on the other. ^  Skirmishes between 
the Boran and the Somali became more frequent, with the threat of
•'Notes on Wajir's Political background and Somali tribal organisation", 
Appendix 'A', p. 6.
2J.0.W,Hope, Report, 10 May 1910, CO.533/76.
%.G. Turnbull, "Digodia", PC/nFD/4/i/i .
'^Only the Rer Muhammad Babin-;and the Gelibleh Digodia were shegats 
to the Ajuran until 1916, R.G,Turnbull, The Darod Invasions "Notes 
on Wajir1 s Political background"; F,G.Jennings, Memorandum, KLCU ,
EM. (1934), II, p.1650.
494
even more serious clashes in the future.
Zaphiro felt compelled to intervene in a situation that
seemed certain otherwise to develop into a major confrontation
between the Boran and the Somali, But since he was acting from
a position of weakness, 1b was scarcely in a position to put any
pressure on tie Somali or to try and re-establish the status quo ante.
Instead he removed most of the Boran and their clients from Wajir,
1and settled them to the north of Buna. After this, a rumour
spread that the Boran had left the district for good, and the
number cf new Ogaden immigrants increased rapidly. Prom a short 
terjii point of view Zaphiro succeeded in defusing a potentially 
dangerous situation, but in the long run he failed. For the Somali 
push westwards had to be checked. It was a problem that could not 
be entirely ovei’looked. Yet Zaphiro was facilitating a deeper 
Somali penetration into the Protectorate, while this was a policy 
that was bound to be reversed by the new administration which was 
introduced into the area the following year.
At the-beginning of 1910 the Boran began to return to Wajir,
but the Somali had so increased numerical^ that they were afraid
to really settle there. They were also confused by a clever stratagem 
master-mined by All Guled. He sent some Muhammad Zubeir to ICismayu 
where they got a letter from the Provincial Commissioner addressed
E.G.Turnbull, "Digodia", PC/ffi’D/4/l/l.
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to the Boran aid telling them to live peaceably together. Ali 
Guled then showed this letter to the Sakuye saying that it was 
their authority from the Government to stay at Wajir and trans­
ferring the land to them,***
The Boran appealed to the new administration for help, yet 
there was little that could be done for them. The policy of ob­
servation then in force did not permit an3r active intervention 
in tribal disputes. Barrett visited Wajir early^n the year and 
asked the Somali to leave, but he lacked the necessary sanction 
to make his orders carry conviction. The Somali left readily 
enough, though he was powerless to prevent them from returning as 
sonn as he had gone,^
When Hope visited Wajir in December 1910 he warned the Somali
that they would have to move since the wells belonged to the Boran,
3but he was powerless to do anything about it. The following year, 
however, a decision was taken to occupy Wajir and a station was 
opened in January 1912 under the control of Deck. The main purpose 
of this post was to prevent either the Boran or the Ajuran from 
being driven away by the Somali, and also to encourage the former to 
*
Hope, Intelligence Report, 10 Dec.1910, 00,533/84-2 "Notes on Wajir1 s 
Political Background",
Sf. 33. H. Barrett, Records of Moyale Station, PO/WPD/l/3/l.
5Hope to Chief See., 10 Dec. 1910, VO/Mkc/5/l.
1resettle at Wajir as far as was possible. Over the years a
certain amount of success was achieved. In 1912 the Boran who 
then tended to visit Wajir for short periods only, gradually 
rebuilt some of their villages there. Yet the habit of stressing 
that every well at Wajir was the personal property of some individual 
Boran, and that the Somali had' to be entirely evicted, gradually 
became pro forma. In the end it was obvious that the Somali never 
would be pushed back, and in 1918 it was finally stated that wthe
3
Somali claim to Wajir is recognised'1.
But with the introduction of administration, the problem that . 
most preoccupied officials at Wajir was not so much the Somali- 
Boran conflict as the growdng discord amongst the Somali themselves. 
Initially, the main cause for concern was the ilvalry between the 
Muhammad Zubeir and the Aulihan, later it was the escalation of 
armed conflict between the Muhammad Zubeir and the Abd Wale.
A few Aulihan had arrived about 1906 and their numbers, 
though small at first, had gradually grown. They remained independent 
and were not tied as shegats to any other section.^ However, the 
Aulihan-Muhammad Zubeir conflict of 1908 in which Omar Murgham was
V.Gr.Jennings, Memorandum, KLC.EM. (1934) > I!> 1650; Bast Africa 
Protectorate Annual Report of 1912-13, GO.533/125; Castle-Smith, 
Handing Over Report, 10 Dec. 1913? WAj/l6.
*T£ittermaster, nAdministration of Jubaland and MED" from NPD point 
of view", 28 Oct. 1918, PC/jUB/l/lO/7; C.W.Haywood (1927), 161.
3"Extract of Conference Minutes held at ICismayu on 9 Mov, 1918 to 
discuss Administration of Somalis", PC/jUB/l/lO/7.
4F.G.Jennings, Memorandum, KLC .EM. ,. (I934), II,&$£?!.
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killed near Bardera later spread toWajir when Omar's brother,
Ahmed Murgham, moved there around 1909. The following year there
were a number of reports of raids and clashes between these two
sub-clans, but one factor that limited their seriousness was the
still relatively small number of Aulihan at Wajir.^
Moreover, the Muhammad Zubeir were weakened by internal
divisions. When Ahmed Murgham arrived at Wajir he behaved as
though he was the sultan of the entire- sub-clan, as he had been
at Afmadu. But those sections of the Muhammad Zubeir that had
not come from Jubaland, and in particular the Ugas G-uleid under
2Abdi Mulu, refused to acknowledge his titular leadership. And 
since administrative officials considered Ahmed Murgham to be 
sullen, uncboperative and slow to obey orders, they encouraged 
this split, The Ugas Guleid were separated from the other Muhammad 
Zubeir sections, given their own wells, and allotted the status 
of an independent tribe.
Another set-back was the arrival of one more group of Digodia 
at Wajir in 1912 - the Jibrahil. The rnttmbers of the Digodia had now
1G. to C., 12 July 1910, CO.533/74; Hope, Intelligence Report for June 
and July 1910, 00.533/76; Hope Intelligence Report, 10 Dec. 1910,
CO.533/85.
o
Castle Smith, Handing Over Report, 10 Dec. 1910, WAj/l6.
3
idem.
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increased to such an extent that they reverted to their independent
status and broke away from the Muhammad Zubeir.l On the other hand,
Ahmed Murgham greatly strengthened his personal position amongst
the Jubaland sections of his sub-clan by his uncooperative attitude
/
towards the administration. In particular he gained a large measure 
of popularity when Hope kept him under restriction at Moyale for 
six months in 1913* Hope bad thought of having him deported,
1but since there ms nothing definite against him he let him go.
Any hope the Government may have had of further weakening the
Muhammad Zubeir by backing Abdi Salaam, who was considered friendly
towards the administration, against Ahmed Murgham vanished after 
2this. In 1913j moreover, the Muhammad Zubeir were still by far 
the strongest Somali sub-clan at Wajir. The population was estimated 
at 8,000 fully half of whom were thought to have been Ogaden.
The conflict between the Muhammad Zubeir and the Aulihan per­
sisted, however, though with time it came to have litfcle or no 
connection with the earlier hostility of 1908. Its root cause could 
now be' traced to the westward migration of the Aulihan, especially 
after 1913* This resulted in a contest to see which sub-clan could
-j
S'.G.Jennings, Memorandum, KLO.BM. (1934), II> 1651.
Hops, Intelligence Report, 20 Nov. 1913, PC/jUB /l/9/l.
^Filleul to Provincial Commissioner Jubaland, 8 April 1914? PC/kISM/13/5. 
4B. to H., 25 June 1915, CO.533/119.
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gain control not just over Wajir, but also over Buna to the north
1and the Lorian Swamp to .the south. There was a perceptible in­
crease in the number of Aulihan migrating to Wajir, and in
2
1914 there were estimated to be 1,400 there. This was a most 
serious development which, if allowed to persist, was quite de­
finitely going to lead to a trial of strength with the Muhammad 
Zubeir. Beck, the District Commissioner at Wajir, handled the 
situation with aplomb;
Acting on his own initiative, /liej quietly moved the 
Aulihan from Wajir to put an end to their bickering 
with the Mohamed Zubeir. His success, because it created 
no crisis, went unnoticed.3
1 s
But if it/true that his inmediate success drew 110 observation, 
his ultimate failure did, For the following year Kittermaster, the 
new District Commissioner, wrote anxiously to say that the Aulihan 
were returning and he asked for -instructions. Abdurrahman Mursaal 
had returned from a trip to Nairobi in 1915 claiming that the 
government had given the Aulihan all the land between Serenli and 
Wajir. ICittermaster predicted a very serious fight in the near 
future, but he was told that the administration had every confidence 
that he would be able to deal with the situation. He should not issue
1 „
Sultan Osman Geyli, Murghan, Dahri Omar, Ismail Abdi, Mohammad Zubeir,
26 Feb. 1916 to Provincial Commissioner Jubaland, DC/GOS/6/3; R.G.Otter, 
"The impact on Bast Africa of the Gal la and the Somali", Rhodes House 
MSS. Afr. S. 520.
2
’ Deck to Sec., 20 Jan. 1914, C0.533/134.
3
T.H.R.Cashmore, Unpublished Thesis (1966), 355.
orders that would not be obeyed, aid the use of force was ruled 
out. In the event Kittermaster1s prediction proved to be correct, 
only the fight took place one month later than he had estimated 
and it was between the Aulihan aid the administration at Serenli.^- 
let the sudden increase in the momentum of the Aulihan move­
ment westwards after 1914 was also the outcome of a victory over 
the Muhammad Zubeir which they shared vicariously with the Abd Wak. 
Ever since 1912 relations between the Abd Wak and the Muhammad 
Zubeir had been bad, For the former had gradually moved up the 
river Tana, eventually settling near the Lorian Swamp. In 1912, 
however, they had moved up to the Lorian itself where Deck ordered
them to leave as they were much too far north; instead they attacked
2
a Muhammad Zubeir village. Thus there were three main Ogaden sub­
clans attempting to gain control of the Lorian; the Abd Wak, the 
Aulihan and the Muhammad Zubeir. It appears that in 1915 the Aulihan
3
intrigued with the Abd Wak to break the power of the Muhammad Zubeir. 
After months of inconclusive skirmishing there was an important 
battle on the Lorian Swamp in January 1914. The numbers involved 
do not appear to have been large and it was said that there were 
only 400 Muhammad Zubeir with 200 rifles. The Abd Wak were not much
^Kittermaster to Chief Sec., S July 1915; Chief Sec. to IC., 115 Aug. 
1915, PO/to/4/1/5.
^East Africa Protectorate Annual Report, 1912-15, CO,555/125; to 
H., 5 March 1914, and. R.E.Salkeld, "Short History of the Muhammad 
Zubeir and Abd Wak fighting", 1914,,C0*555/l54.
5Deck to Chief Seo., 20 Jan. 1914, CO-533/134.
more numerous but they inflicted a crushing defeat on their 
enemies. Ahmed Murgham was killed with most of his brothers and 
relatives, and a very large number of important headmen.'1'
This competition amongst the Ogaden was a reflection of a 
much broader problem, for it was the movement cf the Somali in 
general to the west and the south that was responsible for these 
tensions and rivalries. As early as 19^5 Sir Charles Eliot had
noted! "Our real task at present is., to see that they ffihs Somali/
do not encroach to the south and prevent them from raiding the Tana" 
Much the. same preoccupation ms in evidence in 1913 when Col. Graham 
pointed out; "We cannot afford to lose sight of the fact that the 
Somali movement should be checked". But in the meantime there had 
been one crisis, and another was looming. Already in 1909 there 
had been an unpleasant situation when it was said that some 10,000
Somali were massed on the Tana due to an abnormal drought. One
Company of the K.A.R. plus a maxim gun ms rushed to the spot, with 
instructions that great care ‘ should be taken to avoid a collision.
It was feared that the Somali would raid the Pokomo and the Gall a or 
if they crossed the river Tana, push far to the west.^ " But there
B^. to. H., 13 Feb. 1914?'CO.533/l33; R.E.Salkeld, "Muhammad Zubeir 
and Abd Wak", CO.. 533/134-
^Sir Charles Eliot (19O5), 121.
Graham, Memorandum, 25 Aug. 1913* CO.533/121.
4 /
H.—S. to Sec. of State, 12 March 1909, C0.533/5S; M.R.Mahoney,
"Memorandum for District Records! Somalis and Gall a", 2 May 1928,
DC/GRA/3/4; Moyse-Bartlett (1956), 212.
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was also a fear that the Somali would not leave the Tana even 
after the next rains had fallen, and this proved to be absolutely 
correct. The Abd Wak remained on the Tana, gradually moving north 
towards the Lorian Swamp with results that have already been 
described. ^
Yet while the dangers remained obvious enough, it was by 
no means apparent what could be. done to halt this movement. The 
large numbers of Somali involved generally dwarfed the lone District 
Commissioner, backed by a mere handful of police, who had to tackle 
the problem. Thus Graham, who was most anxious to put a stop to 
the continual migration of Somali into the Protectorate from the 
Italian sphere, nevertheless had to allow a group of Aulihan to 
cross the Juba in 1914. He simply could not prevent them, for he
was faced with 1,000 Aulihan who had with them an estimated 6,000
2
camels, 4,000 cattle and 10,000 sheep. In the first six months of 
1914, it was estimated that 4,000 Somali had crossed the river Juba 
into the British Protectorate, and many of them possessed rifles.
It was a little pointless to spend thousands of pounds an a punitive 
expedition against the Marehan which resulted in the destruction 
of 192 guns, when many times that number were entering the Protectorate
Gilkison to H.S., 13 March 1909, 00.533/58; T.S.Thomas' (1917),
40-41.
Graham to Chief Sec. , 30 March 1914, 00.533/135.
503
every month. Salkeld offered three suggestions for solving the 
problem. Pirst, a Convention between Italy, Ethiopia and Creat 
Britain, though the difficulty here would be in implementing any 
meaningful agreement, Secondly, considerable grants of secret 
service money to enable officers to get information, and flying 
patrols to follow up clues. No doubt this idea grew out o f Salkeld1 s 
quaint method of collecting intelligence which consisted in making 
a small cash payment to any Somali travelling in the Province who 
told him something useful, lastly, he suggested that it was time 
to consider the feasibility of a Somali Reserve, precisely with
•j
the object of checking the westward movement of the Somali.
Other suggestions were also made from time to time. Salkeld, for 
instance, also thought that by encouraging small shops at Wajir
ct 2
the Somali might become less nomadic in their habits. But the
%
most important suggestion ms that there should be a Somali Reserve. 
No agreement could be reached on this, however, and Kittermaster 
felt that while the idea m s  fine in theory, it would fail in 
practice.' The whole discussion, moreover, was abruptly terminated 
by Great Britain's transfer of jubaland and its Somali inhabitants
Salkeld to Chief Sec., 7 July 1914, C0.533/l39.
S. to Chief Sec., 6 April 1914, Co-533/137.
3Thevhole question of a Somali Reserve has been discussed in more 
detail and more broadly by T.H.R. Cashmore (1966), passim.
4IC. to P.O.Tan aland, 13 May 1919, PC/jtTB/l/lo/7.
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to the Italians;^ yet the problem remained unsolved for, despite 
the transfer, there were still Somali to he found after 1920 in 
Kenya Colony.
Yet, prior to that date almost nothing had been done to prevent
the Somali from pushing further and further south-west. This had
already been pinpointed as a crucial problem that needed immediate
tackling, but the means were never at hand to deal, with it. That
is why those theories that the British saved the Bantu tribes of
Kenya from almost certain Somali conquest alx-rays seem to be so
2
irrational and unhist or ical. Nevertheless, it had been recognised
that the Somali movement west carried x-rithin it the seedsjbf a
grave political crisis, and in 1918 Plowman, the Acting District
Commissioner at Moyale, x*rotes
I x-rould urge most strongly the immediate removal of 
these undesirable aliens. They are a stumbling-block 
to the progress of the District and a standing menace 
to its internal peace. This reform has often been ad­
vocated in the past but it still awaits execution, and 
the longer we delay the more difficult it will become 
as these Somalis will, before long, be able to point 
to years of residence there. Further there is a great 
danger of their importunity causing people to forget 
that Wajir iss Gall a country, though the rightful oxmers 
have temporarily been dispossessed owing to Government 
slackness.
The transfer of Jubaland to Italy in 1924 lies outside the scope of this
thesis but the political background and reason for this transfer can
be found in Drysdale, The Somali Dispute (London I960 ).
2
Sir Gerald Reece, "The Horn of Africa", International Affairs, XXX 
no. 4 (1954), 441. See also; I.N.Dracapoli, "Across Southern Jubaland 
to the Lorian Swamp", G.J., XLII no. 2 (1913), 132.
3P. to OCT.NFD., 4 Jan 1918, PC/HFDAAA.
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The danger was obvious enough then, but it required force to evict 
the Somali and the Northern Frontier District never possessed that 
sort of force* It was this failure, therefore, to gain control over 
the Somali that made nonsense of those brave demands that their 
advance into the Protectorate shoiild only be regarded as a temporary 
phenomenon*
The sack of Serenli in February 1916 led to the complete
evacuation of the whole of Jubaland as well as much of the N*F*D.
Yet this was not really a turning-point in the history of the area
because it did not lead to any new shift in policy, and most of the
suggestions that were being made in 1918 had been discussed at least
four years earlier*
Nevertheless, the sack of Serenli was the end of a chapter;
it marked the final episode of a long period of bluff 011 the part of
the Protectorate administration, though some claimed that it was the
Somali who had been bluffing* As Kittermaster, the Provincial
0ommissioner for the N*F*D*, noted just after the First World War:
At the present time we are suffering from the in­
heritance of a vicious administrative legend. Never 
yet until the last eighteen months has any order 
given to the Somalis been really enforced* We have 
been afraid to call the Somali*s bluff. I consider 
that Gpt.Salkeld*s policy is largely responsible 
for this*
It was clearly unfair to place all the blame on Salkeld alone, 
tc. to P.C.Tanaland, 13 M a y  1919, PC/JUB/1/10/7.
I
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but the disaster at Serenli demonstrated very forcibly the dangers 
inherent in a so-called policy of ^ observation* At the beginning 
of the First World War, in fact, there were an increasing number 
of iDeople who were stating openly that, as far as administration 
was concerned, there had been little real progress since 1897* in 
marked contrast to so many glib, earlier statements that the Somali
were fully under control, it was now being readily admitted that
. . 1 the Protectorate had hardly begun to administer them*
There were many reasons for this new pragmatism* The very
considerable anxiety engendered by the Marehan expedition was one*
But, equally, the very Important and large clash between the Muhammad
Zubeir and the Abd Wale near the Lorian in 1913 was another* For
Salkeld, who passed by the Lorian two days later, and Deck who was
in the vicinity, knew nothing of the fight for several weeks* Both
these events helped to underline the limitations of the Protectorate*s
2control over the Somali*
This reassessment of the Protectorate's achievements and 
impact along its northern frontier also went hand in hand with a 
more realistic reappraisal of the Somali mentality* There were still 
plenty who assumed that the Somali were grateful for the advent of 
administration and were longing to favour the fruits of civilisation. 
The whole philosophy of paternalism v/as too comforting and self
1Belfield to Harcourt, 31 Oct. 1913, 00.533/123; Hoskins, "Memorandum 
on the military situation in British East Africa Protectorate'*,
6 April 1914 and W.Isaak to Chief Sec*, 17 March 1914, 00*533/136; 
Future of the N.F.'D*, 1918, P C / E F D / W ^ .
2Harper, Minute, 27 May 1914, 00*533/134*
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assuring to die a quick death# Yet from 191^ onwards there is
also evidence of a more detached cynicism amongst certain of the most
pro-Somali administrators# It could now be admitted that the
Somali were largely indifferent towards the Government* It could
be stated that the Somali looked upon the administration as a weak
and harmless irritant# There was a growing awareness that the
Somali regarded the administrations payment to Government headmen
to be a sign of its impotence and not of its strength# The fact
that Jenner's murderers were still at large and that the Somali had
on three occasions faced up to the Government without any real
1defeat lent evidence to this view#
Nevertheless, precisely because the Protectorate administration 
was becoming increasingly aware of its own limitations, there was a 
tendency to assume that what was beginning to be called ’the Somali 
problem1 was due solely to the fact that the northern frontier was 
one of the last areas of the Protectorate to be brought under 
effective control. It was assumed, therefore, that once the number 
of troops there had been increased and once expenditure on the
2Province had risen that the Somali problem would cease to exist*
Yet the essence of the Somali problem was of course only 
partly connected with the whole question of Government control, just 
as it was only partly connected with the policy to be adopted
■^Filleul to P,C#Jubaland, 10 Feb# 191^ * and 8 April 191^* DC/KISM/13/5« 
^Isaak to Chief Sec*, 23 Nov# 1919* PC/JUB/1/10/7#
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towards pastoral peoples in a predominantly agricultural country.
A far greater problem lay in the way in which the Somali could be 
fitted into the framework of the E.A.P*, and this had been pin­
pointed by Craufurd in 1895* It was easy for Kittermaster to
write “obviously our aim must be to civilise our natives as much as 
1
possible*1, what was more to the point was the view of another
official: nI don't think the Somalis will ever be civilised along
2the lines of the Bantu tribes in this country”.
Moreover, in addition to this sense that the Somali were
different was a feeling amongst many administrators that they were
superior to the Bantu. Again one can turn to Craufurd1s view in
1896 when he wrote: “the race, in my opinion, has no equal in this
part of Africa either in intelligence or in courage”. Yet given
the fact that the Protectorate's policy towards the Somali was
essentially a negative one, to prevent their movement westwards,
there also developed a doubt as to whether this was good enough.
“We try to stop him1', one administrator wrote, “Are we right? lie
A-
is obviously better material than many of our tribes”*
What in retrospect is most interesting is to observe how
kittermaster to Plowman, H/O Report 1919* PC/N3PD/2/1/1.
2
M.R.Mahoney, “Somali: General characteristics and policy’*, 9 May
1929, DC/GRA/3A «
^Craufurd to Salisbury, 13 July 1896, FO.107/55*
\.B. Sharpe, “The Somali General History” , O'an* 1932, DC/GRA/3A*
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the whole question of the status of the Somali should have been 
implicitly raised first by Protectorate officials. So that when 
after the : First World War the Somali themselves entered the arena 
of political protest pressure-groups and demanded parity with the 
Indians and a non-native status, it was particularly difficult to 
resist their demands* Why this jjolitical development does not come 
within the scope of the thesis is not just a question of chronology* 
however* but also because it was a movement that started outside the 
N.F.D. amongst people who were later to be termed alien Somali and 
who came from the British Somali Protectorate. Their protests were 
initiated in Nairobi and not on the Northern Frontier. Nevertheless 
it was their agitation that was to be the first step along the road 
to a growing political consciovisness amongst the Somali in the N.F.D 
And the most important later stej>s would also be initiated by Somali 
outside the N.F.D. itself. The first impulse came from the south, 
the second came from the north after the Second World War with the 
formation of the Somali Youth League. But because of the history of 
the N.F.D., and because of the way in which the Somali had been 
administered with the underlying assumption that assimilation was 
impossible and should not be encouraged, any chance of rationally 
opposing later irredensist claims was undermined from the very 
start.
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CONCLUSION
The middle of the nineteenth century forms a turning-point 
of the utmost importance in the history of the savannah lowlands 
of northern Kenya* For, while throughout the rest of east Africa, 
large-scale migrations of people were coming to an end, in northern 
Kenya they were just ahout to begin. And while the ethnic com­
position of east and north-east Africa had more or less assumed its 
present state, north-eastern Kenya proved on the whole to be a 
striking exception* As a result of Samburu and Darod Somali 
migrations, the main pastoral inhabitants of a very large part of 
this savannah lowland had been displaced by the end of the 1860s* 
Two entire peoples (the Wardai Galla and the Laikipiak Masai), who 
between them had controlled a region somewhat larger than the 
United Kingdom, were so entirely crushed that they barely 
survived as independent entities#
These upheavals are to be explained by factors that reach 
back to the first decades of the nineteenth century. Both the 
Samburu and the Darod, searching for better pasture, had been
involved in earlier population movements that had come to a
1temporary halt in the first half of the century; and one cause 
of their recommencement can be found in the growing friction
"Ssupra, p «68, 96•
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1between the II Purko and Samburu, on the one hand, and the Darod
2and Flai Rahanwein on the other. At the same time, there were 
various factors that contributed to a decline in strength of the 
Laikipiak Masai and the Wardai Galla, before their respective 
spheres of dominance were threatened. The former were weakened 
by famine, they were disunited and they had begun to move south­
wards before the Samburu thrust northwards* Furthermore, Samburu 
success against the Laikipiak was achieved in alliance with the 
highly mobile camel-owning Rendille, though how 'far this alliance 
was crucial to their victories remains an open question*
The position of the Wardai to the south of the river Juba 
seems to have been gradually undermined from the beginning of the 
nineteenth century, when Darod she gats (clients) began to infiltrate 
amongst them as herdsmen* Moreover, during the lo30s the Wardai 
were weakened by the rise of Bardera* They suffered several 
important military defeats at the hands of its inhabitants, being 
simultaneously harrassed by the Garre and Boran Galla in the west;
and these two factors led them to relinquish control over the 
5upper Juba* The vast increase in the number of Darod shegats 
living amongst the Wardai in the 1860s was also an important 
prelude to the final Somali challenge to Wardai dominance. And, 
lastly, at precisely the time when the Wardai were attacked by the 
Somali in the north, they were also threatened by Karaba and Masai
’\supra, p*96-7. 2Supra, p.73* ^Supra, p.93ff•
A- 3Supra. p*62 Supra. p*68ff.
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in the south* 1
However, the long term impact of the Somali and Samburu 
migrations was to be very different* For the Somali movement to 
the south of the river Juba did not cease in the 1860s, and, after 
the very rapid acquisition of an enormous area, the Darod and 
Hawiye continued to move slowly but inexorably westward in the 
direction of lake Rudolf and the Merti plateau# It was precisely 
this element of continuous population movement that lay at the very 
core of what was later to be called the Somali problem. On the 
other hand, the expansion of the Samburu S0021 came to a halt* 
Rinderpest epidemics in the l880s and the outbreak of small-pox in 
the next decade seriously reduced the size of their flocks and the 
numbers of their peo£>le* Thus weakened they found themselves over­
extended; and, in the following decades, the area they controlled 
contracted as they were attacked by the Ethiopians in the north,
harrassed by the Turkana in the south and raided by the Somali in 
2
the east*
It is important to note that the displacement of the Wardai 
occurred in two distinct phases: during the 1830s they abandoned 
the upper Juba to the north of Bardera, while it was not until the 
1860s that they were dislodged from the coastal Juba/Tana region.
Loss of control over the upper Juba initially led to the substitution 
of one Galla group by another for the Boran moved into the abandoned 
area, but ultimately it benefited' a Somali group that was not 
directly connected with either the Darod or the Somali of Bardera*
Supra, p.77~8
2
Supra, p*99ff» p*330-2*
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For Boran expansion towards the upper Juba was undertaken jointly
with Garre shegats, and in the 18^0 s the, latter made themselves 
1independent* Perhaps the most significant result of Garre control
over the western side of the upper Juba was that it enabled them
first to dominate and later to reconstruct the long distance
caravan trade that linked the Benadir coast with southern Ethiopia.
Previously, long distance trade had been in the hands of the coastal
Somali who generally penetrated no further inland than Lugh, where
they met Boran who came from the west* The Garre gi'eatly increased
the economic cachment area of the upper Juba by extending the
distance of the caravan routes until they almost reached lake Rudolf
and Mt* Marsahit in the west* At the same time, they gradually
prohibited the Boran from trading directly with Lugh, discouraged
other Somali from trading to the west of the river Juba, and ivith
the Gasar Gtidda from Lugh established something of a monopoly for 
2themselves.
It was to be of great importance that the Ogaden (the strongest 
of the Darod clans south of the Juba), who had been instrumental in 
the defeat of the Wardai, never came to control either of Jubaland1s 
two major trade outlets. Trade through Lugh was dominated by the 
Garre and the Gasar Gudda; while Kismayu and the mouth of the river 
Juba came under the control of the Herti who had taken no part in 
the defeat of the Wardai, only sailing from Berbera to ICismayu once
18upi-a, pp.?2-3. Supra, pp.112-3.
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news of the Ogaden victories had reached the north. Thus the
two major trade outlets of Jubaland were to be controlled by
clans that were' comparatively weak* The Garre and the Gasar
Gudda found it extremely difficult to hold their own against
later Somali immigrants, such as the Marehan and the Digodia,
and they were incapable of countering Ethiopian expansion south- 
1wards. On the coast, the Plerti likewise found themselves
2unable effectively to oppose the Tunni in the north. As a
result, both these Somali groups attempted to involve outside
powers on their behalf: both succeeded, and there can be no
doubt that their success radically affected the history of this
area. The Gasar Gudda received Italian assistance just in time
to prevent Lugh from falling into the hands of the Ethiopians,
while support given to the Herti in 1870, by the Governor of
3Lamu, led to the involvement of Zanzibar at Kismayu.
One of the consequences of this outside intervention was 
that the developing situation on the coast, and in the interior 
of Jubaland, came to be affected in the late nineteenth century 
by British, Italian, and Ethiopian ambitions. In this thesis 
an attempt is made to show how these external forces interacted 
with local developments amongst the pastoral peoples: first, 
dealing with the coast of Jubaland, and then, later, con­
sidering events in the interior.
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Outside involvement along the coastal area increased
steadily from I87O onwards. Zanzibari support for the Herti
led to the establishment of a permanent garrison at Kismayu
with the result that the Joint Delimitation Commission of 
11886 recognised Kismayu and a ten mile radius to be part of 
the Zanzibar dominions* By this time, various European pov/ers 
had shown an interest in this part of the coast* In 1889, the 
Italian Government attempted to gain control over the mouth of 
the river Juba and failed* But, two years later, Germany de­
clared a Protectorate over the interior between the Juba and 
Tana rivers. Then, in 1890, the Imperial British East Africa 
Company (I.B.E.A.Co*) set out to administer this region which
had been ceded to Great Britain in the Anglo-German Agreement
2of July" -that year* However, growing financial problems soon 
led to the liquidation of the Chartered Company, and in 1895 
the British East Africa Protectorate was established* Yet, 
until I9O9, the Protectorate administration in Jubaland was 
tied to the coast, and, though expeditions far into the interior 
were undertaken from time to time, its impact was extremely 
limited*
The assistance which the Herti received from the liwali
^The Joint Delimitation Commission, consisting of France, Germany 
and Great Britain, attempted to ascertain the limits of the 
Sultan of Zanzibar*s dominions* See: Supra, p.87.
^Supra, pp.12*1— 6*
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of Lamu brought the coastal Somali important benefits* The 
building of a stone fort at Kismayu, and the stationing of 
100 Zanzibari troops there, protected the Herti from Tunni 
aggression* Undei* the umbrella of this protection, trade 
expanded until in 1875 Kismayu had become a flourishing com­
mercial centre with 1,000 inhabitants* This trade centred on 
the export of ivory and hides which were obtained by the 
coastal Somali, and cereals which were grown by the Bantu 
Wagosha* However, in the 1870s the first long-distance Boran 
caravans reached the coast; and this reflected the growing 
importance of Kismayu, though the route from southern Ethiopia
to the mouth of the river Juba was*too hazardous ever to assume
1
great economic significance* The Herti, moreover, gained these
very tangible economic and military benefits with scarcely any
3-Oss to their political independence* For the legal and
*
political jurisdiction of the liwali did not extend over the 
coastal Somali who governed themselves under their own law, 
while in Kismayu the local Arab garrison remained unchanged for 
many years intermarrying with Somali women* Their sympathies 
and allegiance became identified with Somali interests, and 
they were likely to represent the Somali viewpoint in any 
dispute,2
Nevertheless, the presence of the Arabs in Kismayu was
^Supra, p ♦ 10 ^f*
2
Supra, p •138*
• *3
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not wholly advantageous to the Herti* European countries tended 
to acknowledge the Sultan of Zanzibar1s authority over the Somali 
at Kismayu, and increasing European interest in the coast led to 
friction between the .Arabs and the Herti. The latter were afraid 
that the Arabs would utilise their contacts with European visitors 
so as to strengthen their political position at the expense of the 
coastal Somali* Between i860 and 1884 there was open and bitter 
warfare between the- Herti and the Arabs, though eventually the 
liwali made peace on the terms of the Herti."*"
One important result of these strained Arab/Herti relations 
was that the Arabs in Kismayu allied themselves with £he Ogaden in 
Afmadu, and this development quickly resulted in a conflict 
between the Herti and the Ogaden with the inevitable long- 
lasting blood-feud as a concomitant* In the period prior to 1880, 
the Ogaden had on several occasions assisted the Herti in their 
struggles against the Tunni at the mouth of the river Juba, despite 
the fact that Ogaden interests were centred further inland and to 
the south; but, from this time onwards, the Herti and the Ogaden 
were to be opposed to one another, and it became an essential part 
of Arab policy to play on this division and deliberately to 
encourage it* Moreover, the Ogaden also supported an attempt by 
the Arabs to establish a fort at the mouth of the river Juba* This 
move was bitterly contested by the Herti* It further exacerbated
^Supra* p*85*
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relations between the Herti and the Ogaden, and also led to
economic competition between the Herti and the Arabs for control
1over the Wagosha export trade*
Distrust of the motives behind Arab/European contacts did
not deter the Somali themselves, however, from getting in touch
with European visitors to Jubaland* The Somali seem to have
been anxious to benefit from increased European interest in the
coast, though only on their own terms* Nevertheless, according
to British, Italian and German accounts, Somali headmen were all
tcfi)prepared to go through the motions of ceding their land,
occasionally several times over, for payment of money* These
claims must be treated sceptically, however, for the very concept
201 ceding land was one that was foreign to Somali pastoralists*
On the other hand, they were well acquainted with the practice 
of being given money as a quid pro quo for gaining their friend­
ship and cooperation, and it seems that they treated European 
advances in this light*
On the eve of the partition of Africa, the coastal Somali 
had evidently 1iot grasped the significance of events that were 
overtaking them. Their relationship with the Imperial British 
East Africa Company (l,B*E.A.Co) was to be complicated by their 
past experience of Zanzibar rule; for the Somali do not seem to 
have anticixoated any change in the pattern of authority along the
~*~Supra, p. 86*
2
The attitude of the Somali towards ownership of land is discussed 
Supra, pp*19ff• See also: Supra, pp*92-3*
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coast, and very great changes were about to take x>lace •
At first sight, however, the I.B.E.A*Co.1s impact on the
Somali was to be very similar to that of the previous Arab
i
administration: for both groups were overwhelmingly preoccupied |
i
with trade and less concerned with imposing political control |
over the coastal peoples, and both were anxious to keep the !
i
I
cost of administration to a minimum and thus prepared to allow j 
the coastal Somali a large measure of autonomy* Yet, while the 
Arabs were primarily concerned with exports from Kismayu, the 
Company was interested in opening up the interior to long­
distance caravan trade* Thus the Company attempted first to 
gain the support of the Ogaden around Afmadu, without in any way 
threatening their autonomy* The Company dismissed a liwali known 
to be hostile to them and then obligingly appealed to the Sultan 
of Zanzibar to pay the Ogaden blood-money which the latter claimed 
they were owed; and when the Sultan refused it paid the money 
to the Ogaden itself# The Company also proved to be very 
sympathetic when the Ogaden demanded that escaped slaves should 
be returned to them. Moreover, it also tacitly encouraged the 
migration of the Abdulla Ogaden south-westwards, and their 
attempt to found a town on the x'iver Tana that would rival Afmadu,
by giving them Company flags; however, Company agents on the river
1
Tana were not so enthusiastic at the intrusion of the Abdulla*
^Supra, pp. 139ff
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One result of the Company’s x)reoccupation with the 
interior, and with long-distance trade, was that the prior 
necessity of coming to terms with the coastal Herti Somali 
was overlooked* But an insurrection at Kismayu in February 
1893 and a mutiny amongst the Company’s troops a few months 
later inevitably focused attention on the coast* Todd’s baraza 
in I?ebruary 1893 was the first occasion of Somali resistance 
to British administration in East Africa# Earlier accounts 
are extremely confused about the motives behind this resist­
ance, and there have been disagreements over whether it was 
masterminded by the Ogaden or the Herti* In this thesis, it is 
argued that the insurrection was limited almost entirely to the 
Herti* There were a number of reasons for Herti discontent: 
the Company’s preferance for a close alliance with the Ogaden 
was one, its attempt to undermine a Herti monopoly over the 
Juba export trade another, but by far the most important reason 
was Todd’s sequestration of all Somali property in Kismayu 
unless a prior claim had been registered in Zanzibar* Only a 
few Ogaden whoe owned property In Eismayu were involved in the 
uprising, but as a result of Todd’s clumsy handling of a
delicate situation all the Herti sections united against the 
1Company*
When in May 1893 the Company abandoned Witu its sphere of
^Supra, pp*1^8ff*
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influence in Jubaland was restricted to Kismayu and a ten mile 
radius* In the new situation the Company*s previous overtures 
to the Ogaden thus became irrelevant and it tried to come to 
terms with the Herti# Kismayu which had been closed to trade 
was nov/ opened* but it was the Ogaden who came and traded and
the Company found it extremely difficult to make peace with the
1
Herti* The main reason for this was that the Company*s offer to 
establish peaceful relations had very different implications for 
the Ogaden and the Herti* The former had everything to gain 
from accepting peace* They ran less risk of being identified 
with the rebellious Herti and having their property destroyed; 
and this was not an unimportant consideration because after the 
Herti uprising of 1893 the first punitive measures were under­
taken against Ogaden villages by mistake* Then the Ogaden 
secured an outlet for their ivory* but, even more important,
2they gained those benefits without any loss to their autonomy.
For the Iierti, however, peace meant an acceptance of their 
loss of control over Kismayu and thus entailed a very real 
political reverse* It took the Herti several years to accept 
that the Company could not be evicted from Kisrnayu* Mutinies 
amongst the Company*s troops, the unreliability of new recruits 
sent to replace rebellious units, and the knowledge that the 
Comxoany was going to leave East Africa* helped to give the Her
2,'Supra, p*l66
# iiri>i*n ■arum
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the impression that time was on their side. Their final 
submission was probably due most to the realisation that with 
naval support the Company could not be dislodged. The Herti 
had also suffered appalling losses in cattle due to a rinder­
pest epidemic and they had been worsted in fights with the 
Wagosha* Moreover, the latter would not agree to make peace
1with the Herti until they had come to terms with the Company.- 
Thus the period of Chartered Company rule did have an important 
impact on the coastal Somali, for the Company successfully 
gained real control over Kismayu and got the Herti to accept 
this. In all other respects, the period of Company administr­
ation in Jubaland was one of dismal failure* Attempts to win 
the friendship and confidence of the Ogaden by a supine policy 
of giving way to their demands achieved nothing concrete and 
was interpreted quite correctly as a sign of weakness* This 
policy, hwwever, was to be reversed in July 1895 when Sir Arthur 
Hardinge became the first Commissioner of the East Africa Protect­
orate (E.A.P,), for he believed that the Somali needed to be 
taught a sharp lesson and that force would have to be used*
The modest Government movement into the interior, set in 
motion by Hardinge in 1895? did not have the same significance 
for the Herti as it did for the Ogaden. To the Herti it meant 
their total encirclement. They had already lost control over
XSupra, p. 1?0 2Svipra, pp. 173, 177-8, 186.
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Kismayu and were quickly to be overawed by rapid and repeated
visits by Government troops to their chief villages close to the 
1
coast. To the Ogaden, on the other hand, the movement merely
represented a frontal threat with the possibility of resistance
and retreat. At the same time, the position of the Ogaden was
complicated by the fact that not all segments were equally mobile.
These segments that owned large numbers of Galla slaves and used
them to cultivate crops around the wells of Afmadu were clearly
the most vulnerable, while those whose grazing areas were to be
found deepest in the interior or whose herds consisted of camels
2rather than cattle were the least threatened.
Thus when the Protectorate administration sent its first 
armed caravan to Afmadu there was a skirmish, not between the 
Ogaden and the Government forces, but amongst the Ogaden them­
selves who were unable to decide whether to resist the approach 
of troops or to capitulate* In 1896 the Ogaden surrendered to 
force ma.jeur, but it was only a submission on paper and the 
signatures of Ogaden leaders was not enough to change the strong 
feelings of hostility in some Ogaden sub-clans, mostly those 
furthest inland and out of the reach of Government forces* 
Moreover, the administration unwittingly undermined the impact
of their show of force when they failed to follow it ux^  by
3
imposing some measure of control over Afmadu* 
upra, pp*190-2. upra, p*20 f^*
•^ Supra, p>.207*
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The submission of the Herti, however, was very different*
Their leaders placed themselves and their families under 
Government protection, and agreed to collaborate fully and actively 
with the administration. Herti leaders such as Shirwar Ismail 
and Ali Hahar were made x3°litical officers, given armed escorts 
and utilised in a propaganda campaign against the Ogaden* Herti 
were employed as scouts and mail-runners, some were trained as 
askaris and they made up a large proportion of the tribal police, 
until after I89S when all the Kismayu police were exclusively 
recruited from amongst them. In this capacity they helped the 
administration against the Ogaden both by gathering intelligence 
and also by fighting* Individuals such as Adam Musa, the Herti 
Government interpreter, xDlayed important political roles* Adam
1
Musa himself acted as an intermediary between the administration
on the coast and potentially hostile Somali sections in the
interior, collected fines and gathered intelligence. Most
important, it was this collaboration of the Herti that enabled 
2Jenner and Hardinge to attempt a forward policy, for an essential 
element of this policy was the necessity to avoid any capital 
expenditure, and this was only possible? with Herti cooperation 
and initiative*^
Although with time the Herti came to enjoy a virtual 
monopoly of government jobs, this had not been intended from the
2The first Sub-Commissioner of Jubaland*
' t f
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beginning, Jenner had planned to recruit Ogaden as well and as 
early as 1896 they had been allowed to select two men for employ­
ment in the Customs Department, with the promise of further jobs 
if they behaved themselves well* Government employment, then, 
was used as a reward for collaboration; and a focal point of later 
Ogaden resentment was to be their exclusion from government jobs*
The benefits £0 be gained from collaboration were clearly 
valued and sought after# Herti headmen gained a new source of 
patronage, through being able to give their supporters salaried 
jobs, and they acquired a new official status backed by an escort 
and Government pay# Yet, despite the advantages to be gained fr*om 
collaboration, the overall effect was to weaken the position of 
some Herti leaders# Ali Nahar himself admitted that "his power
amongst the Herti had considerably waned since he entered
2Government service", and there were three reasons for this#
First and most important, the tendency of the administration to 
rely on Ali Nahar for the implementation of government policy, 
and thus to by-pass the Herti council, undoubtedly caused wide­
spread resentment* Then, while patronage was a new and valuable 
source of power, it also tended to be a highly divisive one and 
important Herti segments, dissatisfied with their share of 
government jobs, attempted to undermine Ali Nahar*s position*
Lastly and in this case much less important, collaboration with 
the British was at times unpopular# Nor vjas this an isolated
1 P
guprat P * 199 Supra, p p # 1 9 zl-5.
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phenomenon. By and large, the more any Somali leader cooperated
with the administration the less authority he was likely to retain
over his followers, and hence the less useful he became to the
Government, In the search for collaborators this was a-dilemma
that was generally overlooked. Yet it seems to have been at the
root of the problem of Jenner*s relationship with Ahmed Murghan,
the Sultan of the Ogaden, for the latter1s cooperation went hand
in hand with a diminishing control over Ogaden sub-sections. It
was in fact only many years later, when Ahmed Murghan had fought
against the British and been imprisoned by them that his popularity
1and authority amongst the Ogaden began to recover.
The mishandling of the Ogaden was perhaps the most important 
and certainly the most costly of the mistakes made in the period 
of Foreign Office rule in Jubaland, and much of the blame for this 
must rest on Jenner, in the first place, Jenner only approached 
Ogaden sub-sections through Ahmed Murghan, though the latter1 s 
authority was not recognised by several segments and though his 
character left much to be desired, Jenner completely overlooked 
the fact that the real problem lay in pursuading all Ogaden sub­
sections that the Government*s authority had to be respected, and
2
that this was an impossible task for a weak sultan.
There were also more personal reasons behind Jenner*s short-
^Supra, p^-98. ^Supra, p#212.
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comings* Gharacter faults such as a violent temper, a tendency
towards hasty ill-conceived actions and a poor judgement of men
played a part; so too did his overconfidence and his exaggerated
estimation of the value of Ogaden submission in 1896* These
characteristics, moreover, were made the more dangerous because
of the inadequacy of Jenner*s intelligence service which was geared
to filter optimistic news and left him desperately out of touch
1with potentially hostile Ogaden sub-sections*
Jenner thoughtlessly forced a confrontation with the Ogaden 
by prohibiting them from undertaking an age-grade raid against the 
Boran, unaware of the social implications of his order and mistaking 
the proposed raid for a simple razzia* The Ogaden naturally 
disobeyed the order and a punitive expedition against them became 
inevitable* Thus, while the Herti were the collaborators, the 
Ogaden are to be classed with the resisters* Yet what is most 
noticable about their resistance is not the provocation that 
caused it, but the devisive response that this provocation elicited* 
Tor three Ogaden sub-clans never took part - in the 1898 confront­
ation with the Government, while others participated most reluct­
antly* In fact, there only appear to have been two sub-clans, the
■ 2
Abd Wak and the Aulihan, who really wished to resist* Yet the 
political significance of this disunity was systematically 
disregarded both by Jenner and by later administrators who, quite
1Supra, pp.226-7, 230-1. Supra, p.213ff
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the contrary, did their best to unite the Ogaden* As one official
observed in 1901 when contemplating the possibility of dealing with
Ogaden sub-clans on the basis that their attitudes towards the
Government differed: “the situation is already very complicated*♦•
The difficulty would be accentuated if there were friendly Ogaden
as well"• According to this official it was difficult enough
dealing with “nominally friendly Plerti Somalis in and around Kismayu 
1and Gobwen11* It was so much easier when fighting to label all 
Somali as resisters, but the reality was rather more complicated*
The 1898 Ogaden punitive expedition did not lead to any 
significant military exj)ansion* Once more the Ogaden stibmitted to 
superior force, but once more no active measures were taken to 
bring them under control* The Government gained access to the 
interior, though this was probably due more to Somali fears of 
Ethiopian aggression than any reflection 011 the success of the 
punitive expedition itself* Thus the impact of the Ethiopian 
victory at Adowa on the Jubaland Somali seems to have been very 
different to that normally suggested* Far from encouraging the 
Somali to believe that they could achieve a similar success against 
a European power, it led them to demand British Protectorate flags 
and British protection against Ethiopian aggression of which they 
had a very real fear* These demands unfortunately gave the 
mistaken impression that the Aulihan and the Abd Wak could now be
Z 5
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classed, as friendly.1
Failure to impose control over the Ogaden after the 1898
campaign and the crystallisation of resentment against Jenner led
to his murder in 1901 and a second punitive expedition against 
2
the Ogaden* In this campaign Italian cooperation was particularly 
important in securing, the submission of the Aulihan* For the Juba 
was patrolled by a joint Anglo-Italian force, and all canoes found
011 the river were destroyed. The impact 011 the Somali was 
considerable, and according to McDougall they assembled at Afmadu 
add discussed whethervthe Italians had transferred their land to 
the British* Moreover, it was becoming clear that without Italian 
cooperation administration of the northern Ogaden in Jubaland was 
practically impossible. But while the 1898 expedition had led to 
an opening up of the interior beyond Afmadu, at least to exploring 
parties, the 1901 campaign by contrast led to a complete withdrawal 
to the coast and the initiation of a new more restricted policy 
towards Jubaland*
Abandonment of the interior was advocated for financial 
reasons, while the psychological impact of Sheik Muhammad Abdille 
Hassan1s rebellion further north also encouraged a policy of 
retrenchment. There were real fears that the rebellion would 
spread southwards and that any advance into the interior would be 
fraught with danger. These fears may have been largely imaginary
1 2  3Supra, pp.22^ 1— 3* Supra, p.232. Supra, p>.263*
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in 1902 when they, were heightened by inaccurate’rumours^ but they
1nevertheless continued to discourage a forward policy. Sheik 
Muhammad1s movement, however, also had a more positive impact on 
the Jubaland coast - one that ended by estranging the Herti from, 
the administration, 5?or, in 1906, Salkeld killed a Herti named J 
Ashgar who had been associated with the Sheik, and was said to be 
spreading sedition, and in retaliation disaffected Herti elements 
murdered the government-backed Herti sultan# There was no general 
uprising, but the loyalty of the Herti was stispected and the
2administration toyed with the, idea of abolishing their sultanate# = 
Ashgar|s movement also coincided with a, revival of the long-distances 
caravan trade with Kismayu, and, in February 190f>, the first Garre 
caravan from Boran country since 1901.arrived on the. coast*; By the. 
end of the year, however, two or three rifles from Ethiopia were 
discovered in the possession of the coastal Somali* Officials 
were deeply worried at the possibility of an arms trade developing, 
especially at the time that Ashgar was beginning to acquire a 
following* So in 1906 all long-distance trade with Kismayu was 
prohibited*
It was recognised by the administration at Kismayu that 
withdrawal from the interior after 1901 meant an implicit acceptance 
of inter-clan fighting, and one of the most striking developments 
in this period was the growing disunity, not to say rivalry, 
amongst the Ogaden. These differences did not stem from different
^Supra, pp.236-7. 2Supra, p*195ff*
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attitudes towards the European administration on the coast, for
the*latter barely impinged on Somali life* The gradual migration
of the Abdullah away from the Juba region led to a grazing dispute
with the Muhammad Zubeir who moved into areas once controlled by
the former* Then there was a succession dispute to the sultanate,
and Ahmed Murghan*s own standing amongst the Muhammad Zubeir was
threatened after 1902 by Abdi Salaam, head of the Rer Hersi*
Finally, Ahmed Murghan became involved in a serious personal
dispute with the Aulihan, when his brother Omar Murghan v/as
murdered by them in 1906* .
These divisions and conflicts led once more to Government
intervention into their affairs^ only this time with surprising
results. In 1906 Ahmed Murghan 11 borrowed'1 80 Government rifles
to settle scores with the Aulihan. The guns were not returned.
As a result he was dismissed as a government headman, his stipend
was withdrawn and his clan was fined. Ahmed Murghan took no
notice of government demands for a cessation of fighting, but he
did not feel safe close to the coast and this led to his
migration to Wajir in 1907? his position amongst the Muhammad
Zubeir strengthened by government disapproval. One additional
reason for moving to Wajir may have been the search for more water
2as the Deshek Wama was then drying up#
When the government initiated a forward policy in 1909 its
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attention was still focused on Afmadu some 80 miles from the 
coast, which was then considered to.be the strategic and pol­
itical centre of Jubaland# By that date, however, its political 
importance had declined for it was no longer the residence of 
the Ogaden Sultan. On the other hand, one year later the 
attention of the administration had also shifted so completely
j _, '
to the interior around B1 VI/ale, Wajir and the Lorian Swamp that
it is impossible to trace further the history of the coastal
1Somali in Jubaland from government records alone*
By 1910, then, the impact of outside forces on the coastal 
Somali had been considerable. The Herti had been brought fully 
under Government control, turned into collaborators, and 
closely associated with the administration* Ashgar1s movement 
of 1906 caused alarm but, apart from the conviction of the Sub- 
Gommissioner, Salkeld, that it was seditious, there is no 
further evidence that it was in fact.so, and by 1910 the Herti 
had resumed their cooperative attitude towards the Government.
The position of the Ogaden was more complex* Those elements 
that were centred on Afmadu, and were thus most vulnerable to 
pressure from the coast, moved far into the interior in 1907*
Thus, unexpectedly, the effect of a weak and ineffective 
administration at Kismayu was to cause the Sultan of the Ogaden 
to abandon Afmadu in favour of Wajir. Other Ogaden segments were
either out of range of government forces or mobile enough to 
become so without any difficulty: 011 these segments the 
Kismayu administration made no impact at all*
in the interior of Jubaland, the turn of the twentieth 
century was characterised by a great increase in the outside 
pressure on this area, which can be traced to the migration 
south-westwards of new Somali clans as well as to the political 
ambitions of Italy, Ethiopia and Great Britain. The destruction 
of Wardai power along the upper Jtiba in the middle of the nine­
teenth century had soon led to a relatively stable balance of 
power between, on the one hand, a group of Somali clans centred
on the upper Juba and consisting of the Garre, the Gasar Gudda
' j
and the Marehan and, on the otherjhand, the Boran and their 
shegats who controlled Wajir and much of central Jubaland* 
Political and demographic pressures towards the end of the nine­
teenth centviry did not immediately upset this Galla/Somali 
balance, but instead they indiscriminately undermined the 
position of all Boran and Somali segments that lay towards the 
edge of north-western Jubaland, along the river Daua and the 
upper Juba. The most important and persistent threat to the 
savannah pastoralists came from the gradual Ethiopian expansion 
southwards over a very wide front from lake Hudolf in the west 
to the upper Juba in the east* And this Ethiopian advance made 
an impact on two quite different levels* In the first place,
it very naturally .affected the history of the local populations
who were conquered or raided* Secondly, it posed a problem to
the two European powers, Great Britain and Italy, that had also
advanced claims to precisely the area towards which Ethiopia
was expanding*
Ethiopian expansion southwards had an impact on the
savannah pastoralists that was fairly complex. For though it
altered the balance of power over a wide area in favour of the
Amhara, this was not detrimental to all groups. Those peoples
that previously had been in a dominant position, and were
conquered, probably lost most: the Arbore in the west were
totally impoverished, while in the east the Boran were much 
1weakened* Yet, most peoples found the period when they were 
raided by Ethiopians far worse compared to actual occupation 
when it followed. Indeed, those who were only raided had 
nothing to gain, while those who were conquered could at least 
hope to benefit from collaboration. Thus the Gelubba suffered 
greatly from Ethiopian raids, but, once an Ethiopian fort was 
constructed amongst them, they threw in their lot with their 
conquerors, obtained rifles and ammunition and participated in 
raids. There can be no doubt that the Gelubba ultimately 
benefit/ed very greatly from their contact with the Ethiopians, 
and that their possession of guns gave them a considerable
1 535measure of independence* The Turkana were another group to
benefit conspicuously from their contacts with Ethiopia, but
they were never conquered* For though the Turkana suffered
from Ethiopian raids, they also gained access to guns and
ammunition which gave them a decided advantage over their other
enemies, and ironically made them more formidable adversaries
2for their suppliers of arms when the latter raided them*
At the same time, the process of Ethiopian expansion 
southwards was characterised by the extreme rapidity with which 
the highlands were conquered and the corresponding slovmess with 
which they moved into the lowlands. It seems that conquest of 
the savannah lowlands of the E..A.P* was not one of Henelick1s 
primary objectives. No permanent garrison was ever built in 
this area and its penetration was unhurried and spasmodic, 
related to the vagaries of haphazard raids* Nevertheless, 
penetration of the lowlands was always connected with assumptions 
about the ethnic relationship between 1 tribes' in the lowland 
(golbo) and those in the highland (goro). The Ethiopians were 
convinced that they were inter-related and that they had a right to 
control the lowland people* But largely for reasons of climate 
and ecology they were unwilling to exercise this right to the 
full# It was precisely this reluctance on the part of the 
Ethiopians to move into the lowlands that later made for a more
intractable frontier problem* 'For it enabled some of the Boran I
and Gabbra to migrate further south out of their reach, thus
accentuating the disparity between the area under effective /
Ethiopian control and that inhabited by people the Ethiopians 
claimed to be its citizens*'*'
Ethiopian expansion in the late nineteenth century also 
had a special significance for the Somali* In the first, place , 
it caused a'very great increase in the Somali movement south­
west towards the upper Juba# It heightened the population 
pressures in this area, making for much greater instability and 
inter-clan competition# Secondly, the Ethiopians attempted to
gain direct control over the Garre Somali, whom they thought
2
were related to the Boran* The position of the Garre, however, 
was complicated by the arrival of the Italians on the upper Juba 
In 1895*
Almost all the peoples threatened by the Ethiopian advance 
southwards appealed for European intervention and help at one 
time or another* The Boran Galla, a people then considered to 
be within the British sphere of influence and like3.y to be of
3
some importance to Great Britain, repeatedly asked for assistance;
so too did the Garre, the Gasar Gudda, the Aulihan, the Samburu
5and the Eendille* But Britain and Italy responded in different 
ways to these appeals* and, while Britain seems to have favoured
^Supra, p*270.
Supra, p*2^-l #
a diplomatic solution to the problem of Ethiopian expansionism, 
Italy reacted on the basis that Ethiopians ambitions could 
only be contained by force.
Thus, a request from the Sultan of Iugh for help led to
the involvement of Italy in the upper Juba and to a direct
confrontation with the Ethiopians*^ Yet the defeat of the
Italians at Adowa undermined the confidence of the local
population around Lugh in their ability to defend them against
Ethiopian aggression* It was only after Wolde Gabriel*s severe
defeat in Somalia late In 1896 that confidence in the Italians
was restored and their position on the upper Juba made secure*
The military importance of an Italian presence at Lugh, however,
appears to have been overrated, and the garrison there was only
2
partially successful in deterring Ethiopian raiding parties*
At the same time, Italian attempts to prop up and revive 
the trade of Lugh led them, at the very end of the nineteenth 
century^ to take an increasing interest in its economic cachment 
area to the west, which they thought of bringing under control* 
The Italians were particularly anxious to benefit from contacts 
with tie Boran, and the Garre were the indispensible middlemen 
for conducting this trade* Garre headmen were paid by the 
Italians while the Garre Kuran who lived near their station at 
Lugh were taxed* For a very short time the Italians also
£ 1
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succeeded in getting the Garre to organise the long-distance
trade with the Boran, but Ethiopian competition proved too
severe# Ultimately, Italy failed because it was unwilling to
use troops to the west of the Juba river and was thus unable to
offer the Garre•protection against Ethiopian aggression* And the
reason for this was that all the Garre on the upper Juba were
to be found in the British sphere of influence« Italy was
apparently not prepared to commit itself too decisively or
openly in this area*"*"
Ethiopian expeditions to the Garre for the purpose of
levying tax had at first been fairly leisurely* But when
Britain queried Ethiopian claims that the Garre were related
to the Boran - and thus to be considered within the Ethiopian
sphere of influence - a more methodical attempt was made to.
bring them under effective occux>ation* Ethiopian troops were
stationed at El Wak, Muddo Eri and the area of Gedu, for
several months in the year* Taxes were levied on all Garre
sections, and they were pressed into Ethiopian service levying
customs duties on traders throughout southern Ethiopia (as far
west as the river Qmo) and supervising the caravan trade with
the Boran* Moreover, important hpstages such as the son of
Chaban Alio, the aged head of the Kuran Garre, were taken to
2
Addis Ababa as a surety for the good behaviour of the clan*
ra, pp*369~70 *
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However, Ethiopian pressure on the Garre was brought to
a dramatic end by the intervention of Great Britain, for in
1906 Photius Zaphiro, a British border agent, arrived on the
frontier supported - and this surely was the supreme irony ~ by
an escort of Ethiopian irregulars recruited in Addis Ababa*
Zaphiro*s outstanding success was the termination once and for
all of Ethiopian pretensions to control the Garre, and it was a
remarkable achievement for one man. His presence on the frontier
X
also for a time checked Ethiopian raids across it*
But these benefits were secured with several drawbacks* In
the first place, Zaphiro relied on Ethiopian irregulars to
enforce his demands, and he also threatened people in the British
sphere with Ethiopian raids if his orders were not obeyed.
Moreover, these thi'eats were not idle ones, but sanctioned by the
British Legation in Addis Ababa. They led to some confusion
amongst the border peoples as to his relationship with the
Ethiopians, which tended to undermine confidence in his role as
the defender of British protected peoples against Ethiopian 
2aggression. Secondly, Britain was attempting to halt the 
Ethiopian advance southwards by diplomacy, yet Zaphiro did not 
appreciate the basis on which the border was being negotiated.
Britain and Ethiopia had started negotiations over the 
E*A.P./Ethiopia frontier 011 the understanding that the border
2.
Supra, p.383* /
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would be a ‘tribal* one. According to Menelick the frontier 
was to be determined by the ‘natural* frontiers of the peoples 
themselves, and he was essentially concerned with the problem 
of deciding which people were to be considered Ethiopian.***
Many subsequent difficulties can be traced to the actions of 
Captain Maud, a British representative sent to collect material 
on the border area, whose recommendations concerning the frontier 
were later accepted with minor modifications by Britain and 
Ethiopia and determined the de facto boundary*
Maud*s instructions explicitly stated that the^frontier 
he was to recommend would not ‘‘divide tribes between the two 
spheres**,- yet he deliberately disregarded these instructions.^ 
Instead, he recommended a boundary which followed clearly 
definable physical features, at the same time maintaining 
inaccurately that this coincided exactly with the limits of 
Ethiopian occupation as well as with the 1 natural* frontier of 
the border peoples. What Maud completely failed to point out 
was that there was in fact a very large discepancy between the 
area effectively occupied by Ethiopia, and that occupied by the 
peoples she claimed to govern. So that any solution based on 
the area occupied by peoples alleged to be Ethiopian, such as 
the Boran, would have led to a large extension of the area 
considered to be a part of Ethiopia# Yet his attempt to
1 2 Supra, p.302^  Supra, p«303»
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produce a frontier solution by turning a blind eye to ethnic 
realities was misguided for it only resulted in a far more
Thus Zaphiro's main weakness stemmed from his defence of 
the claim that Maud's line was a ’tribal1 on$, for it led him 
to overlook the very real ’tribal1 problems caused by a border 
which ran through the middle of Boran and Gabbra grazing 
grounds, and often left water-holes in one country and grazing 
in another* He failed to understand the ecology of pastoralism 
in the golbo (lowlands) and, because of his preconceived ideas 
about Ethiopian imperialism, suspected quite erroneously that 
the Boran to the south of the Maud line had been sent there for 
political reasons# This anti-Boran bias also led him to evade 
the larger problem of the. Somali movement westwards for", when 
the Somali clashed with the Boran at Wajir, Zaphiro moved the 
latter away from an area to which they had a prior claim, thus
facilitating a migration that all later authorities would
attempt to halt* Moreover, Zaphiro^ success in halting 
Ethiopian incursions across the border was undermined by
Menelick!s illness in 1908, since this led to a breakdown of
law and order 011 the frontier and a further breakdown in the 
chain of authority# Representations in Addis Ababa achieved 
nothing, and Zaphiro*s efforts brought diminishing returns as
intractable frontier problem* 1
1'Supra, p* 30^* ^ upra, pp. 373, 385, 388. -/
the weakness of one man with a tiny escort was increasingly 
1appreciated*
Zaphiro1s intervention had been a very limited one but, 
nevertheless, he succeeded in identifying the most acute 
problems in the interior of Jubaland (to be called the Northern 
Frontier District after 1910)* First,there was the question of 
halting the continuoiis Somali migration south-westwards and 
maintaining a rough status quo in what was necessarily a fluid 
situation* This, moreover, was a double-ended problem for there 
was the migration of Somali into the British Protectorate as 
well as their movement within it* By 1908 this was leading to 
an increase in scale of disputes between Somali clans as well as 
to a confrontation between the Boran and the Somali at Wajir* 
Secondly, there was the question of ensuring that the Ethiopian 
thrust southwards was halted and that a negotiated frontier was 
respected* Lastly, and this was a problem that did not really 
emerge until after 1910 when administration was introduced into
this area, there was the question of supporting friendly 1 tribes^
\
that somehow always tended to consist of peoples who were weak ;
Zand vulnerable*
These were the main problems that officials attempted to 
solve with the sudden introduction of administration in 1910 
throughout the whole of the Northern Frontier District (N*F*D.)
'Ssupra, p * 388 •
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Supra, p.^l
1and Jubaland, though with limited success* Thus it was
unfortunate that the advent of frontier administration could 
do nothing to solve the border quarrel with Ethiopia, and 
that on the contrary the extension of administration north­
wards exacerbated the dispute* Throughout years of negotiation 
it had seemed that all that was needed to make an agreement 
stick was some show of force on the frontier. Xet in 1910
the frontier was still disputed with the result that border
2incidents escalated dangerously.
In the east, Ethiopian incursions across the river Daua
began once more to take place after a three years lull, while
in the west, near lake Eudolf, the border was openly and
frequently violated by repeated Gelubba/Ethiopian raids that
A*reached as far as the southern tip of the lake. These raids 
led the Bamburu to migrate southwards across the Uaso Eyiro* 
Government attempts to protect them by stationing a K.A.R* 
detachment at Loyangalani were abortive. When in 1913 attempts 
were made to move the Bamburu north again these had to be 
abandoned because the area was largely in the control of 
Ethiopian raiders* Along the centre of the frontier the Boran 
and Gabra also suffered from Ethiopian incursions which at times 
assumed alarming proportions.^
^The background to the establishment of administration in- this 
area is discussed, Supra, pp.3&9ff*
Ultimately, a price had to he paid for this ineffective
control of the border area* Aylmer*s death was part of that
price and it succeeded in temporarily easing Ethiopian 
1
pressure* But generally it was the border peoples themselves
who paid dearly for British administrative weakness, just as they
suffered most from an unrealistic frontier line which made it
absolutely necessary for Boran and Gabra to cross from one
side to another* They risked double taxation, extortion and
interference with their movements from the Ethiopian authorities,
while on the British side the lack of security made them
vulnerable to raids, stock thieving and banditry* This failure
to make the border respected inevitably exacerbated another
problem: that of protecting peoples considered to be friendly
towards the administration*
There were two peoples who were considered to be particularly
cooperative and friendly towards the administration, and who were
to ask urgently for assistance against external aggression: the
Bamburu and the Garre* But while neither* were to be given
sufficient help, their fortunes were to be very different* The
Bamburu were given a small amount of IC.A.R. protection but it
was completely inadequate and they were driven from their grazing
3grounds to the east of lake Rudolf# The Garre, on the other 
hand, despite heavy pressure managed to hold their own. The
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Garre were exposed to considerable population pressure caused 
by the Somali movement south-west towards the tipper Juba.
Their grazing areas were threatened by the Rer Afgab Aulihan 
and the Digodia* Moreover, these pressures greatly increased 
in intensity after 1909 with the introduction of relatively 
large numbers of firearms amongst the Aulihan and Marehan 
both of which clans were hostile to the Garre.^
In these circumstances the Garre turned to the government 
with repeated pleas for assistance, but they were only advised 
to be patient« The real problem of the government's declared 
policy of working through "chiefs and tribes along the boundary, 
strengthening and protecting those who are friendly" lay in the 
fact that it was made virtually impossible by the additional 
statement that the policy was also to be one of "observation 
only, with no attempt to effect compliance with orders". The 
end result was that restraint was imposed only on those peoples 
friendly towards the administration. Thus the Garre were 
dissuaded from raiding the Marehan, but nothing could be done 
to prevent the Marehan from raiding the Garre. This situation 
was extremely embarrassing to the government and it helped to 
produce a crise de conscience, but when help finally arrived it 
was too late for the Garre had already placed themselves in an 
ambiguous position with regard to the administration by forming
2
Supra, p.
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Obviously unable to remain jjatient in the face of repeated 
raids by their enemies, the Garre bought axnns from Ethiopian 
Tigre bandits and built up a very close relationship with the 
latter* They raided together in the British Vrotectorate, while 
the Garre fed, housed and concealed them from the British 
authorities. The Garre benefited very greatly from this alliance* 
They acquired easy access to firearms and an ally that was much 
feared by other Somali clans* Moreover, their alliance with the 
Tigre enabled them to hold their own successfully against their 
enemies* However, in 191*1- Ali Abdi, head of the Garre, was 
arrested and deported by the administration formhis part in 
harbouring Tigre bandits, though he was freed one year later
because the government was finding harder to control Garre
1
sub-chiefs *
Between 191*1- and 191& the Garre were prevented from seeking 
Tigrean assistance and instead a small detachment of government 
troops was stationed amongst them* Nothing indicates the 
inadequacy of the administration* s support better than an 
examination of this period. For officials were too weak to 
prevent the Digodia from encroaching on Garre grazing grounds, 
and many Garre had to migrate to Ethiopia to obtain the protection 
they required* Then in 1916, after the sack of Serenli, the Garre 
were completely abandoned by the Government which evacuated all
^Supra, p**h*i*9# y
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forces from the upper Juba* Once more the Garre reunited with 
the Tigre and together they were overwhelmingly successful 
against the Digodia who v/ere driven out of Garre grazing areas 
and into south-western Ethiopia. When Glenday returned in 1917 
to administer the Garre there were no recriminations for the 
alliance with the Tigre and, on the contrary, a very much
1stronger government force was sent to protect the former*
Thus the Garre solved the problem of their weakness in their 
own way; a way, moreover, that proved decidedly more effective 
than anything the E*A*P. administration could offer, though it 
happened to be one that they disapproved of*
The Somali movement south-westwards, which was such a 
serious threat to the Garre, presented two rather different 
problems to the administration: the one very generalised, the 
other considerably more specific* On the one handm it concerned 
a very broad movement of almost all the Somali to the west of the 
river Juba, and extending from the river Tana in the south to 
the river Daua in the north* On the other hand, it was also 
associated in a very sj)ecial way with Marehan migrants into the 
Protectorate•
Almost all the gaiti (new arriva3.s) Marehan had fought with
S omali
Mohammad Abdille Hassan in the British/Protectorate further north; 
and the fact thaththey had abandoned the Sheik*s movement did not 
imply that they had rejected his ideas, merely that the material
'Supra, p *^9*
spoi3_s had not been sufficient* Moreover, almost all these
new arrivals possessed firearms, and it was the Marehan who
introduced large numbers of guns into the upper Juba area from
1907 onwards* Thus the Marehan presented a special problem;
for the migration of this one clan went hand in hand with an
active arms trade and the possible dissemination of an ethoes
1of rebellion and resistance to colonial rule*
The problem of the Marehan also had wider international 
implications, for they became involved in a cycle of retaliatory 
raiding that carried them across the river Juba into the Italian 
Protectorate. This led to complaints being made by the Italian 
Ambassador in London to the Foreign Office, and made it more 
difficult for the E.A.P. officials to defend a policy of non­
interference or to maintain a complacent attitude towards inter­
clan feuding. Thus a growing priority was the disarmament of 
the Marehan and their subjection to some form of government 
control* It was not an easy task and it was made no easier by 
bad planning, bad communication with the upper Juba, a foolhardy 
over-optimism due to a patchy unreliable intelligence service, 
and giving ultimatums which it was said were never intended to 
be enforced, but which somehow had to be when face was lost#
The problem was mishandled by Col. Graham, the Officer Commanding 
Troops, in a way that has been obscured by later anodyne
p
accounts of his activities
Supra, pp*^55ff
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The .main weakness of the Marehan lay in their internal 
divisions# The administration needed to exploit these; instead 
they aroused a very widespread hostility and only the deep 
antagonism between the Ahmed Wet and the Farah TJgas prevented 
a united Marehan stand# The position became more serious, 
however, when in 1913 Haj Mohammad, who had been a disciple of 
Mohammad Abdille Hassan, crossed into the Protectorate and 
allegedly tried to unite all sections of the Marehan# In the 
end the Marehan were subdued and had to submit to a certain 
amount of government control, but the attempt to disarm them 
was abandoned and a derisory total of 192 guns was all that 
could be confiscated# Their disarmament did not take place 
until after the First World War#
Final government success against the Marehan was to a large
extent due to the support they received from various Aulihan
sections. Yet the attempted disarmament of the Marehan had an
extremely divisive impact on the Aulihan, some of whom sided
with the Government while others (the Abioukr Jibrahil) aided
the Marehan by supplying them with arms# Moreover, the Aulihan
were themselves in the somewhat anomolous position of possessing
sizeable quantities of arms. The relationship between the
Aulihan and the Marehan was extremely complex, and, after the
Marehan had been subdued by the government, friction between the
1
two Somali groups soon got out of hand# The overbearing 
^iS-upra, pp # 483*5 *
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intervention of Elliott, head of the Constabulary at Serenli,
in this dispute, and his decision to force a confrontation
with the Aulihan without realising the risks led to a major
crisis in which Elliott was murdered, Serenli was sacked and
the -Aulihan rebelled*^
The sack of Serenli by the Aulihan under the command of
Abdurrahman Mursaal took the administration comx:>letely by
sur£>rise, and lacking a. ready explanation it put forward a large
number of hypotheses* Yet Mursaal1s appeal to Sheik Mohammad
for assistance is no indication of a close connection with the
rebellion in British Somaliland, while his appeal to Islam was
almost perfunctory and placed after clan solidarity. On the
other hand, the struggle between the Aulihan and the Marehan
undoubtedly had a great deal to do with Abdurrahman Mtirsaalfs
standing in his own c3.an which was far from undisputed# His
j>restige was at stake and Elliott1 s actions seemed likely to
threaten his political position# It is here than an explanation
2
for the rebellion is most likely to be found#
In so far as the wider problem of a general Somali movement 
westward is concerned the administration had ambitious aims: it
hoped to crystalise an essentially fluid situation and to halt a 
shifting nomadic frontier* But these were aims which necessitated 
a considerable amount of force, and it was.lack of foi^ce that 
undermined the governments policy# Thus attempts to get the
1 2 i n
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Somali to leave Wajir under a policy of 'observation1 were 
unsuccessful. Administrators had no sanction with which to back 
up their commands which were therefore ignored with impunity. 
Gradually support given to Boran claims to Wajir became pro 
forma, until in 1918 it was stated that 11 the Somali claim to 
Wajir is recognised11. ^
Perhaps the most serious problem caused by the westward
movement of the Somali before 1916 was not the conf]^ c/|is that
restilted with other peoples to the west, but the growing
internecine conflicts amongst the Somali themselves* Bitter
hostility between the Aulihan and the Mohammad Zubeir, and
between the Mohammad Zubeir and the Abd Wak, after 1911 was
directly linked to a contest for control over Wajir and the
Lorian Swamp area; and this hostility was brought about by the
migration of these clans westwards* The administration had 110
real answer to this unsatisfactory situation. Some officials
achieved temporary success by separating competing factions, but
they were always told not to use force and without force little
could be achieved* Large-scale fighting took place with the
administration often totally ignorant of what was happening and
2
completely uhable to bring it to a stop.
In the years immediately preceding the first World War there 
was also a very large-scale migration of Somali into the British 
Protectorate. In the first six months of 191^ it was estimated
1 '2Supra, P.A96. Supra, pp*4-98f f *
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that some -^,000 Somali crossed the river Juba, and many of them
armed with rifles* Under these circumstances it was a little
pointless spending thousands of pounds on an expedition against
the Marehan which resulted in the confiscation of 192 guns when
many times that number were entering the Protectorate every year*
The migration of the Somali westwards posed many problems,
therefore, and carried within it the seeds of a grave political
crisis; but without force there was little the administration
in the N*F.I)* could accomplish before 1916, except express the
1pious hope that the problem would vanish*
By 1916, then, British authority had not been effectively 
established in Jubaland and the N*F*D*, and it is suggested that 
the weakness of British administration was detrimental to the 
interests of the Samburu, the Somali and the Boran* This is 
not to argue that the advent of full colonial government 
represented the suranium bonum for the pastoralists of the 
but all three groups had sought to involve Britian in this area* 
Initially, the Garre and the Tunni had sought outside aid because 
they were vulnerable to presstires that they could not withstand, 
yet this was also the ease with all those people who experienced 
the threat of Ethiopian expansion southwards* British intervent­
ion finally halted this advance, but only after it had proceded, 
to such an extent that the area under Ethiopian control cut 
across ethnic boundaries causing a major frontier problem*
^Supra, p* 502* ^
Moreover, much of the help given by the British administration 
to people threatened by Ethiopian aggression was either totally 
inadequate, as in the case of the Samburu, or arrived too late, 
as the northern Boran discovered* Sometimes administrative aid 
was positively detrimental, as in the case of the Garre, who 
were inadequately supported by the British against Digodia and 
Marehan attacks, while at the same time they were prevented from 
entering into an alliance with the Tigre which would have offered 
them adequqte protection*
Another indication of the weakness of British administration 
lay in the fact that by 1916 the migration of the Somali south- 
westwards had still not been halted* At times it had even been 
accelerated to the detriment of other peoples, such as the Pokomo 
on the river Tana or the Boran at Wajir* A major factor behind 
this migration was the continuous influx of additional Somali 
into the British Protectorate* Again the British administration 
failed to halt this influx, yet there were many Somali clans in 
the Protectorate that wished for it to be halted* In fact, one 
of the first requests that Jenner received for help came the 
Marehan who were irritated by Digodia pressure across the river 
Juba, and there were other Somali clans too that were anxious
X
for a British intervention that would preserve the status quo* 
This thesis has concentrated on the interaction between 
local developments and imperialist intervention along the coast
and in the interior of Jubaland. This is not the only way in 
which the developing historical sitviation in this area can be 
understood. But it is probably the only way in which it can 
be presented from documentary evidence alone, for there is so 
little evidence or material relating to the pastoral peoples of 
this area until they came within the ambit of administrative 
concern. And this point can be seen clearly with regard to the 
coastal Somali for after 1910 when attention was focused 011 the 
interior they are scarcely mentioned in any surviving document.
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were relevant.
(Abyssinia) Consular. The Mega records 
are to be found here after 1919*
557
Series P.O. 371. (Diplomatic General) Volumes relating
to Ethiopia from 1906 were consulted.
Up to 1918 these include Consular 
material as well.
Series P.O. 403. (This is a series of Confidential Print)
'Correspondence re. Germany and Zanzibar* 
in 26 parts can he found in vols; 93-107, 
117-120, 136-139, 158-159. Parts 27 
and 28 of this series can only he found 
in the Foreign Office Library. The same 
series continues as 'Correspondence re. 
East Africa' in parts 29-41 which are 
found in vols; 172-173, 181-184, 193-196, 
208-210.
(h) Colonial Office Regards;
Series C.0. 519-
Series C.0. 533.
Series C.0. 534. 
Series C,0. 544.
This consists of only one volume and 
contains the original correspondence 
on the hand-over of the Protectorates 
from the 3T0. to the CO.
(East Africa Protectorate) Piles from 
1904 to just beyond 1916 were consulted.
(iC.A.R.)
(Sessional Papers) This series contains 
S.A.P. administrative reports.
(c) uecor&s:
Series Adrn. 1.
Series Adm. 51.
(General Correspondence) Several volumes 
with material relating to the Jubaland 
coast were utilised.
(Captain's Logs) The logs of ships 
known to have visited the Benadir and 
Jubaland coast were consulted.
Series Adm. 52. (Master's Logs)
2. India Office, London.
(a) Secret Department.
There are a number of volumes with material relating 
to the East Coast of Africa.
(b) Political Department.
The first volume in this series contains material on 
Zanzibar and East Africa.
(c) Miscellaneous.
Opt. Smee and Lieut. Hardy1 s papers, Marine Records 
Miscellaneous, 586.
¥. Christopher, Journal MSS. 13.
List of Charts, A.C. 51.
3* Foreign Office Library.
(a) Foreign Office Confidential Print.
2624. Report of Rear Admiral Gumming to the Sec. of the 
Admiralty, 27 July 1875.
5076. Reports re. German colonisation schemes 1875-1884.
5284- Memorandum on the state of business in the African 
Department, 30 July 1886,
6003* Memorandum re. the southern boundaries of Abyssinia,
3 Dec. 1890, F.I-I.T.Streatfield.
6240. Memorandum on the state of business in the African 
Department, 1892,
7075-i Memorandum on work in the African Department from 
July 1895 to December 1898.
7167, General Report of the Juba (Macdonald) Expedition 
Parts 1 and 2.
7439. Memorandum; questions pending in the African Depart­
ment, 1900,
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7514. Memorandum on administration of African Protectorates 
by the P.O., 1901.
7759. Memorandum on the state of the African Protectorates, 
1902.
7704. Memorandum re, current work of the African Department, 
1902.
(b) Miscellaneous.
Mega Consulate Records. (These consist of two slim volumes 
of correspondence from the middle 1920s. They have not as 
yet been catalogued having only recently been surrendered to 
the P.O. by Her Majesty's Consul at Asmara.)
B. Official Records, Kenya.
1* Nairobi Archives* (The archives were being re-catalogued when 
1 consulted the following volumes. Those District Records 
which are not preceded by a D.C. follow the old catalogue 
numbers.)
(a) Provincial Material
i) Jubaland (PC/jUB).
l/2/l Questions inspecting Arms traffic across the 
Juba in the House of Commons.
l/4/l Kismayu Crown Case no. 1.
l/5/l Effect ive occupation by Italian Government of 
territory around Hugh.
1/9/1 Northern Frontier District Correspondence.
l/l0/5 Evacuation of Alexandria in fear of hostile 
Aulihan Somalis.
l/l0/7 Administration of Jubaland and N.F.D. Somali 
Reserve.
l/X0/9 General: Ethnographic,
l/l6/l Monthly reports on health of Alexandria 
District, 1920.
l/l7/l Serenli. Correspondence, In and Out, 1911.
2/1/1 Commissioner's Records, 1895.
2/1/3-s Miscellaneous, 1002.
2/2/1 Miscellaneous, 1900.
2/2/2 Miscellaneous, 1907, Bundle 1.
2/3/1 Miscellaneous, In and Out, 1906.
Coast Province (PC/CP).
46/1073 Fathili bin Omar 1917.
68/18 Sub-Commissioner * s Office Kismayu, 
Outward 1899.
68/19 K ism ay 11 File 1893/4*
m/20 Sub-Commissioner fan aland Province, 
Inward File 1896-1900.
69/22 Sub-Commissioner Lamu, Inward File 1899.
69/23 Acting Commissioner Lamu, Outward File 1899.
74/44 Sub-Commissioner Jubaland, Outward File 1896/1900.
74/45 Sub-Commissioner Jubaland, Inward File 1896-1900.
77/55 Inward 1893-
78/65 Sub-Commissi oner Kismayu, Inward File 1899.
79/72 Secretariat, Outward 1910.
86/123 Jubaland, Outward 1901-1902.
98/195 Sub-Commissioner Tanaland Province, 
Outward 1896-1900.
99/199 Jubaland Inward, 1901-1902.
109/90 General Correspondence, 1891.
110/91 General Correspondence, 1891.
110/9 Commissioner 1899.
110/115 Jubaland Miscellaneous, 1911-1916.
ii) Southern Province (PO/SP).
6/l/l Somali unrest in the northern Territories, 
1916.
iv) Northern Frontier District (pc/nFD).
l/3/l Mandera (Gurreh) Annual Reports 1914-28;
¥.E.H.Barrett, Record of Moyale Station.
l/4/l A.A.C.Ashton, Uaso Nyiro Annual Report 1915.
l/9/l Samburu Annual Reports and h/o. Reports,
1914-1928.
2/l/l N.F.D.Handing Over Reports, 1914-1950.
2/6/1;.: Moyale Handing Over Reports, 1915-1951.
4/l/l Political Records Miscellaneous.
4/1/2 Political Records Miscellaneous: Gurreh
„District Political Record Book; Moyale & 
Marsabit Political Record Books.
4/1/3 Miscellaneous Political Documents, 1910-1943*
4/l/4 Future of the H.F.D.
4/l/5 N.F.D. and Jubaland, Political, 1913-1916.
4/1/10 Political Records: Provincial and 
General, n.d.
4/2/2 Boundaries.
4/3/1 Abyssinian Affairs, 1913.
4/3/2 Abyssinian Affairs, 1913^ -1914.
4/6/1 Jubaland Political Records, pre-1915.
4/7/1 Somali unrest, 1916.
4/8/1 J.¥.IC.Pease, An Ethnological Treatise 
on the Gurreh tribe.
District Material
i) Baringo District (DO/BAR).
2/l Handing Over Reports.
ii) Garissa District (DC/GAR).
3/4 ¥. A. W.Clarke, Notes on the Battle between
Somalis and Meru c. 1892.
iii) Gosha Sub-District (dg/GOS).
l/4/l Report 011 Gosha Sub-District, 1913.
6/2 Respecting Defence of Alexandria.
6/3 Somali Unrest, 1916.
7/2 Mfudu Records 1916,
10/1 re. Gosha Customs.
13/l Approved estimates for Gosha station, 1915.
iv) Kismayu District (do/k ISM).
l/2 Report coa Bajun islands and co&si;, 1916.
1/4 Report 011 Kismayu District, 1921.
3/1 Gobwen Station Record Book.
6/2 Tribes of Jubaland.
13/5 Afmadu District Coirespondence 1914-1916.
v) ls.io.16. Dis'trict (DC/lSO).
5/l Safari Book.
vi) Lokitaung District (LOK).
32 The Merille or Gelubba, Ethnographic.
vix) Mandera District (;DC/mda) .
4/3 Political Records Book, 1.
4/4 Political Records Book, la.
4/5 Political Records 1911-1912.
viii)Marsabit District (dG/MBT).
5/l Safari Reports 1908-1928.
7/1/2 Further Notes on Marsabit District.
ix) Malindi District (dg/MAL).
2/3 Political Reports.
x) Moyale District (do/MLE).
1 Moyale District Records Book 1902-1942
(Old Catalogue no.).
15 Death of Aylmer (Old cat. no.).
21A Political Records; Zaphiro1s reports 
(Old cat. no.)
2/4 Political Records; Opt. Barrett’s reports 
1909-1912.
Tana River District (DC/TED).
5/1 Political Records, Vol. 1.
Wajir District (WAT).
2 Political Records vol. 2.
15 Political Records, 1916.
16 Handing Over Reports, 1915-1959*
2• Central Government Library
Native Affairs Department (HADM), Clip Files on tribal customs 
and- Special Reports etc.
0. Official Records, Italy.
1. Archivio Storico dell* ex Ministero dell1 Africa Italians (ASMAl).
This contains all that survives of the correspondence that was 
sent to Italy from Somalia. Much is Hissing, whole files have 
obviously disappeared while others have been tampered with. Also 
this collection does not contain any of the Provincial or District 
record_s from Italian Somaliland. Those that were not destroyed 
by the Italians in 1941 were shipped to London, where they have 
still not been released to scholars.
D. Official Records, Sweden.
1 ■ Stadsarkivet Stockholm.
(a) Evangeliska Fosterlandsstiftelsens Archiv, Inkomna Skrivelser.
This contains all the correspondence of K. Cederqvist between 
1898 and. 191C.
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E. Official Records, U.S.A.
I• Rational Archives of the United States.
Dispatches from USA Consuls at Zanzibar from 1856 till 1890 
were consulted on Microfilm in the T. 100 series. There are 
occasional references to the Jubaland coast where the Americans
appointed a Vice-Consul by mistake for a few months!
E. Ron Official Records.
1. British Museum.
Powell-Cotton, "Somali Rotes", MSS, Ethnographic Department.
Smee and Hardy’s Journals, B.M. Add. MSS. 8958.
2. Rhodes House.
J.K.R.Thorp, The Gelubba of the Omo Delta.
Ainsworth Papers; Diaries 1895-1902, 1917, MSS Afr. 577-79*
Ainsworth Papers: Memoranda and some Private Papers, MSS Afr. 581-2
R.G.Otter, "The impact on East Africa of the Galla and Somali",
MSS Afr. S. 520.
0. Private Papers.
S. Brodribb-Pugh, "Background information - ROrthern Province"..
(loaned by Hugh Walker).
W.B.Minnis, "A precis of Somali History during the Christian
era" (1950). Loaned by Hugh Walker.
J.W.K.Pease, "The Gurreh Tribe" (1927). Loaned by
T.H.R.Cashmore.
"Rotes on Wajir1s Political Background and Somali tribal
organisation", anon. (Loaned by Hugh Walker).
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Poulton, "An outline of the tribes of the Somaliland
Protectorate", n.d. (loaned by Hugh Walker).
J,S.S.Rowlands - in Outline of North Turk an a History from
the records of Lokitaung (1950).
■—  A History of the Tana river (1956).
Some aspects of the influence of Islam in 
Kenya (1957). These were all loaned by 
the author,
P. Spencer, MA survey of the Samburu and Rendille tribes of
northern Kenya" (1961). Loaned to me by 
the author.
R.G-.Turnbull - The Darod Invasion, n.d. (loaned to me by
Hugh Walker).
P.T.W.Baxter - The social organisation of the G-alla of
Horthern Kenya, D.Phil. Lincoln College, 1955-
T.H.R.Casbmore - Studies in District Administration in the East
Africa Protectorate, Ph.D. Jesus College, 1965-
Dr, Conscritta - L'Asione della Compagnie Filonardi in Somalia
prima della occupasione Italiana, n.d. Rome.
J. De Kiewiet - The Imperial British East Africa Company,
Ph.D. London, 1955-
Y. Luling - The G-alla, M.A. London, 1966.
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IX PUBLISHED MATERIAL
Books. (London is the place of publication unless 
o t her wi s e sho wn.)
Primary Sources.
Arkell-IIardwick, A. - An Ivory Trader in Northern Kenya, 1903*
Austin, H.H. - With Macdonald in Uganda, 1903.
—  Among Swamps and Giants in Equatorial Africa. 1902.
Borelli, J. - Bthiopie Merid.ion.ale: Journal de mon voyage aux
pays Amhara, Qromo et Sidama, 188.5"6 (p ari s, 1890)
Boteler, T. - Narrative of a voyage of discovery to Africa and 
Arabia, 2 Vols., 1835.
Bottego, V. - II Griubo Nsplorato (Rome, 1895).
Bo yes, Join ~ The Company of Adventurers, 1928.
Burton, R.F. - Zanzibar: City, Island and Coast, 2 Vols,, 1872.
0hail1e-Long, 0. - My Life in Pour Continents, 1912.
Chanler, W.A, - Through Jungle and Desert, 189S.
Golomb, P. II. - Slave catching in the-Indian Ocean, 3873-
Balrymple, A. - Nautical Memoirs, 1806.
Barley, E. - Slaves and Ivory, 1926.
Bevereux, ¥.0. - A Cruise In the Gorgon, 1869.
Bonaldson-Smith, A. - Through Unknown African Countries, 1897.
Bracopoli, I.N. - Through Jubaland to the Lorian Swamp, 1914*
Button, E.A.T. - Lillibullero or the Col den Road (Printed. 
Privately: Zanzibar, 1944).
. ____ dizione Bottego; Pugh Emporio
Commerciale sul G-iuba (llome, 1903).*
Fischer, G.A. - Saa Hasailand (Hamburg, 1885).
Eitzgerald, W.W.A. - Travels in British Blast Africa, Zanzibar and 
Pemba, 1898.
Eliot, Sir Charles - The East Africa Protectorate, 1905- 
Gleichen - With the Mission to Menelick, .1897, 1898.
Guillain, M. - Documents sur 11 Histoire, le Geographie et
le Commerce de I ’Afrique Orientale, 3 Vols.
 -
Haywood, C,W. - To the Mysterious Lori an Swamp, 3927.
Hertslet, E. - The Man of Africa by Treaty, 3 Vols. (2nd ed. 
rev. I896 and 3rd ed. 1909J.
Hindi ip, Lord - British East Africa; Past Present and to Come, 
1903.
Hobley, C.W. - Kenya from Chartered Company to Crown Colony, 1929.
Hodson, A.W. - Seven Years in Southern Abyssinia, 1927.
ETohnel, L. von - Discovery of Lakes Rudolf and Stefanie 
(trans. N. BellT", 2 Vols., 1894^
Horsburgh, J. - Directions for sailing to and from, the East 
Indies, China etc., Vol.*”Y^1809T^
Sailing Directions; TheIndia Directory...,
Vol. I (6th ed. £85277 ~
Isenberg and ICrapf - Journals: to which is prefixed a Geo­
graphical Memoir of Abyssinia and South East 
Africa by James McQueen Esq..grounded on the 
Missionaries Journals and the expedition o_f 
the Pacha of Egypt up the Nile, 1843.
Jackson, P.J. - Early days in East Africa, 1930.
ICers ton, 0. ed. - Von der Deckens Reisen in Oat Afr Ik a,
6 Vols. (Leipzig, 18697*.
ICrapf, J.L. - Travels and Missionary Labours in Eastern 
Africa, 18 60.
Le Hoy - D'Aden a Zanzibar (Tours, 1894).
Lloyd-Jones, W. - Havash, 1925.
Neumann, A.H. - Elephant hunting; in* Hast Equatorial Africa,
1898."*"
New, Gharles - Life, Nan derings end Labours in Eastern 
Africa, 1874.
Owen, W.P.N. - Narrative of voyages to explore the shore of 
Africa etc., 2 Vols., 1855.
Powell-Ootton, P.H.G. - In Unknown Africa, 1904*
A sporting, trip through Abyssinia, 1902.
RennelL Hodd, Sir J. - Social and Diplomatic Memoirs 1884-94i, 1922, 
Social and Diplomatic Memoirs 1894-1901, 1925.
Revoil, M.Gr. - Voyages au Cap des Arpmates (Paris. 1880).
Rohecchi Brichetti, L. - Somalia e Benadir (Milan, 1899).
Nel Paese degii Aromi (Milan, 1905).
Ruspoli, E. - Nel Paese della Mirra (Italy, 1892).
Russell, G. E. B. - General Rigby, Zanzibar and the Slave 
Trade, 1955.
Stigand, C.H. - To Abyssinia through an unknown land, 1910.
Suliva^ i, G.L. - Dhow chasing in Zanzibar waters, 1875.
Thomson, J. - Through Masailand, 1887.
Tucker, A.R. - Eighteen years in Uganda and East Africa, 1911.
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Vannutelli, L., and Citerni, C. - La seconda spediglone
Bottegos L'Omo; viaggio nell1 Africa Orientals 
(Milan, "18997. ~
Well by, M.S. - Twixt Sifdar and Men el idle, 1901.
Anderson, N.J.D. - Islamic Law in Africa (H.M.S.O., 1945).
Anene, J.C., and Brown, G. - Africa in the Nineteenth 'and 
Twentieth Centuries (lbaden, 19o6)".
Barber, Janies - Imperial Frontier (hairobi, 1968).
Beech, M.W.H. - The Suk (Oxford, 191l).
Bennett, 0., and Rosberg, C. - The Kenyatta Election;
Kenya 1960-1» \ 19 01.
Budge, E.A.Wallis - A History of Ethiopia. 2 Vols., 1928.
Bulpett, O.W.L. ed. - John Bo.yes King of the Wakikuyu, 1911.
Butler, J, ed. - Boston University Papers on African History,
2 Vols. XBeston,"T964 "aiid”l,"966).
Cani, R. - II Oiubaland (haples, 192l).
Carletti, T. ~ Attraverso il Benadir (Viterbo, 1910).
Gerulli, S. - Etiopia Occidentale, 2 Vols. (Rome, 1933).
Peoples of South-West Ethiopia and its borderland, 1956.
Somalia; scritti vari editi ed inediti, 5 Vols.,
Tfkmie, 19 577".
Ghenevix Trench, G. - The Desert* s Busty Pace, 1964.
Christie, James - Cholera epidemics in East Africa, 1876.
Oolucci, M. - Principi di diritto consuetudinario della Somalia 
Italian a Meridional e (Florence, 192477*""
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Ooupland, R. - The Exploitation of East Africa 1856-1890? 1939-
Crazzolara, J.P. - The hwoo» 3 Vols. (Verona, 1950, 1951? 1954)*
Dainelli, G. ~ Gli Esploratori Italiani in Africa, 2 Vols.
(Turin, 19 6oX!
Drysdale, J. - The Somali Dispute, 1964.
Ferrand, G, - hes Comalis (Paris, 1903).
Fortes, M., and Dieterlan, G. - Africans systems of thought, 1965.
Gregory, J.V. - The foundations of British East Africa, 1901.
Grottanelli, V.L. - Pescatori dell Oceano Xndiano (Rome, 1955)*
Gulliver, P.H. - The Family Herds, 1955.
Haberl and, S, - Gall a Sud Athlonlens (Stuttgart. 1963).
Hardinge, Sir A. - A Diplomatist in the East, 1928.
Harlow, V., and Chilver, E.M., ed. - ~ History of East Africa,
Vol. 2 (Oxford,’ 1965J.
Hess, R.L. 7 Italian Colonialism in Somalia, 1966.
Jensen, A.S. - Heuere Hotizen tiber das Gada System, 2 Vols. 
(Stuttgart, 194l).
Jesmaxi, 0. - Russians in Ethiopia, 1958.
Johnston, Sir H.H. - The opening1 up'of Africa, n.d,
Johnston, K. - Africa? Stanford1 s Compendium- of Geography 
and TravelTl877, 1878 and 1884 3rd ed.). "
Kirkman, James S. - Men and Monuments on the East African 
Coast, 1964.
ICnutsson, IC. S. - Authority and Change: a study of the kallu 
institution among the Macha Gall a of Ethiopia,
110. 29 Etnologiska Studier~T§oteborg,~ 1967j.
Krapf, J.L. - Vocabulary of the Kngutuk or the language ox 
the Hakwafl nation in the interior of 
Equatorial Africa (Tubihgham, 18541
Kroeber, A.L. - Anthropology (Hew York, 1948).
Lewis, I.M. - Peoples of the Horn of Africa, 1955.
A Pastoral Democracy ( 0 xf o r d, 1961) .
The Modern History of Som^iljmd. 1965.
Lewis, I.M. ed. - Islam in Tropical Africa (Oxford, 1966).
Lindblom, 0. - The Akamba in British East Africa (Uppsala, 1916).
Lloyd-Jones, ¥. - K.A.R. , 1926,
McDermott, P.L. - British East Africa or IBS A. 1895.
Magnus, Philip - Kitchener; Portrait of an Imperialist. 1958. 
Merlcer, M, ~ Die Masai (Berlin, 1910).
Middleton, John, and Tail, David - Tribes without Rulers. 1958.
Moreno, M.m . „ l3:itrpdujh_one_j^  (Milan, 1938).
Moyse-Bartlett, H. - The IC.A.R.> a study in the Military
History 0f East and Central Africa 1890-1945 
(Aldershot, 19~56)7~
Mungeam, G.M. - British Rule in Kenya 1895-1912 (Oxfords 1966).
Murdock, O.P. - Africa its peoples and their culture history 
(Hew York, 1959)7"
Hal dor, L.P. ed. - A tribal survey of Hong all a Province. 1937.
Oliver, R,, and Page, J.D. - A Short History of Africa, 1962.
Oliver, E., and Mathew, G., ed. - History of East Africa,
Vol. I (Oxford, 196377"
Posnansky, M., ed. - Prelude to East African History, 1966.
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Priiis, A,II.J. “ Bast African Age-class systems, 1953.
Sailing from Lamu; a study in Maritime •culture 
in Islamic Bast Africa (Assen, 19657.
Puccioni, N. - Giuba e Pit re Giuba (Florence, 1937).
Le populazioni indigene della Somalia Italiana 
"(bologna, 1927).
Reclus, R. - Wouvelle Seographie Universelle (Paris, 1888).
Reece, A. - To my wife fifty camels, 1963.
Robinson, R., and Gallagher, J. - Africa and the Victorians, 1965.
Rossetto, Y. - Heinoria sul Basso Giuba (Rome, n. d.).
Spencer, P. - The Samburu, 1965.
Stephan ini, G. - In Somalia note e impression! di viaggio 
(Florence, 1922).
Stigand, C.H. - Administration in Tropical Africa, 1914.
Stokes, E., ed. - The Zambesian Past (Manchester, 1966).
Triminghan, J.S. - Islam in Ethiopia, 1952,
Islam in Bast Africa (Oxford, 1964).
Tucker, A.N., and Bryan, M.A. - Ron Bantu Languages of 
north-eastern Africa, 1955.
T3RBSC0 - Horn ad es et Nomadisme au Sahara, Yol. 19 of
Recherches sur la Zone Aride (Paris, 1965).
The Problems of the Arid Zone: Proceedings of
the Paris Symposium (Paris', 19627.
Wakefield, E,S. - Thomas Wakefield: Missionary and Geographical 
Pioneer in East'Equatorial Africa, 1904.
Zavattari, B. - Missione Biologia nel Paese dei Bprana. Re ale. 
Academia d'Italia. Centro studi per 1* Africa 
Orientals Italiana No. 4 (Rome, 194O).
B. Articles and Pamphlets.
1• Primary Sources.
d’Abbadie, A. -"List© des noms de lieux situes sur la partie 
de la cOte Africaine habitee principal ©men t 
par les tribus des Somalis", B.S.G.P.,,, XI,
2nd. series (1839).
—  "Renseignments sur la geographie ethiopienne",
B.S.G.P., XU, 2nd series (1839).
—  "Lettre... sur le voyage du R.P.Leon des
Avanchers sur la c6te de Zanzibar", B.S.G.P.,
XVI, 4th series (1858).
"Lettre a M. le President de la Soc.", B.S.G.P., 
II, 5th series (l86l).
"Sur les Oromo, Annales de la Soc. Scientifique 
de Bruxelles", 4i©me annee (l880),
Angelvy, G. - "La cOte orientale d’Afrique", Bull, de la Soc.
de Geographic Commercial© de Bordeaux, 17ieme 
annee, 2nd series (1894X7"
Austin, H.H. - "Lake Rudolf", G.J., XIV, no. 2 (1899).
"A Journey from Omdurman to Mombasa via Lake 
Rudolf", G.J. ,XIX, no. 6 (1902).
"A glimpse of Western Abyssinia", J.R.A.S., 
XOTII (1938).
Avanchers, R.P. Leon des - "Esquisse geographique du pays
Oromo ou Galla, du pays. Soomali et de la c6te 
orientale d’Afrique (Extrait d'une lettre du 
R.P.Leon des Avanchers mission aire apostolique 
a M. Antoine d’Abbadie)", B.S.G.P,, VIII,
4th series (1859).
"Extrait d’une lettre... a M. d’Abbadie", 
B.S.G.P* , HI, 5th series (.1863) .
"Lettre.. . a M. d'Abbadie'j XII,
5th series (1856).
"Extrait d’une lettre a M. d’Abbadie", B.S.G.P.
XVII, 5th s eri e s (18 69).
d'Avezac - "Essai sur la geographie de pays de Scoumal", 
B.S.G.P., XVII, 2nd. series (182-2).
Aylmer, L. - "The country between the Juba river and Lake 
Rudolf", fi.J., XXXVII (l91l).
Barker, Lieut. - "On Eastern Africa", J.R.G.S., XVIII (lS4S).
Biasulti, R, - "Pastori, agricoltori e cacciatori nell Africa 
orientals interna, a mez-zogiorno dell Etiopia" 
B.S.G.I., VI (1905).
Bird, James - "Commercial aid Geographical view of Eastern 
Africa", T.B.G.S.t III (1839).
Bozas, Bourg de - "L*Addis Ababa au Nil par le Lac RudolpheJ1 
La Geographie, VII (l90p).
"Mission du Bourg de Bozas" La Geographie,
v (1902).
Brenner, R. - "Porschungen in Ost Afrilca", P.M. (1868).
Brooke, J.W. - "A journey north and west of lake Rudolf",
G.J. XXV, no. 5 (1905).
Broun, W.H. - "A Journey to the Lorian Swamp, British East 
Africa", G.J.. XXVII (1906).
Bulatovich, A.K, - "Is Abissinii cherez stranu Kaffa no ozero 
Rudolf a,’ Izvestiya Imperatorskavo Russkovo 
Geograf icheskovo Obshchestva, XXXV (l699).
"Ball Abyssinia a1 Lago Rudolfo per il Caff a", 
B.S.G.I., I, 4th series (19OO),
Camperio, M. - "II Commercio della costa dei Somali", B.S.G.I 
I, 2nd series (1876).
Cavendish, H.S.H. - "Through Somaliland and around and south 
of Lake Rudolf", G.J.t XI no. 4 (1898),
Cecchi, A,0. - "A1 Giuba", Nuova Antologia, XLII (Becember, 1
Christopher, W. - “Extracts from a Journal kept during’ a
partial enquiry into the present resources and 
state of North East Africa, with Memoranda". 
T.B.G.S., VI (1844) or J.R.G.S., XIV (1844).
Craufurd, Clifford Ii. - "Journeys in Gosha and beyond the 
Deshek Wama", G.J.. IX, no. 1 (1897).
Cruttenden, G.J. - "On Eastern Africa", J.R.G.S., XVIII (1848).
Darragon - "Voyage1,1 Oomptes Rendus des Seances de la Soc. 
de Geographie de Paris (l89§T-
Denhardt, G, - "Bemerkungen zur Originallcarte des unteren 
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